“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
coercive acts. The case was remanded to the Alegrete courts so that it could properly be decided as a civil matter “in accordance with the law.” 151 Teixeira had secured his faction’s right to disentangle the cross-border property dispute between Lima and da Silva in the Alegrete courts. Teixeira then constructed a narrative designed to protect his own allies’ property claims. Much like he had done in his prolonged struggle with Prado Lima, Teixeira immediately began to reframe Lima’s conduct as an unlawful, coercive attempt to exploit borderlands political instability. In Teixeira’s telling, shortly after Estolle and da Silva completed their negotiations, Francisco Pedro de Abreu had launched a massive “california” raid across the border. Abreu had sought to seize Brazilian cattle that the blanco government had allegedly confiscated. He had further aimed to destabilize the borderlands by encouraging an imperial intervention to open the border and remove the blancos from power. The raid itself was a failure. Diego Lamas, the blanco military commander in the region, defeated Abreu’s forces. Blanco officials immediately began retaliating against Brazilian ranchers suspected as participating in Abreu’s incursion. According to Teixeira’s brief, Lima utilized his connections with the blancos in Salto to “persuade Col. Diego Lamas . . . that [da Silva] had taken part in this invasion.” 152 Fearing reprisals, da Silva had fled the country. Lima then proceeded to use the settlement document as a launching point for asserting complete dominion over the disputed property. Teixeira alleged that Lima went with the local teniente alcalde to survey da Silva’s lands. This belied his claims to have rejected the Salto settlement. 153 Teixeira alleged that over the next two years Lima regularly removed cattle from the land “under the protection of the military commander and absolute authority of 151 Ibid., O Mercantil, Ano V, No. 35 (February 10, 1854), 3. 152 Ibid., 13bis-14. 153 Ibid., 103bis. 220
that department, Colonel Diego Lamas.” 154 Teixeira argued that Lima entered into an agreement with Lamas to remove cattle from da Silva’s lands. He concluded that his client, “[found] himself beyond the law, like so many others, when Lamas destroyed all of their possessions.” 155 The district court in Alegrete agreed with Teixeira’s version of events. It concluded that Lima’s purported property rights instead represented the poisonous fruit of illegal blanco coercion. Much like he had done against Prado Lima in their local dispute, Teixeira again demonstrated his faction’s ability to dictate private law rights by obtaining a verdict in da Silva’s favor. By effectively providing legal patronage to factional allies, Teixeira could enhance his own faction’s political position in Alegrete’s comarca. This time, however, the Alegrete court’s decision impacted the property rights of two Brazilians across the border in Uruguay. The determination of property rights in the neighboring republic represented an important front in the clashes between the Ribeiros and Canabarro to control the administration of justice in Alegrete. Their interventions in conflicts over land, herds and other rights, particularly within the large Brazilian community located in the northern Uruguayan borderlands, provided the rival factions with a means to bolster reciprocal ties. Teixeira’s emphasis on blanco coercion also underlined how these legal maneuverings to win allies in Brazilian struggles fed back into local legal clashes occurring on both sides of the border. The persistent violence between blancos and colorados created a wealth of opportunities for Brazilian elites to intervene in disputes in the neighboring republic. As the governing blancos attempted to adjudicate property rights in the Uruguayan Republic, the constant interventions by the Ribeiros and Canabarro provided factional rivals with a 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 221
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that department, Colonel Diego Lamas.” 154 Teixeira argued that Lima entered into an<br />
agreement with Lamas to remove cattle from da Silva’s lands. He concluded that his client,<br />
“[found] himself beyond the law, like so many others, when Lamas destroyed all of their<br />
possessions.” 155<br />
The district court in Alegrete agreed with Teixeira’s version of events. It concluded<br />
that Lima’s purported property rights instead represented the poisonous fruit of illegal blanco<br />
coercion. Much like he had done against Prado Lima in their local dispute, Teixeira again<br />
demonstrated his faction’s ability to dictate private law rights by obtaining a verdict in da<br />
Silva’s favor. By effectively providing legal patronage to factional allies, Teixeira could<br />
enhance his own faction’s political position in Alegrete’s comarca. This time, however, the<br />
Alegrete court’s decision impacted the property rights of two Brazilians across the border in<br />
Uruguay. The determination of property rights in the neighboring republic represented an<br />
important front in the clashes between the Ribeiros and Canabarro to control the<br />
administration of justice in Alegrete. Their interventions in conflicts over land, herds and<br />
other rights, particularly within the large Brazilian community located in the northern<br />
Uruguayan borderlands, provided the rival factions with a means to bolster reciprocal ties.<br />
Teixeira’s emphasis on blanco coercion also underlined how these legal maneuverings<br />
to win allies in Brazilian struggles fed back into local legal clashes occurring on both sides of<br />
the border. The persistent violence between blancos and colorados created a wealth of<br />
opportunities for Brazilian elites to intervene in disputes in the neighboring republic. As the<br />
governing blancos attempted to adjudicate property rights in the Uruguayan Republic, the<br />
constant interventions by the Ribeiros and Canabarro provided factional rivals with a<br />
<br />
154 Ibid.<br />
155 Ibid.<br />
221 <br />