“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

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found them. In the disorder, plagues of wild dogs roamed the borderlands and attacked the remaining herds. 6 The conflicts during the Guerra Grande had also revealed the persistent inability of the small “buffer” state to escape foreign intervention in its domestic affairs. As we saw in the preceding chapter, struggles between the unitarists and federalists across the Uruguay in the Argentine Confederation continued to spill over into the Estado Oriental. Similarly, Brazilian ranchers repeatedly challenged Uruguayan authorities. These incursions ultimately culminated in the 1851 Brazilian invasion that ended nearly two decades of war between the colorados and blancos. The invasion also reaffirmed the empire’s longstanding right to intervene in Uruguayan affairs. Imperial power over its small neighbor was formally codified in five treaties ratified in October of 1851. The treaties established a permanent alliance between the two countries, provided loans to the Uruguayan government and harsh conditions for their repayment, guaranteed free commerce across the border, fixed national boundaries and ensured the return of fugitive Brazilian slaves to their masters. The treaties further gave the Brazilian government the right to intervene in Uruguayan affairs to ensure that recurring factional conflicts did not undermine the national government. 7 Utilizing their rights under the 1851 agreements, Brazilian forces repeatedly crossed into Uruguay to assert their control over the tumultuous republic. For much of the decade, the imperial army served as the ultimate arbiter of domestic political disputes. It also brokered favorable economic arrangements for its subjects in Uruguay’s northern borderlands. Thus, while ostensibly respecting Uruguayan sovereignty, the imperial government clearly intended to ensure that the small republic could not govern itself. 























































 6 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 50-52. 7 Juan E. Pivel Devoto and Alcira Ranieri de Pivel Devoto, La Guerra Grande, 1839- 1851 (Montevideo: Editorial Medina, 1971), 100-04. 
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Brazilian officials opened secret negotiations with the British and French to incorporate Uruguay back into the imperial fold. Once again, the small nation’s very existence appeared to hang in the balance. 8 With Uruguay’s economy in ruins and its independence continually threatened by its larger neighbors, political leaders throughout the 1850s embarked on an aggressive campaign to restore order in the countryside, reduce factional conflicts and establish a legal basis for the fractured republic’s national government. The touchstone of this effort was the outright elimination of the traditional blanco and colorado factions. In their place, separate political associations would be “fused” into a new national identity. 9 Bernardo Berro, the blanco statesman and eventual president of the Uruguayan Republic in 1860, provided much of the theoretical underpinnings for the fusionist movement. Viewing the vast scale of the destruction in the countryside, Berro argued that for the small republic to survive and prosper it had to develop a sense of national identity for the first time. He called upon the warring factions in the country to accept the peace at the end of the Guerra Grande. He pointed out that both sides had famously agreed that war had produced “neither victors nor vanquished.” This philosophy of shared responsibility for the conflict had to now guide the country’s politics. Berro in particular argued that the old parties were not divided by “ideas” but by “events.” Now that the “events” of the Guerra Grande were at an end, the country no longer possessed a need for its traditional factional allegiances. Berro claimed that by fusing these parties together, the nation could overcome its deep divisions. This did not mean the end of parties or political clashes. Rather, in Berro’s telling, fusionism was a transitional 























































 8 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 52-53. 9 Ibid., 53-56. 
 153
 


Brazilian officials opened secret negotiations with the British and French to incorporate<br />

Uruguay back into the imperial fold. Once again, the small nation’s very existence appeared<br />

to hang in the balance. 8<br />

With Uruguay’s economy in ruins and its independence continually threatened by its<br />

larger neighbors, political leaders throughout the 1850s embarked on an aggressive campaign<br />

to restore order in the countryside, reduce factional conflicts and establish a legal basis for<br />

the fractured republic’s national government. The touchstone of this effort was the outright<br />

elimination of the traditional blanco and colorado factions. In their place, separate political<br />

associations would be “fused” into a new national identity. 9 Bernardo Berro, the blanco<br />

statesman and eventual president of the Uruguayan Republic in 1860, provided much of the<br />

theoretical underpinnings for the fusionist movement. Viewing the vast scale of the<br />

destruction in the countryside, Berro argued that for the small republic to survive and<br />

prosper it had to develop a sense of national identity for the first time. He called upon the<br />

warring factions in the country to accept the peace at the end of the Guerra Grande. He<br />

pointed out that both sides had famously agreed that war had produced “neither victors nor<br />

vanquished.” This philosophy of shared responsibility for the conflict had to now guide the<br />

country’s politics. Berro in particular argued that the old parties were not divided by “ideas”<br />

but by “events.” Now that the “events” of the Guerra Grande were at an end, the country no<br />

longer possessed a need for its traditional factional allegiances. Berro claimed that by fusing<br />

these parties together, the nation could overcome its deep divisions. This did not mean the<br />

end of parties or political clashes. Rather, in Berro’s telling, fusionism was a transitional<br />

























































<br />

8 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 52-53.<br />

9 Ibid., 53-56.<br />


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