“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
law ended at the port city’s gates. The interior was a “barbarous” region that threatened the rule of law. It had to be controlled by the civilized elites in Buenos Aires. 180 To carry out his vision, Mitre turned his considerable intellectual and military skills to the task of combating Urquiza’s rival confederation. Mitre took to the press to oppose Urquiza’s plans to reorganize the Argentine state. He railed that Urquiza was nothing more than a “despot” who lacked “law, norms, or any entity to serve as a counterweight to his powers.” 181 Eventually, Urquiza cracked down on Mitre and his allies. In June of 1852, he ordered their newspapers closed. He further ordered Mitre to leave Buenos Aires or face arrest. This repression, however, only confirmed the fears of many porteño elites that Urquiza intended to impose his rule – and that of the peripheral provinces – on Buenos Aires by force. The fragile coalition between Buenos Aires and interior elites that had defeated Rosas collapsed. On 11 September 1852, Buenos Aires rose up in an open revolt. 182 The entrerriano leader worked to quell the opposition, particularly through the enactment of the 1853 Constitution. Urquiza’s hesitancy to use his advantageous military position to crush the rebellious porteños reflected the interior’s economic weakness. To sustain a national project, Urquiza required access to customs revenues from Buenos Aires. He also needed the support and capital of Buenos Aires’ prosperous merchant community. Without the acquiescence of the porteño elite, he could only maintain his putative national project through his personal fortune, reciprocal ties and military prowess. Fiscal weakness and internal divisions would plague the Confederation throughout its brief existence. 183 180 Adelman, Republic of Capital, 198. 181 Scobie, La Lucha por la Consolidación, 44-45. 182 Ibid., 56-59. 183 Ibid., 153. 232
Urquiza’s efforts to placate his rivals in Buenos Aires failed. Mitre and his allies continued to lead the charge to break with the Confederation in the early 1850s. By the end of 1853, Buenos Aires had declared its de facto independence. Ironically given the growing conflict between Buenos Aires and the interior provinces, Mitre largely accepted the 1853 constitutional framework that established a strong executive. Mitre’s goal was not ultimately to gain independence for his home province. Rather, Mitre intended to secure its predominance within the national framework. Mitre perceived that a powerful executive from Buenos Aires could direct a transformation from warring provinces to a modern, centralized polity. Urquiza’s rival system of autonomous provinces bound together through personal relationships represented the principal roadblock to Mitre’s vision. The stage was set for a decade-long clash between Urquiza’s interior confederation and Mitre’s Buenos Aires as they maneuvered to forge their competing sovereign visions. 184 Mitre and his porteño allies drew upon an increasingly vibrant economy to sustain their efforts. With the British and French naval blockades lifted, Buenos Aires emerged as a major export center to European markets. With trade booming, customs revenues flowed into porteño coffers. As Buenos Aires thrived, the Confederation languished. Urquiza labored to bypass Buenos Aires and encourage overseas commercial traffic to ports along the Uruguay and Paraná rivers through favorable tariff regimes. The Confederation’s modest efforts, however, paled in comparison to Buenos Aires’ growing economic might. They equally failed to meet the Confederation’s expenses. Throughout the 1850s, the Confederation struggled to remain solvent. A merchant in Paraná neatly summed up the Confederation’s finances in 1857, writing that “there are no funds in the treasury and we do 184 Adelman, Republic of Capital, 209-15. 233
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Urquiza’s efforts to placate his rivals in Buenos Aires failed. Mitre and his allies<br />
continued to lead the charge to break with the Confederation in the early 1850s. By the end<br />
of 1853, Buenos Aires had declared its de facto independence. Ironically given the growing<br />
conflict between Buenos Aires and the interior provinces, Mitre largely accepted the 1853<br />
constitutional framework that established a strong executive. Mitre’s goal was not ultimately<br />
to gain independence for his home province. Rather, Mitre intended to secure its<br />
predominance within the national framework. Mitre perceived that a powerful executive<br />
from Buenos Aires could direct a transformation from warring provinces to a modern,<br />
centralized polity. Urquiza’s rival system of autonomous provinces bound together through<br />
personal relationships represented the principal roadblock to Mitre’s vision. The stage was<br />
set for a decade-long clash between Urquiza’s interior confederation and Mitre’s Buenos<br />
Aires as they maneuvered to forge their competing sovereign visions. 184<br />
Mitre and his porteño allies drew upon an increasingly vibrant economy to sustain<br />
their efforts. With the British and French naval blockades lifted, Buenos Aires emerged as a<br />
major export center to European markets. With trade booming, customs revenues flowed<br />
into porteño coffers. As Buenos Aires thrived, the Confederation languished. Urquiza<br />
labored to bypass Buenos Aires and encourage overseas commercial traffic to ports along<br />
the Uruguay and Paraná rivers through favorable tariff regimes. The Confederation’s<br />
modest efforts, however, paled in comparison to Buenos Aires’ growing economic might.<br />
They equally failed to meet the Confederation’s expenses. Throughout the 1850s, the<br />
Confederation struggled to remain solvent. A merchant in Paraná neatly summed up the<br />
Confederation’s finances in 1857, writing that “there are no funds in the treasury and we do<br />
<br />
184 Adelman, Republic of Capital, 209-15.<br />
233 <br />