“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
Littoral and Buenos Aires. In 1863, Diego Lamas had written to Urquiza’s lieutenant, Ricardo Lopéz Jordán, warning: “if the colorados obtain the Uruguayan government . . . they will soon strike blows against parties in Entre Ríos in the interests of the circle of demagoguery in Buenos Aires, our common enemy.” 4 Radical federalists increasingly clamored to intervene in the Estado Oriental on behalf of the blancos. The factional conflicts across the river threatened to explode. Urquiza struggled to contain the Uruguayan fighting by arranging negotiations between the combatants. Urquiza possessed relationships with both sides. Despite opposing him militarily on several occasions, Flores had entered into a number of commercial arrangements with Urquiza. He also had ties to many of Flores’ Brazilian allies like Manuel Ferreira Bica. Urquiza hoped to use his connections with “so many friends on each side” to forge an end to the “unjust conflict.” 5 Urquiza also correctly sensed the potential for the factional struggles in Uruguay to upset the delicate balance in the borderlands, particularly if Brazilian forces intervened on behalf of the colorados. Urquiza stressed that “I have undertaken [negotiations] at the last moment in order to avoid complications with Brazil, whose part in this struggle I can do nothing but condemn.” 6 By the mid-1860s, however, the factional divisions in Uruguay had become too deep to be resolved by negotiations. Local disputes over borderlands legalities had, throughout the 1850s, sharpened political tensions as each side struggled to protect the personal reputations and property rights of factional allies. These local clashes over borderlands courthouses had equally become intertwined with disputes between successive “fusionist” 4 María Amalia Duarte, Urquiza y López Jordán (Buenos Aires: Librería Editorial Platero, 1974), 61. 5 Bosch, Urquiza y Su Tiempo, 610. 6 Ibid. 300
governments in Montevideo and Brazilian ranchers and their colorado allies on the periphery over basic questions of national sovereignty. Mitre’s political maneuverings in support of Flores had provided to final push towards war. The conflict now further radicalized coastal elites in Montevideo. In 1864, Atansio Aguirre was elected president. Where Berro had sought to “fuse” traditional parties together in order to encourage the “nationalization” of Uruguayan affairs, Aguirre now pushed the rebellious colorados from the government. Aguirre then moved to crush Flores once and for all in the borderlands. Blanco leaders in Montevideo also adopted an increasingly strident tone towards Argentina and Brazil. Aguirre called for the elimination of all “foreign” influences in the Uruguayan countryside. Writing to Urquiza in order to reject his peace overtures in September of 1864, Aguirre made it clear that he blamed Brazilian and Argentine interference for the ongoing rebellion in the borderlands: If the neighboring governments in Brazil and Buenos Aires, instead of interesting themselves in the peace of this country, which cannot take hold without respect for its authority, instead of contributing to the suffocation of revolutionary discord, protect and foment it, it is then impossible to obtain the peace you desire, despite my sacrifices to obtain it. 7 Simply put, the conflict concerned fundamental questions of Uruguayan sovereignty. Aguirre could brook no compromises on such questions and hope to govern in any real sense. With the national government unwilling to compromise with the powerful forces on its peripheries, Urquiza realized his efforts to contain the Uruguayan conflict were destined to fail. Urquiza expressed his anger at the blanco president, writing that there was nothing left to do “but let events run their course.” 8 As Urquiza feared, Brazilian forces crossed into Uruguay in support of Flores and the colorados shortly after Aguirre’s refusal to negotiate. By the end of 1864, the residents of 7 Mitre and Mitre, Archivo Mitre, v. 2, 79. 8 Ibid., v. 2, 85. 301
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governments in Montevideo and Brazilian ranchers and their colorado allies on the periphery<br />
over basic questions of national sovereignty. Mitre’s political maneuverings in support of<br />
Flores had provided to final push towards war. The conflict now further radicalized coastal<br />
elites in Montevideo. In 1864, Atansio Aguirre was elected president. Where Berro had<br />
sought to “fuse” traditional parties together in order to encourage the “nationalization” of<br />
Uruguayan affairs, Aguirre now pushed the rebellious colorados from the government.<br />
Aguirre then moved to crush Flores once and for all in the borderlands. Blanco leaders in<br />
Montevideo also adopted an increasingly strident tone towards Argentina and Brazil.<br />
Aguirre called for the elimination of all “foreign” influences in the Uruguayan countryside.<br />
Writing to Urquiza in order to reject his peace overtures in September of 1864, Aguirre<br />
made it clear that he blamed Brazilian and Argentine interference for the ongoing rebellion<br />
in the borderlands:<br />
If the neighboring governments in Brazil and Buenos Aires, instead of interesting<br />
themselves in the peace of this country, which cannot take hold without respect for<br />
its authority, instead of contributing to the suffocation of revolutionary discord,<br />
protect and foment it, it is then impossible to obtain the peace you desire, despite my<br />
sacrifices to obtain it. 7<br />
Simply put, the conflict concerned fundamental questions of Uruguayan sovereignty.<br />
Aguirre could brook no compromises on such questions and hope to govern in any real<br />
sense. With the national government unwilling to compromise with the powerful forces on<br />
its peripheries, Urquiza realized his efforts to contain the Uruguayan conflict were destined<br />
to fail. Urquiza expressed his anger at the blanco president, writing that there was nothing left<br />
to do “but let events run their course.” 8<br />
As Urquiza feared, Brazilian forces crossed into Uruguay in support of Flores and<br />
the colorados shortly after Aguirre’s refusal to negotiate. By the end of 1864, the residents of<br />
<br />
7 Mitre and Mitre, Archivo Mitre, v. 2, 79.<br />
8 Ibid., v. 2, 85.<br />
301 <br />
<br />