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cil (NSC). With Nixon's strong encouragement, Henry Kiss- inger transformed the NSC system into a personal foreign policy secretariat within the White House. As head of the reformed and revitalized NSC, Kissinger occupied the "super- official" position of assistant to the President for national security affairs, with more powers than those who, since Eisenhower's presidency, had served as special assistants for national security affairs. Ultimately, Kissinger chaired six special committees operating just below the NSC level, in- cluding the controversial Committee of 40, which oversaw all covert CIA activity abroad. The reorganized NSC also created a conceptual framework for formulating U.S. foreign policy by establishing a series of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs). These were drafted by NSC staff and signed by Nixon or by Kissinger on behalf of the President. The NSSMs directed various agencies and interdepartmental groups within the government to prepare detailed policy or "area" options, not policy recommendations, which were then passed on by Kissinger to members of the National Security Council, who sometimes argued over them in Nixon's presence. However, since these "formal options" were written, Nixon did not always need them orally debated by the NSC. Nixon seems to have relied most heavily on these NSSMs in his first two years in office and less so in subsequent years. The NSSM system was designed to prevent the State Depart- ment and other executive departments from becoming ad- vocates of particular policies by relegating them to the roles of analysts rather than policymakers. According to political scientist Alexander George, this "Nixinger" system for for- mulating foreign policy became the "most centralized and highly structured model yet employed by any American Presi- dent." It is this system with minor variations that is still operative almost twenty years after its creation. It is sometimes said that, when Nixon created the Urban Affairs Council (UAC) with its colorful executive secretary Patrick Moynihan, this made Moynihan the Henry Kissinger of domestic policy, because the UAC was presumably based on the emerging NSC model. Such a comparison has proven misleading for a number of reasons, not the least of which was Moynihan's lack of attention to management skills. More- over, Moynihan's presence in the White House was always more tenuous than Kissinger's, not only because he was a Democrat, but also because Nixon had appointed as counselor to the Presi- viii Nixon Papers, Part 5. H. R. Haldeman Notes dent for domestic affairs, Arthur Bums, whose views opposed and often neutralized those of the head of the UAC. Despite the lack of centralization that characterized the struc- ture for formulating foreign policy, Nixon's first administra- tion actively pursued five areas of domestic reform: welfare, civil rights, economic and environmental policy, and reorganization of the federal government. In all these areas, even though his welfare reform failed to pass Congress, Nix- on's positive domestic programs may be remembered longer than his currently better known foreign policy activities, because fewer of them have been dismantled or neglected by his successors in the White House. Obviously, the domestic record of Richard Milhous Nixon will forever remain tarnished by a negative series of events, in- cluding wiretaps, the creation of the "plumbers" unit within the White House to plug information leaks and ultimately to conduct break-ins, the harassment of individuals on an "enemies" list, the misuse of the CIA to infiltrate and in- vestigate a variety of protest organizations, and temporary con- sideration given to the "Houston Plan," which would have institutionalized surveillance of suspect groups and individuals. These events climaxed with the Watergate break-ins in May and June 1972 and the subsequent attempts by the President and his closest aides to cover up these and other illegal acts. While Watergate was probably an accident waiting to hap- pen, given the "hardball" nature of U.S. politics by 1972, this does not excuse the break-ins or the cover-up that resulted in a President of the United States resigning before he could be impeached for obstructing justice. However, if historians or other students of the American presidency continue to insist that Richard Nixon was an aberration, rather than an all too common product of the American political system, as a peo- ple we will have learned little from Watergate. It is time to re- evaluate, rather than simply rehash the positive as well as the negative lessons from the administration of the thirty-seventh President of the United States. This microfiche edition of the first papers released from the Nixon White House Central Files makes such a scholarly réévaluation possible outside the facihties of the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and Alexandria, Virginia. Joan Hoff-Wilson Professor of History Indiana University

INTRODUCTION TO H.R. HALDEMAN: NOTES OF WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS This introduction describes the Haldeman Notes, a subfile of the White House Special Files, Papers of Harry R. Haldeman. This subfile has been microflched and constitutes Part 5 of UPA's Papers of the Nixon White House series. H.R. Haldeman began his political career as an advance man for Richard Nixon's 1956 vice presidential campaign; subsequently, he worked in Nixon's 1960 presidential cam- paign as tour manager, in the 1962 California gubernatorial campaign as manager, and in the 1968 presidential campaign as chief of staff. Haldeman's official title while he served in the White House was assistant to the President, but in fact, he operated as the President's chief administrative officer and chief of staff. Haldeman's many responsibilities included those of staff manager, timekeeper, and communications director. Directing the operation of the President's appoint- ments secretary and the White House staff secretary were Haldeman's two most important and time-consuming duties. The planning of the President's daily schedule was a gruel- ing and ever-changing process. Cabinet members, senior government officials, White House staffers, congressmen, senators, governors, labor leaders, businessmen, campaign contributors, foreign officials, and many others all wanted to meet the President to lobby for their own issues. It was Haldeman's duty to select those individuals or groups who would meet with the President; to this end, Haldeman met fre- quently with President Nixon to discuss who the President wanted to see and who Haldeman thought really needed to see the President. It was the role of the White House staff secretary to pro- vide the President with information he requested and to distribute instructions from the President to the White House staff and members of the executive branch. Haldeman directed this vast operation, making sure that directives from the Presi- dent were acted upon. Usually it was Haldeman who personal- ly recorded these directives from the President. In H.R. Haldeman, Richard Nixon had a loyal and long- term assistant who was both a master of detail and a hard taskmaster for the White House staff and members of the ex- ecutive branch. This allowed the President to concentrate on policy, politics, and public relations, and to avoid time- consuming details and personal confrontations. Haldeman became an extremely powerful figure, as he controlled both whom the President met and what the President read. Only a few individuals, most notably Henry Kissinger, were able to circumvent Haldeman. In addition to his duties as an assistant to Nixon the Presi- dent, Haldeman was also a political agent for Nixon the can- didate. Having worked for Richard Nixon in all of his cam- paigns from 1956 to 1968, Haldeman was part of the inner cir- cle that prepared for the 1972 presidential election. To accomplish his duties Haldeman spent much of his time with the President. Except during a foreign policy crisis, Haldeman was the first and last person to see the President each day. He was usually present for the most important meetings of the President with other White House and ex- ecutive branch officials and often spent long periods alone with President Nixon, acting as a sounding board for the Presi- dent's thoughts. This was especially true when the President was at Camp David, Key Biscayne, or San Clemente. Haldeman almost always travelled with the President, but when he was not physically near the President, they kept in close contact by telephone. Included in the files of H.R. Haldeman are the handwrit- ten notes taken at meetings and during telephone conversa- tions mainly with the President but also with other White House staffers, members of the executive branch, con- gressmen, senators, and others. These meeting notes were kept religiously, beginning on January 12,1969, until Haldeman's resignation. Haldeman used his notes to record the President's directives and, in addition, would record in an abbreviated form entire presidential monologues. One reason these papers are so important is that these notes were kept for Haldeman's use only. He recorded the true in- tent of President Nixon in blunt language. These notes were then used to produce official memoranda or verbal com- munications. This documentation probably would not have survived or been opened in this century had the files not been seized by the FBI after Haldeman resigned on April 30,1973. A second reason these notes are important is that, even though Nixon's tape recordings from the Oval Office, Cabinet Room, and his Executive office Building (EOB) office will someday be opened, many of his conversations will not be found in the tapes or will not be understandable. Tape recording did not actually begin until February 1971. No such recordings were ever made at Camp David, Key Biscayne, San Clemente, Air Force One, or in any other rooms at the White House or the EOB. When recordings did take place, the quality is often very poor. Anyone who has listened to the Watergate tapes, which are open, will know how difficult it is to understand what is being discussed. The clinking of coffee cups, the shuffling of papers, people speaking at the same time, and people speak- ing away from the microphones make using the tapes a dif- ficult and sometimes fruitless endeavor. The subject matter recorded in Haldeman's handwritten notes covers a wide range, from Watergate and the Vietnam War to what clothes to wear at a social function or what wine to serve for a state dinner. Fortunately, important subjects such as the ITT affair, the Pentagon Papers, and the 1972 presiden- tial campaign were recorded in much more detail and length than minor administrative or social topics. A researcher Nixon Papers, Part 5. H. R. Haldeman Notes IX

INTRODUCTION TO<br />

H.R. HALDEMAN:<br />

NOTES OF WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS<br />

This introduction describes the Haldeman Notes, a subfile<br />

of the White House Special Files, Papers of Harry R.<br />

Haldeman. This subfile has been microflched and constitutes<br />

Part 5 of UPA's Papers of the Nixon White House series.<br />

H.R. Haldeman began his political career as an advance<br />

man for Richard Nixon's 1956 vice presidential campaign;<br />

subsequently, he worked in Nixon's 1960 presidential cam-<br />

paign as tour manager, in the 1962 California gubernatorial<br />

campaign as manager, and in the 1968 presidential campaign<br />

as chief of staff. Haldeman's official title while he served in<br />

the White House was assistant to the President, but in fact,<br />

he operated as the President's chief administrative officer and<br />

chief of staff. Haldeman's many responsibilities included<br />

those of staff manager, timekeeper, and communications<br />

director. Directing the operation of the President's appoint-<br />

ments secretary and the White House staff secretary were<br />

Haldeman's two most important and time-consuming duties.<br />

The planning of the President's daily schedule was a gruel-<br />

ing and ever-changing process. Cabinet members, senior<br />

government officials, White House staffers, congressmen,<br />

senators, governors, labor leaders, businessmen, campaign<br />

contributors, foreign officials, and many others all wanted to<br />

meet the President to lobby for their own issues. It was<br />

Haldeman's duty to select those individuals or groups who<br />

would meet with the President; to this end, Haldeman met fre-<br />

quently with President Nixon to discuss who the President<br />

wanted to see and who Haldeman thought really needed to<br />

see the President.<br />

It was the role of the White House staff secretary to pro-<br />

vide the President with information he requested and to<br />

distribute instructions from the President to the White House<br />

staff and members of the executive branch. Haldeman directed<br />

this vast operation, making sure that directives from the Presi-<br />

dent were acted upon. Usually it was Haldeman who personal-<br />

ly recorded these directives from the President.<br />

In H.R. Haldeman, Richard Nixon had a loyal and long-<br />

term assistant who was both a master of detail and a hard<br />

taskmaster for the White House staff and members of the ex-<br />

ecutive branch. This allowed the President to concentrate on<br />

policy, politics, and public relations, and to avoid time-<br />

consuming details and personal confrontations. Haldeman<br />

became an extremely powerful figure, as he controlled both<br />

whom the President met and what the President read. Only<br />

a few individuals, most notably Henry Kissinger, were able to<br />

circumvent Haldeman.<br />

In addition to his duties as an assistant to Nixon the Presi-<br />

dent, Haldeman was also a political agent for Nixon the can-<br />

didate. Having worked for Richard Nixon in all of his cam-<br />

paigns from 1956 to 1968, Haldeman was part of the inner cir-<br />

cle that prepared for the 1972 presidential election.<br />

To accomplish his duties Haldeman spent much of his time<br />

with the President. Except during a foreign policy crisis,<br />

Haldeman was the first and last person to see the President<br />

each day. He was usually present for the most important<br />

meetings of the President with other White House and ex-<br />

ecutive branch officials and often spent long periods alone<br />

with President Nixon, acting as a sounding board for the Presi-<br />

dent's thoughts. This was especially true when the President<br />

was at Camp David, Key Biscayne, or San Clemente.<br />

Haldeman almost always travelled with the President, but<br />

when he was not physically near the President, they kept in<br />

close contact by telephone.<br />

Included in the files of H.R. Haldeman are the handwrit-<br />

ten notes taken at meetings and during telephone conversa-<br />

tions mainly with the President but also with other White<br />

House staffers, members of the executive branch, con-<br />

gressmen, senators, and others. These meeting notes were kept<br />

religiously, beginning on January 12,1969, until Haldeman's<br />

resignation. Haldeman used his notes to record the President's<br />

directives and, in addition, would record in an abbreviated<br />

form entire presidential monologues.<br />

One reason these papers are so important is that these notes<br />

were kept for Haldeman's use only. He recorded the true in-<br />

tent of President Nixon in blunt language. These notes were<br />

then used to produce official memoranda or verbal com-<br />

munications. This documentation probably would not have<br />

survived or been opened in this century had the files not been<br />

seized by the FBI after Haldeman resigned on April 30,1973.<br />

A second reason these notes are important is that, even though<br />

Nixon's tape recordings from the Oval Office, Cabinet Room,<br />

and his Executive office Building (EOB) office will someday<br />

be opened, many of his conversations will not be found in the<br />

tapes or will not be understandable. Tape recording did not<br />

actually begin until February 1971. No such recordings were<br />

ever made at Camp David, Key Biscayne, San Clemente, Air<br />

Force One, or in any other rooms at the White House or the<br />

EOB. When recordings did take place, the quality is often very<br />

poor. Anyone who has listened to the Watergate tapes, which<br />

are open, will know how difficult it is to understand what is<br />

being discussed. The clinking of coffee cups, the shuffling of<br />

papers, people speaking at the same time, and people speak-<br />

ing away from the microphones make using the tapes a dif-<br />

ficult and sometimes fruitless endeavor.<br />

The subject matter recorded in Haldeman's handwritten<br />

notes covers a wide range, from Watergate and the Vietnam<br />

War to what clothes to wear at a social function or what wine<br />

to serve for a state dinner. Fortunately, important subjects such<br />

as the ITT affair, the Pentagon Papers, and the 1972 presiden-<br />

tial campaign were recorded in much more detail and length<br />

than minor administrative or social topics. A researcher<br />

Nixon Papers, Part 5. H. R. Haldeman Notes IX

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