“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
CHAPTER 4 BORDERLANDS LEGAL POLITICS AND RENEWED FACTIONAL DIVISIONS IN THE WAKE OF THEIR TRIUMPH AT CASEROS, INHABITANTS THROUGHOUT THE Río de la Plata basin started to sort out the consequences of two decades of warfare. They once again began to confront questions of how to solve the persistent problem of order throughout the region. In the eastern borderlands along the Uruguay, where the military clashes of the previous decades had been most intense, political leaders in Montevideo sought to end factional conflicts by “fusing” the blancos and colorados together through accords and compromises. The goal was to forge the basis for a new national dialogue and with it a new elite politics. Reformers hoped to overcome the sharp political conflicts over questions of sovereignty and social order that, as we have seen, had produced nearly incessant wars in the decades following the 1810 revolutions. Central to these efforts was the persistent belief that once the anarchy in the borderlands ended, new states could finally begin the process of consolidating their hold on the contested ground along the Uruguay. In these “fusionist” visions, law could finally be extended into the interior now that archaic political divisions had been suppressed. The programs of would-be constitutionalists, fusionists and state-builders to tramp down conflicts and forge workable coalitions in the name of state authority collided sharply with the alternative legalities that continued to define personal and political identities in the borderlands. While military conflicts had momentarily ended, local struggles over borderlands courtrooms continued. At stake was the ability to control the local systems of justice and cross-border trading networks that had arisen in the proceeding decades. As a result, courtrooms became centers for renewed hostility over the power to define borderlands legalities. In turn, these local conflicts in and around borderlands courtrooms 146
fed back into broader political disputes. In particular, the very centrality of the law to defining factional power, personal reputations and reciprocal ties led to increasingly sharp local struggles. These clashes in turn radiated through the networks of commercial and political associations stitching the tightly integrated borderlands together. As the 1850s progressed, therefore, the loose coalitions of elites envisioned by reformers progressively ceded ground to more sharply defined factional assemblages. These entities centered on powerful figures like David Canabarro, among others, who organized allies to control courtrooms throughout the borderlands. The peripheral solutions to the problem of order in the previous decades now began to lay the foundation for new rounds of sovereign conflicts. This chapter explores how borderlands legalities produced increased political tensions and factional rivalries. It does so by dropping down to the local level and looking at the relationship between litigation and sharpening factional disputes over the course of the 1850s. It maps the conflicts in and around courthouses in two strategic fora in the Brazilian and Uruguayan borderlands. The first, Alegrete, Brazil, witnessed a decade-long conflict to control the administration of justice in the town. These factional clashes involved legal proceedings, elections and pervasive violence. This chapter examines how the prolonged struggle to control Alegrete’s courthouse propelled the creation of much more sharply defined political coalitions. The second section explores renewed conflicts between the old blanco and colorado parties in Salto, Uruguay around issues of personal reputation and political power. Here, litigation over juicios de imprenta, a particularly public proceeding held in the town’s theater, provided much of the impetus for local struggles to control borderlands legalities. In each forum, litigation remained a critical moment in which local rivals could publicly express their commercial and political associations and define their place within the 147
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CHAPTER 4<br />
BORDERL<strong>AND</strong>S LEGAL POLITICS <strong>AND</strong> RENEWED FACTIONAL DIVISIONS<br />
IN THE WAKE OF THEIR TRIUMPH AT CASEROS, INHABITANTS THROUGHOUT THE<br />
Río de la Plata basin started to sort out the consequences of two decades of warfare. They<br />
once again began to confront questions of how to solve the persistent problem of order<br />
throughout the region. In the eastern borderlands along the Uruguay, where the military<br />
clashes of the previous decades had been most intense, political leaders in Montevideo<br />
sought to end factional conflicts by “fusing” the blancos and colorados together through<br />
accords and compromises. The goal was to forge the basis for a new national dialogue and<br />
with it a new elite politics. Reformers hoped to overcome the sharp political conflicts over<br />
questions of sovereignty and social order that, as we have seen, had produced nearly<br />
incessant wars in the decades following the 1810 revolutions. Central to these efforts was<br />
the persistent belief that once the anarchy in the borderlands ended, new states could finally<br />
begin the process of consolidating their hold on the contested ground along the Uruguay. In<br />
these “fusionist” visions, law could finally be extended into the interior now that archaic<br />
political divisions had been suppressed.<br />
The programs of would-be constitutionalists, fusionists and state-builders to tramp<br />
down conflicts and forge workable coalitions in the name of state authority collided sharply<br />
with the alternative legalities that continued to define personal and political identities in the<br />
borderlands. While military conflicts had momentarily ended, local struggles over<br />
borderlands courtrooms continued. At stake was the ability to control the local systems of<br />
justice and cross-border trading networks that had arisen in the proceeding decades. As a<br />
result, courtrooms became centers for renewed hostility over the power to define<br />
borderlands legalities. In turn, these local conflicts in and around borderlands courtrooms<br />
146 <br />