Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
M y s t i F i e d c o n s c i o U s n e s s interpretation of Hegel, stressing the social and structural origins of “unhappy consciousness,” calling for solutions rooted in praxis not faith. This trajectory was immeasurably aided by another big formative event for Lefebvre: the rediscovery of the Hegelian origins of Marxism, as evinced with the debut appearance in the early 1930s of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts of 1844. Almost immediately he and Norbert Guterman began translating and popularizing Marx’s early writings, extracting them alongside snippets from Hegel. 10 The duo would drag Hegel closer and closer to Marx and Marx closer and closer to Hegel. In the process, they’d stake out a rich, heterodox Hegelian–Marxism in between. “The importance of Hegel’s Phenomenology,” wrote the young Marx, in a text many times studied by Lefebvre, “and its final result—the dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle—lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, [and] objectification as loss of object, as alienation.” 11 Yet the Hegelian fix to alienation, to unhappy consciousness, had recourse to the thinking alone, to abstract dialectical logic. All the drama is in the head; everything is form without any real content, any real materiality and concrete objectivity. People populate Hegel’s universe, but, as Marx said, they course around as mere “forms of consciousness,” as minds without men. Hegel, for Marx, “turns man into the man of consciousness, instead of turning consciousness into the consciousness of real men.” As such, Hegel posited a philosophical history not a philosophy of history. “This movement of history,” Marx claimed, “is not yet the real history of man as a given subject.” 12 Lefebvre’s originality lies in how he unites Hegel’s unhappy consciousness with young Marx’s humanist critique. In the mix, he warned neither individual nor collective forms of consciousness necessarily represent a criterion of truth: modern consciousness is a consciousness manipulated by ideology, ideology propagandized by state power. Different kinds of authority enter into 149
H e n r i L e F e b v r e people’s heads, fill their minds, and mist their brains. La Conscience Mystifiée shattered the prevailing Marxist idea that working-class consciousness had transparent access to reality, that it somehow reflected in its collective head what was really out there. The thinly disguised target here was comrade Georg Lukács, whose influential History and Class Consciousness (1923) became a staple for Third Internationalist Marxists. 13 Crucial for Lukács had been the concept of “reification”—of how, in capitalist society, relations between people take on a “phantom objectivity” as relations between “things.” Lukács located this “thingification” in the “commodity-structure” and suggested it was no accident that Marx began Capital with an analysis of commodities. The “fetish” commodity, said Lukács, became decisive “for the subjugation of men’s consciousness … and for their attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate themselves from servitude of the ‘second nature’ so created.” 14 Marx’s concept of fetishism illustrated how the human world becomes a fuzzy reality concealed by a material object, by a thing exchanged for another thing, money for money, money for labor power. 15 People, as labor power, as peculiar commodities, are separated from their activity, from the product of that activity, from their fellow workers, and ultimately from themselves. Isolation, fragmentation, and reification ensue. Needless to say, the ruling class prospers from all this, while the proletariat becomes submissive, unable to grasp their real conditions of life. Lukács reckoned reification could be punctured, exposed by the knowing mind acting on full knowledge of itself, acting in a “unified manner,” understanding the “totality of history.” Thus, in the climax to “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” the central pillar of History and Class Consciousness, Lukács concluded, “Reification is, then, the necessary immediate reality of every living person in capitalist society. It can be overcome by constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of 150
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M y s t i F i e d c o n s c i o U s n e s s<br />
interpretation of Hegel, stressing the social and structural origins<br />
of “unhappy consciousness,” calling for solutions rooted in praxis<br />
not faith. This trajectory was immeasurably aided by another big<br />
formative event for <strong>Lefebvre</strong>: the rediscovery of the Hegelian origins<br />
of Marxism, as evinced with the debut appearance in the early<br />
1930s of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts of 1844. Almost immediately<br />
he and Norbert Guterman began translating and popularizing<br />
Marx’s early writings, extracting them alongside snippets from<br />
Hegel. 10 The duo would drag Hegel closer and closer to Marx and<br />
Marx closer and closer to Hegel. In the process, they’d stake out a<br />
rich, heterodox Hegelian–Marxism in between. “The importance<br />
of Hegel’s Phenomenology,” wrote the young Marx, in a text many<br />
times studied by <strong>Lefebvre</strong>, “and its final result—the dialectic of<br />
negativity as the moving and producing principle—lies in the fact<br />
that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, [and]<br />
objectification as loss of object, as alienation.” 11<br />
Yet the Hegelian fix to alienation, to unhappy consciousness,<br />
had recourse to the thinking alone, to abstract dialectical logic.<br />
All the drama is in the head; everything is form without any real<br />
content, any real materiality and concrete objectivity. People populate<br />
Hegel’s universe, but, as Marx said, they course around as<br />
mere “forms of consciousness,” as minds without men. Hegel, for<br />
Marx, “turns man into the man of consciousness, instead of turning<br />
consciousness into the consciousness of real men.” As such,<br />
Hegel posited a philosophical history not a philosophy of history.<br />
“This movement of history,” Marx claimed, “is not yet the real<br />
history of man as a given subject.” 12<br />
<strong>Lefebvre</strong>’s originality lies in how he unites Hegel’s unhappy<br />
consciousness with young Marx’s humanist critique. In the mix,<br />
he warned neither individual nor collective forms of consciousness<br />
necessarily represent a criterion of truth: modern consciousness<br />
is a consciousness manipulated by ideology, ideology propagandized<br />
by state power. Different kinds of authority enter into<br />
149