“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
Uruguayan state formation forward in the borderlands in a concerted effort to improve their own social standing. Yet the very interconnected nature between national boundaries and social rights so evident in the borderlands slave citizenship cases rendered attempts to define each inherently unstable. As elites and subalterns turned to cross-border networks to assert their rights in borderlands courts, their conflicts over categories like citizenship and property increasingly implicated persistent disputes over nebulous national divisions. By the early 1860s, rival state formation projects in Argentina and Brazil, and the tensions over national boundaries they engendered, provided factional rivals in the borderlands with the opportunity to articulate starkly different conceptions of sovereignty and citizenship through their webs of borderlands connections. As we saw in the previous chapter, Mitre and his allies in Buenos Aires had established a new Argentine Republic in 1862. They in turn backed Venancio Flores’ political aspirations in Uruguay. In 1863, Flores had crossed the Uruguay River and occupied Uruguay’s northern borderlands. Although officially proclaiming their neutrality, Mitre’s government openly ensured that Flores received a steady supply of munitions in his struggle with Berro’s constitutional government. In exchange, Mitre received assurances from Flores that he would assist him in his own campaign to further consolidate his Argentine state. 74 As Uruguay’s colorado faction increasingly linked its power to that of the emerging centralized Argentine state under Mitre, their Brazilian allies worked to connect their legal rights in the borderlands to the imperial efforts to solidify its authority along its southern and western peripheries. Throughout the 1850s, Brazilian relations with the Paraguayan 74 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 88-96. 290
Republic over issues of rivertine trade and national boundaries had grown increasingly acrimonious. The two sides particularly clashed over a number of settlements in the Mato Grosso region in the empire’s far western reaches. These Brazilian outposts were thousands of miles from the empire’s coastal core. Brazilian officials had sought access to the Paraguay River in order to promote commerce with their far-flung possessions. For its part, Paraguay remained suspicious of Brazilian incursions along its borders. The two sides nearly went to war over the issue in the mid-1850s. In 1856, the Paraguayans reversed course and entered into a treaty granting the Brazilians free navigation. The Paraguayans continued, however, to contest the Brazilian occupation of a large portion of Mato Grosso. 75 As the 1860s dawned, the two sides continued to eye each other warily. Talks over the border question in Mato Grosso had not clarified the issue. By 1864, the imperial government already was planning its campaign against Paraguay in order to ensure rivertine access to the empire’s vast interior. Imperial belligerence also flowed from an increasing assertiveness on the part of Brazil’s coastal elites. With export revenues surging, officials in Rio de Janeiro reveled in the growing power of their “American empire.” The old dreams of extending its boundaries to the mouth of the Río de la Plata remained ever present in imperial discourse. 76 Appeals from riograndense ranchers connected with this expansionist sentiment. Men like Antonio Netto argued that Brazil should aggressively extend its borders into the Río de la Plata. Persistent narratives of abuses by Uruguayan officials (particularly blancos) against the borderlands ranching community fed once again into imperial desires to control the borderlands. 77 75 Thomas Whigham, The Paraguayan War (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 86-92. 76 Bandeira, La Formación. 77 Whigham, The Paraguayan War, 144-51. 291
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Republic over issues of rivertine trade and national boundaries had grown increasingly<br />
acrimonious. The two sides particularly clashed over a number of settlements in the Mato<br />
Grosso region in the empire’s far western reaches. These Brazilian outposts were thousands<br />
of miles from the empire’s coastal core. Brazilian officials had sought access to the Paraguay<br />
River in order to promote commerce with their far-flung possessions. For its part, Paraguay<br />
remained suspicious of Brazilian incursions along its borders. The two sides nearly went to<br />
war over the issue in the mid-1850s. In 1856, the Paraguayans reversed course and entered<br />
into a treaty granting the Brazilians free navigation.<br />
The Paraguayans continued, however, to contest the Brazilian occupation of a large<br />
portion of Mato Grosso. 75 As the 1860s dawned, the two sides continued to eye each other<br />
warily. Talks over the border question in Mato Grosso had not clarified the issue. By 1864,<br />
the imperial government already was planning its campaign against Paraguay in order to<br />
ensure rivertine access to the empire’s vast interior. Imperial belligerence also flowed from<br />
an increasing assertiveness on the part of Brazil’s coastal elites. With export revenues<br />
surging, officials in Rio de Janeiro reveled in the growing power of their “American empire.”<br />
The old dreams of extending its boundaries to the mouth of the Río de la Plata remained<br />
ever present in imperial discourse. 76 Appeals from riograndense ranchers connected with this<br />
expansionist sentiment. Men like Antonio Netto argued that Brazil should aggressively<br />
extend its borders into the Río de la Plata. Persistent narratives of abuses by Uruguayan<br />
officials (particularly blancos) against the borderlands ranching community fed once again into<br />
imperial desires to control the borderlands. 77<br />
<br />
75<br />
Thomas Whigham, The Paraguayan War (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press,<br />
2002), 86-92.<br />
76<br />
Bandeira, La Formación.<br />
77<br />
Whigham, The Paraguayan War, 144-51.<br />
291 <br />