“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

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power necessarily would derive their authority from the law rather than from brute force. In Lamas’ telling, it was up to the country’s “natural leaders” – by which he meant the elites in the capital – to put aside their differences and establish a legal basis upon which a new class of official could arise in the interior. 12 These new efforts to establish a unified national government that could govern the tumultuous republic ultimately bore fruit with the election of Gabriel Pereira to the presidency in 1856. Upon assuming office, Pereira declared that “whoever rules, half of the pueblo oriental cannot and must not remain in eternal tutelage to the other.” 13 Pereira took immediate steps to end factional divisions. He outlawed any public meetings that might take on factional overtones. He further worked to build a base of support both in Montevideo and in the countryside for his new, non-factional government. At the same time, Pereira confronted the interior caudillos. In 1858, he defeated an uprising led by the colorado general César Díaz. Pereira ordered the defeated caudillo and his followers shot following their capture after the battle of Quinteros. 14 With the government’s resounding victory, the countryside was, for the moment, pacified. Further, the old political divisions in the capital receded as various factions unified behind Pereira’s triumphant government. In 1860, Pereira became the first Uruguayan president since Rivera’s initial government in the 1830s to complete a full term in office. The fusionist program appeared to be slowly consolidating national authority over the troubled republic. Yet factional divisions did not disappear in Uruguay or across the border in Rio Grande do Sul. Rather, even as fusionists placed their faith in the power of the law to 























































 12 Ibid., 77-78. 13 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 61. 14 Ibid. 
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end political violence in the interior, factional conflicts to control local courthouses throughout the borderlands were intensifying. Lawyers, Judges and Factional Legal Politics in Alegrete, Brazil In January of 1853, a prominent local merchant in Alegrete, Manoel de Freitas Valle, appeared before the district court in the town to complain of judicial misconduct and electoral violence directed against him. He testified that following the end of the Farrapos Rebellion in 1845, Alegrete had returned to “constitutional life, producing peaceful elections without the presence of any disputes [devergencia] between the most prominent men of the town.” 15 Freitas Valle claimed, however, that two years later “divisions had already appeared” as a result of the creation of a faction led by Joaquim do Santos Prado Lima. According to Freitas Valle, Prado Lima’s “opposition” had triumphed in the 1847 elections. He testified that by 1849, there were even more conflicts, but again Prado Lima and his allies retained control in the town. He now claimed that Prado Lima’s faction was using the courts against him in order to prevent him from serving on the electoral board overseeing the 1852 elections. He alleged they had orchestrated his arrest based on false charge that he had conspired to murder another merchant. 16 As Freitas Valle’s story suggests, efforts to reduce political tensions throughout the Brazilian borderlands through the creation of elite coalitions increasingly collided with sharp local struggles over reputation and rights swirling around courthouses. Rather than political ideology, efforts to use local courts to control the complex relationships of reciprocity and 























































 15 Manoel de Freitas Valle c. José Vaz Alves de Castro Amaral, Juiz Municipal, APRGS. Alegrete. Cartório Civil e Crime. Ações Ordinárias, Maço 79, No. 2760 (1853). 16 Ibid., 336-336bis. 
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power necessarily would derive their authority from the law rather than from brute force. In<br />

Lamas’ telling, it was up to the country’s “natural leaders” – by which he meant the elites in<br />

the capital – to put aside their differences and establish a legal basis upon which a new class<br />

of official could arise in the interior. 12<br />

These new efforts to establish a unified national government that could govern the<br />

tumultuous republic ultimately bore fruit with the election of Gabriel Pereira to the<br />

presidency in 1856. Upon assuming office, Pereira declared that “whoever rules, half of the<br />

pueblo oriental cannot and must not remain in eternal tutelage to the other.” 13 Pereira took<br />

immediate steps to end factional divisions. He outlawed any public meetings that might take<br />

on factional overtones. He further worked to build a base of support both in Montevideo<br />

and in the countryside for his new, non-factional government. At the same time, Pereira<br />

confronted the interior caudillos. In 1858, he defeated an uprising led by the colorado general<br />

César Díaz. Pereira ordered the defeated caudillo and his followers shot following their<br />

capture after the battle of Quinteros. 14<br />

With the government’s resounding victory, the countryside was, for the moment,<br />

pacified. Further, the old political divisions in the capital receded as various factions unified<br />

behind Pereira’s triumphant government. In 1860, Pereira became the first Uruguayan<br />

president since Rivera’s initial government in the 1830s to complete a full term in office.<br />

The fusionist program appeared to be slowly consolidating national authority over the<br />

troubled republic. Yet factional divisions did not disappear in Uruguay or across the border<br />

in Rio Grande do Sul. Rather, even as fusionists placed their faith in the power of the law to<br />

























































<br />

12 Ibid., 77-78.<br />

13 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 61.<br />

14 Ibid.<br />


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