Death, sex and the Cylon - College of Liberal Arts
Death, sex and the Cylon - College of Liberal Arts
Death, sex and the Cylon - College of Liberal Arts
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
Living au<strong>the</strong>ntically on Battlestar Galactica<br />
Lewis Call<br />
The second half <strong>of</strong> Battlestar Galactica’s four-season narrative arc constitutes an extended,<br />
energetic <strong>and</strong> effective commentary on <strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> death initiated by Martin Heidegger’s<br />
Being <strong>and</strong> Time. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s demonstrate <strong>the</strong> crucial links between death, <strong>sex</strong>uality <strong>and</strong><br />
reproduction. At first, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s are infinitely downloadable <strong>and</strong> thus effectively immortal.<br />
D’Anna pursues a radical experiment in being-towards-death, deliberately <strong>and</strong> repeatedly<br />
‘killing’ herself in a perpetual quest to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> being. For her, death has<br />
<strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> a <strong>sex</strong>ual fetish. Season four concerns <strong>the</strong> quest by certain individual <strong>Cylon</strong>s to<br />
overcome <strong>Cylon</strong> immortality, <strong>the</strong> fulfilment <strong>of</strong> which permits some <strong>Cylon</strong>s to attain what<br />
Heidegger calls an au<strong>the</strong>ntic being-towards-death. The end <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> immortality radically<br />
foregrounds <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>sex</strong>uality <strong>and</strong> biology. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s become obsessed with<br />
discourses <strong>of</strong> reproduction <strong>and</strong> racial purity, but <strong>the</strong>ir story ends with a radical endorsement<br />
<strong>of</strong> difference. The child Hera, a human–<strong>Cylon</strong> hybrid whose parents are played by multi-ethnic<br />
actors, becomes <strong>the</strong> ancestral mo<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> humanity. The show thus concludes by rejecting<br />
decisively both <strong>the</strong> old fears <strong>of</strong> racial miscegenation, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> newer fears <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> techno-organic<br />
cyborg. BSG argues for a future <strong>of</strong> hybridity in which species merge, nations intersect <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
biological <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> cybernetic come toge<strong>the</strong>r, leading us to a place where death establishes <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> meaning, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> love <strong>of</strong> bodies permits <strong>the</strong> fulfilment <strong>of</strong> that meaning.<br />
An immortal person is a contradiction in terms.<br />
– Emmanuel Levinas, God, <strong>Death</strong> <strong>and</strong> Time<br />
The re-imagined Battlestar Galactica (2003–9) is a remarkably philosophical<br />
creature. Strange as it may seem, <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> BSG’s four-season narrative<br />
arc constitutes an extended, energetic <strong>and</strong> effective commentary on one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
twentieth century’s most important philosophies <strong>of</strong> death. This philosophy was<br />
initiated by <strong>the</strong> chapter on death in Martin Heidegger’s 1927 masterpiece Being<br />
<strong>and</strong> Time. The subject <strong>of</strong> this chapter is, by Heideggerian st<strong>and</strong>ards, relatively<br />
straightforward, <strong>and</strong> is largely expressed in <strong>the</strong> chapter’s title: ‘Dasein’s Possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> Being-a-whole, <strong>and</strong> Being-towards-death’. As I argue below, <strong>the</strong>se also<br />
become <strong>the</strong> fundamental concerns <strong>of</strong> BSG’s cybernetic organisms, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s.<br />
Heidegger argues that Dasein (‘being-<strong>the</strong>re’, his term for a person) is defined<br />
by <strong>the</strong> way in which it comports itself towards death, its being-towards-death.<br />
He speaks <strong>of</strong> an attitude which truly recognises death as <strong>the</strong> ultimate limit <strong>of</strong><br />
Dasein’s possibilities, an attitude that derives meaning from that limitation.<br />
Heidegger dubs this attitude ‘au<strong>the</strong>ntic’, <strong>and</strong> seems to endorse it. So <strong>the</strong> chapter<br />
Science Fiction Film <strong>and</strong> Television 5.1 (2012), 85–113 ISSN 1754-3770 (print) 1754-3789 (online)<br />
© Liverpool University Press doi:10.3828/sfftv.2012.5
86 Lewis Call<br />
on death appears to be an existential cry for us to embrace our finitude. But as<br />
we shall see, everything depends on <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> ‘death’.<br />
The <strong>Cylon</strong>s provide a well thought-out example <strong>of</strong> embodied artificial intelligence.<br />
This machine species provides us with an intriguing ontological ‘test bed’,<br />
a place where experiments about being can take place. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s model <strong>the</strong><br />
concerns <strong>of</strong> Heidegger’s Dasein in interesting ways, <strong>and</strong> reflect those concerns<br />
onto an audience <strong>of</strong> organic real-world humans. There are 12 models <strong>of</strong> humanoid<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>s. There are also at least three distinct types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> identity; this<br />
is important, because only one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se types has <strong>the</strong> potential to experience<br />
(<strong>and</strong> thus comment upon) being-towards-death. First, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
machine species as a collective whole. 1 Second, <strong>the</strong>re are <strong>the</strong> 12 distinct models,<br />
each with its own specific characteristics. A reliably essentialist Number One<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong> (Dean Stockwell) observes in ‘Six <strong>of</strong> One’ (11 April 2008) that ‘millions<br />
<strong>of</strong> Twos have that nose. Millions <strong>of</strong> Sixes possess that mouth. Eights share those<br />
breasts, <strong>and</strong> Ones have this brain. We’re mechanised copies.’ 2 Third, <strong>and</strong> most<br />
importantly for our purposes, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> individual <strong>Cylon</strong>: a consciousness<br />
<strong>and</strong> a set <strong>of</strong> experiences which exists across a sequence <strong>of</strong> identical bodies. The<br />
individual <strong>Cylon</strong> turns out to be a good deal more than a mere mechanised copy<br />
<strong>of</strong> its siblings. This <strong>Cylon</strong> comes to resemble Heidegger’s Dasein quite closely;<br />
indeed, <strong>the</strong> individual <strong>Cylon</strong> may even have <strong>the</strong> potential to attain Heideggerian<br />
au<strong>the</strong>nticity. But when BSG’s narrative begins, this is a fairly remote possibility,<br />
for individual <strong>Cylon</strong>s are almost immortal. Provided with an endless series <strong>of</strong><br />
replacement bodies into which <strong>the</strong>y may download upon ‘death’, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>Cylon</strong>s<br />
are infinite <strong>and</strong> limitless. The narrative arc <strong>of</strong> seasons three <strong>and</strong> four concerns<br />
<strong>the</strong> quest by certain individual <strong>Cylon</strong>s to overcome <strong>Cylon</strong> immortality.<br />
The story <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s is <strong>the</strong> story <strong>of</strong> Dasein’s journey towards a resolute<br />
existence, <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> existence that can only be attained through an au<strong>the</strong>ntic<br />
being-towards-death. BSG tells this story in <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> sf, ra<strong>the</strong>r than that<br />
<strong>of</strong> Being <strong>and</strong> Time, but <strong>the</strong> story is <strong>the</strong> same: all <strong>of</strong> this has happened before,<br />
<strong>and</strong> all <strong>of</strong> it will happen again. The attainment <strong>of</strong> mortality makes au<strong>the</strong>nticity<br />
possible for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s. This dramatic event also foregrounds issues <strong>of</strong> <strong>sex</strong>uality<br />
<strong>and</strong> reproduction, as <strong>the</strong> usually sterile <strong>Cylon</strong>s struggle to survive in a world<br />
1. The <strong>Cylon</strong> are a diverse race. In addition to <strong>the</strong> humanoid models, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> also includes ‘lower’<br />
forms such as <strong>the</strong> robotic Centurions <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> semi-sentient living spacecraft known as Raiders. The<br />
Hybrids represent a ‘higher’ form: <strong>the</strong>se hyperintelligent beings are <strong>the</strong> brains <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> baseships,<br />
<strong>and</strong> at least one humanoid <strong>Cylon</strong> model (<strong>the</strong> Twos) consider <strong>the</strong> inscrutable, non-linear chaos <strong>of</strong><br />
Hybrid speech to be <strong>the</strong> literal word <strong>of</strong> God.<br />
2. Most dialogue quotations are drawn from Sadgeezer transcripts, available at www.twiztv.com/<br />
scripts/battlestar/. I have made a few minor corrections. Dialogue quotations from <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong><br />
season four are my own.
‘Downloaded’, Battlestar Galactica. Universal Studios Home Entertainment.<br />
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 87<br />
where <strong>the</strong>y must die. As BSG meditates on bodies, it first connects death with<br />
<strong>sex</strong>. It <strong>the</strong>n connects <strong>sex</strong> with life, <strong>and</strong> it does so in a way which endorses evolutionary<br />
biology while soundly rejecting <strong>the</strong> eugenic <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>and</strong> fears <strong>of</strong> racial<br />
miscegenation which sometimes haunt that paradigm.<br />
Of course, nei<strong>the</strong>r Heidegger nor <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s were <strong>the</strong> first to note <strong>the</strong> connection<br />
between <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death. In 1920, seven years before Being <strong>and</strong> Time,<br />
Sigmund Freud had already gone Beyond <strong>the</strong> Pleasure Principle to introduce<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> death drive. Freud immediately recognised that <strong>the</strong> death<br />
drive might be connected to <strong>the</strong> <strong>sex</strong>ual instinct in a very intimate way. Indeed,<br />
he gave sadism as his first clear example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> death instinct, <strong>and</strong> used it to<br />
explain ‘<strong>the</strong> familiar ambivalence <strong>of</strong> love <strong>and</strong> hate in erotic life’ (Beyond 65). In<br />
Civilization <strong>and</strong> Its Discontents (1929), Freud continued to hold up sadism <strong>and</strong><br />
masochism as examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘strong alloy’ or ‘union’ that could form between<br />
love <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> destructive instinct (78). 3 But by <strong>the</strong>n, with <strong>the</strong> shadow <strong>of</strong> fascism<br />
spreading across Europe, Freud had bigger problems. Thus his mature position<br />
held that <strong>the</strong> death instinct <strong>and</strong> its ‘main representative’, <strong>the</strong> aggressive instinct,<br />
shared ‘world-dominion’ with <strong>the</strong> erotic instinct (82). This allowed Freud to<br />
claim, boldly, that he had uncovered ‘<strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> civilization’:<br />
‘<strong>the</strong> struggle between Eros <strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong>, between <strong>the</strong> instinct <strong>of</strong> life <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
instinct <strong>of</strong> destruction’ (82).<br />
3. By 1943, Sartre’s Being <strong>and</strong> Nothingness would identify love <strong>and</strong> hate, along with sadism <strong>and</strong> masochism,<br />
as basic modes <strong>of</strong> being-for-o<strong>the</strong>rs (see part two, chapter three). This suggests that <strong>the</strong>se concerns<br />
are not unique to psychoanalysis, but are also vital to <strong>the</strong> existential analytic.
88 Lewis Call<br />
The Freudian analysis is brilliant but ultimately too limited. The problem<br />
is that Freud underestimated <strong>the</strong> magnetic attraction between <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death.<br />
He continued to view <strong>the</strong> union between <strong>the</strong>m as exceptional (e.g. sadomasochism),<br />
<strong>and</strong> so tended to idealise <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> Eros. Freud attributed to Eros<br />
an implausible purity, making her into a virtuous maiden who would bravely<br />
defend herself in <strong>the</strong> eternal struggle against <strong>Death</strong>. Thus for Freud, ‘civilization<br />
is a process in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human<br />
individuals, <strong>and</strong> after that families, <strong>the</strong>n races, peoples <strong>and</strong> nations, into one<br />
great unity, <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> mankind’ (Civilization 81). Freud presented <strong>the</strong>se processes<br />
<strong>of</strong> racial expansion <strong>and</strong> nation-building in a pr<strong>of</strong>oundly positive light,<br />
but he could only do that by assuming that Eros was perpetually opposed to <strong>the</strong><br />
death instinct. In fact, <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> races, peoples <strong>and</strong> nations has frequently<br />
entailed violence, conquest <strong>and</strong> colonisation.<br />
The existential analytic allows us to see what Freud could not. By analysing<br />
<strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> Dasein’s Being, including being-towards-death <strong>and</strong> being-foro<strong>the</strong>rs,<br />
we discover that <strong>the</strong>re is a deep, basic connection between death <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>sex</strong>. Freud found this connection mainly in sadomasochism; perhaps that is<br />
why he viewed sadism <strong>and</strong> masochism as ‘<strong>the</strong> most common <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> most significant<br />
<strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> perversions’ (Three Essays 23). For Freud, <strong>the</strong> perversions were<br />
pathologies to be treated by psychoanalysts. But <strong>the</strong> things that Freud diagnosed<br />
as perversions are now tolerated <strong>and</strong> even celebrated as ‘kinks’ in many<br />
alternative <strong>sex</strong>ual communities. Indeed, sadomasochism might be even more<br />
common <strong>and</strong> more significant than Freud imagined, since it may point to a<br />
fundamental aspect <strong>of</strong> our existence, a basic link between <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death. Such<br />
a link would be found at <strong>the</strong> ontological ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> psychological level.<br />
This link would thus exceed psychoanalysis’s interpretive powers: an existential<br />
analysis is indicated.<br />
Such an analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>sex</strong>-death connection can provide us with a fundamental<br />
ontology <strong>of</strong> kink. This ontology suggests that those who dwell in <strong>the</strong><br />
world are, in a way, always already kinky. It suggests that <strong>the</strong>re is something<br />
kinky right at <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> our being. On this reading, Freud’s perverts (<strong>and</strong><br />
today’s kinksters) may be closer to <strong>the</strong> place where <strong>sex</strong> meets death than o<strong>the</strong>rs,<br />
but <strong>the</strong>y are by no means alone. The fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> kink suggests<br />
that we all live near <strong>the</strong> intersection <strong>of</strong> death <strong>and</strong> <strong>sex</strong>. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it suggests<br />
that this is no bad place to live. While Freud feared <strong>the</strong> perversions for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
ability to link <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death, fundamental ontology suggests that kinks are to<br />
be admired for <strong>the</strong>ir honest recognition <strong>of</strong> that link. The fundamental ontology<br />
<strong>of</strong> kink valorises those ways <strong>of</strong> being which refuse to hide from <strong>the</strong> <strong>sex</strong>/death<br />
connection. This ontology, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ways <strong>of</strong> being it endorses, point to a system
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 89<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>sex</strong>ual ethics based on <strong>the</strong> consent <strong>of</strong> minds <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> desire <strong>of</strong> bodies. Such a<br />
system, already widely used by kinksters, could be useful even to those outside<br />
such erotic minority communities. If <strong>the</strong>re is indeed a reciprocal link between<br />
<strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death, <strong>the</strong>n surely all humans <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s st<strong>and</strong> to benefit from an open,<br />
honest engagement with that link.<br />
Sf may be <strong>the</strong> best place to explore <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> kink. I have<br />
argued elsewhere, for example, that <strong>the</strong> stories <strong>of</strong> James Tiptree, Jr effectively<br />
examine <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>sex</strong>-death equation’, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>se stories articulate an ethical philosophy<br />
which accounts for that equation. Tiptree’s stories recognise erotic love<br />
<strong>and</strong> death as <strong>the</strong> ‘major components <strong>of</strong> our biological <strong>and</strong> ontological condition’<br />
(Call 71), dramatically foregrounding <strong>the</strong> ethical choices we make within that<br />
condition. BSG articulates a similar existential ethics, revealing – like Tiptree’s<br />
stories – that our being-in-<strong>the</strong>-world is structured by both death <strong>and</strong> <strong>sex</strong>. From<br />
this basic existential situation, BSG deduces an ethical framework which accepts<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>sex</strong>-death equation’, yet refuses to take that equation as grounds for despair.<br />
Instead, BSG uses <strong>sex</strong>-death in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> an existential revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> psychoanalytic<br />
narrative. The show’s conclusion allows us to imagine that it takes<br />
<strong>Death</strong> <strong>and</strong> Eros, working in t<strong>and</strong>em, to build <strong>the</strong> ‘great unity <strong>of</strong> mankind’. The<br />
thought that <strong>Death</strong> might be Eros’s partner now starts to look like a repressed<br />
memory or desire. The racism, misogyny <strong>and</strong> fears <strong>of</strong> O<strong>the</strong>rness which have<br />
haunted many attempts to build races, peoples <strong>and</strong> nations into that great unity<br />
now start to look like <strong>the</strong> neurotic symptoms <strong>of</strong> that repression. The Oedipal<br />
sadism <strong>of</strong> John, <strong>the</strong> original Number One, can easily be read in this light. John<br />
flees from death. He insists that <strong>Cylon</strong>s must always continue to download into<br />
new bodies. He struggles to build a civilisation, while denying <strong>the</strong> death that<br />
must always be part <strong>of</strong> such a project. That which was repressed returns as terror<br />
<strong>and</strong> civil war. But existential analysis lets us conceive <strong>of</strong> a more open, more honest<br />
unity, one which engages <strong>Death</strong> instead <strong>of</strong> repressing it. This analysis allows<br />
us to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death in ethical terms.<br />
The <strong>Cylon</strong>s eventually establish a viable system <strong>of</strong> <strong>sex</strong>ual ethics, one that<br />
embraces death while endorsing love as <strong>the</strong> foundation <strong>of</strong> ethical <strong>sex</strong>ual relations.<br />
This ethical system rejects all essentialisms, including those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> racial<br />
<strong>and</strong> humanist types. BSG sanctions unions between many varieties <strong>of</strong> humans,<br />
but also between human <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s have always occupied <strong>the</strong> intersection<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> death, ever since a Six dressed in red (Tricia Helfer) gave<br />
<strong>the</strong> Colonial diplomatic <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>the</strong> kiss <strong>of</strong> death at <strong>the</strong> very beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
show. But things change once <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s <strong>the</strong>mselves can die. The possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Cylon</strong> death makes possible <strong>the</strong> affirmation <strong>of</strong> new life. A sufficiently powerful<br />
affirmation <strong>of</strong> this type could create an entire new world, as scholars such as
90 Lewis Call<br />
Battlestar Galactica miniseries. Universal Studios Home Entertainment.<br />
Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. This is precisely what happens at <strong>the</strong> show’s<br />
end. At <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> BSG’s narrative, death even produces a strange new<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> immortality. Indeed, BSG suggests that a viable immortality can only be<br />
attained by embracing <strong>the</strong> inevitable connections between death <strong>and</strong> <strong>sex</strong>. This<br />
is a philosophy for all beings, human or <strong>Cylon</strong>. It <strong>of</strong>fers options <strong>and</strong> possibilities<br />
for us, <strong>the</strong> real-world audience, just as it did for <strong>the</strong> humans <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s who<br />
were, according to <strong>the</strong> show’s mythology, our distant ancestors.<br />
Finitude <strong>and</strong> freedom: Heidegger’s analysis <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> new Dreyfusards<br />
The analysis <strong>of</strong> death in Heidegger’s Being <strong>and</strong> Time is important but incomplete.<br />
Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s existence is structured by <strong>the</strong> finitude<br />
which death guarantees, but <strong>the</strong> ambiguous status <strong>of</strong> death in Heidegger’s work<br />
makes it difficult to see that structure. In <strong>the</strong> late twentieth century, an influential<br />
circle <strong>of</strong> philosophers around Hubert Dreyfus interpreted Heideggerian<br />
death as ‘world collapse’. For <strong>the</strong>se philosophers, death might mean <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong><br />
whole cultures, worlds <strong>and</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> being. But this is not necessarily cause for<br />
despair. As Nietzsche observed, one must tear down a temple in order to build<br />
one; similarly, <strong>the</strong> collapse <strong>of</strong> old worlds could lead to <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> new ones.<br />
Those new worlds appear to <strong>of</strong>fer some striking possibilities. Among <strong>the</strong>se is<br />
<strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong> endless, infinite project <strong>of</strong> confronting death might lead<br />
to a strange new kind <strong>of</strong> immortality.
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 91<br />
Heidegger’s original formulation <strong>of</strong> being-towards-death describes two basic<br />
attitudes towards death. There is <strong>the</strong> inau<strong>the</strong>ntic attitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> They (das Man,<br />
‘<strong>the</strong> Anyone’ in some English translations). The They is Heidegger’s term for<br />
everyday society with its idle talk (‘I heard that somebody died’, ‘Well, we all<br />
have to die sometime’, <strong>and</strong> so on). ‘In such a way <strong>of</strong> talking, death is understood<br />
as an indefinite something’ which presents no threat (297). But Dasein can also<br />
approach death au<strong>the</strong>ntically, recognising death as ‘<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impossibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> any existence at all’ (307), <strong>the</strong> ultimate limit <strong>of</strong> Dasein’s existence <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>refore <strong>of</strong> all its projects. Heidegger argues that Dasein ‘is au<strong>the</strong>ntically itself<br />
only to <strong>the</strong> extent that . . . it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-<br />
Being ra<strong>the</strong>r than upon <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>y-self ’ (308). Here Heidegger<br />
seems to be providing us with a recipe for an au<strong>the</strong>ntic existence, one which<br />
requires us to confront death boldly <strong>and</strong> honestly, ra<strong>the</strong>r than fleeing from death<br />
into <strong>the</strong> idle chatter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> They. Heidegger concludes his chapter on death with<br />
a courageous call for ‘an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which<br />
has been released from <strong>the</strong> Illusions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y”, <strong>and</strong> which is factical, certain<br />
<strong>of</strong> itself, <strong>and</strong> anxious’ (311). It would seem that for Heidegger, perfect existential<br />
freedom is to be found in this au<strong>the</strong>ntic attitude towards death, this absolute<br />
knowledge that one’s existence is finite.<br />
Dreyfus points out that if Dasein truly accepts death, <strong>the</strong>n ‘<strong>the</strong> same structure<br />
that seemed to threaten all its secure projects <strong>and</strong> its very identity would<br />
be seen to be challenging <strong>and</strong> liberating’ (Being-in-<strong>the</strong>-World 317). This suggests<br />
that Heidegger’s thought <strong>of</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic being-towards-death is what is known in<br />
some quarters as a performative thought, <strong>and</strong> in o<strong>the</strong>rs as a Jedi mind trick: it<br />
is a thought that makes something happen. Specifically, it makes possible a new<br />
mode <strong>of</strong> being. Heidegger’s term for this state <strong>of</strong> being is ‘resoluteness’, which<br />
‘signifies letting oneself be summoned out <strong>of</strong> one’s lostness in <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y”’ (345).<br />
So resoluteness is an openness to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> au<strong>the</strong>nticity, ra<strong>the</strong>r than an<br />
active choice. Strangely, this seems to imply a kind <strong>of</strong> existential pragmatism.<br />
Heidegger’s analysis suggests that it is pointless to pursue au<strong>the</strong>nticity, but we<br />
may anticipate <strong>the</strong> moment when it will become a possibility for us.<br />
But should we anticipate that moment? This is surprisingly unclear in Heidegger’s<br />
original philosophy, since Heidegger is careful to avoid making normative<br />
claims about <strong>the</strong> phenomena he analyses. Havi Carel observes that<br />
Heidegger actually can’t make such claims, since he believes that <strong>the</strong> call to<br />
au<strong>the</strong>nticity cannot be brought about deliberately (Life <strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong> 103). Yet it<br />
is clear that Heidegger finds au<strong>the</strong>nticity to be an interesting <strong>and</strong> important<br />
alternative to <strong>the</strong> inau<strong>the</strong>ntic. Bruce Baugh suggests that for Heidegger, au<strong>the</strong>ntic<br />
death ‘both has a meaning <strong>and</strong> is a source <strong>of</strong> meaning: <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> time
92 Lewis Call<br />
<strong>and</strong> being’ (74). And <strong>the</strong>re are signs in Heidegger’s philosophy that signal his<br />
endorsement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic. For example, au<strong>the</strong>nticity seems to be <strong>the</strong> hallmark<br />
<strong>of</strong> a more mature Dasein; Carel notes that Heidegger always discusses <strong>the</strong><br />
transition from inau<strong>the</strong>nticity to au<strong>the</strong>nticity, never <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way around (Life<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong> 103).<br />
It is also crucial to have a clear underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> this ‘death’ towards which<br />
Dasein comports itself. For many years, critics like Sartre interpreted Heidegger’s<br />
‘death’ as <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> an individual Dasein. Sartre believed that one<br />
could expect ‘a particular death but not death’ (683). Recent criticism strongly<br />
suggests, however, that Heidegger is indeed asking us to expect death, if we<br />
underst<strong>and</strong> ‘death’ as <strong>the</strong> ultimate end <strong>of</strong> all projects <strong>and</strong> possibilities. Commentators<br />
now tend to read Heidegger’s ‘death’ as <strong>the</strong> limit which establishes<br />
<strong>the</strong> horizons <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> meaning in our existence. This new<br />
interpretation suggests that <strong>the</strong> defining features <strong>of</strong> Dasein are its finitude <strong>and</strong><br />
its awareness <strong>of</strong> that finitude. Dreyfus identifies <strong>the</strong> quest for a proper underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
<strong>of</strong> finitude as <strong>the</strong> basic motivation which underlies Heidegger’s entire<br />
philosophical project. He writes, ‘Heidegger is trying again <strong>and</strong> again to find<br />
<strong>the</strong> right way to describe <strong>the</strong> basic structure <strong>of</strong> finitude that makes possible our<br />
access to <strong>the</strong> world <strong>and</strong> to everything in it’ (‘Foreword’ ix). For Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> his<br />
followers, Heidegger must be talking about something much more radical than<br />
an awareness <strong>of</strong> our own personal mortality. On this view, Heidegger seems to<br />
be saying that existence itself is finite, <strong>and</strong> must be so, if it is to have any meaning<br />
for us.<br />
In a strongly worded passage from Being <strong>and</strong> Time, Heidegger defines death<br />
as ‘<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong> any existence at all . . . It is <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong> every way <strong>of</strong> comporting oneself towards anything,<br />
<strong>of</strong> every way <strong>of</strong> existing’ (307). Clearly, ‘<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong><br />
any existence at all’ means something much more than <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> an individual<br />
life. Heidegger seems to be talking about <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world here. And<br />
indeed, that is how members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dreyfus circle have been reading him. In<br />
Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong>, Carol J. White advances a radical but highly influential interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Heidegger’s concept <strong>of</strong> death. She argues that ‘Heidegger is talking<br />
about <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> existential death. It occurs when old worlds die <strong>and</strong> new<br />
ones are born’ (89). Although White’s original interpretation is uniquely hers,<br />
its influence has no doubt been enhanced by <strong>the</strong> endorsement it has received<br />
from Dreyfus. For White <strong>and</strong> Dreyfus, ‘<strong>Death</strong> is equated with <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> worldcollapse<br />
that can befall a cultural epoch’ (Dreyfus ‘Foreword’ xxxi). This is death<br />
at its most serious <strong>and</strong> sobering: it is a statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> finitude <strong>of</strong> all human<br />
projects, an awareness that all human worlds (even entire cultures) have limits
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 93<br />
<strong>and</strong> endings. It is no easy thing to stare into <strong>the</strong> abyss <strong>of</strong> this death without<br />
blinking, <strong>and</strong> yet <strong>the</strong> White/Dreyfus reading suggests that this is <strong>the</strong> project<br />
<strong>of</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic Dasein. So let us call Dreyfus, White <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir followers <strong>the</strong> New<br />
Dreyfusards. Like <strong>the</strong> original Dreyfusards, <strong>the</strong>y champion an unpopular cause,<br />
because <strong>the</strong>y hope that by doing so <strong>the</strong>y can initiate a new world.<br />
The New Dreyfusards bring us a truly terrifying project, but fortunately this<br />
project <strong>of</strong>fers an immense pay<strong>of</strong>f. For <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusards, au<strong>the</strong>ntic being-towardsdeath<br />
anticipates a radical world-collapse, which in turn will enable an equally<br />
radical world-creation. White resorts to uncharacteristically poetic language to<br />
describe <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> this event: ‘Au<strong>the</strong>ntic Dasein is <strong>the</strong> one who reaches<br />
into <strong>the</strong> depths <strong>of</strong> this well to find <strong>the</strong> new star, a new way <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
<strong>the</strong> being <strong>of</strong> what-is, that becomes <strong>the</strong> culture’s new focal point as it navigates<br />
<strong>the</strong> twilight between its old world <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> new way <strong>of</strong> disclosing its world that<br />
glimmers on <strong>the</strong> horizon’ (75). All this talk <strong>of</strong> new stars <strong>and</strong> horizons evokes<br />
Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, <strong>and</strong> indeed, when Zarathustra dreamed <strong>of</strong><br />
weighing <strong>the</strong> world, what he loved about <strong>the</strong> world was its finitude: ‘How surely<br />
my dream looked upon this finite world, not inquisitively, not acquisitively, not<br />
afraid, not begging, as if a full apple <strong>of</strong>fered itself to my h<strong>and</strong>, a ripe golden apple<br />
with cool, s<strong>of</strong>t, velvet skin, thus <strong>the</strong> world <strong>of</strong>fered itself to me’ (187). For Nietzsche,<br />
as for <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusards, finitude was a great gift, not something to regret.<br />
The Dreyfusard position has many virtues, not least <strong>of</strong> which is that it lets<br />
us underst<strong>and</strong> how death might actually be ‘<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impossibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> any existence at all’. As <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard William Blattner persuasively argues,<br />
‘<strong>the</strong> term “death” in Being <strong>and</strong> Time does not refer to an event that takes place at<br />
<strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> every human being’s life. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it is <strong>the</strong> name for a certain condition<br />
in which Dasein can find itself, viz., <strong>the</strong> condition <strong>of</strong> not being able to be anyone’<br />
(67–8). This is <strong>the</strong> condition which results from <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> cultural worldcollapse<br />
that Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> White have described. Blattner shows that Heidegger<br />
borrowed from Karl Jaspers <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘limit situation’, that is, ‘<strong>the</strong> idea<br />
that one can define <strong>and</strong> delimit <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> human existence by describing<br />
its limits’ (Blattner 66). Blattner argues compellingly that, for Heidegger,<br />
death is important mainly as a ‘limit-situation that defines <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> Dasein’s<br />
ability-to-be . . . The condition Heidegger calls “death” is a limit-situation for<br />
that ability-to-be, one in which one confronts this limitation’ (67). Following<br />
Blattner, Carel suggests that ‘death is not non-existence but existence without<br />
<strong>the</strong> ability to press into any specific possibility. This explains Heidegger’s seemingly<br />
baffling definition <strong>of</strong> death as “<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> impossibility”’ (‘Temporal<br />
Finitude’ 549). So <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard interpretation solves a significant interpretive<br />
problem regarding <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> ‘death’ in Being <strong>and</strong> Time.
94 Lewis Call<br />
The Dreyfusard view also gives us <strong>the</strong> important (<strong>and</strong> surprising) ability to<br />
speak about life. Heidegger always denied that he was doing life-philosophy.<br />
Blattner, however, suggests that his re-interpretation <strong>of</strong> Heidegger may give<br />
us new access to this denial (68). It seems clear that death, in <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard<br />
view, is a phenomenon <strong>of</strong> life: death is <strong>the</strong> perpetual possibility <strong>of</strong> cultural collapse,<br />
<strong>the</strong> ever-present risk that Dasein will be unable to live any specific life<br />
at all. Thus, as Stephen Mulhall argues, ‘death shows up only in <strong>and</strong> through<br />
life, in <strong>and</strong> through that which it threatens to render impossible – as <strong>the</strong> possible<br />
impossibility <strong>of</strong> that life. Phenomenologically speaking, <strong>the</strong>n, life is death’s<br />
representative, <strong>the</strong> proxy through which death’s resistance to Dasein’s grasp is<br />
at once acknowledged <strong>and</strong> overcome’ (305). It is through life, <strong>and</strong> only through<br />
life, that Dasein may engage with <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> death (i.e. <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
that no particular existence may be available). Thus, as Mulhall argues, ‘beingtoward-death<br />
is essentially a matter <strong>of</strong> being-toward-life’ (305).<br />
Indeed, Heidegger already understood <strong>the</strong> intimate relationship between<br />
death <strong>and</strong> life. In <strong>the</strong> place where he sets out to distinguish <strong>the</strong> existential analytic<br />
<strong>of</strong> death from o<strong>the</strong>r possible interpretations, he acknowledges that ‘death,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> widest sense, is a phenomenon <strong>of</strong> life’ (290). Heidegger goes on to define<br />
dying, very carefully, as ‘that way <strong>of</strong> Being in which Dasein is towards its death’<br />
(291). By Heideggerian st<strong>and</strong>ards, this is fairly unambiguous. Dying is a way <strong>of</strong><br />
being for Dasein; specifically, it is Dasein’s being towards death. Dasein could<br />
not be towards <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> its own life, since that end st<strong>and</strong>s outside its existence.<br />
Dasein could, however, be towards death in <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard sense. Heidegger<br />
appears to authorise this interpretation in an interesting passage on <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> immortality. ‘If “death” is defined as <strong>the</strong> “end” <strong>of</strong> Dasein – that is to<br />
say, <strong>of</strong> Being-in-<strong>the</strong>-world – this does not imply any ontical decision whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
“after death” still ano<strong>the</strong>r Being is possible, ei<strong>the</strong>r higher or lower, or whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Dasein “lives on” or even “outlasts” itself <strong>and</strong> is “immortal”’ (292). Here ‘death’<br />
looks precisely like world-collapse: <strong>the</strong> possibility that Dasein will suddenly<br />
lose its ability to be in <strong>the</strong> world. Interestingly, Heidegger does not rule out<br />
immortality here, though he does rule claims about immortality ‘out <strong>of</strong> bounds’.<br />
The existential analytic cannot have anything to say about <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> life<br />
after death, or any o<strong>the</strong>r metaphysical questions. Thus Blattner is quite right<br />
to claim that ‘Heidegger is not asserting immortality’ (65). Yet he is not denying<br />
it ei<strong>the</strong>r. Blattner goes on to emphasise, importantly, that ‘human life stops;<br />
nei<strong>the</strong>r existence nor underst<strong>and</strong>ing can be said to stop as such, however’ (65).<br />
Dasein could always find itself unable to embrace any particular mode <strong>of</strong> being,<br />
<strong>and</strong> thus unable to dwell in <strong>the</strong> world. Yet existence, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> project <strong>of</strong> trying to<br />
underst<strong>and</strong> existence, continues indefinitely.
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 95<br />
Carel argues convincingly that <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> death must include not only<br />
‘finitude <strong>of</strong> possibility (<strong>the</strong> Dreyfus/Blattner sense)’, but also ‘temporal finitude’<br />
(‘Temporal Finitude’ 547). Dasein should be understood as finite in <strong>the</strong> sense<br />
that it may find itself without projects <strong>and</strong> possibilities, but also in <strong>the</strong> sense<br />
that Dasein’s existence is temporal <strong>and</strong> temporary. ‘The question that emerges<br />
with respect to <strong>the</strong>se two types <strong>of</strong> finitude’, Carel argues, ‘is not how one ought<br />
to die, but how one ought to live knowing that one will die, taking into account<br />
both mortality <strong>and</strong> finitude’ (548). Once again, death is important for <strong>the</strong> ways<br />
in which it structures life. There is also an interesting tension at work here, since<br />
Dasein is temporally finite (mortal), <strong>and</strong> yet Dasein’s general project <strong>of</strong> trying to<br />
underst<strong>and</strong> its own being is infinite. This implies a peculiar kind <strong>of</strong> immortality,<br />
for Dasein is <strong>the</strong> being whose being is always an issue for it. Being continues<br />
to be an issue for Dasein in general, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ending <strong>of</strong> any particular<br />
individual.<br />
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction <strong>of</strong> Heidegger attempts to exploit this tension.<br />
Derrida wants to demonstrate that death is an aporia, a gap which will<br />
prevent Heidegger’s thought from attaining systematic closure. He does this, for<br />
example, by trying to show how Dasein’s mortality leads back to an unexpected<br />
immortality. ‘There is no sc<strong>and</strong>al whatsoever in saying that Dasein remains<br />
immortal in its originary being-to-death’, declares Derrida, ‘if by “immortal”<br />
one underst<strong>and</strong>s “without end” in <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> verenden’ (Aporias 39–40).<br />
Indeed, <strong>the</strong>re is no sc<strong>and</strong>al. Dasein is temporal <strong>and</strong> finite. But Dasein’s central<br />
project, its attempt to confront <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> its own being, is infinite. Dying<br />
continues forever. And dying is a way <strong>of</strong> being towards <strong>the</strong> eternal, ever-present<br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong> existence. This way <strong>of</strong> being is always open to<br />
Dasein, <strong>and</strong> ‘immortality’ may simply be a name for this fact. But all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
options already exist in Being <strong>and</strong> Time. So why does Derrida so strenuously call<br />
our attention to this non-sc<strong>and</strong>al? Perhaps he means to show that if Dasein’s<br />
‘immortality’ is not sc<strong>and</strong>alous, it is at least aporetic. Derrida may mean to be<br />
provocative when he claims that ‘only a being-to-death can think, desire, project,<br />
indeed, “live” immortality as such’ (Aporias 55). But Derrida’s critique is<br />
ultimately unconvincing. His deconstructionist strategy is intended to reveal<br />
<strong>the</strong> hidden fissures in a text, but in Heidegger, those fissures are not so hidden.<br />
And even if Heidegger’s thought is unable to achieve <strong>the</strong>oretical closure, that<br />
inability does not reduce <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existential analytic.<br />
Derrida’s deconstruction does have at least one important effect, however: it<br />
makes an implicit possibility explicit. Where Heidegger spoke <strong>of</strong> being-towardsdeath,<br />
Derrida speaks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vigil: a careful, patient anticipation <strong>of</strong> death. In The<br />
Gift <strong>of</strong> <strong>Death</strong>, Derrida traces this vigil back to Socrates, in order to connect <strong>the</strong>
96 Lewis Call<br />
vigil with philosophy itself: ‘<strong>the</strong> Phaedo explicitly names philosophy: it is attentive<br />
anticipation <strong>of</strong> death, care brought to bear upon dying, meditation on <strong>the</strong><br />
best way to receive, give, or give oneself death, experience <strong>of</strong> a vigil over <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> death, <strong>and</strong> over <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> death as impossibility’ (14). Derrida<br />
preserves <strong>the</strong> major <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> existentialism; he declares that <strong>the</strong> vigil is ‘ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
name for freedom’ (17). He even preserves <strong>the</strong> basic ontological structure which<br />
Heidegger introduced: Derrida tells us that <strong>the</strong> link between <strong>the</strong> care <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
being-toward-death <strong>and</strong> freedom is ‘a structure analogous to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dasein<br />
as described by Heidegger’ (17). So Derrida retains <strong>the</strong> basic structural elements<br />
<strong>of</strong> Heidegger’s philosophy, even as he deconstructs that philosophy. Ironically,<br />
even Derrida’s deconstruction <strong>of</strong> Heidegger’s philosophy remains faithful to<br />
that philosophy <strong>and</strong> occurs within it.<br />
BSG models <strong>the</strong> Derridean vigil at least twice. The <strong>Cylon</strong> attack on <strong>the</strong> Colonies<br />
brings humanity to <strong>the</strong> brink <strong>of</strong> extinction, <strong>and</strong> forces <strong>the</strong> surviving humans<br />
to embark upon a constant vigil over death. But <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s are destined for an<br />
even more poignant vigil. The <strong>Cylon</strong> downloading technique is incompatible<br />
with finitude. As long as <strong>the</strong>y maintain <strong>the</strong> false immortality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> download,<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s can never experience <strong>the</strong> care <strong>of</strong> a being-towards-death. Once <strong>the</strong>y<br />
overcome that ‘immortality’, <strong>the</strong>y are able to experience that care as no one else<br />
could, for <strong>the</strong>y experience it fresh, as blank slates. This care, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> vigil which<br />
embodies it, point <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s towards a new <strong>and</strong> more sustainable immortality.<br />
End <strong>of</strong> line: <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s discover <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> being finite<br />
During BSG’s first two seasons, <strong>the</strong> humanoid <strong>Cylon</strong>s generally cannot die.<br />
David Vessey is quite right to argue that ‘a successful death is not available to<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s’ (295). He recognises how <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong> death impacts <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>s: <strong>the</strong>y ‘are not existentially preoccupied about whe<strong>the</strong>r a resurrection<br />
ship is nearby’ (295). At this point, <strong>the</strong>ir being is not an issue for <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are initially incapable <strong>of</strong> Heideggerian au<strong>the</strong>nticity or Derridean vigils.<br />
All <strong>of</strong> this begins to change about a third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way through season three. In<br />
‘Torn’ (3 November 2006), a deadly virus ravages a <strong>Cylon</strong> basestar. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s<br />
send <strong>the</strong>ir human agent Gaius Baltar (James Callis) to investigate. He finds most<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s aboard <strong>the</strong> basestar dead, <strong>the</strong> rest dying. He locates a Number Six<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>, who begs him to kill her. Baltar, who has had erotic relations with Sixes<br />
both real <strong>and</strong> hallucinatory, is at first horrified: ‘You don’t underst<strong>and</strong>. There is<br />
no resurrection ship nearby. You will not be downloaded into a new body. You<br />
will just be gone.’ Delirious, <strong>the</strong> Six accuses Baltar <strong>of</strong> bringing on <strong>the</strong> plague
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 97<br />
which has decimated <strong>the</strong>se <strong>Cylon</strong>s. Baltar panics <strong>and</strong> strangles her. When <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>s on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r baseship ask Baltar to report what he sees, he replies ‘I see<br />
nothing. Nothing <strong>of</strong> consequence.’ But <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>the</strong> amoral Baltar is an unreliable<br />
witness. What he has in fact witnessed is <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> meaning for <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>.<br />
The deadly disease quickly foregrounds <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> death, not just for<br />
individual <strong>Cylon</strong>s but for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> as a whole. Since <strong>the</strong> entire <strong>Cylon</strong> culture<br />
is at stake here, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s are confronting death in <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard sense. The<br />
Colonial humans discover that <strong>the</strong> disease could easily spread to all <strong>Cylon</strong>s, via<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> resurrection apparatus. Here death asserts itself as a primal, cataclysmic<br />
force. It is <strong>the</strong> dark secret which lurks at <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s’ false<br />
immortality. Indeed, death threatens to destabilise that ‘immortality’ in a radical<br />
way. ‘We can destroy <strong>the</strong> entire <strong>Cylon</strong> race’, observes Major Lee ‘Apollo’ Adama<br />
(Jamie Bamber) in ‘A Measure <strong>of</strong> Salvation’ (10 November 2006). Captain Karl<br />
‘Helo’ Agathon (Tahmoh Penikett) is generally presented as <strong>the</strong> most ethical <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Colonial <strong>of</strong>ficers; he also happens to be married to a Number Eight <strong>Cylon</strong>.<br />
Helo protests: ‘Genocide? So that’s what we’re about now?’ Helo uses his own<br />
wife, Lieutenant Sharon ‘A<strong>the</strong>na’ Agathon (Grace Park), as an example to illustrate<br />
why this would be wrong: ‘She made a choice. She’s a person. They’re a<br />
race <strong>of</strong> people.’ Helo makes a compelling critique <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plan to wipe out <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>s, but he’s not quite right. At this point in <strong>the</strong> narrative, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s are<br />
different enough from humans that <strong>the</strong>y seem more like ano<strong>the</strong>r species than<br />
a ‘race <strong>of</strong> people’. And as long as resurrection remains possible for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s,<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir default existential condition is radically different from that <strong>of</strong> Dasein. Resurrection<br />
precludes finitude. This means that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s’ being cannot be a<br />
perpetual issue for <strong>the</strong>m, as it is for humans. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s are not quite people<br />
yet.<br />
But this is <strong>the</strong> moment when that begins to change, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> change comes<br />
first to A<strong>the</strong>na. The Colonial military to which she has sworn allegiance is contemplating<br />
<strong>the</strong> extermination <strong>of</strong> her species. ‘My people may die’, she acknowledges.<br />
‘My entire race may be wiped out.’ There is a long pause; a tight shot on<br />
her face shows <strong>the</strong> agony <strong>of</strong> incipient au<strong>the</strong>nticity. She whispers, barely audible:<br />
‘Does a <strong>Cylon</strong> keep her word even if it means she’s <strong>the</strong> last <strong>Cylon</strong> in <strong>the</strong><br />
universe? Can a human being do that?’ Here A<strong>the</strong>na confronts not her own<br />
mortality, but what <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusards would call world-collapse. She is considering<br />
<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> her people, which is <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>and</strong><br />
she is resolute in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> that horrifying prospect. A<strong>the</strong>na thus provides our<br />
first glimpse <strong>of</strong> an au<strong>the</strong>ntic <strong>Cylon</strong> existence. This seems especially significant<br />
given that she is <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> Hera (Iliana Gomez-Martinez), who turns out to
98 Lewis Call<br />
‘Rapture’ <strong>and</strong> ‘Hero’, Battlestar Galactica. Universal Studios Home Entertainment.<br />
be <strong>the</strong> primal ancestor <strong>of</strong> Earth’s human race: au<strong>the</strong>nticity must precede evolution.<br />
But A<strong>the</strong>na is not yet fully human. <strong>Death</strong> remains for her not a real limit,<br />
but something lovers do toge<strong>the</strong>r, something that has to do with <strong>the</strong> bearing<br />
<strong>and</strong> raising <strong>of</strong> children, something more like <strong>sex</strong>. Thus in ‘Rapture’ (21 January<br />
2007), A<strong>the</strong>na begs Helo to find <strong>the</strong> courage to ‘kill’ her, so she can download to<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> baseship <strong>and</strong> rescue <strong>the</strong>ir daughter. The two swear <strong>the</strong>ir love to one<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> he shoots her in <strong>the</strong> belly. The scene is beautiful, to be sure, but it<br />
doesn’t take Helo or A<strong>the</strong>na any closer to an au<strong>the</strong>ntic underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> death.<br />
Still, <strong>the</strong> prospect <strong>of</strong> racial extinction has made death an issue for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s.<br />
In ‘Hero’ (17 November 2006), D’Anna (Lucy Lawless), a Number Three, begins<br />
to pursue a radical experiment in being-towards-death. In a dream, she runs<br />
through <strong>the</strong> corridors <strong>of</strong> Galactica, pursued by Colonial Marines. She reaches<br />
a hatch marked ‘End <strong>of</strong> Line’. (Computer programmers use this phrase to mark<br />
<strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> a line <strong>of</strong> computer code. The <strong>Cylon</strong> hybrid which operates/is <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Cylon</strong> baseship utters this phrase <strong>of</strong>ten, <strong>and</strong> uses it with increasing frequency<br />
as D’Anna begins her illicit investigation into death’s mysteries.) When D’Anna<br />
opens <strong>the</strong> hatch, she sees a brilliant white light. She turns, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines fill<br />
her with bullets. She wakes up in bed with Baltar <strong>and</strong> Caprica Six. <strong>Death</strong> is<br />
again connected to <strong>sex</strong>.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> astonishing scene which follows, D’Anna orders a Centurion to kill<br />
her, initiating her own ‘death’ with an ironic comm<strong>and</strong> to ‘execute’ <strong>the</strong> program.<br />
The Centurion fills her with bullets, for real this time, <strong>and</strong> we get a vision <strong>of</strong><br />
transcendence: <strong>the</strong> Opera House on Kobol, a tantalising glimpse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Final<br />
Five <strong>Cylon</strong>s, <strong>the</strong>ir faces too brilliant to see, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> hatch again, ‘End <strong>of</strong> Line’.<br />
Then D’Anna resurrects, <strong>and</strong> informs her fellow <strong>Cylon</strong>s that ‘<strong>the</strong>re’s something<br />
beautiful . . . miraculous, between life <strong>and</strong> death’. No one quite knows what to<br />
make <strong>of</strong> this. In ‘The Passage’ (8 December 2006), Baltar points out <strong>the</strong> futility<br />
<strong>of</strong> it all: ‘intentionally killing yourself over <strong>and</strong> over so you can download
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 99<br />
over <strong>and</strong> over. <strong>Death</strong>’s just a revolving door, isn’t it?’ In <strong>the</strong> hybrid chamber<br />
with D’Anna, Baltar realises that this is where D’Anna got <strong>the</strong> idea to begin<br />
intentionally downloading. ‘Gestalt <strong>the</strong>rapy <strong>and</strong> escape clauses’, says <strong>the</strong> hybrid.<br />
But once in a while Baltar gets it right: D’Anna will not find any escape clauses<br />
through her download fetish, <strong>and</strong> what she really needs is existential <strong>the</strong>rapy,<br />
not gestalt. 4<br />
Brian Willems <strong>of</strong>fers a provocative Heideggerian reading <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘D’Anna<br />
problem’. He sees her as ‘a non-human who learns her own life-in-death’ (89)<br />
<strong>and</strong> claims, remarkably, that she has ‘not only begun to learn her own facticity,<br />
but she’s also taken this new knowledge <strong>and</strong> applied resurrection technology<br />
to it in order to go beyond such knowledge; <strong>and</strong> she’s finding a way to access<br />
totality’ (97). But this position is hard to sustain. The ‘deaths’ which D’Anna<br />
experiences do not represent a limit for her, since <strong>the</strong>y are never permanent<br />
or ‘real’ deaths. She never confronts <strong>the</strong> more significant existential death or<br />
Dreyfusard world-collapse. D’Anna wants to have her death <strong>and</strong> live it too, <strong>and</strong><br />
that is cheating. She will not get to death that way. In fact, we can be pretty sure<br />
that until she gives up her cheap thrills, she will never develop a real underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
<strong>of</strong> death. Emmanuel Levinas reminds us that in order to be-for-death<br />
au<strong>the</strong>ntically, we must maintain <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> death as a possibility, without<br />
transforming it into a reality (52). D’Anna’s death fetish is an interesting form <strong>of</strong><br />
play, but it has nothing to do with <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> being-towards-death which might<br />
truly give <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s access to totality, or what Heidegger calls Being-a-whole.<br />
That comes later. For now, all that D’Anna’s experiment gets her is boxed. ‘Your<br />
model is fundamentally flawed’, declares an absolutist Number One. D’Anna<br />
maintains that she would do it all again. And that, replies <strong>the</strong> One, is why <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have decided to box her entire line, placing all Threes in cold storage. ‘One must<br />
die to know <strong>the</strong> truth’, D’Anna asserts bravely. The trouble is, she still does not<br />
underst<strong>and</strong> what death means.<br />
The <strong>Cylon</strong>s, however, soon learn death’s meaning, for <strong>the</strong>y practice a strange<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> democracy. With <strong>the</strong> Threes boxed, <strong>the</strong>y have six remaining ‘known’<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong> models: an even number, <strong>and</strong> no tie-breaking vote. This raises <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> a genuine schism in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that is <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> worldcollapse<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard sense. As <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s live that possibility, <strong>the</strong>y move<br />
closer to au<strong>the</strong>nticity. On <strong>the</strong> crucial question <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> ‘lower’ <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
models should be permitted to think independently, Boomer (Grace Park)<br />
votes against <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Eights, giving <strong>the</strong> Ones <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir allies a razor-thin<br />
4. The existential approach in psychology was developed in <strong>the</strong> mid-twentieth century by Rollo May<br />
<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. Heidegger’s philosophy <strong>of</strong> death remains a major concern for analysts working in this<br />
tradition (see M<strong>and</strong>ic).
100 Lewis Call<br />
majority. The leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> minority faction, a Number Six who becomes known<br />
as Natalie, protests: ‘No one has ever voted against <strong>the</strong>ir model.’ Here is more<br />
world-collapse for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>. Natalie continues: ‘Our identities are determined<br />
by our models. Each model is unique. We belong toge<strong>the</strong>r.’ Natalie is not quite<br />
right here: a certain kind <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> identity is determined by model, but a more<br />
interesting kind is determined, as we have seen, by continuous experience<br />
through a series <strong>of</strong> same-model bodies, which is why <strong>the</strong>re can be such a thing<br />
as a Boomer or a Natalie, <strong>and</strong> not just Sixes <strong>and</strong> Eights. In any case, <strong>the</strong> die is<br />
cast: Natalie removes <strong>the</strong> behavioural inhibiter which prevents higher reasoning<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Centurions. Cavil, <strong>the</strong> chief spokesman for <strong>the</strong> Ones, reminds her<br />
that she cannot do anything without a vote. Natalie replies ‘no, we can’t do anything<br />
with one. So we’re finished voting.’ This is, among o<strong>the</strong>r things, <strong>the</strong> death<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> democracy. The Centurions turn against Cavil’s faction, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
disintegrates into civil war. This represents <strong>the</strong> disastrous failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first type<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> identity (‘<strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>’); it is a world-collapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first magnitude.<br />
The two factions make an uneasy truce, but this soon falls apart. In ‘The Ties<br />
That Bind’ (18 April 2008), <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> fleet jumps, <strong>and</strong> Natalie’s ‘rebel’ faction is<br />
dismayed to learn that <strong>the</strong> resurrection ship has stayed behind. As Cavil’s forces<br />
attack, a new comprehension dawns in Natalie’s mind: ‘no Resurrection Ship . . .<br />
They’re really trying to kill us!’ For <strong>the</strong> first time, Natalie can experience death<br />
as a real possibility: not just <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> her own personal death (which is<br />
also very real <strong>and</strong> very new for her), but <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deaths <strong>of</strong> entire<br />
models, perhaps <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> itself. In Dreyfusard terms, Natalie<br />
glimpses <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world at this moment. In Heideggerian terms, she has<br />
been <strong>of</strong>fered an opportunity for au<strong>the</strong>nticity. In Derridean terms, she may now<br />
establish a vigil over death.<br />
Natalie is <strong>the</strong> first <strong>Cylon</strong> to grasp fully <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> death. She is resolute<br />
in her attitude towards death, <strong>and</strong> Heidegger points out that ‘when Dasein<br />
is resolute, it can become <strong>the</strong> “conscience” <strong>of</strong> O<strong>the</strong>rs’ (344). Natalie does indeed<br />
become <strong>the</strong> conscience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>. She is now ready to consider what was<br />
previously unthinkable: <strong>the</strong> elimination <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> immortality. Seeking human<br />
help in her quest to unbox D’Anna, Natalie negotiates with Colonial President<br />
Laura Roslin (Mary McDonnell). Natalie points out in ‘Guess What’s Coming<br />
to Dinner’ (16 May 2008) that ‘<strong>the</strong> boxing facility resides within <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
Resurrection Hub. This Hub controls <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> every Resurrection Ship<br />
in existence.’ It is interesting that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s have designed <strong>the</strong>ir resurrection<br />
network according to this vulnerable centralised architecture (ra<strong>the</strong>r than, say,<br />
a more rugged distributed architecture). Perhaps <strong>the</strong> Final Five designed this<br />
architecture knowing that one day <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> would need to encounter death in
‘Guess What’s Coming to Dinner’, Battlestar Galactica.<br />
Universal Studios Home Entertainment.<br />
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 101<br />
a serious way. In any case, <strong>the</strong> opportunity is clear: ‘you destroy <strong>the</strong> Hub, <strong>Cylon</strong>s<br />
lose <strong>the</strong>ir ability to download’, Natalie explains. ‘All <strong>of</strong> us’, she concludes, to<br />
emphasise <strong>the</strong> fact that she is choosing finitude for herself <strong>and</strong> all her bro<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
<strong>and</strong> sisters. Natalie is not merely confronting <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> world-collapse;<br />
she is actively embracing it. Roslin underst<strong>and</strong>s what this means: ‘once <strong>the</strong>y’re<br />
gone, <strong>the</strong>y can’t come back. Mortal enemies.’ It is a nice play on words, which<br />
reminds us that this choice may not end <strong>the</strong> human–<strong>Cylon</strong> war, but it will at<br />
least create equality <strong>and</strong> balance between <strong>the</strong> two sides. It will turn this conflict<br />
into a war between people. Horrific as those wars are, <strong>the</strong>y are at least finite, for<br />
<strong>the</strong>y reflect <strong>the</strong> finitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir participants.<br />
Natalie makes her case in a speech to <strong>the</strong> Colonial legislature, <strong>the</strong> Quorum<br />
<strong>of</strong> Twelve. This emphasises <strong>the</strong> political importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision which confronts<br />
<strong>the</strong> two species:<br />
In our civil war, we’ve seen death. We’ve watched our people die. Gone forever. As terrible<br />
as it was, beyond <strong>the</strong> reach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Resurrection Ships, something began to change. We could<br />
feel a sense <strong>of</strong> time, as if each moment held its own significance. We began to realise that for<br />
our existence to hold any value, it must end. To live meaningful lives, we must die <strong>and</strong> not<br />
return. The one human flaw that you spend your lifetimes distressing over, mortality, is <strong>the</strong><br />
one thing . . . Well, it’s <strong>the</strong> one thing that makes you whole.<br />
This is <strong>the</strong> testimony <strong>of</strong> Dasein, <strong>the</strong> narrative <strong>of</strong> Natalie’s journey towards<br />
au<strong>the</strong>ntic being. She <strong>and</strong> her comrades have been flying without resurrection<br />
ships for quite some time now, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y are feeling <strong>the</strong> existential effects.<br />
An awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mortality <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir finitude has given <strong>the</strong>m a new <strong>and</strong><br />
au<strong>the</strong>ntic concept <strong>of</strong> time, one in which moments have meaning. And Natalie is<br />
enough <strong>of</strong> a philosopher to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> broader implications <strong>of</strong> this revelation:<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong> mortality (like its human equivalent) is a necessary condition for<br />
Being-a-whole. Finitude is what Romo Lampkin (Mark Sheppard) would call a
102 Lewis Call<br />
sine qua non. This Latin phrase provides <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> episode (27 May 2008)<br />
in which Natalie dies. Speaking to Admiral Adama in a different context, Lampkin<br />
defines <strong>the</strong> phrase: ‘those things we deem essential, without which we cannot<br />
bear living, without which life in general loses its specific value. Becomes<br />
abstract.’ Here Lampkin describes death in <strong>the</strong> Dreyfusard sense: <strong>the</strong> inability<br />
to live any specific life, to be any particular person at all. Ironically, temporal<br />
finitude (personal mortality) is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> things that gives us a fighting chance<br />
against this death.<br />
Shot twice by A<strong>the</strong>na in cold blood, Natalie dies on <strong>the</strong> operating table <strong>of</strong><br />
Doc Cottle (Donnelly Rhodes). Natalie’s death may be predictable, but it also<br />
provides narrative satisfaction: this woman, who has become <strong>the</strong> foremost<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong> philosopher <strong>of</strong> death, has faced death with courage since her basestar<br />
first jumped beyond resurrection range. Ever since <strong>the</strong>n she has been dying in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Heideggerian sense: she has been comporting herself towards death, <strong>and</strong><br />
she has been open to opportunities for au<strong>the</strong>nticity. More recently she has<br />
maintained a vigil over death. She has worked hard to find <strong>the</strong> right way to die,<br />
<strong>and</strong> she has found it at last: her vigil is at an end. Natalie goes bravely to her fate.<br />
She grips Cottle’s h<strong>and</strong> for strength, <strong>and</strong> she uses <strong>Cylon</strong> ‘silent projection’ to<br />
create a peaceful forest scene in order to calm herself as she dies.<br />
The <strong>Cylon</strong>s are now free to become people at last. They feel it happening<br />
even before <strong>the</strong> attack on <strong>the</strong> Resurrection Hub. In ‘The Hub’ (6 June 2008), an<br />
Eight rallies sceptical human pilots just before that attack. She declares: ‘now<br />
all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se <strong>Cylon</strong>s here, all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se people? They’re pilots like you, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y’re<br />
gonna be out in <strong>the</strong> soup with you, taking out o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Cylon</strong>s.’ Cavil <strong>and</strong> Boomer<br />
are aboard <strong>the</strong> Hub when <strong>the</strong> attack comes; <strong>the</strong>y have just resurrected D’Anna.<br />
Predictably, Cavil rejects <strong>the</strong> existential explanation, retreating into a kind <strong>of</strong><br />
liberal legalism: ‘that would be mass murder. <strong>Death</strong> would be permanent for<br />
all <strong>of</strong> us. They’ve gone insane!’ The freshly downloaded D’Anna, however, is<br />
much quicker on <strong>the</strong> uptake: ‘permanent death? Well, that makes this all <strong>the</strong><br />
more meaningful.’ With that, she kills him. Jane Espenson’s script gives this<br />
crucial episode an appropriately literary quality: contra T. S. Eliot, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
world ends with a bang <strong>and</strong> a whimper. The nuclear strike on <strong>the</strong> Hub provides<br />
<strong>the</strong> bang, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n as D’Anna observes, ‘with a whimper, every <strong>Cylon</strong> in <strong>the</strong><br />
universe begins to die’. A<strong>the</strong>na dives in with a pro-death argument based on<br />
<strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> equality outlined above: ‘yes, that’s right. And it’s a good thing,<br />
D’Anna. Because now <strong>the</strong>re’s no difference. We can all start trusting each o<strong>the</strong>r.’<br />
Maybe, but for someone in D’Anna’s unique existential position, that trust will<br />
be a long time coming: ‘I’m mortal now’, she says. ‘In fact, I’m <strong>the</strong> only Three<br />
in <strong>the</strong> whole darn universe. So I gotta worry about protecting myself.’ Midway
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 103<br />
through life’s journey <strong>and</strong> halfway through season four, D’Anna finds that her<br />
being has finally become an issue for her in a real <strong>and</strong> undeniable way. She is<br />
mortal, finite <strong>and</strong> explicitly unique. (Her fellow <strong>Cylon</strong>s are now equally limited,<br />
though individuals in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r models still have large numbers <strong>of</strong> identical<br />
siblings.)<br />
Dreyfusard world-collapse has given <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s <strong>the</strong> opportunity to live<br />
au<strong>the</strong>ntically in <strong>the</strong> Heideggerian sense. But <strong>of</strong> course, au<strong>the</strong>nticity is only ever<br />
a possibility, never a necessity. At this point in <strong>the</strong> narrative, D’Anna mainly<br />
seems interested in avoiding death. Here she risks falling into <strong>the</strong> inau<strong>the</strong>ntic<br />
attitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> They. O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Cylon</strong>s will soon discover, however, that <strong>the</strong> collapse<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir old world has created a surprisingly transcendent possibility. In <strong>the</strong><br />
second half <strong>of</strong> season four, certain <strong>Cylon</strong>s begin to treat <strong>the</strong> collapse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
world as an opportunity to establish a Derridean vigil over death. By <strong>the</strong> end<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series, this vigil will allow <strong>the</strong>se <strong>Cylon</strong>s to conceive (<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> audience to<br />
conceive <strong>of</strong> ) an ontologically viable new form <strong>of</strong> immortality.<br />
‘Love outlasts death’: death, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> reproduction in late season four<br />
David Farrell Krell begins his book on Heidegger <strong>and</strong> life-philosophy by observing<br />
that death is just one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two ends which define Dasein’s finite existence.<br />
The o<strong>the</strong>r is birth: ‘Dasein natal, Dasein fatal’ (33). Of course, Heidegger does<br />
not want to talk about birth, because that would mean talking about <strong>sex</strong>. Of <strong>sex</strong>,<br />
as Derrida reminds us, Heidegger speaks as little as possible (‘Geschlecht’ 65).<br />
Yet Derrida’s critique <strong>of</strong> this silence is compelling: Heidegger insists that Dasein<br />
is <strong>sex</strong>ually neutral, over <strong>and</strong> above Dasein’s neutrality towards any o<strong>the</strong>r kind<br />
<strong>of</strong> difference. Ironically, Heidegger thus ends up granting <strong>sex</strong>uality <strong>and</strong> <strong>sex</strong>ual<br />
difference a peculiar privilege (69). It seems that Heidegger cannot escape discourses<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> body, its life <strong>and</strong> its <strong>sex</strong>uality, much as he might like to. Indeed,<br />
it is his own analytic <strong>of</strong> Dasein that foregrounds <strong>the</strong>se things. Krell notes that<br />
‘life thrusts itself to <strong>the</strong> fore in <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> Dasein. It is almost as<br />
though Sein were Leben’ (88). By making death <strong>the</strong> central axis upon which <strong>the</strong><br />
fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> Being turns, Heidegger has ensured that life <strong>and</strong> its<br />
philosophy will continue to inhabit that ontology.<br />
This is perhaps bad news for Heidegger, who would no doubt prefer a simpler<br />
phenomenological analysis, untroubled by <strong>the</strong> messiness <strong>of</strong> bodies, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
life. But it is good news for those <strong>of</strong> us who want to explore <strong>the</strong> fundamental<br />
connection between death <strong>and</strong> <strong>sex</strong>. If bodies must die, <strong>the</strong>n bodies must also<br />
reproduce. We must reverse Krell’s formula: ‘Dasein fatal, Dasein natal’. This is
104 Lewis Call<br />
precisely <strong>the</strong> lesson <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s learn at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> BSG. Once <strong>the</strong>y can die, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
must learn to live. To live as a species <strong>the</strong>y must love: <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s firmly believe<br />
that <strong>the</strong>ir ability to conceive children <strong>sex</strong>ually will depend entirely on <strong>the</strong>ir ability<br />
to love, <strong>and</strong> BSG’s narrative seems to endorse this remarkable philosophy.<br />
Their newfound mortality permits <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s to pursue meaningful projects,<br />
<strong>and</strong> those projects are primarily procreative. Frank Schalow describes a ‘special<br />
economy’ in Heidegger’s thought which ‘suggests a temporal cycle in which <strong>the</strong><br />
replenishment <strong>of</strong> life springs from its cessation’ (90). This same temporal cycle<br />
suggests that <strong>the</strong> projects <strong>of</strong> those who live today gain meaning through <strong>the</strong><br />
‘prospect <strong>of</strong> futurity’ (90). So death is a necessary condition for meaning, but it<br />
may not be a sufficient condition. Meaning may also require <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
new life. This is <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> Dasein’s existence: <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> new projects, new generations, new worlds being born as old ones die.<br />
There is, however, a serious political danger here. Krell summarises <strong>the</strong> problem<br />
nicely: ‘Dasein natal is Dasein fatal. Its nativity implies nationality, <strong>and</strong><br />
its nationality, at least in Heidegger’s case, although certainly not in his alone,<br />
entails a nationalism’ (179). If <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s are truly going to be a people, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y<br />
will do more than simply breed. Their breeding will become a project, it will have<br />
meaning for <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y will call that meaning nation. Season four’s mortal<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>s speak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves with increasing frequency as ‘<strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> nation’,<br />
<strong>and</strong> this is no accident. They have discovered what Krell calls ‘<strong>the</strong> daimonic<br />
nexus <strong>of</strong> god <strong>and</strong> Geschlecht, life <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> body, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> reproduction’ (204).<br />
Krell suggests that for Heidegger, this is a ‘volkisch node’ (204): it is <strong>the</strong> place<br />
where peoples are born, where nations happen. Heidegger was terrified <strong>of</strong> this<br />
node, <strong>and</strong> rightly so. As Derrida points out, Heidegger had hoped that he could<br />
embrace National Socialist politics while rejecting Nazi racism: he thought ‘that<br />
he would be able to distinguish between <strong>the</strong> national <strong>and</strong> nationalism, that is,<br />
between <strong>the</strong> national <strong>and</strong> a biologicist <strong>and</strong> racist ideology’ (‘Geschlecht II’ 165).<br />
Unsurprisingly, this proved impossible. Had Heidegger given <strong>the</strong> body its due,<br />
he might have understood why <strong>the</strong> nation inevitably becomes entwined with<br />
discourses <strong>of</strong> biology <strong>and</strong> race. Dasein natal is Dasein racial. Any given Dasein<br />
is always already a Dasein <strong>of</strong> a particular colour, a Dasein <strong>of</strong> a certain race <strong>and</strong><br />
nation, a cybernetic Dasein, a biological one, or some curious hybrid <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two.<br />
Here is <strong>the</strong> real challenge for mortal <strong>Cylon</strong>s. They have found death. If <strong>the</strong>y<br />
can find life, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y can be a people. But <strong>the</strong>y must at all costs find a way<br />
to do this without descending into nationalism <strong>and</strong> biological racism. BSG<br />
invokes a darkly Nietzschean eternal recurrence to underscore <strong>the</strong> risks: time<br />
<strong>and</strong> time again, organic humans have created cybernetic beings. Time <strong>and</strong> time<br />
again <strong>the</strong>se two types <strong>of</strong> beings have warred against each o<strong>the</strong>r, driving one
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 105<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> brink <strong>of</strong> extinction. All <strong>of</strong> this has happened before, but it must<br />
not happen again. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s must learn a new way to live. They must lose <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
fears <strong>of</strong> miscegenation. They must ab<strong>and</strong>on all concept <strong>of</strong> racial purity. They<br />
must embrace diversity in all its forms. This is precisely what <strong>the</strong>y do in <strong>the</strong><br />
final episodes <strong>of</strong> BSG. The story <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> ends with a radical endorsement<br />
<strong>of</strong> difference. The future <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> is a future <strong>of</strong> hybridity. It is a future in<br />
which species merge <strong>and</strong> nations intersect. It is a future in which <strong>the</strong> biological<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> cybernetic may come toge<strong>the</strong>r at last.<br />
Yet BSG’s vision <strong>of</strong> hybridity is far from utopian. This vision is, for example,<br />
quite heteronormative. On BSG, hybridity implies hetero<strong>sex</strong>ual reproduction.<br />
Indeed, homo<strong>sex</strong>uality is almost entirely invisible in <strong>the</strong> series. The show’s main<br />
narrative contains no portrayals <strong>of</strong> homo<strong>sex</strong>uality whatsoever. The television<br />
movie Battlestar Galactica: Razor (2007) tells its story mainly in flashback <strong>and</strong><br />
was not broadcast as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series. This marginal narrative provides us with<br />
BSG’s only representation <strong>of</strong> lesbianism: we learn that Admiral Cain (Michelle<br />
Forbes) was involved with <strong>the</strong> Number Six <strong>Cylon</strong> known as Gina Inviere. But<br />
when Cain discovers that Gina is a <strong>Cylon</strong>, she has her thrown in <strong>the</strong> Pegasus<br />
brig, subject to torture <strong>and</strong> gang rape. Cain becomes a caricature <strong>of</strong> a vicious,<br />
sadistic lesbian. Killed by a vengeful Gina, Cain conforms to every element <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> so-called ‘Dead-Evil Lesbian Cliché’ (see Wilts): she plays into American<br />
television’s stereotypical portrayal <strong>of</strong> lesbians as evil, doomed, or in this case,<br />
both. 5 But <strong>the</strong>re is an interesting ambiguity at work here. On <strong>the</strong> surface, Cain<br />
is punishing Gina for deceit <strong>and</strong> betrayal. Lurking beneath <strong>the</strong> surface, however,<br />
is Cain’s need to colonise <strong>and</strong> control O<strong>the</strong>rness. This is perhaps why Cain<br />
orders her male <strong>of</strong>ficers to rape Gina. These <strong>of</strong>ficers act as surrogates for Cain.<br />
They allow her to penetrate <strong>and</strong> claim <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r. This hybridity is about <strong>sex</strong>ual<br />
access to <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r. It is a colonial form <strong>of</strong> hybridity whose ultimate aim is to<br />
eradicate difference. Here we see <strong>the</strong> dark side <strong>of</strong> hybridity: <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> an<br />
ethically catastrophic meeting <strong>of</strong> species characterised by <strong>the</strong> subjugation <strong>and</strong><br />
conquest <strong>of</strong> O<strong>the</strong>rness.<br />
Hybridity is hardly innocent in BSG, but it does contain important options<br />
for being. In this sense BSG’s narrative about hybridity is comparable to that <strong>of</strong><br />
early cyborg <strong>the</strong>orist Donna Haraway. Describing <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> writing which<br />
5. The show treats male homo<strong>sex</strong>uality in similar terms. A series <strong>of</strong> webisodes called Battlestar Galactica:<br />
The Face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Enemy was released midway through season four, but never broadcast as part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> series. These webisodes reveal that Lt Felix Gaeta (Aless<strong>and</strong>ro Juliani) was in a relationship with Lt<br />
Louis Hoshi (Brad Dryborough). Shortly after <strong>the</strong> webisodes appeared, Gaeta became an embittered<br />
mutineer <strong>and</strong> was eventually executed. Like Cain, Gaeta came out to <strong>the</strong> show’s audience – <strong>and</strong> was<br />
immediately shown to be both evil <strong>and</strong> doomed.
106 Lewis Call<br />
hybridity enables, Haraway declared that ‘cyborg writing must not be about <strong>the</strong><br />
Fall, <strong>the</strong> imagination <strong>of</strong> a once-upon-a-time wholeness before language, before<br />
writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is about <strong>the</strong> power to survive not on <strong>the</strong><br />
basis <strong>of</strong> original innocence, but on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> seizing <strong>the</strong> tools to mark <strong>the</strong><br />
world that marked <strong>the</strong>m as o<strong>the</strong>r’ (217). Cain <strong>and</strong> her rape gang represent a kind<br />
<strong>of</strong> hybridity which marks <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s as O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> simultaneously attempts to<br />
colonise that O<strong>the</strong>rness. But BSG also <strong>of</strong>fers a positive kind <strong>of</strong> hybridity, one<br />
which lets <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s mark <strong>the</strong> world that marked <strong>the</strong>m as o<strong>the</strong>r. BSG’s vision<br />
<strong>of</strong> human–<strong>Cylon</strong> hybridity is not innocent, <strong>and</strong> it <strong>of</strong>fers no certainties. But it<br />
does <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> hope. The show’s beautifully ambiguous conclusion<br />
<strong>of</strong>fers <strong>the</strong> hope <strong>of</strong> a positive, (re)productive hybridity. That same conclusion<br />
also suggests that hybridity could one day give way, once again, to fragmentation,<br />
segregation <strong>and</strong> fear. BSG will not let hybridity become an achieved utopia.<br />
Ra<strong>the</strong>r, hybridity must remain a constant project. It is something to die for, as<br />
do many BSG characters in <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> season four. And it is something<br />
to live for, as do <strong>the</strong> human–<strong>Cylon</strong> hybrid Hera <strong>and</strong> her parents.<br />
Late in season four, it becomes clear that <strong>the</strong> survival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> will take<br />
one <strong>of</strong> two possible forms. One is Hera. But Caprica Six’s improbable union<br />
with a hallucinating Colonel Tigh (Michael Hogan) has produced something<br />
almost miraculous: she is pregnant, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> embryo is pure <strong>Cylon</strong>. So <strong>the</strong> second<br />
half <strong>of</strong> season four is immediately concerned with discourses <strong>of</strong> racial ‘purity’.<br />
In ‘The Oath’ (30 January 2009), anti-<strong>Cylon</strong> mutineers seize all <strong>Cylon</strong>s aboard<br />
Galactica <strong>and</strong> throw <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> brig. ‘They’re gonna kill us’, laments Caprica<br />
Six. ‘Don’t you see? Our children represent everything that <strong>the</strong> humans hate!<br />
With resurrection gone, <strong>the</strong> thought that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> race could survive through<br />
natural procreation terrifies <strong>the</strong>m.’ Caprica is right about <strong>the</strong> hate, but her estimation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> captured <strong>Cylon</strong>s’ probable fate is not quite correct. Racist humans<br />
will kill, certainly, to preserve <strong>the</strong>ir vision <strong>of</strong> a ‘natural’ procreative order. There<br />
are many real world examples <strong>of</strong> this. But <strong>the</strong> sadistic, <strong>Cylon</strong>-hating Specialist<br />
Gage (Mike Dopud) has already informed Helo that he is saving himself<br />
for Helo’s ‘sweet toaster wife’, A<strong>the</strong>na. Had Gaeta’s Rebellion succeeded, female<br />
<strong>Cylon</strong>s would have been subjected to gang rape in Galactica’s brig. This type <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>sex</strong>ual atrocity occurred, among o<strong>the</strong>r places, in some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> failed states which<br />
comprise <strong>the</strong> former Yugoslavia. This is a racially motivated form <strong>of</strong> rape which<br />
targets a despised racial minority; it is intended in part to dilute <strong>the</strong> blood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
minority with that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dominant racial group. This is ano<strong>the</strong>r instance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
kind <strong>of</strong> colonising hybridity represented by Admiral Cain.<br />
The Sartrean title ‘No Exit’ (13 February 2009) confirms <strong>the</strong> show’s existentialist<br />
credentials; in this episode, we see <strong>the</strong> aftermath <strong>of</strong> resurrection’s end
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 107<br />
from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> viewpoint. John, <strong>the</strong> original Number One <strong>Cylon</strong>, rants about<br />
being ‘trapped in this absurd body’. Here we learn that his insecurities about<br />
his own body are actually driving <strong>Cylon</strong> policy. He is <strong>the</strong> first to recognise <strong>the</strong><br />
magnitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crisis which confronts <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>. ‘We can’t procreate biologically,<br />
so we’re going to have to find a way to rebuild resurrection.’ Without<br />
resurrection, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> faces extinction. John is quite prepared to cut open <strong>the</strong><br />
head <strong>of</strong> Ellen Tigh (Kate Vernon) to get <strong>the</strong> knowledge he thinks <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
needs. (She is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Final Five, refugees from an ancient Earth who brought<br />
resurrection technology to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s.) The show suggests that John’s sadism<br />
is <strong>the</strong> consequence <strong>of</strong> his frustrations with his body, with his inability to reproduce,<br />
perhaps with his <strong>sex</strong>uality. His is also an Oedipal sadism: Ellen made<br />
John first, so he is essentially her eldest son. She recognises his sadism for what<br />
it is: ‘I’m sure you’ll make <strong>the</strong> procedure as long <strong>and</strong> painful as possible.’ When<br />
John denies this, she explicitly names him sadist, <strong>and</strong> accuses him <strong>of</strong> trying to<br />
give <strong>the</strong> Five ‘<strong>the</strong> right amount <strong>of</strong> suffering, <strong>the</strong> right amount <strong>of</strong> punishment,<br />
all weighed out. Then we could give you <strong>the</strong> approval that you’ve always craved.’<br />
It is all true, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> show clearly rejects this kind <strong>of</strong> sadism in particular: <strong>the</strong><br />
rational, measured, disciplined kind, which is to say <strong>the</strong> modern kind.<br />
So John models a calculating sadism, motivated by Oedipal <strong>and</strong> reproductive<br />
insecurities. On BSG, as in our world, this specific type <strong>of</strong> sadism is allied with<br />
an especially egregious scientific project: eugenics. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s are obsessed<br />
with ideas <strong>of</strong> racial hygiene. Tori (Rekha Sharma) argues in ‘Deadlock’ (20 February<br />
2009) for ‘<strong>the</strong> survival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original thirteenth tribe in its purest form’.<br />
Naturally, Caprica’s ‘pure <strong>Cylon</strong>’ embryo is central to this discourse. Tori points<br />
out that ‘Caprica Six’s unborn baby is pure <strong>Cylon</strong>. We can rebuild a pure <strong>Cylon</strong><br />
civilisation.’ Ellen Tigh is certainly not thrilled to learn that her husb<strong>and</strong> has<br />
impregnated a Six. After all, we now know that Ellen <strong>and</strong> Saul Tigh created<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sixes. So Ellen reacts, underst<strong>and</strong>ably, as if she has just learned that her<br />
husb<strong>and</strong> has impregnated <strong>the</strong>ir daughter. ‘You are our children!’ she says with<br />
disgust. But <strong>the</strong> real problem is her jealousy: she <strong>and</strong> Saul could never reproduce<br />
<strong>sex</strong>ually, <strong>and</strong> so she takes <strong>the</strong> very existence <strong>of</strong> Caprica’s baby as evidence<br />
that Saul loves <strong>the</strong> Six more than he loves her.<br />
As usual, Colonel Tigh cuts through all <strong>the</strong> frakking crap to tell us how it really<br />
is: ‘Pure human doesn’t work. Pure <strong>Cylon</strong> doesn’t work. It’s too weak!’ Caprica’s<br />
miscarriage confirms his argument. This event is a disaster for <strong>the</strong> eugenicists,<br />
but Jane Espenson allows this important pedagogic point to be overshadowed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Colonel’s personal tragedy. Thus <strong>the</strong> crucial anti-eugenic argument is<br />
delivered subtly, <strong>and</strong> far more effectively. Saul asserts his love for <strong>the</strong> women in<br />
his life <strong>and</strong> for his stillborn child, while refusing to reduce that love to words:
108 Lewis Call<br />
‘Isn’t it enough that I feel it? I feel it! For her, for you, for Liam. I shouldn’t need<br />
to spout <strong>the</strong> words. I feel it less with words.’ This is an existential love; it exists<br />
prior to language <strong>and</strong> resists language’s attempt to capture its essence by naming<br />
it. This love will not be constrained by jealousy or by eugenics.<br />
As BSG reaches its conclusion, <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> <strong>sex</strong>, death <strong>and</strong> reproduction begin<br />
to align beautifully. Boomer declares her love for Chief Tyrol (Aaron Douglas):<br />
‘I’ve thought about you every day since that moment I died in your arms.’ Of<br />
course when she ‘died’, Boomer downloaded into a new body. Yet it appears that<br />
by sharing even this false ‘death’, Boomer <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chief have been able to form a<br />
strong bond. The Chief helps Boomer escape from <strong>the</strong> brig. She promptly beats<br />
A<strong>the</strong>na senseless, binds her, gags her <strong>and</strong> stuffs her in a closet. When Boomer<br />
fraks <strong>the</strong> unsuspecting Helo, A<strong>the</strong>na can only watch, silent <strong>and</strong> helpless. Helo<br />
cannot tell Eights apart; when he sees one whom he identifies as his wife, he<br />
wants her. In an important sense, Helo is actually married to <strong>the</strong> entire Number<br />
Eight line, despite Roslin’s earlier comment to <strong>the</strong> contrary in ‘The Hub’. Thus<br />
Boomer is able to steal <strong>the</strong> desire which Helo <strong>and</strong> A<strong>the</strong>na share. She <strong>the</strong>n steals<br />
<strong>the</strong> product <strong>of</strong> that desire, <strong>the</strong> child Hera, a unique human–<strong>Cylon</strong> hybrid. The<br />
show’s casting choices seem designed to emphasise Hera’s mixed heritage. At<br />
<strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> season four, Hera is portrayed by Iliana Gomez-Martinez. Her mo<strong>the</strong>r<br />
is played by Korean-Canadian actress Grace Park. Her fa<strong>the</strong>r is portrayed by<br />
Tahmoh Penikett, a Canadian actor with an English fa<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> a mo<strong>the</strong>r from<br />
Yukon’s White River First Nation. Hera is all about hybridity: she is a multiethnic,<br />
multi-species cyborg. The show thus endorses a strikingly exogenous<br />
reproductive politics.<br />
It is underst<strong>and</strong>able that <strong>the</strong> Chief would respond to Boomer’s actions by<br />
denying her humanity, but he goes fur<strong>the</strong>r, rejecting <strong>the</strong> possibility that any<br />
Eight or indeed any <strong>Cylon</strong> could live an au<strong>the</strong>ntic existence. In ‘Daybreak: Part<br />
1’ (13 March 2009), Helo once again asserts that his wife A<strong>the</strong>na is a person.<br />
Chief Tyrol replies coldly: ‘She’s a blow-up doll, Karl. They all are.’ Tyrol has<br />
retreated into a joyless, loveless, masturbatory <strong>sex</strong>uality. He never really leaves<br />
this place. At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series, he chooses to live out his days as a hermit<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than risk real love. Clearly his way is not <strong>the</strong> way. And A<strong>the</strong>na is much<br />
more than a blow-up doll. She is <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> a being who holds <strong>the</strong> destiny <strong>of</strong><br />
both <strong>Cylon</strong>s <strong>and</strong> humans in her tiny h<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> end it is about family, as it always has been. Adam(a) has always been<br />
a patriarch. Like Adam, <strong>and</strong> like Lorne Greene’s Adama, Bill Adama is destined<br />
to found a people, but Edward James Olmos plays an Adama whose strange<br />
postmodern family includes numerous nonhumans <strong>and</strong> semi-humans. Most<br />
importantly for us, Adama’s extended family includes Helo, a kind <strong>of</strong> adopted
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 109<br />
son, <strong>and</strong> Helo’s <strong>Cylon</strong> wife, A<strong>the</strong>na. It is this crucial fact that allows us to underst<strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> semi-suicidal assault on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> colony. Adama launches this attack<br />
knowing it will mean <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> humanity’s last battlestar. Why does Adama<br />
risk everything to save a single little girl? Perhaps he has accepted <strong>the</strong> opportunity<br />
for au<strong>the</strong>nticity. Mortal <strong>Cylon</strong>s have quickly immersed <strong>the</strong>mselves in human<br />
death rituals, notably by posting photos <strong>of</strong> dead <strong>Cylon</strong>s in Galactica’s memorial<br />
corridor. It is Adama’s final visit to this corridor that prompts his decision to<br />
rescue Hera. He sees her photo on <strong>the</strong> wall, sees her trapped in <strong>the</strong> rituals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
They, about to fade from memory along with <strong>the</strong> dying battlestar which carries<br />
her photo. Adama leaves <strong>the</strong> corridor. He st<strong>and</strong>s for a moment with his back to<br />
<strong>the</strong> camera – resolute, perhaps? Here he is choosing his own death, choosing<br />
for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> future life, for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> possibility. This is a radical<br />
existential choice, <strong>and</strong> when in ‘Daybreak: Part 2’ (20 March 2009) he asks<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs to join him on this all-volunteer mission, Adama emphasises that he can<br />
only make such a choice for himself. Helo again emphasises <strong>the</strong> likelihood <strong>of</strong><br />
death to his Raptor jocks, <strong>and</strong> again calls for volunteers. All h<strong>and</strong>s go up. He<br />
congratulates <strong>the</strong>m: ‘That’s my Raptor wranglers: always looking for new <strong>and</strong><br />
interesting ways to get killed.’ Half <strong>of</strong> Galactica’s crew has chosen death for<br />
<strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> a single half-human girl. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rebel <strong>Cylon</strong>s make <strong>the</strong> same<br />
choice, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> show portrays this as a beautiful thing. Here again BSG models<br />
<strong>the</strong> Derridean vigil. At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series, humans <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s come toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
to choose <strong>the</strong> best death, to find <strong>the</strong> best way to die. Even Boomer finds a good<br />
death in <strong>the</strong> end, sacrificing herself to return Hera to her parents.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> height <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battle, with <strong>Cylon</strong>s pouring into Galactica at platoon<br />
strength, John holds a gun to Hera’s head in <strong>the</strong> CIC. He wants to use Hera as<br />
a bargaining chip, to force <strong>the</strong> Final Five to give him resurrection technology,<br />
but Baltar points out that this will not work: ‘You want to break <strong>the</strong> cycle? Break<br />
<strong>the</strong> cycle <strong>of</strong> birth, death, rebirth, destruction, escape, death? Well, that’s in our<br />
h<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> our h<strong>and</strong>s only. It requires a leap <strong>of</strong> faith. It requires that we live in<br />
hope, not fear.’ If <strong>the</strong>y want to become people, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong>s must learn to die, to<br />
live, to love.<br />
Against all odds, Starbuck (Katee Sackh<strong>of</strong>f) leads <strong>the</strong> surviving humans <strong>and</strong><br />
mortal <strong>Cylon</strong>s to ano<strong>the</strong>r Earth. The fact that she does this by programming<br />
‘All Along <strong>the</strong> Watchtower’ into Galactica’s FTL computer makes us suspect<br />
that this is finally our Earth. A beautiful moon shot confirms this, as does a<br />
glimpse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> continents. The remnants <strong>of</strong> Colonial humanity l<strong>and</strong> on <strong>the</strong><br />
planet. Adama exercises <strong>the</strong> patriarch’s traditional right to name <strong>the</strong> worlds he<br />
creates, <strong>and</strong> calls <strong>the</strong> planet Earth. But what kind <strong>of</strong> world will this Earth be?<br />
The Colonials discover that <strong>the</strong> planet is inhabited by tribal humans, nomads
110 Lewis Call<br />
who live without language. In an amusing scene, <strong>the</strong> would-be patriarchs ga<strong>the</strong>r<br />
on a hillside to view <strong>the</strong> aborigines through field glasses, <strong>and</strong> think about <strong>the</strong><br />
dynasty <strong>the</strong>y might found. The group is all men, mostly old: Adama, Tigh, Doc<br />
Cottle, Baltar – <strong>and</strong>, in <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> favourite gay uncle, Louis Hoshi. Cottle confirms<br />
that <strong>the</strong> natives are not only humans but people: <strong>the</strong>y have death rituals,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y bury <strong>the</strong>ir dead. DNA analysis reveals that <strong>the</strong> natives are genetically compatible<br />
with Colonial humans – ‘meaning we can breed with <strong>the</strong>m’, as Baltar<br />
is quick to point out. But this leaves a crucial question unanswered: who will<br />
breed with <strong>the</strong>m? Approximately 39,000 humans l<strong>and</strong>ed on Earth, along with<br />
some <strong>Cylon</strong> Twos, Sixes <strong>and</strong> Eights. But out <strong>of</strong> all those living bodies, only one<br />
bred true. Young Hera Agathon moves confidently through <strong>the</strong> African savannah,<br />
her walking stick in h<strong>and</strong>. She looks up, into <strong>the</strong> sky.<br />
Human history, our history, begins in that moment. A flash forward takes<br />
us 150,000 years into <strong>the</strong> future. Series creator Ron Moore appears as himself,<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ing on a Manhattan street corner, reading a National Geographic article<br />
about Mitochondrial Eve, <strong>the</strong> most recent common ancestor <strong>of</strong> all realworld<br />
humans. The ‘angels’, Head Six <strong>and</strong> Head Baltar, take one last turn as<br />
<strong>the</strong> Greek chorus. Looking over Moore’s shoulder, <strong>the</strong>y read about <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>of</strong> humanity. Head Six observes that ‘she lived in what is now Tanzania, over<br />
150,000 years ago’. Baltar gives <strong>the</strong> punch line: ‘along with her <strong>Cylon</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
<strong>and</strong> human fa<strong>the</strong>r!’ So <strong>the</strong> show concludes by endorsing a radical form <strong>of</strong> evolutionary<br />
biology. The combination <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> <strong>and</strong> human is what breeds true.<br />
This reinforces <strong>the</strong> show’s argument: in evolutionary terms, survival depends<br />
on diversity. Moore has reimagined <strong>the</strong> human race, our human race, as <strong>the</strong><br />
product <strong>of</strong> a striking miscegenation. He has retold our most ancient story, a<br />
myth about <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human world, but this version rejects homogen-<br />
‘Daybreak: Part 3’, Battlestar Galactica. Universal Studios Home<br />
Entertainment.
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 111<br />
eity in all its forms: certainly it rejects racial sameness, but it also ab<strong>and</strong>ons all<br />
fears <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> techno-organic hybrid. The end <strong>of</strong> BSG confirms that Haraway was<br />
right <strong>the</strong> whole time: we are all cyborgs. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> BSG looks<br />
very much like <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> ‘cyborg writing’ she called for in her famous 1985<br />
manifesto: ‘in retelling origin stories, cyborg authors subvert <strong>the</strong> central myths<br />
<strong>of</strong> origin <strong>of</strong> Western culture. We have all been colonized by those origin myths,<br />
with <strong>the</strong>ir longing for fulfillment in apocalypse’ (217). The only longing in Battlestar<br />
Galactica is a longing to move beyond <strong>the</strong> eternally recurring apocalypse.<br />
This apocalypse, however, remains a distinct possibility right up to <strong>the</strong> show’s<br />
conclusion. ‘Commercialism, decadence, technology run amuck – remind you<br />
<strong>of</strong> anything?’, muses Head Six as she surveys our world. Head Baltar cites all<br />
<strong>the</strong> worlds where hybridity has given way to fear <strong>and</strong> destruction: Kobol, <strong>the</strong><br />
scorched Earth that came before ours, Caprica before <strong>the</strong> Fall. When Six reminds<br />
him that all <strong>of</strong> this has happened before, Baltar asks <strong>the</strong> big question: ‘does all<br />
<strong>of</strong> this have to happen again?’ Head Six replies, ‘this time I bet “no”’. Baltar<br />
dem<strong>and</strong>s to know <strong>the</strong> reasons for her sudden <strong>and</strong> surprising optimism. ‘Ma<strong>the</strong>matics’,<br />
she replies. ‘Law <strong>of</strong> averages. Let a complex system repeat itself long<br />
enough, eventually something surprising might occur.’ BSG insists that history<br />
(even <strong>the</strong> recurring kind) can be re-written. Thanks to <strong>the</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> organic<br />
systems, new outcomes are always possible. Hybridity has failed before, but it<br />
need not fail again. The show ends with a series <strong>of</strong> visuals which seem designed<br />
to remind us, once again, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> danger. We see a homeless person’s boom box,<br />
a television programme about ‘advances in robotics’, <strong>and</strong> a b<strong>and</strong> composed <strong>of</strong><br />
toy robots who look a bit like miniature proto-Centurians. Humans are flirting,<br />
once again, with <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> cybernetic slaves. But if <strong>the</strong> show’s ambiguous<br />
conclusion refuses to <strong>of</strong>fer us unqualified hope, it also denies us <strong>the</strong> certainty<br />
<strong>of</strong> a despair based on destiny. Naturally, <strong>the</strong> boom box is playing ‘All Along <strong>the</strong><br />
Watchtower’. As we watch <strong>the</strong> robots dance, <strong>the</strong> voice <strong>of</strong> Jimi Hendrix assures us<br />
that ‘<strong>the</strong>re must be some kinda way outa here’. That way may be hybridity. BSG’s<br />
final image shows Baltar <strong>and</strong> Six blending <strong>and</strong> merging into a crowd <strong>of</strong> humans<br />
on <strong>the</strong> streets <strong>of</strong> Manhattan. Thus BSG’s finale <strong>of</strong>fers <strong>the</strong> hope <strong>of</strong> a hybridity<br />
powerful enough to create <strong>and</strong> sustain a new species. This species bears witness<br />
to its own creation, via its representatives in BSG’s audience. The show’s final<br />
scene encourages that audience to nurture its hybridity always, lest that hybridity<br />
give way to segregation <strong>and</strong> isolation.<br />
Jane Espenson’s direct-to-DVD/television movie coda The Plan (2009) is<br />
largely an exercise in retroactive continuity; it might be better named ‘Recaprica’.<br />
Yet despite its limitations, The Plan <strong>of</strong>fers solid confirmation <strong>of</strong> BSG’s<br />
central argument. We see <strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Twelve Colonies once more,
112 Lewis Call<br />
but this time from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> point <strong>of</strong> view. The <strong>Cylon</strong> hybrid disables <strong>the</strong> Colonial<br />
battlestar fleet <strong>and</strong> prepares to rain nuclear fire on <strong>the</strong> Colonies <strong>of</strong> man.<br />
‘Accepting scan. Love outlasts death’, intones <strong>the</strong> hybrid. Within <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong><br />
BSG’s concern for hybridity in general, <strong>the</strong> voice <strong>of</strong> those beings who are named<br />
hybrid gains a peculiar privilege. Their non-linear speech allows <strong>the</strong> hybrids to<br />
state <strong>the</strong> show’s major <strong>the</strong>mes explicitly, without sounding didactic or preachy.<br />
Thus hybrid speech permits truth claims far more powerful than any a normal<br />
character might make. The entire narrative <strong>of</strong> BSG, especially its ending, seems<br />
to argue that <strong>the</strong> hybrid was right. Heidegger showed how death establishes<br />
<strong>the</strong> horizons <strong>of</strong> human life, <strong>the</strong> limits that make meaning possible. But he also<br />
showed how <strong>the</strong> human activity <strong>of</strong> dying can exceed those limits. Dying implies<br />
living; <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> BSG suggests that it also implies love.<br />
Thus Battlestar Galactica completes a journey which Martin Heidegger<br />
began over eighty years ago. This journey has led us to a place where death is<br />
<strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> meaning, <strong>and</strong> love is its culmination. Dasein dances between<br />
<strong>the</strong>se twin poles <strong>of</strong> meaning. This is a dance <strong>of</strong> bodies, for it is bodies that die<br />
<strong>and</strong> live <strong>and</strong> love. It is no easy dance, but it is <strong>the</strong> dance that makes us people. It<br />
is <strong>the</strong> dance that lets us be in <strong>the</strong> world. If we would escape <strong>the</strong> grey half-life <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> They, we should learn this dance. The <strong>Cylon</strong>s can show us how. 6<br />
Works cited<br />
Baugh, Bruce. ‘<strong>Death</strong> <strong>and</strong> Temporality in Deleuze <strong>and</strong> Derrida’. Angelaki: Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Theoretical Humanities 5.2 (2000): 73–83.<br />
Blattner, William D. ‘The Concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>Death</strong> in Being <strong>and</strong> Time’. Man <strong>and</strong> World 27 (1994):<br />
49–70.<br />
Call, Lewis. ‘“This Wondrous <strong>Death</strong>”: Erotic Power in <strong>the</strong> Science Fiction <strong>of</strong> James Tiptree,<br />
Jr’. Science Fiction Studies 34.1 (2007): 59–86.<br />
Carel, Havi. Life <strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong> in Freud <strong>and</strong> Heidegger. New York: Rodopi, 2006.<br />
—. ‘Temporal Finitude <strong>and</strong> Finitude <strong>of</strong> Possibility: The Double Meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>Death</strong> in Being<br />
<strong>and</strong> Time’. International Journal <strong>of</strong> Philosophical Studies 15.4 (2007): 541–56.<br />
Derrida, Jacques. ‘Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference’. Research in Phenomenology<br />
13.1 (1983): 65–83.<br />
—. ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s H<strong>and</strong>’. Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr, ed. John Sallis. Deconstruction<br />
<strong>and</strong> Philosophy: The Texts <strong>of</strong> Jacques Derrida. Chicago: U <strong>of</strong> Chicago P, 1987.<br />
161–96.<br />
—. Aporias. Trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993.<br />
6. I would like to thank <strong>the</strong> numerous people who provided thoughtful comments on previous drafts<br />
<strong>of</strong> this essay: <strong>the</strong> editors <strong>of</strong> SFFTV, <strong>the</strong> two anonymous readers <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> my Cal Poly writing<br />
group, Les Petites Guillotines.
<strong>Death</strong>, <strong>sex</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cylon</strong> 113<br />
—. The Gift <strong>of</strong> <strong>Death</strong>, Second Edition, <strong>and</strong> Literature in Secret. Trans. David Wills. Chicago:<br />
U <strong>of</strong> Chicago P, 2008.<br />
Dreyfus, Hubert L. ‘Foreword’. Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong>: Heidegger’s Analysis <strong>of</strong> Finitude. Ed. Carol<br />
J. White. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005: ix–xxxvi.<br />
—. Being-in-<strong>the</strong>-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being <strong>and</strong> Time, Division I. Cambridge:<br />
The MIT Press, 1991.<br />
Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on <strong>the</strong> Theory <strong>of</strong> Sexuality. Trans. <strong>and</strong> ed. James Strachey. New<br />
York: Basic Books, 1975.<br />
—. Beyond <strong>the</strong> Pleasure Principle. Trans. <strong>and</strong> ed. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton,<br />
1989.<br />
—. Civilization <strong>and</strong> Its Discontents. Trans. <strong>and</strong> ed. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton,<br />
1989.<br />
Haraway, Donna. ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, <strong>and</strong> Socialist Feminism<br />
in <strong>the</strong> 1980s’. Feminism/Postmodernism. Ed. Linda J. Nicholson. New York: Routledge,<br />
1990. 190–233.<br />
Heidegger, Martin. Being <strong>and</strong> Time. Trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Robinson. New<br />
York: Harper <strong>and</strong> Row, 1962.<br />
Krell, David Farrell. Daimon Life: Heidegger <strong>and</strong> Life-Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana UP,<br />
1992.<br />
Levinas, Emmanuel. God, <strong>Death</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Time. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000.<br />
M<strong>and</strong>ic, Mo. ‘Being-towards-<strong>Death</strong> <strong>and</strong> Its Relevance to Psycho<strong>the</strong>rapy’. Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Society<br />
for Existential Analysis 19.2 (2008): 254–66.<br />
Mulhall, Stephen. ‘Human Mortality: Heidegger on How to Portray <strong>the</strong> Impossible Possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> Dasein’. A Companion to Heidegger. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> Mark A. Wrathall.<br />
Malden: Blackwell, 2005. 297–310.<br />
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All <strong>and</strong> None. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.<br />
New York: Penguin, 1988.<br />
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being <strong>and</strong> Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Pocket Books,<br />
1956.<br />
Schalow, Frank. The Incarnality <strong>of</strong> Being: The Earth, Animals, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Body in Heidegger’s<br />
Thought. Albany: SUNY Press, 2006.<br />
Vessey, David. ‘The Meaning <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Death</strong>less Life’. Battlestar Galactica <strong>and</strong> Philosophy: Mission<br />
Accomplished or Mission Frakked Up? Ed. Josef Steiff <strong>and</strong> Tristan D. Tamplin. Chicago:<br />
Open Court, 2008. 289–99.<br />
White, Carol J. Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>Death</strong>: Heidegger’s Analysis <strong>of</strong> Finitude. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005.<br />
Willems, Brian. ‘When <strong>the</strong> Non-Human Knows Its Own <strong>Death</strong>’. Battlestar Galactica <strong>and</strong><br />
Philosophy: Knowledge Here Begins Out There. Ed. Jason T. Eberl. Malden: Blackwell,<br />
2008. 87–98.<br />
Wilts, Alissa. ‘Evil, Skanky, <strong>and</strong> Kinda Gay: Lesbian Images <strong>and</strong> Issues’. Buffy Goes Dark.<br />
Ed. Lynne Y. Edwards, Elizabeth L. Rambo <strong>and</strong> James B. South. Jefferson: McFarl<strong>and</strong>,<br />
2009. 41–56.