“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
the concept of “honorable vecinos” appearing in local fora to offer reputational testimony. The jury dismissed the charges against Cardoso outright. However, it did authorize charges against Figuero on much weaker evidence. In response, Figuero produced ample proof that at the time of the invasion he was conducting operations around Santana do Livramento, making it “impossible” for him to have participated. 33 The Alegrete jury then dismissed the case. The acquittal effectively ratified the actions of the Brazilian commanders. It publicly manifested the support of the local community for the california raids. In the process, it bolstered the commanders’ personal prestige as defenders of the local community and its cross-border rights. As Oribe and his blancos struggled to control Uruguay’s northern borders, their efforts increasingly clashed with the borderlands legalities underpinning the authority of prominent Brazilians. Throughout 1848, the collisions between these two sovereign conceptions progressively escalated. By 1850, Francisco Pedro de Abreu, one of the most prominent frontier commanders, had organized a fighting force of some 1,500 men to conduct raids to seize cattle and affect reprisals against Uruguayan violations of Brazilian properties. The repeated raids and reprisals once again destabilized the borderlands. Imperial officials again found themselves being pulled into the political conflicts raging throughout the Río de la Plata. This time, however, the empire would side with its borderlands subjects in their struggles against the extension state-centered sovereignties and putative national divisions. Towards Caseros 33 Justiça c. Hypolito Firio Cardoso e Cándido Figuero. Figuero’s alibi actually was not very good. The jury without a doubt knew that Cardoso could have easily crossed the border and participated in the raids from Santana do Livramento. 138
As the 1850s dawned, the persistent clashes between peripheral and state-centered sovereignties continued to beset the Río de la Plata’s eastern borderlands. Although Brazilian ranchers had grown particularly restless with Uruguayan efforts to enforce national divisions bisecting their commercial operations, the blancos and their federalist allies in the Argentine Littoral retained their unquestioned military supremacy. Rosas and his allies had largely vanquished their unitarist opponents by the end of the 1840s. They had likewise overcome successive European naval blockades, using the British and French intervention to bolster support for the defense of “American” interests. By 1848, Buenos Aires was once again open to trans-Atlantic trade and its vital customs revenues. But as a triumphant Rosas, like his Uruguayan ally Oribe, moved to consolidate his regime’s control over the borderlands trade, he provoked a powerful backlash from his putative federalist allies in the Argentine Littoral. Aggrieved elites throughout the borderlands began to forge a new coalition to confront Rosas, preserve their local autonomy and protect their trading networks across the Río de la Plata’s interior. Urquiza was at the center of the gradually emerging opposition to Rosas in the early 1850s. Throughout the 1840s, Urquiza had continued his political ascent. He had become one of Rosas’ most effective and important federalist surrogates. With Rosas’ blessing, Urquiza was elected governor of Entre Ríos in 1842. For the next few years, the new governor engaged in nearly constant military actions against Rosas’ unitarist and colorado rivals. He assisted Oribe’s successful campaign across the Uruguayan countryside in 1843. He then engaged in a prolonged struggle against the unitarists and their allies in Corrientes. Following his decisive victory over unitarist forces at the battle of Vences in late 1847, Urquiza installed his own ally, Benjamin Virasoro, to the governorship of the neighboring province. Urquiza now controlled the entire Argentine Littoral. Through these actions, 139
- Page 97 and 98: opposite direction from Porto Alegr
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- Page 139 and 140: Throughout the early 1830s, the Uru
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- Page 157 and 158: fed back into broader political dis
- Page 159 and 160: advance their visions for a new nat
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- Page 163 and 164: Brazilian officials opened secret n
- Page 165 and 166: The 1855 occupation reinvigorated e
- Page 167 and 168: end political violence in the inter
- Page 169 and 170: important) but also dealt with defi
- Page 171 and 172: Ribeiros, Prado Lima possessed land
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- Page 179 and 180: men. They were capable of protectin
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- Page 195 and 196: the parties and the public, with ea
- Page 197 and 198: matter, he was an outsider. Tristan
As the 1850s dawned, the persistent clashes between peripheral and state-centered<br />
sovereignties continued to beset the Río de la Plata’s eastern borderlands. Although<br />
Brazilian ranchers had grown particularly restless with Uruguayan efforts to enforce national<br />
divisions bisecting their commercial operations, the blancos and their federalist allies in the<br />
Argentine Littoral retained their unquestioned military supremacy. Rosas and his allies had<br />
largely vanquished their unitarist opponents by the end of the 1840s. They had likewise<br />
overcome successive European naval blockades, using the British and French intervention to<br />
bolster support for the defense of “American” interests. By 1848, Buenos Aires was once<br />
again open to trans-Atlantic trade and its vital customs revenues. But as a triumphant Rosas,<br />
like his Uruguayan ally Oribe, moved to consolidate his regime’s control over the<br />
borderlands trade, he provoked a powerful backlash from his putative federalist allies in the<br />
Argentine Littoral. Aggrieved elites throughout the borderlands began to forge a new<br />
coalition to confront Rosas, preserve their local autonomy and protect their trading<br />
networks across the Río de la Plata’s interior.<br />
Urquiza was at the center of the gradually emerging opposition to Rosas in the early<br />
1850s. Throughout the 1840s, Urquiza had continued his political ascent. He had become<br />
one of Rosas’ most effective and important federalist surrogates. With Rosas’ blessing,<br />
Urquiza was elected governor of Entre Ríos in 1842. For the next few years, the new<br />
governor engaged in nearly constant military actions against Rosas’ unitarist and colorado<br />
rivals. He assisted Oribe’s successful campaign across the Uruguayan countryside in 1843.<br />
He then engaged in a prolonged struggle against the unitarists and their allies in Corrientes.<br />
Following his decisive victory over unitarist forces at the battle of Vences in late 1847,<br />
Urquiza installed his own ally, Benjamin Virasoro, to the governorship of the neighboring<br />
province. Urquiza now controlled the entire Argentine Littoral. Through these actions,<br />
139 <br />
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