Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
M o M e n t s Somme et le Reste. “We will call ‘Moment,’ ” he says, “the attempt to achieve the total realization of a possibility. Possibility offers itself; and it reveals itself. It is determined and consequently it is limited and partial. Therefore to wish to live it as a totality is to exhaust it as well as to fulfill it. The Moment wants to be freely total; it exhausts itself in the act of being lived.” 14 The “moment” assumed the same gravity for Lefebvre as white spaces between words did for the poet Stéphane Mallarmé. “The blank,” the latter said, intervenes in the text to such a degree that it becomes part of the work itself. It becomes a secret door letting the reader enter. Once inside the reader can subvert each verse, rearrange its rhythm, reappropriate the poem as a covert author: “The text imposes itself,” Mallarmé wrote, “in various places, near or far from the latent guiding thread, according to what seems to be the probable sense.” 15 Mallarmé’s poetry disrupted linear textual time much as Lefebvre’s theory of moments sought to disrupt Henri Bergson’s notion of linear real time—his durée, or duration. Creation, for Bergson, is like the flow of an arrow on a teleological trajectory. “The line [of the arrow] may be divided into as many parts as we wish,” Bergson said, “of any length that we wish, and it will always be the same line.” 16 Life itself, Bergson insisted, unfolds with similar temporality, and we comprehend ourselves in his unbroken, absolute time, not in space: “we perceive existence when we place ourselves in duration in order to go from that duration to moments, instead of starting from moments in order to bind them again and to construct duration.” 17 Lefebvre goes against the grain of time’s arrow of progress, building a framework of historical duration from the standpoint of the moment—from, in other words, the exact opposite pole to Bergson’s. Lefebvre hated Bergson’s guts. In La Somme et le Reste (Tome II, p. 383), he writes, pulling no punches, “If, during this period [1924–26], there was a thinker for whom we (the young philosophers group) professed without hesitation the most utter 27
H e n r i L e F e b v r e contempt, it was Bergson. This feeble and formless thinker, his pseudo-concepts without definition, his theory of fluidity and continuity, his exaltation of pure internality, made us physically sick.” Time, says Lefebvre, isn’t just about evolution but involution: “The duration, far from defining itself solely as linear and punctuated by discontinuities, re-orientates itself like a curl of smoke or a spiral, a current in a whirlpool or a backwash.” 18 The Lefebvrian moment, like Mallarmé’s, was there between the lines, in a certain space, at a certain time. It disrupted linear duration, detonated it, dragged time off in a different, contingent direction, toward some unknown staging post. The moment is thus an opportunity to be seized and invented. It is both metaphorical and practical, palpable and impalpable, something intense and absolute, yet fleeting and relative, like sex, like the delirious climax of pure feeling, of pure immediacy, of being there and only there, like the moment of festival, or of revolution. The moment was what Lefebvre on numerous occasions calls “the modality of presence.” A moment, be it that of contemplation or struggle, love and play, rest and poetry, is never absolutely absolute or unique. “There are,” he says, “a multiplicity of undefined instances,” even though, in the plurality, a specific moment is “relatively privileged,” relatively absolute, definable, and definitive, at least for a moment. 19 Each moment, accordingly, is a “partial totality” and “reflected and refracted a totality of global praxis,” including the dialectical relations of society with itself and the relations of social man with nature. Moments become absolute— indeed, Lefebvre says, they have a duty to define themselves absolutely. They propose themselves as impossible. They wager for random winnings, “for the heady thrill of chance.” 20 The entire life of a moment becomes a roll of the dice, a stack of chips at the casino of modern life. “The revolutionary aspect of non-linear time,” Lefebvre explains in La Somme et le Reste (Tome I, p. 236, original 2
- Page 11 and 12: F o r e w o r d Manhattan, meanwhil
- Page 13 and 14: F o r e w o r d He dramatizes this
- Page 15 and 16: F o r e w o r d couples staggering
- Page 18: Acknowledgments I’d like to thank
- Page 21 and 22: p r e F a c e rumpled brown tweed j
- Page 23 and 24: p r e F a c e always inquisitive, h
- Page 25 and 26: p r e F a c e * * * Lefebvre may ha
- Page 27 and 28: p r e F a c e if, in fact, he was r
- Page 29 and 30: p r e F a c e culture and tradition
- Page 31 and 32: p r e F a c e collaborator Norbert
- Page 33 and 34: p r e F a c e his frank concern for
- Page 36 and 37: 1 Everyday Life One finds all one w
- Page 38 and 39: e v e r y d a y L i F e warmth, bri
- Page 40 and 41: e v e r y d a y L i F e Marxist dia
- Page 42 and 43: e v e r y d a y L i F e familiar is
- Page 44 and 45: e v e r y d a y L i F e This is the
- Page 46 and 47: e v e r y d a y L i F e idealized v
- Page 48 and 49: e v e r y d a y L i F e of mechanic
- Page 50 and 51: e v e r y d a y L i F e everyday li
- Page 52 and 53: e v e r y d a y L i F e wrote “ea
- Page 54: e v e r y d a y L i F e my green ca
- Page 57 and 58: H e n r i L e F e b v r e “turbo-
- Page 59 and 60: H e n r i L e F e b v r e the poten
- Page 61: H e n r i L e F e b v r e possibili
- Page 65 and 66: H e n r i L e F e b v r e or collap
- Page 67 and 68: H e n r i L e F e b v r e the Frenc
- Page 69 and 70: H e n r i L e F e b v r e periphera
- Page 71 and 72: H e n r i L e F e b v r e Lefebvre
- Page 73 and 74: H e n r i L e F e b v r e feelings
- Page 75 and 76: H e n r i L e F e b v r e Lefebvre
- Page 77 and 78: H e n r i L e F e b v r e the Hotel
- Page 79 and 80: H e n r i L e F e b v r e found the
- Page 81 and 82: H e n r i L e F e b v r e thought i
- Page 83 and 84: H e n r i L e F e b v r e examinati
- Page 85 and 86: H e n r i L e F e b v r e with cohe
- Page 87 and 88: H e n r i L e F e b v r e in Quebec
- Page 89 and 90: H e n r i L e F e b v r e “the sc
- Page 91 and 92: H e n r i L e F e b v r e into a si
- Page 93 and 94: H e n r i L e F e b v r e common fo
- Page 95 and 96: H e n r i L e F e b v r e alienatio
- Page 97 and 98: H e n r i L e F e b v r e history,
- Page 99 and 100: H e n r i L e F e b v r e of a thou
- Page 101 and 102: H e n r i L e F e b v r e self-cons
- Page 103 and 104: H e n r i L e F e b v r e To some e
- Page 105 and 106: H e n r i L e F e b v r e nearby, c
- Page 107 and 108: H e n r i L e F e b v r e wherewith
- Page 109 and 110: H e n r i L e F e b v r e Estrada C
- Page 111 and 112: H e n r i L e F e b v r e twenty-th
M o M e n t s<br />
Somme et le Reste. “We will call ‘Moment,’ ” he says, “the attempt<br />
to achieve the total realization of a possibility. Possibility offers<br />
itself; and it reveals itself. It is determined and consequently it is<br />
limited and partial. Therefore to wish to live it as a totality is to<br />
exhaust it as well as to fulfill it. The Moment wants to be freely<br />
total; it exhausts itself in the act of being lived.” 14<br />
The “moment” assumed the same gravity for <strong>Lefebvre</strong> as white<br />
spaces between words did for the poet Stéphane Mallarmé. “The<br />
blank,” the latter said, intervenes in the text to such a degree that<br />
it becomes part of the work itself. It becomes a secret door letting<br />
the reader enter. Once inside the reader can subvert each verse,<br />
rearrange its rhythm, reappropriate the poem as a covert author:<br />
“The text imposes itself,” Mallarmé wrote, “in various places, near<br />
or far from the latent guiding thread, according to what seems to<br />
be the probable sense.” 15 Mallarmé’s poetry disrupted linear textual<br />
time much as <strong>Lefebvre</strong>’s theory of moments sought to disrupt<br />
<strong>Henri</strong> Bergson’s notion of linear real time—his durée, or duration.<br />
Creation, for Bergson, is like the flow of an arrow on a teleological<br />
trajectory. “The line [of the arrow] may be divided into as many<br />
parts as we wish,” Bergson said, “of any length that we wish, and<br />
it will always be the same line.” 16 Life itself, Bergson insisted,<br />
unfolds with similar temporality, and we comprehend ourselves in<br />
his unbroken, absolute time, not in space: “we perceive existence<br />
when we place ourselves in duration in order to go from that duration<br />
to moments, instead of starting from moments in order to bind<br />
them again and to construct duration.” 17<br />
<strong>Lefebvre</strong> goes against the grain of time’s arrow of progress,<br />
building a framework of historical duration from the standpoint<br />
of the moment—from, in other words, the exact opposite pole to<br />
Bergson’s. <strong>Lefebvre</strong> hated Bergson’s guts. In La Somme et le Reste<br />
(Tome II, p. 383), he writes, pulling no punches, “If, during this<br />
period [1924–26], there was a thinker for whom we (the young<br />
philosophers group) professed without hesitation the most utter<br />
27