“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
Through these types of demands, Flores and his allies linked their revolution to the Brazilian government’s attempts to consolidate its own authority over the southern borderlands. The growing conflicts across the Uruguayan border provided an opportunity to secure the support of the powerful ranching elites in Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay, along with a reliable international ally. To support these aims, diplomatic negotiations were underway between the blanco government in Montevideo and imperial officials led by José Antonio Saraiva. 83 Saraiva’s demands explicitly included the discharge of all Brazilians wrongfully impressed into the Uruguayan military, as well as punishment for civil and military commanders guilty of criminal violations against imperial subjects. 84 These negotiations above all aimed to pave the way for a Brazilian invasion. Pastor and his local allies were providing the Brazilian government with continuing evidence of the violation of her subjects’ (as well as Argentine citizens’) rights throughout the borderlands in an effort to redraw political boundaries to serve their personal interests. In short, they lent legal support to imperial military plans. Conclusion Disputes over the meaning of citizenship played out in a number of different fora and in a multitude of ways for borderlands residents. For Brazilian slaves like Fermin Ferreira, their own freedom hinged on their skills in navigating national legal differences and factional conflicts to advance their rights. Claiming free status also required mobilizing collective networks of solidarity to pry open factional divisions. It equally demanded a sophisticated sense of where to deploy these resources, when to assert citizenship, how to appeal to national law and when to turn their backs and simply run. The ephemeral nature 83 Whigham, The Paraguayan War, 147-48. 84 Ibid., 148. 294
of warfare in the borderlands further shaped these strategies. It required constant attentiveness to changing conditions as rival nations fought to control the borderlands. As slaves struggled to restrict the juridical reach of the Brazilian slave system, more elite residents along the frontier like Cándido Azambuja and Agustín Sañudo worked to maintain cross-border commercial ties while preserving their own rights and legal privileges through factional and familial alliances. In the end, the individual assertions of citizenship by fugitive slaves and the national reform projects they provoked could not be separated from the destabilization and violence they sought to exploit, respond to and often unwittingly engendered. Cross-border commercial relationships and political ties meant that asserting or strengthening frontier divisions often led inextricably to violent collisions between networks that could benefit or be harmed by such actions. The strategic choices made by slaves deepened these conflicts and laid bare the tensions around sovereign divisions. These debates over the meaning of the border served as a continuous source of fuel for factional brushfires. By the mid-1860s, the persistent clashes between state-centered sovereign models and borderlands legalities had once again reached a breaking point. A few weeks after Pastor Tejo’s dismissal from his counselor post in Salto, the Brazilian government acted. Imperial forces crossed the border to attack the blanco government. The Triple Alliance or Paraguayan War had begun. 295
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of warfare in the borderlands further shaped these strategies. It required constant<br />
attentiveness to changing conditions as rival nations fought to control the borderlands. As<br />
slaves struggled to restrict the juridical reach of the Brazilian slave system, more elite<br />
residents along the frontier like Cándido Azambuja and Agustín Sañudo worked to maintain<br />
cross-border commercial ties while preserving their own rights and legal privileges through<br />
factional and familial alliances.<br />
In the end, the individual assertions of citizenship by fugitive slaves and the national<br />
reform projects they provoked could not be separated from the destabilization and violence<br />
they sought to exploit, respond to and often unwittingly engendered. Cross-border<br />
commercial relationships and political ties meant that asserting or strengthening frontier<br />
divisions often led inextricably to violent collisions between networks that could benefit or<br />
be harmed by such actions. The strategic choices made by slaves deepened these conflicts<br />
and laid bare the tensions around sovereign divisions. These debates over the meaning of<br />
the border served as a continuous source of fuel for factional brushfires. By the mid-1860s,<br />
the persistent clashes between state-centered sovereign models and borderlands legalities had<br />
once again reached a breaking point. A few weeks after Pastor Tejo’s dismissal from his<br />
counselor post in Salto, the Brazilian government acted. Imperial forces crossed the border<br />
to attack the blanco government. The Triple Alliance or Paraguayan War had begun.<br />
295 <br />