“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
Urquiza reiterated his role as the political and military guarantor of the commercial revolution along the lower Uruguay. In the process, he enhanced his personal prestige and the corresponding power of his commercial associates as they extended trading linkages. 34 While Urquiza continued to serve as Rosas’ most important lieutenant, his economic success began to produce frictions with his erstwhile ally in Buenos Aires. The Guerra Grande had been a personal bonanza for the entrerriano leader. When Oribe encircled Montevideo, Urquiza had used his ever-expanding commercial connections along the Uruguay and his rivertine flotilla to supply the besieged city. The European naval blockade of Buenos Aires only further increased trade towards his warehouses along the Uruguay. By the late 1840s, Urquiza had become one of the principal importers of manufactured goods in the Río de la Plata basin. He now possessed sufficient wealth to expand his landholdings and construct the largest salting plant in the region. Through these operations, he further augmented his profits by exporting hides and salted beef to Europe. Along with agricultural staples, he cornered the gold export market as well. 35 So long as Rosas and Urquiza faced a common enemy, their relationship prospered. Rosas drew upon the deeply rooted opposition to the unitarists and their European allies throughout the Littoral to paper over differences between Buenos Aires and the interior. The end of the European naval blockade in 1848, however, laid the growing commercial tensions between the thriving rivertine ports throughout Entre Ríos under Urquiza’s protection and Buenos Aires bare. Urquiza and his allies had flourished through their growing cross-border trading relationships, particularly with merchants in Montevideo. With the European blockade now lifted, Rosas sought to reassert porteño control over the rivertine 34 Adolfo Saldías, Cómo Surgió Urguiza (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1973). 35 Bosch, Urquiza y Su Tiempo. 140
traffic along the Uruguay. Rosas first prohibited direct trade between the Argentine Littoral and Montevideo in 1849. This effectively closed off the re-export trade at the center of Entre Ríos’ economy. Merchants along the rivertine interior scoffed at porteño demands that they surrender profitable trade routes in order to support Buenos Aires’ monopoly on the overseas trade. Rosas further took steps to end the steady drain of specie from Buenos Aires into Entre Ríos and to Urquiza in particular by banning gold shipments to the littoral provinces. For the cash-starved interior, denying access to hard currency threatened to undermine the delicate webs of credit stitching commercial relationships together. In short, Rosas threatened the very foundations of rivertine prosperity. 36 Rosas’ efforts to restore Buenos Aires’ special position as the regulator of commercial linkages along the Río de la Plata’s river networks provoked an immediate reaction in the interior. Urquiza once again asserted his position as the political guarantor of the Uruguay River trade, petitioning Rosas to reconsider his policies. When Rosas refused, Urquiza moved to protect his cross-border trading relationships, as well as his personal reputation, by beginning to forge a coalition to now confront Rosas and his ally Oribe. At this moment the besieged colorados in Montevideo began to encourage Urquiza to break with Rosas in the name of his province’s right to maintain its advantageous economic position. The colorados equally reached out to the aggrieved Brazilian ranching community by offering concessions designed to reopen the northern Uruguayan borderlands. These concessions included foregoing any and all taxes on the export of cattle from Uruguayan pasturelands into the empire. For more than a decade, the unitarists and colorados in Montevideo had been repeatedly frustrated in their efforts to defeat Rosas through alliances with the British and 36 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 40-41. 141
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traffic along the Uruguay. Rosas first prohibited direct trade between the Argentine Littoral<br />
and Montevideo in 1849. This effectively closed off the re-export trade at the center of<br />
Entre Ríos’ economy. Merchants along the rivertine interior scoffed at porteño demands that<br />
they surrender profitable trade routes in order to support Buenos Aires’ monopoly on the<br />
overseas trade. Rosas further took steps to end the steady drain of specie from Buenos<br />
Aires into Entre Ríos and to Urquiza in particular by banning gold shipments to the littoral<br />
provinces. For the cash-starved interior, denying access to hard currency threatened to<br />
undermine the delicate webs of credit stitching commercial relationships together. In short,<br />
Rosas threatened the very foundations of rivertine prosperity. 36<br />
Rosas’ efforts to restore Buenos Aires’ special position as the regulator of<br />
commercial linkages along the Río de la Plata’s river networks provoked an immediate<br />
reaction in the interior. Urquiza once again asserted his position as the political guarantor of<br />
the Uruguay River trade, petitioning Rosas to reconsider his policies. When Rosas refused,<br />
Urquiza moved to protect his cross-border trading relationships, as well as his personal<br />
reputation, by beginning to forge a coalition to now confront Rosas and his ally Oribe. At<br />
this moment the besieged colorados in Montevideo began to encourage Urquiza to break with<br />
Rosas in the name of his province’s right to maintain its advantageous economic position.<br />
The colorados equally reached out to the aggrieved Brazilian ranching community by offering<br />
concessions designed to reopen the northern Uruguayan borderlands. These concessions<br />
included foregoing any and all taxes on the export of cattle from Uruguayan pasturelands<br />
into the empire.<br />
For more than a decade, the unitarists and colorados in Montevideo had been<br />
repeatedly frustrated in their efforts to defeat Rosas through alliances with the British and<br />
<br />
36 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 40-41.<br />
141 <br />