“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
easoned that it was better to work within national structures to negotiate provincial rights than to engage in futile conflicts in the name of traditional federalism. Yet as Urquiza labored to work within the new reality of a national system oriented around Buenos Aires, he began to lose his grip on the older elements of personal reputation and reciprocity that formed the touchstone of his political power in the borderlands. Regardless of the growing tensions within the federalist ranks, Urquiza continued to possess sufficient personal prestige and power to mobilize substantial forces at the outset of the Paraguayan conflict. By July of 1865, he had assembled some eight thousand troops. Urquiza marched north to an encampment along the correntino frontier at Basualdo. As Urquiza made final arrangements to confront Paraguayan forces in Corrientes, however, rumors began to swirl among his forces. When Urquiza traveled back to Concordia to meet with Mitre, his army rose in open revolt. Mitre and others immediately suspected López Jordán and other federalists of orchestrating the uprising in order to discredit Urquiza and lay the groundwork for an open rebellion against the national government. Reports indicated that groups of officers had traveled throughout the camp encouraging troops to revolt by proclaiming that Urquiza himself had “gone home.” 22 Although allegations of a conspiracy among Urquiza’s federalist lieutenants could never be definitively proven, the Basualdo incident unquestionably weakened the entrerriano leader’s hold on the province and its armed forces. Urquiza’s son, Diogenes, clearly recognized it as an assault on his father’s reputation. He pled with Urquiza to form a new army to show that “his prestige has not fallen or that he is not a traitor or as stupid as the ill-willed would suppose.” 23 22 Ibid., 342. 23 Bosch, Urquiza y Su Tiempo, 628. 308
Urquiza struggled to reorganize his forces. In an effort to lure his soldiers back to camp, Urquiza issued a decree absolving the Basualdo deserters. By October, he had gathered a new, smaller army, only to watch it again dissolve in another open revolt. 24 News of the second uprising radiated throughout the borderlands. Salto’s newspaper, El Eco de los Libres, openly asked what had become of the “loyal and honorable soldiers of Entre Ríos, that, full of patriotism, had stood with their illustrious caudillo through all the tides of war?” 25 The same question could have been asked about Urquiza’s ability to mobilize military forces. Urquiza no longer appeared to have the power to summon his native province to support his political projects. Following the second uprising, Urquiza effectively surrendered. He returned to San José and resigned himself to sitting out the war. The mutinies signaled Urquiza’s decline in the province and the rise of men like López Jordán who openly opposed the war and the national government. 26 With each successive revolt, the strength of the forces threatening to pull apart the fragile Argentine union grew. Conversely, Urquiza’s ability to leverage his personal reputation and his vast network of reciprocal connections to act as the glue that could hold both federalist and nationalist interests together within a single political system grew weaker. The distance between borderlands legalities and Mitre’s porteño-centered sovereign model remained too great for even Urquiza to bridge. Mitre correctly perceived the implications of the uprisings, writing that “of course General Urquiza has fallen at Basualdo and that a revolution has occurred in Entre Ríos, a revolution that will have repercussions later.” 27 24 Whigham, The Paraguayan War, 405-06. 25 El Eco de los Libres, n. 151 (November 20, 1865), 1. 26 Whigham, The Paraguayan War, 342. 27 Bosch, Urquiza y Su Tiempo, 628. 309
- Page 267 and 268: Borderlands inhabitants in the earl
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easoned that it was better to work within national structures to negotiate provincial rights<br />
than to engage in futile conflicts in the name of traditional federalism.<br />
Yet as Urquiza labored to work within the new reality of a national system oriented<br />
around Buenos Aires, he began to lose his grip on the older elements of personal reputation<br />
and reciprocity that formed the touchstone of his political power in the borderlands.<br />
Regardless of the growing tensions within the federalist ranks, Urquiza continued to possess<br />
sufficient personal prestige and power to mobilize substantial forces at the outset of the<br />
Paraguayan conflict. By July of 1865, he had assembled some eight thousand troops.<br />
Urquiza marched north to an encampment along the correntino frontier at Basualdo. As<br />
Urquiza made final arrangements to confront Paraguayan forces in Corrientes, however,<br />
rumors began to swirl among his forces. When Urquiza traveled back to Concordia to meet<br />
with Mitre, his army rose in open revolt. Mitre and others immediately suspected López<br />
Jordán and other federalists of orchestrating the uprising in order to discredit Urquiza and<br />
lay the groundwork for an open rebellion against the national government. Reports<br />
indicated that groups of officers had traveled throughout the camp encouraging troops to<br />
revolt by proclaiming that Urquiza himself had “gone home.” 22 Although allegations of a<br />
conspiracy among Urquiza’s federalist lieutenants could never be definitively proven, the<br />
Basualdo incident unquestionably weakened the entrerriano leader’s hold on the province and<br />
its armed forces. Urquiza’s son, Diogenes, clearly recognized it as an assault on his father’s<br />
reputation. He pled with Urquiza to form a new army to show that “his prestige has not<br />
fallen or that he is not a traitor or as stupid as the ill-willed would suppose.” 23<br />
<br />
22 Ibid., 342.<br />
23 Bosch, Urquiza y Su Tiempo, 628.<br />
308 <br />
<br />