“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
The Ribeiro faction saw to it that Theodora could vehemently contest Vital’s move. Angelo Muniz da Silva, Alegrete’s district judge, concluded that Vital had ignored substantial evidence in rendering his decision. He concluded that Theodora had in fact been born across the border in Uruguay and therefore was legally free. The Tribunal de Relação in Rio de Janeiro ultimately heard the case. They affirmed da Silva’s finding and ordered the municipality to pay the costs of the appeal. 59 The eventual appeal to the high court in Rio de Janeiro of a case involving the legal status of an Brazilian woman of color again demonstrates the extent to which factional politics could embed itself in “mundane” judicial actions. Legal rights were never too far removed from political conflicts. It also reveals the importance of controlling the courthouse for solidifying factional allegiances. Although Canabarro’s strength in the town was waxing, the Ribeiros used their control of the district court to maintain their power over the distribution of private law rights. In this way, they ensured their position as the ultimate arbiters of personal reputations and reciprocal ties in the city. They remained necessary parties to the system of borderlands legalities that governed Alegrete’s political and commercial relationships. Yet, as the Ribeiros increasingly saw their own political power tied to their control over Alegrete’s legal offices, they faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they had to draw closer to the provincial president to sustain their position. Recall that the president 59 It is unclear whether Theodora ultimately benefited from the successful appeal on her behalf. The appeal concerned allegations of criminal misconduct by the judge and did not explicitly seek to reverse the findings of the underlying proceeding. It is entirely possible that her owner simply departed with their legal judgment in tow, unchallenged by local officials more interested in weakening Oliveira than obtaining justice for Theodora. As we will see in chapter six, however, such factional disputes often did create spaces for persons in the lower strata of the borderlands social hierarchy to assert a variety of claims in order to enhance their own social standing. “Brazilian slaves” proved particularly adept at utilizing factional politics in this way to support their claims to Uruguayan citizenship and with it their own freedom. 176
controlled the appointment of district judges. 60 Thus, by channeling their strength through the judiciary, Teixeira and the Ribeiros’ political authority ultimately hinged upon maintaining at least a working relationship with the provincial executive. On the other hand, the system of borderlands legalities they defended was deeply rooted in conceptions of local autonomy. Throughout the 1850s, the progressistas had sought to paper over these issues at the provincial level through personal relationships. The Ribeiros’ local rivals did not face the same problem. Canabarro’s strength, although rooted in his own military office, flowed from his ability to recruit and deploy borderlands residents in the service of the state. His strength lay, therefore, precisely in his relative autonomy from the central government and the personal nature of his command. There was no need for him to avoid conflicts with provincial authorities. In this way, the fissures around control of the reputational and reciprocal relationships at the heart of borderlands legalities began to intersect with political tensions at the provincial level between centrally-appointed provincial presidents and the locally-elected legislature. That is to say, control over the courts accelerated the reemergence of ideological divisions throughout the Brazilian borderlands. As Newton Carneiro described in his discussion of the rise of the Liberal Party as the representative of Rio Grande do Sul’s regional identity, conflicts between the provincial president and legislature emerged as one of the dominant features of political life in the late 1850s. 61 One of the most important powers the imperial cabinet possessed was the ability to appoint provincial executives throughout Brazil’s far-flung provinces. Provincial presidents in turn used their broad powers over the state’s administrative and judicial apparatus to “ensure the viability of centralism as the 60 Carneiro, A Identidade Inacabada, 142. 61 Ibid., 141. 177
- Page 135 and 136: Sosa almost immediately responded.
- Page 137 and 138: funds, the imperial government took
- Page 139 and 140: Throughout the early 1830s, the Uru
- Page 141 and 142: Fernandes Braga, the provincial pre
- Page 143 and 144: Frustrated by the lack of progress,
- Page 145 and 146: cataloguing illegal property confis
- Page 147 and 148: also provided prominent local elite
- Page 149 and 150: As the 1850s dawned, the persistent
- Page 151 and 152: traffic along the Uruguay. Rosas fi
- Page 153 and 154: would order, they intend to be resp
- Page 155 and 156: economic and political relationship
- Page 157 and 158: fed back into broader political dis
- Page 159 and 160: advance their visions for a new nat
- Page 161 and 162: Estado Oriental and had fought at C
- Page 163 and 164: Brazilian officials opened secret n
- Page 165 and 166: The 1855 occupation reinvigorated e
- Page 167 and 168: end political violence in the inter
- Page 169 and 170: important) but also dealt with defi
- Page 171 and 172: Ribeiros, Prado Lima possessed land
- Page 173 and 174: move to Alegrete were unclear. Duri
- Page 175 and 176: verification of filings in his foru
- Page 177 and 178: “intimate friend and relative.”
- Page 179 and 180: men. They were capable of protectin
- Page 181 and 182: Nolasco and Vianna responded that t
- Page 183 and 184: in 1834. Joaquim dos Santos Prado L
- Page 185: Vital de Oliveira, securing his ele
- Page 189 and 190: military control. By engaging in th
- Page 191 and 192: faction’s strength. In particular
- Page 193 and 194: mattered greatly to their own power
- Page 195 and 196: the parties and the public, with ea
- Page 197 and 198: matter, he was an outsider. Tristan
- Page 199 and 200: Tristani then attempted to attack h
- Page 201 and 202: litigation in Alegrete, questions o
- Page 203 and 204: throughout the country that his wor
- Page 205 and 206: his wife. He claimed that she “wa
- Page 207 and 208: and the titles of each litigant in
- Page 209 and 210: judgment declaring their rival’s
- Page 211 and 212: CHAPTER 5 POLITICAL POWER AND PROPE
- Page 213 and 214: property of Joaquim dos Santos Prad
- Page 215 and 216: acknowledged by both court and poss
- Page 217 and 218: Paulo, Sá Brito was one of the few
- Page 219 and 220: Teixeira claimed that Prado Lima ha
- Page 221 and 222: the trial court’s judgment. The c
- Page 223 and 224: lands in question in 1833. The cour
- Page 225 and 226: The appearance of testimony by Prad
- Page 227 and 228: of cattle from the da Silva’s lan
- Page 229 and 230: [Lima] contracted with an untrained
- Page 231 and 232: that department, Colonel Diego Lama
- Page 233 and 234: vizinho” in Alegrete’s courts o
- Page 235 and 236: Brigadier Don David Canavarro . . .
controlled the appointment of district judges. 60 Thus, by channeling their strength through<br />
the judiciary, Teixeira and the Ribeiros’ political authority ultimately hinged upon<br />
maintaining at least a working relationship with the provincial executive. On the other hand,<br />
the system of borderlands legalities they defended was deeply rooted in conceptions of local<br />
autonomy. Throughout the 1850s, the progressistas had sought to paper over these issues at<br />
the provincial level through personal relationships. The Ribeiros’ local rivals did not face the<br />
same problem. Canabarro’s strength, although rooted in his own military office, flowed<br />
from his ability to recruit and deploy borderlands residents in the service of the state. His<br />
strength lay, therefore, precisely in his relative autonomy from the central government and<br />
the personal nature of his command. There was no need for him to avoid conflicts with<br />
provincial authorities.<br />
In this way, the fissures around control of the reputational and reciprocal<br />
relationships at the heart of borderlands legalities began to intersect with political tensions at<br />
the provincial level between centrally-appointed provincial presidents and the locally-elected<br />
legislature. That is to say, control over the courts accelerated the reemergence of ideological<br />
divisions throughout the Brazilian borderlands. As Newton Carneiro described in his<br />
discussion of the rise of the Liberal Party as the representative of Rio Grande do Sul’s<br />
regional identity, conflicts between the provincial president and legislature emerged as one of<br />
the dominant features of political life in the late 1850s. 61 One of the most important powers<br />
the imperial cabinet possessed was the ability to appoint provincial executives throughout<br />
Brazil’s far-flung provinces. Provincial presidents in turn used their broad powers over the<br />
state’s administrative and judicial apparatus to “ensure the viability of centralism as the<br />
<br />
60 Carneiro, A Identidade Inacabada, 142.<br />
61 Ibid., 141.<br />
177 <br />