Biannual Review published by the Alphonsian ... - Studia Moralia

575
VILCHES LANDIN, Octavio (Messico - s.j.): Le conseguenze morali
della negazione di Dio nel romanzo itI demoni" di F.M. Dostoevskij.
VIVA, Vincenzo (Italia - diocesi di Nardo): Ragione e fede nella
teologia morale di Franz Xaver Linsenmann (1835-1898).
Un 'indagine nella storia della teologia morale in prospettiva sistematica.
WICKRAMASINGHE, Raymoncl Kingsley (Sri Lanka - diocesi di
Galle): Refugees: A Pastoral Challenge, with a Special Reference
to the Sri Lankan Church.
WUTH MUNOZ, Maria Ines (Cile - diocesi di Santiago): La educación
del sentido etico en Marciano Vidal.
6.4. Diploma in teologia morale
Nel corso dell'anno accaclemico 1997-1998, 1 studente ha ottenuto
il diploma in teologia morale:
KIRUPANANTHAN, Alfred M. (Sri Lanka - c.m.f.): The Claretian
Social Mission with Regards to Sri Lanka.
DANIELLE GROS
Segretaria Generale

StMor 36 (1998) 577-586
REAL TREMBLAY C.Ss.R.
BREVES REFLEXIONS SUR LA SIGNIFICATION
DU DOCTORAT DE THERESE DE LISIEUX
POUR LE MESSAGE MORAL DE L'EGLISE
D'AlTJOURD'HUI
"Dieu veut etre aime plus qu'il ne veut etre
craint. Dieu demande parce qu'il ne veut pas
tellement etre Seigneur qu'etre pere. Dieu demande
avec misericorde pour ne pas exiger
avec rigueur" PIERRE CHRYSOLOGUE.
A la suite d'un processus relativement court de rumination
dans l'Eglise l , Therese de l'Enfant-Jesus et de la Sainte-Face fut,
le 19 octobre 1997, proclamee docteur de l'Eglise par Jean-Paul
lP. II est incontestable que cet evenement a une portee ecclesiale
qu'il est difficile, pour le moment, de mesurer dans tous les de-
J Pour un bon apen;u de la question, voir la positio de la CONGREGATION
POUR LES CAUSES DES SAINTS dont le rapporteur fut le R. P. DANIEL OLS o.p. et
qui fut publiee sous le titre: Corzcessionis tituli doctoris ecclesiae universalis
sanctae Teresiae a Jesu Infante et a Sacra Vultu, Cabellione, 1997, 940p. (sans
compter l'appendice iconographique).
2 Voir a cet egard la Lettre Apostolique Divini Amoris Scierztia dans DC
XCIV(l997), 901-907 (pour la traduction fninc;aise). En lien avec la proclamation
du doctorat theresien, plusieurs ouvrages et articles ont deja ete publies.
Parmi ceux-ci, voir: F-M. LETHEL, L'amour de Jesus. La christologie de
sairzte Therese de l'Enfant-Jesus, (JJC.,72), Paris, 1997, 260p.; P. DESCOUVE­
MONT, Sainte Therese de Lisieux docteur de l'Eglise. Guide de lecture, Paris,
1997, 406p.; A.M. SICARl, La teologia di s. Teresa di Lisieux dottore della Chiesa
(Gia e non ancora, 328), Milano, 1997, 460p; S. PINCKAERS, Therese de l'Enfant-Jesus,
docteur de l'Eglise, dans RT 98(1997), 512-524. Parmi les diverses
contributions parues dans l'Osservatore Romano a l'occasion de la proclamation
du doctorat theresien, voir entre autres celles de D. OLS, Teresa fra i
Dottori, dans OR., 22.10.1997, 1.6.; J. CASTELLANO CERVERA, La sua emirzente
dottrirza, in Ibid. Les autres travaux sont signes par C. MACCISE, M. PAOLINEL­
LI, A. PIGNA, E. GHINI et sont publies dans OR., 19.10. 1997,6.

BREVES REFLEXIONS SUR LA SIGNIFICATION DU OOCTORAT DE THERESE ... 583
Et cette infidelite du fils aine a la pensee du Pere, mieux au
"coeur" patemel, s'enracine dans un tort encore plus radical: celui
de n 'avoir pas compris, refu et wicu sa filiation, son statut, sa
realite de fils. C'est dire que pour contrer a la fois relativisme et
rigorisme moraux et pour cheminer selon les exigences illimitees
de l'amour I'Eglise d'aujourd'hui est plus que jamais conviee
ane miser que sur la grace de la filiation divine. C'est ce que
rappelle Therese par sa sensibilite a la misericorde. Dieu est Pere
et nous sommes ses enfants.
D) Comme je viens a peine de le suggerer, l'insistance de
Therese sur la misericorde est intimement liee a cetle perception
de Dieu comme Pere 10. Cette perception est chez elle si massive
que la paternite de Dieu n'est pas l'un des principes (a cote d'autres)
sur lequel peut se fonder une vie chretienne comme si, par
exemple, outre la misericorde de Dieu, il fallait tenir compte
aussi de sa justice. La patemite de Dieu qui se traduit en misericorde
en face de la misere humaine est l'unique fondement ultime
de la morale chretienne. Voila le sens de la protestation que
constitue son "offrande comme victime d'holocauste a l'Amour
misericordieux du Bon Dieu", en face d'une spiritualite qui cultivait
les victimes d'holocauste a la justice divine. Ce faisant,
10 En citant Gorres, Balthasar fait cette remarque tout a fait pertinente:
""Papa, le bon Dieu" (dit Therese). C'est le biblique "Abba" de Jesus. La, derriere,
se tient 'Timage de son propre pere qui, pour elle, refletait, comme les
gouttes de rosee le soleil, l'amour paternel de celui dont toute paternite tire
son nom"" O.C., 134. Et, dans la meme orbite, ce texte particulierement lucide
et eclairant: "Dans le surnaturel, Therese ne realise que ce qu'elle a, de
quelque maniere, vecu dans le naturel. Peut-etre n'a-t-elle rien de plus intime
et de plus irresistible que l'amour de son pere et de sa mere. C'est pourquoi
son image de Dieu est determinee par l'amour de l'enfant pour ses parents.
A Louis et a Zelie Martin nous devons finalement la doctrine de la "petite
voie", la doctrine de 'Tenfance", car ils ont rendu vivant en Therese de
l'Enfant-Jesus le Dieu qui est plus que pere et mere. A la difference de la
grande Therese, la petite Therese n'a pas connu le mariage mystique. Car
quand elle appelle Jesus son epoux, cette expression reste aussi pale et aussi
nalve qu'elle peut l'etre dans la bouche d'un petit enfant. C'est un nom tendre
pour Jesus, qu'elle repete, sans etre touchee par la mystique nuptiale
reelle, reconnaissante d'avoir trouve un nouveau nom pour l'aime. Mais que
Dieu doive etre son pere, voila qui la subjugue jusqu'aux larmes" O.C., 139.

584 REAL TREMBLAY C.SS.R.
Therese ne conteste pas le Heu theologique authentique que peut
representer une telle vocation, mais pour elle il ne peut pas avoir
le caractere fondamental, universel et ultime qu'a celui de l'offrande
a l'Amour. S'il est legitime d'affirmer que Dieu est juste, il
n'est pas indifferent que saint Jean affirme que "Dieu est amour"
(1 In 4, 8.16) plut6t que d'affirmer que "Dieu est justice"ll.
Dans le meme ordre d'idees, ajoutons encore ceci. Dans son
opposition toute paulinienne a la justice des oeuvres, on pourrait
dire que Therese propose une sorte de tutiorisme de l'amour
qu'il est permis d'opposer aussi bien au tutiorisme pharisaYque
du fils aine qu'au relativisme moral du "fils prodigue". Ce tutiorisme
de l'amour ou, si l'on veut, la dicision de ne compter que
sur l'a1nour contient pourtant bien une relativisation de la perfection
morale ou mieux d'une certaine "perfection" morale. lci,
il faudrait explorer le sens de la felix culpa chez Therese l2 . Si l'on
se replace en l'occurrence dans la perspective de la parabole du
"fils prodigue", on pourrait dire que le Pere se desole de ce que
le flIs aine n'ait pas decouvert sa "liberte de flIs".
E) En Hen avec les considerations de depart sur la "verite de
l'evangile" qui doit etre une verite vecue, incarnee, je voudrais,
en guise de conclusion aces breves ref1exions, insister sur le souci
de Therese de demasquer en elle l'existence possible du mensonge
pour marcher exclusivement dans la verite. Son experience
spirituelle qui, presque a son insu, croissait a une vitesse vertigineuse
et prenait, animee par l'Esprit, des formes aussi inedi­
11 Sur ce point, voir les pages capitales du Manuscrit A 83vo-84vo, dans
OC, 211-213 a la lumiere desquelles ces lignes sont ecrites. Signalons que la
pensee de Therese a des antecedents dans la tradition. Temoin parmi bien
d'autres le beau texte de Pierre Chrysologue cite en exergue [Hom. s. Ze sacrifice
spiritueZ, 108 (PL 52, 499)]. On se souvient de ce sermon impressionnant
ou l.H. NEWMAN, encore anglican, montre comment Satan, instigateur
du mensonge par l'accent mis sur un aspect de la verite aux depens de toute
la verite, defigure le visage du Christ en insistant exclusivement et selon les
circonstances tant6t sur sa justice, tantót sur sa bienveillance (d. ParochiaZ
and PZain Sen11.ons, t. 1, London, 1910, 310ss). Il est bien evident que Therese
ne s'est pas laissee prendre a ce genre de machination.
12 Cf. par exemple Lettre 230, dans OC, 592-593.

BREVES REFLEXIONS SUR LA SIGNIFICATION DU OOCTORAT DE THERESE ... 585
tes qu'etonnantes dans leur simplicite; le caractere original de sa
doctrine ou plutót sa maniere de mettre dans un relief nouveau
des verites aussi anciennes que l'evangile et de se sentir poussee
a les ranger selon une ordonnance encore jamais vue faisaient
que Therese se posait souvent la question: suis-je dans l'illusion
ou suis-je dans la verite? "Therese, ecrit justement Balthasar,
combat [...] avec le glaive de la verite contre les armees opaques
du mensonge qui, inquietantes, indiscernables, toutes proches,
la cernent de tous cótes"13. Atitre d'exemple de cette attitude qui
la tourmente, epinglons ce moment si important de sa vie OU elle
prend conscience de sa vocation d'etre "dans le Coeur de l'Eglise
[...] tout, (d'etre) l'Amour"14. "Mes immenses desirs, se demande-t-elle,
ne sont-ils pas un reve, une folie? ... Ah! s'il en est
ainsi, Jesus, eclaire-moi, tu le sais, je cherche la verite"ls. Et cela
ajoute a toutes les fois OU elle affirme que tout ce qu'elle a ecrit
sur tel ou tel sujet comme, par exemple, sur son desir de la souffrance,
"c'est bien vrai"16. Ce verdict tombe dru et incontournable
parce qu'il possede la consistance de l'experience qu'elle a elle-meme
suscitee ou qu'illui fut donne de vivre.
Qui niera l'importance d'une telle attitude dans un contexte
OU la vie morale des chretiens est placee devant tant de defis
encore inedits avec le danger que cela comporte de prendre
parti pour des solutions partielles et partiales... A la fin de ces
quelques pages, on pourrait transcrire ce texte prononce par une
Therese desormais presque aux portes de la mort ou plutót de la
Vie en souhaitant qu'il passe dans la chair et le sang de chaque
membre du Peuple de Dieu en general et en particulier de tous
ceux d'entre eux qui ont mission de verite:
"Je n'ai jamais fait comme Pilate qui refusa d'entendre la verite.
J'ai toujours dit au bon Dieu: O mon Dieu, je veux bien vous
13 O.c., 38.
14 Manuscrit B 3vo, dans OC, 226.
15 Manuscrit B 4vo, dans OC, 229. (C'est moi qui souligne). Sur la hantise
de Therese pour la verite, voir encore: Manuscrit A 78ro dans OC 202; Cahier
Jaune, 9.5.1; 4.8.3; 5.8.4; 3.9.1; 30.9, dans OC, 996; 1076; 1078; 1120; 1144.
16 Cahier Jaune, 25.9.2; 30.9, dans OC, 1137;1144. C'est moi qui souligne.

586 REAL TREMBLAY C.SS.R.
entendre, je vous en supplie, repondez-moi quand je vous dis
humblement: Qu'est-ce que la verite? Faites que je voie les choses
telles qu'elles sont, que rien ne me jette de poudre aux
yeux"17.
Via Merulana, 31 REAL TREMBLAY C.Ss.R.
I - 00185 Roma
C.P.2458
Roma - Italy
The author is Professor of Fundamental Maral theology at the
Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor ordinario de Teologia Maral Funclamental
en la Acaclemia Alfonsiana.
17 Cahier Jaune, 21.7.4, dans OC, 1053.

StMor 36 (1998) 587-595
BRIAN V. JOHNsTaNE C.Ss.R.
BERNHARD HARING: AN APPRECIATION
Born in 1912 at Bottingen (Germany), Bernard Haring,
C.Ss.R. was ordained by Cardinal Faulhaber in 1939, and
immediately after was conscripted into the German Army. He
served as a medical orderly in France, Poland and Russia, and
this experience of suffering and of human goodness, even in the
midst of barbarous conditions, had a profound impact on his
understanding of faith and theology. lt also left him deeply
convinced of the danger of blind acceptance of human authority.
Haring gained his doctorate in theology at Tiibingen in 1947 and
taught moral theology first at Gars am lnn and then in Rome, at
the Accademia Alfonsiana, from 1950 to 1953, and from 1957 to
his retirement in 1988. He died at Gars am Inn on July 3 rd • 1998
at the age of 85.
This notice will seek to describe the place of Bernard Haring's
work within the tradition of Catholic moral theology. It is not
intended as an apologia nor as a panegyric. lt will not enter into
the controversies that some of his positions have aroused; this
would be inappropriate to the occasion and impossible to carry
through in such a brief reflection. Throughout his life, including
his later years, Haring published a large number of works on
spirituality and what might be called contributions to
quaestiones disputatae. In this short account it is not possible to
comment on these and I will limit myself to those writings
dedicated to more basic issues of moral theology. The aim is to
identify the positive and distinctive contribution that he made
and those features of his work which may have enduring
significance. These are, I suggest, twofold: first, on the level of
moral theory, the proposal of the fidelity of God calIing for
human fidelity as the fundamental framework of moral theology
and second, on the level of pastorai practice, the presentation of
the Christian moral life, not as a grim submission to imposed
law, but as a good life, hopeful, liberating and joyful.

588 BRIAN V. JOHNSTaNE C.SS.R.
Haring clearly understood himself as a Catholic moral
theologian, committed to the Church and its Tradition. Moral
theological thinking for him meant thinking within the faith of
the Church. Haring's moral theology has many features that
have met with well nigh universal commendation. He set out to
found moral theology on the BibIe, to draw from the liturgy
those symbols which might shape the moral imagination of
Christians, to overcome the unfortunate separation of moral
theology and spirituality, to take into account the findings of the
human sciences and above all to link theological reflection more
closely to pastoraI practice. Particularly noteworthy was his
ecumenical openness to the theologies of other traditions in
particular that of the Orthodox Churches. Rather than repeat
what has already been written about these points by others, I
will seek to identify the background and the importance of what
Haring set out to do.
I propose, firstly, a map of some of the major movements in
moral theology up to and during the time in which Haring
developed his own approach. Taking a very broad view, we can
identify three streams within the tradition of moral theology,
each of which can be described in terms of its background
framework or ontology. By this last term I mean the way in
which people understood themselves and their place in the
world, what they took to be the sources of moral knowledge and
how they conceived moral truth.
The first, which prevailed from the earliest centuries of the
Church up to the modern era, we could call the Christian
Neoplatonic mode. In this view, the world itself was an
expression of ordered reason, and ultimately of the divine
wisdom, which set the purposes of the beings within it. The
moral task was to discover these purposes and express them in
choice and action. Moral truth was the due embodiment of this
reason in human thought and action.
In the second model, of which St. Thomas Aquinas was the
major inovator, the subject acquires a more distinctive role. For
Thomas, the object of the will is that proposed by the reason of
the subject, not simply that delivered to the subject by the
reason inherent in the cosmos itself (S. Th. I-II, q. 19, aa. 3, 5)
This subject, however, is still, by its very being, related to the
world that embodies divine reason and has itself meaning and

BERNHARD HARING: AN APPREClATION
589
goodness. By uworld" is meant all those relationships by which
the subject is ontologically related to the other - to God, to
human persons, to other creatures. It is these relationships
which give meaning and direction to freedom and which, when
articulated by reason, and engaged by the will, constitute the
maral order. Moral truth is generated in relationships; it can be
accounted for as a ucorrespondence", but this means not merely
a static similarity, but one that is actively constituted.
The third transformation within the tradition is
characterized by a uturn to the subject." This immensely
complex movement included theological currents within a
profound cultural change; a very simplified account must suffice
here. It involved a certain splitting off of the subject from the
world and a loss of the sense of an inherent relationship between
the two. The term objective was now defined as separate fram
the subjective, and subjective meant turned away from the world
into the self. The second model situated the subject within a
world of beings moving towards their proper ends, and
accordingly moral theology began with an inquiry into the true
good of the human subject. In the style of moral theology that
emerged with the third model, this question is now reduced to a
remnant, and attention shifts to the separated subject, and
specifically to conscience. Freedom, which had been conceived
of as meaningful only within an ordered world of ends, is naw
thought of as Ilfreedom of indifference." The subject now stands
over against a world that no longer embodies the goods which,
in the second model, had given to freedom its meaning and
possibility. The world now becomes something of merely
material significance in itself; it has moral significance only
when raised to the level of law by the divine will. Accordingly,
theories of the natural law emerged which held that the
structures of nature provided onIy indications of what couId be
done; for them to be morally obligatory the addition of the idea
of the divine will was necessary. These structures considered as
willed by God are taken as the source of Uobjective" marality,
such that acts contrary to them are necessarily materially sinful.
Consistently with their notion of the subject separated from the
world, moral theologians posited a second source of marality
within the separated subject. The good faith and right striving of
that subject now become a distinct point of reference for maral

BERNHARD HARING: AN APPRECIATION
591
corresponding to the division that characterized the third
model. One has been developed within an object oriented moral
theology, the other within the subjective variety. In the first case,
theologians have sought to develop an objective concept of the
person from which norms may be derived, just as formerly they
were derived from an objective notion of nature. That is, the
person is objectified in much the same way as the world had
been objectified in the earlier model. In the second version of
personalism, the person as separated subject is central. The true
self is to be uncovered by a process of disengaging from outer
layers, Le. modes of relating to the world, unti! the true inner
self is revealed.
This self now becomes the principal source of moral
theology. Notions like core freedom, fundamental option and
fundamental conscience are now explained in reference to this
separated self: the fundamental option, for example, is defined
as total self-understanding and radical self-expression.
The influence of the ontology of separation appears also in
other issues. For example, some who hold that there is no
specifically Christian ethic posit an objectified IIreason"
common to all as the foundation of ethics, and confine the
Christian element to motivation or perspective within the
subject. On the other hand, those who hold for a specifically
Christian ethic sometimes seem to be converting the BibIe into
an objectified law, imposing moral meaning on human actions
as if these had no such meaning in themselves. The
developments along these two lines, the object oriented and the
subject oriented, have led to significant divisions within moral
theology and to no little tension.
The various forms of transcendental theology are clearly
subject oriented: the subject, and some form of deduction of the
necessary conditions of moral experience are key elements.
Others again sought to elaborate a moral theology via a theory
of free choice. AlI these theories assumed in one way or another
that the consciousness of the subject was the point at which
moral reflection should begin. For some, the world is seen as
composed of non-moral facts which cannot be a source of moral
value. For others, the world is reduced to a collection of premoralor
ontic values to be related by a theory of proportion, as
in the method of proportionalism.

592 BRIAN V. }OHNSTONE C.SS.R.
Haring's personalism is of the subject-oriented variety.
However, he did not follow in a precise way any of the
approaches that have been outlined above under this heading.
He has sometimes been classified as a proportionalist, but such
an interpretation is quite mistaken. He refused to become
preoccupied with constructing norms; a fundamental concern,
as he saw it, for proportionalist theory. Values, character, and
especially in his later work, virtue, were at the center of his
moral theology. He believed in a specifically Christian ethic, but
did not attempt to use the BibIe as an extrinsic, objective law.
One might say that his endeavor was to overcome the divisions
inherent in the third model, from a starting point within the
subject oriented sub-tradition, through a theory of religious
experience, interpreted in biblical terms, with considerable help
from the value philosophy of Max Scheler.
In his later work (Free and Faith in Christ) Haring continued
to cite Scheler favorably, although less frequently, especially for
his theory of the hierarchy of value. Biblical terms, however, are
now given a more central role: thus the person becomes the
person /lin Christ." The dialogical character of the person is
stressed and developed with the help of psychological theory.
The significance of this dialogical element is, of course, Haring's
way of overcoming the split that had set the subject apart from
others and from the world. Haring, in fact, developed a new
implicit ontology expressed in terms such as the following:
"Those who want to live creative freedom and fidelity in Christ
ought to understand themselves, above all, in relationship with
God, with fellow men, themselves and all of creation." (Free and
Faithful in Christ J vol. 1. p. 85).
The implications of this basic position can be clearly seen,
for example, in Haring's writing on ecology. The theologies of
the subject, even when they took the form of the analysis of the
interrelationships between persons, still retained something of
the notion that the world itself is the realm of the non-moral.
Such a view may have been a major factor inhibiting the
development of environmental ethics within Roman Catholic
theology. Some theologians set·out to correct this deficient view
of the world by re-sacralizing it; giving it back the inherent value
of which it had been deprived. A variant of this can be seen in
the concern of ecologically minded philosophers to endow the

BERNHARD HA.RING: AN APPREClATION
593
world with "intrinsic vaIue." For Haring, however, respect for
creation is not be founded on a re-sacralization of nature but on
ecological responsibility. This includes responsibility, itself
understood in biblical terms, and a sacramental view of nature
coming from Orthodox theology. Haring was among the first to
introduce in a text on moral theology the topie of ecology (Free
and Faithful in Christ, vol. 3). For him, ecology is a relational
science that presumes and articulates the bonds between the
human subject and the world and thus flts well with his general
move beyond the separation of the third model. There have, of
course, been great advances since Haring wrote, but he deserves
credit for appreciating the importance of this subject relatively
early.
Haring's way of expressing his views may seem like a kind of
spiritual rhetoric rather than formai

594 BRIAN V. }OHNSTONE C.SS.R.
Greek concepts that have usually been adopted. I suggest that
the theme of fidelity, as proposed by Haring, is worthy of being
taken up and pursued further: it assumes an ontology rather
different from those adopted by moral theology in n10re recent
centuries.
There are other indications of a change of implicit ontology
in Haring' s work. For example, he has no interest in the notion
of "liberty of indifference." Freedom is meaningful only within
relationships and as directed by fidelity to those relationships,
above all of course to the relationships with Jesus Christ. What
he calls "the structure of responsibility" within the theme of
fidelity to covenant seems to have a role analogous to that of the
world of ends in earlier theologies. It situates liberty within a
trans-subjective framework, no longer drawing on Greek
philosophy, but on the biblical notion of human fidelity as
response to divine fidelity. These features also are worthy of
further reflection and research.
Haring developed his interpretation of the relation of the
subject to others and to the world in terms of a religious
experience of a vocation, calling for a response. Responsibility
thus became the central motif of his theology. The relationship
of call and response was itself articulated in terms of the BibIe,
with the loving response of the person to Jesus Christ as the
central theme. However, the theories of Scheler provided much
of the philosophical underpinning, although the degree of his
influence on Haring is an issue awaiting further research.
Scheler himself would have to be situated within the turn to the
subject, and as following a methodology of reflection on the
consciousness of the subject. Values, for him, are thus forms or
modes of consciousness; the a-priori grounds of feeling. Is this
dependence to be rated positively or is it a limitation on Haring's
thinking? Does it enable him to relate subject and world, or does
it hold his thinking within the subject oriented mode?
In particular, his writing on the theme of conscience is
worth further study. Haring, following St. Alphonsus, carried on
the affirmation of the dignity of personal conscience. This he
did, of course, in the theological context of this century,
situating personal conscience in community, and specifically in
the community of the Church. The emphasis is not on the
individual, separated conscience nor on conscience as

BERNHARD HARING: AN APPRECIATION
595
subsumed under objective law, but on the reciprocity of
consciences. Conscience is meant to be "creative" (another
notion taken from Scheler) which means always seeking after
higher values. Values are not mere ideas, but call for realization
in the world. Thus, for Haring, Bartolomea de las Casas
struggling on behalf of the Indios, and in sa doing contributing
significantly to the theory of rights, was the model of creativity.
However, Haring's major achievement was surely as a
pastorai theologian. The most immediate problem for maral
theology today, as he clearly recognized, is that too many people
experience the Christian moral life as a burden that has to be
borne rather than an attractive possibility of fuller life. Haring's
accomplishment, and the basis of the extraordinarily wicie
acceptance of his works in their time, was his presentation of the
maral life as a hopeful, joyful and liberating response to a
faithful and loving Gad, revealed to us in Christ. Such a vision,
I believe, is what Haring would have wished to contribute to the
Church as the fruit of his life's wark.
Accademia Alfonsiana BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.Ss.R.
Via Memlana 31
C.P.2458
00l 00 Roma, Italy
The author isordinary Professor of Systematic Moral Theology
at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor orclinario de Teologia Moral Sistematica de
la Academia Alfonsiana.

Reviews / Recensiones
Amor Pan J. R., Afectivitad y sexualidad en la persona eon deficiencia
11'zental. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 1997, 595p.
(Catedra de Bioetica 2).
II volume contiene una tesi difesa aHa Universita Pontificia
Comillas di Madrid intorno ad un probIerna delicato e oggi al centro
di un esteso dibattito, alimentato anche di recente dalle indicazioni
votate dal Parlamento europeo favorevoli alla sterilizzazione degli
handicappati mentali. Ovviamente la discussione sulla vita affettiva
e sessuale della persona con un deficit mentale non pUD essere ridotta
alI'uso della genitalita e tanto meno alIa questione - pur importante
- della liceita della sterilizzazione, essendo coinvolta tutta una
visione della vita umana, della sessualita, del matrimonio, della
fecondita. IIlavoro che presentiamo e notevole proprio per l'ampiezza
di orizzonti in cui cerca di muoversi e per la volonta di radicare la
riflessione etica in una salda prospettiva antropologica, nella quale
con gli apporti imprescindibili della sapienza teologica concorrono
le scienze umane J l'esperienza giuridica J la filosofia.
11 primo capitolo sintetizza i principali dati storici, meclici, psicologici
e sociologici del terna. Elaborando in modo originale le proposte
interpretative di D. Gracia, A. Aguado Diaz e R. C.
Scheerenberger, si percorrono gli atteggiamenti delle diverse eta culturali
dell'Occidente in rapporto con la deficienza mentale e, piu in
generale, con la malattia mentale e con ogni handicap che faccia
deviare un soggetto dai parametri sociali generalmente accettati:
vediamo cos! emergere, in mezzo a un vetusto e malsano intreccio cli
-:, Les ouvrages sont disposes selon l'ordre alphabetique. / The works are
arranged in alphabetical order.

598
emarginazione ed eugenismo, una eonsiderazione piu umana dell'harzdicap
mentale e una sempre piu ehiara rivendieazione della
dignita e dei diritti delI'handieappato mentale. Benehe resistano
aneora miti e pregiudizi, in partieolare riguardo alIa sessualita di
questi soggetti, la psiehiatria moderna ha offerto un notevole eontributo
per determinare i eonfini e le eoordinate di un territorio senza
clubbio malsieuro e seivoloso, introdueendo preeisi eriteri di valutazione,
rieonsiderando la eondizione di normalita e di handicap in
modo dinamico e interattivo rispetto alI'ambiente e alIe attese personali
e soeiali, sviluppando approeei pedagogici innovativi.
Dopo questo inquadramento generale, l'Autore affronta il nucleo
deI lavoro, la sessualita della persona eon deficit mentale, eon speciale
riferimento alIa defieenza mentale lieve (eon Ql Era 50 e 70) e
moderata (eon Ql Era 35 e 50). lnfatti "questi soggetti sono quelli ehe
possiedono maggiori eapaciHl cli sviluppo e di autonomia e, di eonseguenza,
sono quelli che presentano maggiori dilemmi morali in
relazione al sesso" (p. 29). Dal momento che non esiste un progetto
umano diverso per i eosiddetti normali e per gli handieappati, ma
soltanto eondizioni piu o meno favorevoli di attuazione deI medesimo
progetto, l'Autore giustamente prende l'avvio per la sua riflessione
traeeiando il profilo della persona eome "referenza etiea fondamentale"
e tematizzando una antropologia sessuale in prospettiva
esplicitamente teologiea. La eoneezione della sessualita come dimensione
eostitutiva della persona, come fattore propulsore deI divenire
personale, eome espressione privilegiata dell'affettivita e delI'an10re,
eostituisee la trama entro eui leggere il senso e il valore delIa sessualita
delIa persona eon deficit mentale: l'handieappato mentale e un
membro della eomunita civile a pieno diritto, e una ereatura fatta
anch'essa per l'ineontro, per l'autorealizzazione, per integrarsi in un
eontesto di relazioni umane, e una persona sessuata eon esigenze
sessuali adulte che devono essere rieonosciute dalla societa, ma
anche opportunamente orientate attraverso un intervento educativo
che non si trasformi in iperprotezione o eoartazione, ma si ispiri a
profondo rispetto per la persona.
Si apre a questo punto uno degli argomenti piu spinosi e eontroversi
di tutta la questione, quelIo deI tipo di edueazione sessuale
da offrire alI'handieappato mentale lieve e moderato, dei suoi metodi,
agenti e eontenuti. A questo aspetto ededieato il terzo capitolo deI
volume. Viene eomunemente ammesso ehe ogni persona ha diritto a
ricevere una edueazione adeguata per poter esplieare ed attuare le

600
sia deHa prole eventuale. Per molti handicappati mentali, nonostante
il desiderio - diversamente motivato - di sposarsi, il ritardo mentale
costituisce di fatto una barriera insormontabile per l'accesso alle
nozze, ma l'Autore ritiene che non sia corretto presumere una situazione
di incapacita e si studia "di scoprire, nel contesto di una antropologia
personalista, quei valori basilari che siano capaci di orientare
in maniera efficace e benefica la realta deH'amore coniugale Era i
deficienti mentali" (p. 388).
Senza negare i presupposti dottrinali sottesi, mi pare che la posizione
di Ramon Pan pecchi di un certo eccesso di ottimismo e che le
sue indicazioni possano riferirsi solo a situazioni pedagogicamente e
socialmente privilegiate, come quella che pub verificarsi in piccole
comunita che sostengano famiglie in cui gli sposi siano affetti da
handicap mentale (matrimonio con sostegno). E vero inoltre che "le
persone con deficit mentale soffrono per l'abisso che si apre Era le
loro aspirazioni - che dovremmo qualificare come legittime e che noi
stessi abbiamo contribuito a generare con la filosofia basata sui principi
di normalizzazione e di integrazione - e la incapacita che hanno
di formare una comunita coniugale, secondo la societa" (pp. 472­
473), ma eanche vero - a nostro parere - che compito di una buona
educazione e queHo di insegnare a realizzare se stessi in modo realistico,
senza coltivare attese impossibili e senza conformarsi a model­
Ii precostituiti.
La forzatura impressa dall'entusiasmo deHa tesi da difendere
conduce infine a proporre orientamenti difficilmente condivisibili
per quanto riguarda la fecondita nel matrimonio degli handicappati
mentali. Evitando di entrare in merito al problema delI'uso di contraccettivi
o delIa sterilizzazione nell'ambito delIa difesa dalIa violenza
sessuale (che in effetti e tutt'altra cosa dalla contraccezione),
l'Autore approva senza tentennamenti il ricorso a mezzi artificiali
per una perpetua esclusione deHa generazione di figli che la coppia
handicappata non potrebbe di regola accogliere ed educare responsabilmente.
Non si possono confondere, con Erettolosi e inopportuni
accostamenti, le situazioni dilemmatiche che si presentano neHa vita
deHe coppie normali, situazioni che talara possono condurre a vera
perplessita la coscienza, e l'esigenza di evitare la prole da parte di
queste coppie un po' speciali. Qui non si tratta - a nostro avviso - di
interrogarsi sulla derogabilita deHa norma operativa di Humanae
vitae, quanta piuttosto e piu radicalmente di domandarsi se passa
essere membro di una coppia, compagno o compagna di un'altra per­

601
sona in un patto coniugale, chi si presume non possa svolgere il
ruolo di padre o di madre per suo figlio.
Le osservazioni critiche - e chiaro - non tolgono nulla al nostro
apprezzamento per un lavoro pensato con amore, argomentato con
cura, articolato con intelligenza. Come ci ricorda l'Autore stesso,
"tutto converge nell'idea che nonostante tutto non si e ancora giunti
ad un traguardo definitivo" (p. 575) e quindi ben vengano gli studi
che stimolano la discussione e la riflessione nella comunita teologica.
MAURIZIO P. FAGGIONI, ofm
Benvenuto, Edoardo, Il Zieto annunzio ai poveri, Bologha: Centro
Editoriale Dehoniano, 1997, 363p. (Collana "Fede e Storia" 27).
This is a book to provoke theological discussion. In part, the
freshness of the ideas is due to the background of the author, as it is
hardly usual for someone with an international reputation in the
area of structural mechanics to enter the world of theological debate.
Benvenuto does exactly this, with a vigorous passion and with an eye
for those type of details which might escape the narrow focus of the
traditional theologian but which seem obvious to the trained gaze of
one interested in architecture. Not that the overall structure of the
book is all that novel: his triple division of sodal doctrine into three
periods (Leo XIII to Pius XI: Pius XII to Paul VI: John Paul II) has
paralleis with other authors. This triple division allows the author to
comment on the main magisterial documents of the period: he does
not, admittedly, follow a strictly chonological presentation, as most
do, but the internal structure of the book is recognizable and is the
background for a prolonged theological reflection in the concluding
chapters.
Basic to Benvenuto's approach is a grappling with what he sees
as a double paradox: why is it that Catholic sodal doctrine seems
always to start with magisterial documents (unlike other elements
within the theological enterprise) and why is it that the latest
document seems to subsume all previous documents (thereby risking
the loss of an appropriate historical perspective)? Because of these
paradoxes, it is Benvenuto's view that catholic sodal doctrine is often
more a collection of neat aphorisms than a strict analysis. The
guiding hermeneutical thread of Benvenuto's work is the search for

604
part of many that this is nowa self-standing theological corpus. A
more fruitful approach would be the following. The social question
is primarily an anthropological one about the meaning of human
life: it is not, therefore, in the first place a discussion about social
class, private property, political systems, capital and labour, or the
like. This primary anthropological analysis leads to a second level,
the more precisely theological question: here catholic social doctrine
must face the questions of the Church-world relationship (with its
echoes of the pure nature tradition, so ably weakened by De Lubac):
the theological task is to assure that catholic social ethics is truly
theological and, indeed, salvific: there can be no place for a social
doctrine based on an etsi Deus non daretur principle. The
methodology should be completed by a consideration of the
eschatological dimension, particularly important for social theology
because of the danger of confusing a prevailing spirit with the Spirit.
This framework is suggested by Benvenuto's book, though not
formally proposed. I propose it as a way of dealing with the
paradoxes raised by Benvenuto: the rich texture of the magisterial
contribution to catholic social doctrine will be better seen in its
historical contexts and developnlental possibilities if one places it
within prior criteria rather than, as too often happens, forcing the
texts to produce criteria that are not part of their theological or
literary scope.
RAPHAEL GALLAGHER C.Ss.R.
Biagi L., Pegoraro R. (a cura di), Religioni e Bioetica. Un confronto
sugli inizi della vita, Padova: Gregoriana Libreria Editrice, 1997,
495p.
II ricchissimo volume curato con singolare competenza da L.
Biagi, coordinatore deI Progetto Etica Filosofia e Teologia della
Fondazione Lanza di Padova, e da R. Pegoraro, docente di bioetica e
segretario della medesima Fondaziovle, raccoglie gli esiti di una serie
di seminari tenuti negli anni 1994-1995 con lo scopo di approfondire
il rapporto fra bioetica e religioni, prendendo come indicatore i
probIerni connessi con gli inizi delIa vita.
Nella societa tardo-moderna, caratterizzata dall'esaurirsi delIe
certezze ideologiche, dalla scomparsa delle metanarrazioni giustifi­