“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
in the previous decades. By the early 1850s, these relationships had become sufficiently robust to blunt attempts to impose national limitations on their scope. Acting in the name of local autonomy, but with an eye towards broader relationships secured by reciprocity and personal reputations, borderlands elites had triumphed in the first round of sovereign conflicts over the region’s political and economic divisions. Conclusion Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, efforts to impose national boundaries and legal categories on the borderlands repeatedly collided with dense webs of integrated trading networks stretching across the Río de la Plata. The success of these trading chains, particularly in the eastern borderlands along the Uruguay River, rested upon the ability to move goods, cattle and money across boundaries without interference from outside officials. Rather than states, these trading relationships depended upon reciprocal ties and local reputations to sustain them. For men like Urquiza, protecting these simultaneously integrated and localized borderlands systems provided a source of wealth and power. Attempts to erect national divisions and slice up these borderlands associations threatened to bring the entire edifice down. For this reason, each successive attempt to do so, whether in Brazil, Uruguay, or ultimately Argentina, met with fierce and concerted resistance from peripheral elites. Eventually, Urquiza and his allies succeeded where European naval blockades and unitarist politicians had failed, brining an end to Rosas’ rule over Buenos Aires. The victory over Rosas and Oribe represented a triumph for models of borderlands sovereignty premised upon local laws and cross-border connections cemented together through factional political alliances and personal reputations. The Caseros coalition largely agreed on the need to defeat sovereign models that interfered with their borderlands legal, 144
economic and political relationships. The victory did not, however, resolve questions of regional sovereignty or national boundaries. It also did not end factional conflicts over legal rights and personal reputations. Rather, as we will see in the next few chapters, the local legal politics of the 1850s and 1860s that arose out of the military and political conflicts of the proceeding decades possessed within them the seeds for further international warfare. These struggles in turn were driven by the need to resolve prickly questions over sovereignty and private law rights. Borderlands courtrooms would be at the center of these clashes as strands of violence and law again entangled together. 145
- Page 103 and 104: Ríos or by ship to Montero’s out
- Page 105 and 106: alliances with the blancos to open
- Page 107 and 108: connections up and down the river t
- Page 109 and 110: With his money now in limbo and his
- Page 111 and 112: honorable merchant. His associates
- Page 113 and 114: meant more than establishing a docu
- Page 115 and 116: Uruguaiana and Salto. 80 Chaves and
- Page 117 and 118: complex laws “that they only unde
- Page 119 and 120: were considered suspect, particular
- Page 121 and 122: status. Public recognition of one
- Page 123 and 124: They reasoned that “one has to re
- Page 125 and 126: unanimous and respected testimony o
- Page 127 and 128: powerful figures like Urquiza, depe
- Page 129 and 130: CHAPTER 3 SOVEREIGN CONFLICTS THE R
- Page 131 and 132: conflicts between peripheral ranche
- Page 133 and 134: further agreed to provide payments
- Page 135 and 136: Sosa almost immediately responded.
- Page 137 and 138: funds, the imperial government took
- Page 139 and 140: Throughout the early 1830s, the Uru
- Page 141 and 142: Fernandes Braga, the provincial pre
- Page 143 and 144: Frustrated by the lack of progress,
- Page 145 and 146: cataloguing illegal property confis
- Page 147 and 148: also provided prominent local elite
- Page 149 and 150: As the 1850s dawned, the persistent
- Page 151 and 152: traffic along the Uruguay. Rosas fi
- Page 153: would order, they intend to be resp
- Page 157 and 158: fed back into broader political dis
- Page 159 and 160: advance their visions for a new nat
- Page 161 and 162: Estado Oriental and had fought at C
- Page 163 and 164: Brazilian officials opened secret n
- Page 165 and 166: The 1855 occupation reinvigorated e
- Page 167 and 168: end political violence in the inter
- Page 169 and 170: important) but also dealt with defi
- Page 171 and 172: Ribeiros, Prado Lima possessed land
- Page 173 and 174: move to Alegrete were unclear. Duri
- Page 175 and 176: verification of filings in his foru
- Page 177 and 178: “intimate friend and relative.”
- Page 179 and 180: men. They were capable of protectin
- Page 181 and 182: Nolasco and Vianna responded that t
- Page 183 and 184: in 1834. Joaquim dos Santos Prado L
- Page 185 and 186: Vital de Oliveira, securing his ele
- Page 187 and 188: controlled the appointment of distr
- Page 189 and 190: military control. By engaging in th
- Page 191 and 192: faction’s strength. In particular
- Page 193 and 194: mattered greatly to their own power
- Page 195 and 196: the parties and the public, with ea
- Page 197 and 198: matter, he was an outsider. Tristan
- Page 199 and 200: Tristani then attempted to attack h
- Page 201 and 202: litigation in Alegrete, questions o
- Page 203 and 204: throughout the country that his wor
in the previous decades. By the early 1850s, these relationships had become sufficiently<br />
robust to blunt attempts to impose national limitations on their scope. Acting in the name<br />
of local autonomy, but with an eye towards broader relationships secured by reciprocity and<br />
personal reputations, borderlands elites had triumphed in the first round of sovereign<br />
conflicts over the region’s political and economic divisions.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, efforts to impose national boundaries and legal<br />
categories on the borderlands repeatedly collided with dense webs of integrated trading<br />
networks stretching across the Río de la Plata. The success of these trading chains,<br />
particularly in the eastern borderlands along the Uruguay River, rested upon the ability to<br />
move goods, cattle and money across boundaries without interference from outside officials.<br />
Rather than states, these trading relationships depended upon reciprocal ties and local<br />
reputations to sustain them. For men like Urquiza, protecting these simultaneously<br />
integrated and localized borderlands systems provided a source of wealth and power.<br />
Attempts to erect national divisions and slice up these borderlands associations threatened to<br />
bring the entire edifice down. For this reason, each successive attempt to do so, whether in<br />
Brazil, Uruguay, or ultimately Argentina, met with fierce and concerted resistance from<br />
peripheral elites. Eventually, Urquiza and his allies succeeded where European naval<br />
blockades and unitarist politicians had failed, brining an end to Rosas’ rule over Buenos<br />
Aires.<br />
The victory over Rosas and Oribe represented a triumph for models of borderlands<br />
sovereignty premised upon local laws and cross-border connections cemented together<br />
through factional political alliances and personal reputations. The Caseros coalition largely<br />
agreed on the need to defeat sovereign models that interfered with their borderlands legal,<br />
144 <br />