“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
slowly crushed uprisings by Angel Vicente Peñaloza in La Rioja province. Peñaloza, known as “Chacho,” had invoked Urquiza’s name repeatedly in his opposition to Mitre. Urquiza, however, spurned Peñaloza’s requests for aid. The short-lived rebellion ended with Peñaloza’s assassination in November of 1863. However, it lingered on in federalist ideology of resistance to porteño oppression. 13 Urquiza’s steadfast refusal to intervene in the La Rioja conflict pushed López Jordán to begin to oppose his former patron openly. In 1864, López Jordán solidified his position as the head of the “dissident federalists” by running for provincial governor against Urquiza’s chosen candidate. Although soundly defeated, the growing conflicts in Uruguay bolstered López Jordán’s reputation as a more radical alternative to the increasingly conciliatory governor. 14 These intensifying internal conflicts within Argentina paralleled the heightened political tensions throughout the region as the Brazilian invasion of the Estado Oriental set off a chain of events that led the entire Río de la Plata towards war. These conflicts only further radicalized the dissident federalists and eroded the middle ground upon which Urquiza hoped to erect his own national project. Solano López, the Paraguayan president, intervened in the Uruguayan conflict on behalf of the blanco government. López also began to court an alliance with Urquiza. He sent representatives to meet with the entrerriano leader in an attempt to revive the old federalist alliance against both the Brazilian empire and Buenos Aires. Although deeply suspicious of the growing Brazilian presence just across the Uruguay River, Urquiza continued to advocate neutrality. By keeping the Argentine Provinces out of the deepening conflict, Urquiza might still be able to use his personal 13 For a detailed description of the uprising and the popular politics and meaning of Peñaloza’s rebellion, see De la Fuente, Children of Facundo. 14 Jorge Newton, Ricardo López Jordán: Ultimo Caudillo en Armas (Buenos Aires: Ed. Plus Ultra, 1974), 60-69. 304
authority to contain the more radical federalists like López Jordán and avoid a rupture in his fragile alliance with Mitre’s national government. Urquiza once again attempted to placate both sides in the Uruguayan conflict to limit its impact in the Argentine Republic. Urquiza opened Entre Ríos to blancos fleeing from Flores and the colorados across the river. Deposed Uruguayan President Aguirre, Diego Lamas, Lucas Piris and other prominent blancos gathered in eastern Entre Ríos under Urquiza’s protection. Urquiza wrote to Mitre that providing asylum for “persons of all political strips was also a calling for this Province, and even Rosas had to respect it.” 15 At the same time, Urquiza openly advised Mitre to remain neutral in the pending conflict between Paraguay and the Brazilian empire. He wrote that the republic should exercise its authority “to influence the outcome of this foreign [extraña] conflict without being enveloped in someone else’s [ajeno] interest.” 16 There may have also been an implicit threat. By sheltering the blancos, Urquiza made clear that he could still throw his support behind the dissident federalist cause. In effect, Urquiza implied that he would remain loyal to Mitre in exchange for autonomy in conducting his own local affairs, as well as the ability to regulate and protect cross-border relationships. Renewed military conflicts threatened the delicate balance Urquiza was attempting to construct. However, it could also topple Mitre’s efforts to establish porteño hegemony over the new Argentine state. Urquiza was quite blunt on this point, writing to Mitre that “[o]ur still incipient political organization could fail like on other occasions and perhaps more terribly if we adopt sterile efforts towards imprudent and agitated passions.” 17 15 Bosch, Urquiza y Su Tiempo, 635. 16 Ibid., 618. 17 Mitre and Mitre, Archivo Mitre, v. 2, 95. 305
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slowly crushed uprisings by Angel Vicente Peñaloza in La Rioja province. Peñaloza, known<br />
as “Chacho,” had invoked Urquiza’s name repeatedly in his opposition to Mitre. Urquiza,<br />
however, spurned Peñaloza’s requests for aid. The short-lived rebellion ended with<br />
Peñaloza’s assassination in November of 1863. However, it lingered on in federalist<br />
ideology of resistance to porteño oppression. 13 Urquiza’s steadfast refusal to intervene in the<br />
La Rioja conflict pushed López Jordán to begin to oppose his former patron openly. In<br />
1864, López Jordán solidified his position as the head of the “dissident federalists” by<br />
running for provincial governor against Urquiza’s chosen candidate. Although soundly<br />
defeated, the growing conflicts in Uruguay bolstered López Jordán’s reputation as a more<br />
radical alternative to the increasingly conciliatory governor. 14<br />
These intensifying internal conflicts within Argentina paralleled the heightened<br />
political tensions throughout the region as the Brazilian invasion of the Estado Oriental set<br />
off a chain of events that led the entire Río de la Plata towards war. These conflicts only<br />
further radicalized the dissident federalists and eroded the middle ground upon which<br />
Urquiza hoped to erect his own national project. Solano López, the Paraguayan president,<br />
intervened in the Uruguayan conflict on behalf of the blanco government. López also began<br />
to court an alliance with Urquiza. He sent representatives to meet with the entrerriano leader<br />
in an attempt to revive the old federalist alliance against both the Brazilian empire and<br />
Buenos Aires. Although deeply suspicious of the growing Brazilian presence just across the<br />
Uruguay River, Urquiza continued to advocate neutrality. By keeping the Argentine<br />
Provinces out of the deepening conflict, Urquiza might still be able to use his personal<br />
<br />
13 For a detailed description of the uprising and the popular politics and meaning of<br />
Peñaloza’s rebellion, see De la Fuente, Children of Facundo.<br />
14 Jorge Newton, Ricardo López Jordán: Ultimo Caudillo en Armas (Buenos Aires: Ed. Plus<br />
Ultra, 1974), 60-69.<br />
304 <br />
<br />
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