“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

nineteen in the provincial militia under Urquiza’s command. In typical fashion, Urquiza
fostered López Jordán’s military and ranching career. This again cemented the reciprocal
ties at the heart of his trading networks and political power throughout the borderlands.
López Jordán quickly rose through the ranks in the militia. He fought with Urquiza at
Caseros. He eventually served as one of Urquiza’s principal lieutenants in the Confederation
army, commanding the entrerriano cavalry at Pavón. As López Jordán gained prestige on the
battlefield, Urquiza facilitated his transition into politics. He arranged for López Jordán’s
election to the Confederation’s national assembly in 1856. Urquiza also sold lands around
Concordia to López Jordán on favorable terms in an effort to cement their commercial
connections. 12 Despite these ties, however, the relationship between the two men had
always been somewhat cold. This probably reflected López Jordán’s personal ambitions.
Urquiza’s conciliatory project above all aimed to ensure the entrerriano leader’s continued
dominance over his home province. To increase his own political role, López Jordán had to
embrace an alternative to Urquiza’s negotiated nation in the form of a more radical federalist
vision.
The younger López Jordán had also risen to prominence primarily as a military
officer. He consistently favored much more direct confrontation with Buenos Aires. López
Jordán had viewed Pavón as a victory for the Confederation. He pleaded with Urquiza to
invade Buenos Aires province to assert federalist dominance over their porteño rivals.
Urquiza’s unwillingness to oppose Mitre militarily following the battle outraged the entrerriano
commander. López Jordán further frowned on Urquiza’s failure to challenge the porteño
campaigns against their federalist allies in the interior. Throughout 1863, for instance, Mitre
12 Bernardo I. Salduna, La Reblelión Jordanista (Buenos Aires: Editorial Dunken, 2005),
22-29.
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