Commentary on Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians

Comm on Phil, Col, Thes
There are, in any action, two principal departments — the inclination, and the power to carry
it into effect. Both of these he ascribes wholly to God; what more remains to us as a ground of
glorying? Nor is there any reason to doubt that this division has the same force as if Paul had
expressed the whole in a single word; for the inclination is the groundwork; the accomplishment
of it is the summit of the building brought to a completion. He has also expressed much more than
if he had said that God is the Author of the beginning and of the end. For in that case sophists would
have alleged, by way of cavil, that something between the two was left to men. But as it is, what
will they find that is in any degree peculiar to us? They toil hard in their schools to reconcile with
the grace of God free-will — of such a nature, I mean, as they conceive of — which might be
capable of turning itself by its own movement, and might have a peculiar and separate power, by
which it might co-operate with the grace of God. I do not dispute as to the name, but as to the thing
itself. In order, therefore, that free-will may harmonize with grace, they divide in such a manner,
that God restores in us a free choice, that we may have it in our power to will aright. Thus they
acknowledge to have received from God the power of willing aright, but assign to man a good
inclination. Paul, however, declares this to be a work of God, without any reservation. For he does
not say that our hearts are simply turned or stirred up, or that the infirmity of a good will is helped,
but that a good inclination is wholly the work of God. 119
Now, in the calumny brought forward by them against us — that we make men to be like stones,
when we teach that they have nothing good, except from pure grace, they act a shameless part. For
we acknowledge that we have from nature an inclination, but as it is depraved through the corruption
of sin, it begins to be good only when it has been renewed by God. Nor do we say that a man does
anything good without willing it, but that it is only when his inclination is regulated by the Spirit
of God. Hence, in so far as concerns this department, we see that the entire praise is ascribed to
God, and that what sophists teach us is frivolous — that grace is offered to us, and placed, as it
were, in the midst of us, that we may embrace it if we choose; for if God did not work in us
efficaciously, he could not be said to produce in us a good inclination. As to the second department,
we must entertain the same view. “God,” says he, “is ̔Ο ἐνεργῶν το ἐνεργεῖν he that worketh in
us to do.” He brings, therefore, to perfection those pious dispositions which he has implanted in
us, that they may not be unproductive, as he promises by Ezekiel, —
“I will cause them to walk in my commandments.”
(Ezekiel 11:20.)
From this we infer that perseverance, also, is his free gift.
According to his good pleasure. Some explain this to mean — the good intention of the mind.
120 I, on the other hand, take it rather as referring to God, and understand by it his benevolent
disposition, which they commonly call beneplacitum, (good pleasure.) For the Greek word εὐδοκία
is very frequently employed in this sense; and the context requires it. For Paul has it in view to
ascribe everything to God, and to take everything from us. Accordingly, not satisfied with having
assigned to God the production both of willing and of doing aright, he ascribes both to his unmerited
mercy. By this means he shuts out the contrivance of the sophists as to subsequent grace, which
119 See Institutes, vol. 1, pp. 350, 353.
120 “Aucuns exposent le mot Grec, bon propos et bon cœur, le rapportans aux hommes;” — “Some explain the Greek word as
meaning, a good purpose and a good heart, making it refer to men.”
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John Calvin