“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
on cattle crossing the border. The imperial decision reflected not only its pecuniary needs, but also the local efforts of Rio Grande do Sul’s saladero industry to prevent its more efficient rivals in Argentina and Uruguay from dominating the emerging salted beef trade. 22 Whatever the reasons, ranchers in the borderlands seethed at the growing exactions from the imperial government. By 1835, the majority of borderlands ranchers had had enough. In September, they marched on Porto Alegre and seized the capital. Although initially maintaining that their action was solely against the corrupt provincial president, the growing military conflict quickly radicalized the movement. Within a year, the “Farrapos” rebels had declared Rio Grande do Sul an independent republic, touching-off a decade-long war throughout the Brazilian borderlands. 23 As political conflicts intensified in Brazil, factional violence likewise exploded in the Uruguayan Republic. In 1835, Manuel Oribe was elected the young republic’s second president. Although initially backed by Rivera, Oribe quickly came in conflict with the Uruguayan caudillo over the latter’s continued desire to maintain control over the countryside. When Oribe attempted to strip Rivera of his military command in 1836, the caudillo revolted. He quickly found support from unitarists under Lavalle fleeing from Rosas in Argentina, as well as from his Farrapos allies in Brazil. Rivera’s army donned red sashes in their campaign, 22 In the absence of refrigeration, salting represented the sole mechanism for preparing beef products for export. Oriental saladeros along the Uruguay in particular exploited economic connections with Brazilian ranchers in this regard. They would receive cattle from the northern Uruguayan and Brazilian borderlands, process it, and then export it in many cases back to Brazil. The jerked meat products primarily served to feed the large slave populations in northeastern Brazil and around the coffee plantations in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo states. This trade threatened the less efficient saladeros in Rio Grande do Sul. As a result, they lobbied the imperial government heavily for restrictions on the cross-border trade to protect their industries. 23 Spencer L. Leitman, Raízes Sócio-Economicas da Guerra dos Farrapos: Um Capítulo da História do Brasil no Seculo XIX (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Gral, 1979), Alfredo Varela, Revoluções Cisplatinas e Republica Riograndense, 2 vols. (Porto Alegre: Chardron, 1915). 74
earning the faction’s colorado title. Oribe’s government, echoing Rosas’ proclamations, ordered all loyal forces to display a white standard with the inscription “Defender of Laws.” Oribe’s faction quickly became known by their emblematic color as the “blancos.” 24 The renewed violence throughout the eastern borderlands continued to shape Guarch’s network of commercial and political alliances as he moved to exploit the conflicts. Guarch used his connections to Vázquez to increase his own personal landholdings in the borderlands and his political ties to the Rivera government. Each of these in turn facilitated a commercial enterprise that would reach across the borderlands and eventually into Rio Grande do Sul and Corrientes. The first step in the process occurred in 1835 when Rivera personally began selling property to Guarch, Vázquez and other merchants in order to finance his opposition to the newly elected Oribe government. 25 Vázquez in particular received a large tract of land around Salto from Rivera in 1835. Rivera used this funding to launch his unsuccessful 1836 military campaign against Oribe. In this sense, the commercial opportunities Vázquez, Guarch and the other Montevideo merchants found in the borderlands intertwined tightly with the personal and factional conflicts between Rivera and Oribe. Political factions began to cohere precisely around these types of relationships with colorados like Guarch explicitly developing commercial enterprises in the borderlands through personal ties to Rivera. In turn, because these associations were the touchstone of property rights and trading relationships, Guarch’s economic activities and connections fed back into factional political divisions as he worked to protect his assets. Rivera’s 1836 uprising proved short-lived. Oribe defeated Rivera, but the colorado’s ties to the Farrapos across the border permitted him to enter Brazil and regroup. With 24 Juan E. Pivel Devoto and Alcira Ranieri de Pivel Devoto, Rivera, Oribe y Los Orígenes de la Guerra Grande (Montevideo, Uruguay: Medina, 1971). 25 Sala de Touron, Alonso Eloy, and Rodríguez, El Uruguay Comercial, 135. 75
- Page 33 and 34: of borderlands leaders to negotiate
- Page 35 and 36: Removing the old colonial order, ho
- Page 37 and 38: the city remained a sparsely popula
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- Page 41 and 42: Imperial Collapse and Fragmentation
- Page 43 and 44: ivers, deserts and a few vagrant an
- Page 45 and 46: defend its possessions, peninsular
- Page 47 and 48: They requested that the Junta appoi
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- Page 51 and 52: The Paraguayan government proposed
- Page 53 and 54: Montevideo in January of 1811, he i
- Page 55 and 56: Ríos. From there, he continued to
- Page 57 and 58: easoning. 25 They had rejected the
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- Page 63 and 64: Artigas’ defeat did not spell the
- Page 65 and 66: economy. By 1822, the powerful merc
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- Page 73 and 74: operate throughout the borderlands
- Page 75 and 76: and staple exports instead of the o
- Page 77 and 78: Ríos in particular witnessed a dra
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- Page 81 and 82: simmering struggles. By 1840, local
- Page 83: merchants, traders and landowners.
- Page 87 and 88: Guarch’s deal with Carvalho revea
- Page 89 and 90: web of reciprocal relationships tha
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- Page 93 and 94: In short, over the course of a deca
- Page 95 and 96: that he had employed to first arran
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- Page 99 and 100: Pinto sought to have the property d
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- Page 103 and 104: Ríos or by ship to Montero’s out
- Page 105 and 106: alliances with the blancos to open
- Page 107 and 108: connections up and down the river t
- Page 109 and 110: With his money now in limbo and his
- Page 111 and 112: honorable merchant. His associates
- Page 113 and 114: meant more than establishing a docu
- Page 115 and 116: Uruguaiana and Salto. 80 Chaves and
- Page 117 and 118: complex laws “that they only unde
- Page 119 and 120: were considered suspect, particular
- Page 121 and 122: status. Public recognition of one
- Page 123 and 124: They reasoned that “one has to re
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earning the faction’s colorado title. Oribe’s government, echoing Rosas’ proclamations,<br />
ordered all loyal forces to display a white standard with the inscription “Defender of Laws.”<br />
Oribe’s faction quickly became known by their emblematic color as the “blancos.” 24<br />
The renewed violence throughout the eastern borderlands continued to shape<br />
Guarch’s network of commercial and political alliances as he moved to exploit the conflicts.<br />
Guarch used his connections to Vázquez to increase his own personal landholdings in the<br />
borderlands and his political ties to the Rivera government. Each of these in turn facilitated<br />
a commercial enterprise that would reach across the borderlands and eventually into Rio<br />
Grande do Sul and Corrientes. The first step in the process occurred in 1835 when Rivera<br />
personally began selling property to Guarch, Vázquez and other merchants in order to<br />
finance his opposition to the newly elected Oribe government. 25 Vázquez in particular<br />
received a large tract of land around Salto from Rivera in 1835. Rivera used this funding to<br />
launch his unsuccessful 1836 military campaign against Oribe. In this sense, the commercial<br />
opportunities Vázquez, Guarch and the other Montevideo merchants found in the<br />
borderlands intertwined tightly with the personal and factional conflicts between Rivera and<br />
Oribe. Political factions began to cohere precisely around these types of relationships with<br />
colorados like Guarch explicitly developing commercial enterprises in the borderlands through<br />
personal ties to Rivera. In turn, because these associations were the touchstone of property<br />
rights and trading relationships, Guarch’s economic activities and connections fed back into<br />
factional political divisions as he worked to protect his assets.<br />
Rivera’s 1836 uprising proved short-lived. Oribe defeated Rivera, but the colorado’s<br />
ties to the Farrapos across the border permitted him to enter Brazil and regroup. With<br />
<br />
24 Juan E. Pivel Devoto and Alcira Ranieri de Pivel Devoto, Rivera, Oribe y Los Orígenes<br />
de la Guerra Grande (Montevideo, Uruguay: Medina, 1971).<br />
25 Sala de Touron, Alonso Eloy, and Rodríguez, El Uruguay Comercial, 135.<br />
75 <br />
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