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captured the city of Corrientes. To the east, Paraguayan troops entered Brazil and captured<br />

Uruguaiana and the correntino port of Restauración just across the river. 19 The invasion<br />

ensured that Mitre and the national forces under his command would now enter the conflict<br />

along with the Brazilian empire and the colorados in the Estado Oriental. Brazilian diplomats<br />

promptly opened up negotiations with the Argentine government on the terms of an alliance<br />

against Paraguay. On 12 and 13 June 1865, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay exchanged<br />

ratifications of their Triple Alliance against the Paraguayans. The entire Río de la Plata basin<br />

was once again at war. 20<br />

Mitre’s intervention presented Urquiza with a dilemma. Mitre requested troops from<br />

Entre Ríos to support his campaign against the Paraguayans in Corrientes. If Urquiza<br />

refused, he risked undermining his exclusive control over Entre Ríos’ still substantial armed<br />

forces and perhaps provoking an internal civil war. On the other hand, dissident federalists<br />

like López Jordán clamored for him to support the Paraguayans. López Jordán openly<br />

declared that Mitre, not Paraguay, represented the true enemy in the conflict. He wrote:<br />

“You [Urquiza] call on us to fight against Paraguay. Never, my General, for that nation is<br />

our friend. Call on us to fight the Brazilians and the porteños and we will be ready – for they<br />

are our enemies.” 21 Despite the protests from the dissident federalists, Urquiza again<br />

decided to throw his support behind Mitre. This stance likely reflected Urquiza’s sense that<br />

opposing the new national government carried with it unacceptable risks, both for himself<br />

and his vision for an Argentine nation built around a union of coequal provinces. It also<br />

reflected the central guiding principle in Urquiza’s political maneuvering in the wake of<br />

Pavón – direct opposition to the national state was no longer a real possibility. Urquiza<br />

























































<br />

19 Ibid., 263.<br />

20 Ibid., 276.<br />

21 Ibid., 330.<br />

307
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