“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
abusing his position in order to avenge himself of a writ issued by Your Mercy in my favor. 177 Sañudo argued that authorities could not tolerate such a violent assault on Fernandez and by proxy on Jubim’s estate and maintain any semblance of order in the countryside. Piris agreed. He ordered Fernandez to be released. Piris then ordered Ylla’s arrest. Before Uruguayan officials could act, however, Ylla crossed the border into Brazil. There, he immediately sought protection from Canabarro in the commander’s stronghold in Santana do Livramento. Ylla then claimed that blanco officials had violently dispossessed him of his rightful lands. He demanded justice from his powerful patron. Canabarro aggressively intervened in Ylla’s case on both sides of the border. He petitioned the provincial president in Rio Grande do Sul regarding the illegal “confiscation” of Ylla’s lands. He further sought allies across the border to aid Ylla. He reached out to Andrés Rivas, a prominent colorado rancher around Salto, to provide support for Ylla’s claims. In the process, Canabarro and prominent Brazilians like him further ratcheted-up tensions over property rights back in the Estado Oriental. By the 1860s, the increasingly violent conflicts around the property rights of Brazilian ranchers spilled over into the factional struggle between blancos and colorados. As we saw in detail in the last chapter, conflicts between factional rivals over questions of personal reputation and political power were swirling around Salto’s courthouse and theater. Throughout the early 1860s, these local conflicts began to merge with cross-border political disputes over property and sovereignty. Officials in Montevideo had grown increasingly alarmed by their inability to control the sizeable Brazilian population in the northern borderlands. Following his election in 1860, Bernardo Berro, the fusionist Uruguayan president and blanco, began once again to adopt a series of measures designed to assert control over the country’s porous borders with 177 Ibid., 16. 228
Brazil. Berro ended a decade of free trade between the two countries by annulling the 1851 commercial treaty and imposing taxes on Brazilian goods crossing the border. As we will see in much greater detail in the next chapter, he also took measures aimed at ending the Brazilian practice of importing slave labor into the ostensibly free Uruguayan territories through the use of lengthy and frequently coercive peonage contracts. 178 Berro’s efforts to “nationalize our destiny” aimed at least in part to end interventions by Canabarro, the Ribeiros and other prominent Brazilian ranchers in Uruguay’s domestic affairs. As Manuel Oribe had learned a decade earlier, however, regulating borderlands relationships in the name of Uruguayan interests equally threatened webs of cross-border associations. Thus, as Berro and others sought to end borderland disturbances over property rights in cases like Ylla’s, Vianna’s and Lima’s, they encouraged Brazilian opposition to their own government. As they had during the 1840s, the colorado faction again positioned itself to take advantage of the growing tensions between the Uruguayan government and the Brazilian ranching community. Following their 1858 defeat at Quinteros, the colorados had remained largely disorganized on a national scale. Venancio Flores, its most prominent leader, was in exile in Buenos Aires following his political defeat in 1856. Although temporarily dormant, the colorados remained extremely active locally throughout the northern Uruguayan borderlands. Salto’s colorados continued to clash with the blancos to control local legal institutions and practices. Prominent colorados also maintained close personal and political ties to the Brazilian ranching community. As Brazilians like the Ribeiros and Canabarro reached across the border to influence litigation and then protect the property rights of their 178 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 80-84. 229
- Page 187 and 188: controlled the appointment of distr
- Page 189 and 190: military control. By engaging in th
- Page 191 and 192: faction’s strength. In particular
- Page 193 and 194: mattered greatly to their own power
- Page 195 and 196: the parties and the public, with ea
- Page 197 and 198: matter, he was an outsider. Tristan
- Page 199 and 200: Tristani then attempted to attack h
- Page 201 and 202: litigation in Alegrete, questions o
- Page 203 and 204: throughout the country that his wor
- Page 205 and 206: his wife. He claimed that she “wa
- Page 207 and 208: and the titles of each litigant in
- Page 209 and 210: judgment declaring their rival’s
- Page 211 and 212: CHAPTER 5 POLITICAL POWER AND PROPE
- Page 213 and 214: property of Joaquim dos Santos Prad
- Page 215 and 216: acknowledged by both court and poss
- Page 217 and 218: Paulo, Sá Brito was one of the few
- Page 219 and 220: Teixeira claimed that Prado Lima ha
- Page 221 and 222: the trial court’s judgment. The c
- Page 223 and 224: lands in question in 1833. The cour
- Page 225 and 226: The appearance of testimony by Prad
- Page 227 and 228: of cattle from the da Silva’s lan
- Page 229 and 230: [Lima] contracted with an untrained
- Page 231 and 232: that department, Colonel Diego Lama
- Page 233 and 234: vizinho” in Alegrete’s courts o
- Page 235 and 236: Brigadier Don David Canavarro . . .
- Page 237: assistance, Garces won her case aga
- Page 241 and 242: coexistence of these provincial and
- Page 243 and 244: Urquiza’s efforts to placate his
- Page 245 and 246: and elites now supported Urquiza’
- Page 247 and 248: province within the national framew
- Page 249 and 250: porteño cavalry at Cepeda and Pav
- Page 251 and 252: The correntino merchants responded
- Page 253 and 254: assembling witnesses (in this case,
- Page 255 and 256: etween himself and Abendaño, howev
- Page 257 and 258: complete the exchange, however, Bic
- Page 259 and 260: side sought to dictate the distribu
- Page 261 and 262: Bica had used commercial and politi
- Page 263 and 264: The incident also revealed how impe
- Page 265 and 266: positioned the Ribeiro faction to g
- Page 267 and 268: Borderlands inhabitants in the earl
- Page 269 and 270: neatly encapsulated the ongoing con
- Page 271 and 272: for Brazilian ranchers. In the best
- Page 273 and 274: anchers operating throughout the bo
- Page 275 and 276: Brazilian slave laws followed them
- Page 277 and 278: familial connections on the Brazili
- Page 279 and 280: defined their respective places in
- Page 281 and 282: supply his troops. 26 By the time o
- Page 283 and 284: Brazilian masters that resulted in
- Page 285 and 286: pursue further rights. They would p
- Page 287 and 288: in the Estado Oriental. At the hear
Brazil. Berro ended a decade of free trade between the two countries by annulling the 1851<br />
commercial treaty and imposing taxes on Brazilian goods crossing the border. As we will see<br />
in much greater detail in the next chapter, he also took measures aimed at ending the<br />
Brazilian practice of importing slave labor into the ostensibly free Uruguayan territories<br />
through the use of lengthy and frequently coercive peonage contracts. 178<br />
Berro’s efforts to “nationalize our destiny” aimed at least in part to end interventions<br />
by Canabarro, the Ribeiros and other prominent Brazilian ranchers in Uruguay’s domestic<br />
affairs. As Manuel Oribe had learned a decade earlier, however, regulating borderlands<br />
relationships in the name of Uruguayan interests equally threatened webs of cross-border<br />
associations. Thus, as Berro and others sought to end borderland disturbances over<br />
property rights in cases like Ylla’s, Vianna’s and Lima’s, they encouraged Brazilian<br />
opposition to their own government.<br />
As they had during the 1840s, the colorado faction again positioned itself to take<br />
advantage of the growing tensions between the Uruguayan government and the Brazilian<br />
ranching community. Following their 1858 defeat at Quinteros, the colorados had remained<br />
largely disorganized on a national scale. Venancio Flores, its most prominent leader, was in<br />
exile in Buenos Aires following his political defeat in 1856. Although temporarily dormant,<br />
the colorados remained extremely active locally throughout the northern Uruguayan<br />
borderlands. Salto’s colorados continued to clash with the blancos to control local legal<br />
institutions and practices. Prominent colorados also maintained close personal and political<br />
ties to the Brazilian ranching community. As Brazilians like the Ribeiros and Canabarro<br />
reached across the border to influence litigation and then protect the property rights of their<br />
<br />
178 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 80-84.<br />
229 <br />
Change language