“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

The calculation for Mitre’s government was entirely different. Following their
victory at Pavón, Mitre had engaged in a prolonged campaign to establish national authority
over the traditionally federalist provinces in the interior. Mitre’s stance in Uruguay and later
against Paraguay in many ways represented a logical extension of these domestic conflicts.
In particular, they provided the porteño leader with a means to erode bases of federalist
opposition throughout the Río de la Plata basin. Yet, Mitre did not directly press for war
against the Paraguayans. Like Urquiza, Mitre feared the growing Brazilian influence in the
basin. He sought to position Argentina to take advantage of the tensions between the
Paraguayans and the Brazilians. Mitre, therefore, fashioned a strategy designed to restrict
Paraguayan involvement in the Uruguayan conflict by prohibiting Paraguayan passage
through Argentine territory. At the same time, however, Mitre refused Brazilian requests for
support for their planned naval blockade of Paraguayan ports on the Paraná River. Through
these actions, Mitre hoped to push military conflicts away from Argentine borders, while still
using the Paraguayan presence to limit Brazilian activities throughout the Río de la Plata
basin. 18
The Triple Alliance War and the Limits of Radical Federalism
Mitre, however, miscalculated that he could contain tensions with Paraguay without
provoking an open conflict. Confident that the federalists and emigrant blancos in the
Argentine Littoral would rally to his side, Solano López invaded Corrientes in early 1865.
Paraguayan forces advanced on two fronts. Troops moving along the western flank quickly
18 Whigham, The Paraguayan War, 238-54. Whigham particularly rejects “revisionist”
notions that Mitre aimed to provoke Paraguay into a conflict. He writes: “Mitre harbored
great ambitions for himself and his country. Revisionists are right in supposing that he
wished to forge a new hegemonic order in the Plata with Buenos Aires dominant over all the
other provinces of the old viceroyalty, including Paraguay and the Banda Oriental. His
plans, however, never included provoking the Paraguayans into a genuine war with
Argentina.” Ibid., 252.
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