“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
López Jordán’s defeat clearly demonstrated the growing power of the central government to subdue rebellious provinces by force. This did not mean, however, that the dissident federalists now willingly accepted porteño control. Rather, López Jordán would launch two more uprisings in 1873 and 1876 against national authorities in the province. In these rebellions, however, López Jordán attempted, with much less success, to recreate Urquiza’s strategy of working within the national system to secure provincial autonomy. In each case, the entrerriano commander forged relationships with competing national politicians, seeking to leverage his rural power base to gain concessions from metropolitan allies. In his final 1876 campaign, López Jordán went so far as to enter into an alliance with Mitre and his liberals in their own struggle over the question of the federalization of Buenos Aires city. Ironically, López Jordán’s final defeat came fighting to sustain porteño dominance in the national system in order to revive his waning fortunes in his home province. 42 Local Autonomy and State Power in Uruguay The same tensions that ultimately produced López Jordán’s uprising in 1870 equally occurred across the Uruguay River in the Estado Oriental. The Paraguayan War itself was even less of a national project in Uruguay than in Argentina. With substantial elements of even the victorious colorados largely disinterested in the conflict, Uruguayan involvement was limited to efforts by Flores and a small circle of supporters. Flores himself participated only briefly in the war. He returned to Uruguay in 1866 after less than a year of fighting. 43 Although Flores’ Paraguayan campaign was brief, his absence opened up rifts within the colorados that mirrored those of the federalists across the river. In particular, the party 42 Rock, State Building, 67-68. Rock described López Jordán as a “junior partner of metropolitan politicians.” Ibid., 101. 43 Juan Manuel Casal, "Uruguay and the Paraguayan War," in I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864-1870, ed. Hendrik Kraay and Thomas Whigham (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press 2004), 124. 316
splintered into “traditional” and “conservative” factions. Flores aligned with the former. Upon his return, Flores worked to consolidate his personal authority at the head of the colorados. Flores governed largely by fiat. He attempted to use his political allegiances to consolidate the national government’s hold on the rebellious republic. As Flores cracked down, however, he faced opposition from the same local colorado leaders that he had relied on for support. By 1868, Flores sought to end his formal dictatorship by ceding power to his handpicked civilian successor. The blancos remaining in Montevideo sensed a moment when they could reassert their political power, particularly with the colorados themselves divided over the relationship between the local and national government in the countryside. Bernardo Berro led an uprising in which a small number of blancos attempted to provoke a mutiny among the city’s garrison with shouts of “viva Paraguay!” At the same time, another group of revolutionaries intercepted Flores in the street and assassinated the colorado general. Berro, unaware of Flores’ death (which may have actually been the work of his conservative colorado opponents), ordered his own supporters to disband when it became clear that the city’s forces would not follow the blancos. Captured on his way home, the former Uruguayan president was led to the city’s cabildo, shown Flores’ body and then shot. 44 The assassinations of both Flores and Berro touched off a renewed wave of political instability throughout the republic. A deepening economic crisis, along with growing political turmoil in Argentina, further heightened tensions. The Uruguayan economy in particular had experienced a significant wartime boom as it exported supplies to troops at the front. By 1868, the wartime bonanza was already coming to an end. A number of local caudillos within the colorado ranks rose up against the government to protest the deteriorating economy. Men like José Gregorio Suárez and Máximo Pérez also aimed to reassert their 44 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 101-02. 317
- Page 275 and 276: Brazilian slave laws followed them
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- Page 309 and 310: guarantee their commercial relation
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- Page 315 and 316: authority to contain the more radic
- Page 317 and 318: captured the city of Corrientes. To
- Page 319 and 320: Urquiza struggled to reorganize his
- Page 321 and 322: attle in March of 1870. 29 By the e
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- Page 339 and 340: matter was overblown and that repor
- Page 341 and 342: CHAPTER 8 NEGOTIATING NATIONS ALTHO
- Page 343 and 344: Local Legal Practices and National
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- Page 347 and 348: personal interests, Guarch’s fact
- Page 349 and 350: Guarch first sought to tip the scal
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- Page 353 and 354: history in 1877. 24 Salto’s first
- Page 355 and 356: twenty-five peso fine. 29 Leal prom
- Page 357 and 358: serves?” 36 He continued: “Does
- Page 359 and 360: abuses “no doubt flowed from the
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- Page 363 and 364: Operating within this relationship,
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- Page 369 and 370: with his son-in-law Alexander da Cr
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splintered into “traditional” and “conservative” factions. Flores aligned with the former.<br />
Upon his return, Flores worked to consolidate his personal authority at the head of the<br />
colorados. Flores governed largely by fiat. He attempted to use his political allegiances to<br />
consolidate the national government’s hold on the rebellious republic. As Flores cracked<br />
down, however, he faced opposition from the same local colorado leaders that he had relied<br />
on for support. By 1868, Flores sought to end his formal dictatorship by ceding power to<br />
his handpicked civilian successor. The blancos remaining in Montevideo sensed a moment<br />
when they could reassert their political power, particularly with the colorados themselves<br />
divided over the relationship between the local and national government in the countryside.<br />
Bernardo Berro led an uprising in which a small number of blancos attempted to provoke a<br />
mutiny among the city’s garrison with shouts of “viva Paraguay!” At the same time, another<br />
group of revolutionaries intercepted Flores in the street and assassinated the colorado general.<br />
Berro, unaware of Flores’ death (which may have actually been the work of his conservative<br />
colorado opponents), ordered his own supporters to disband when it became clear that the<br />
city’s forces would not follow the blancos. Captured on his way home, the former Uruguayan<br />
president was led to the city’s cabildo, shown Flores’ body and then shot. 44<br />
The assassinations of both Flores and Berro touched off a renewed wave of political<br />
instability throughout the republic. A deepening economic crisis, along with growing<br />
political turmoil in Argentina, further heightened tensions. The Uruguayan economy in<br />
particular had experienced a significant wartime boom as it exported supplies to troops at<br />
the front. By 1868, the wartime bonanza was already coming to an end. A number of local<br />
caudillos within the colorado ranks rose up against the government to protest the deteriorating<br />
economy. Men like José Gregorio Suárez and Máximo Pérez also aimed to reassert their<br />
<br />
44 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 101-02.<br />
317 <br />
<br />
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