“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
epublic. 26 Berro’s calls for a uniform, national system of law that dispensed with exceptions for foreigners would emerge again and again in the coming decades. 27 By the late 1840s, these nationalist sentiments and economic necessities compelled Oribe to risk angering the powerful Brazilian landowners in the borderlands. Mirroring the imperial policies that had triggered the Farrapos war, Oribe first demanded tax payments for the export of cattle into Rio Grande do Sul. Frontier commanders in the northern borderlands like Diego Lamas immediately took steps to prosecute what was now contraband trade across the border. Unable to stem the flow of cattle, Oribe then prohibited their export entirely in 1848. 28 Much as the imperial government had done a decade earlier, Oribe’s measures aimed to consolidate his government’s authority over economic resources in the borderlands by seeking to enforce national divisions. They provoked a similar response from the aggrieved Brazilians throughout the western campanha. Prominent local elites began to organize large- scale raids into the Estado Oriental to seize cattle. These “californias,” in reference to the ongoing gold rush in the United States, embodied borderlands legalities premised on cross- border reciprocities and local reputations. At the most basic level, the raids violently manifested the rejection of the imposition of artificial national boundaries on what was an integrated economic space. Protecting property across the border through the california raids 26 Ibid., 124. 27 For a discussion of the role of the Brazilian presence in propelling Uruguayan legal reforms forward, see Benton, "The Laws of This Country.", Susana Bleil de Souza and Fabrício Prado, "Las Representaciones del Brasil en el Discurso de Los Constructores de la Identidad Uruguaya en el Siglo XIX," in Fronteras, Indígenas y Migrantes en América del Sur, ed. Hector Hugo Trinchero (Córdoba, ARG: Centro de Estudios Avanzados, 2002). 28 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 33-34. 136
also provided prominent local elites with a mechanism to enhance their own personal standing as guarantors of cross-border economic relationships. 29 Once again, borderlands courtrooms represented important arenas in which to articulate reciprocal ties. Litigation also provided a means to bolster the personal reputations of local leaders vying to protect Brazilian property rights across the border. The criminal charges against Hypolito Firio Cardoso and Cándido Figuero for allegedly organizing an incursion of over three hundred Brazilians into Uruguay in 1847 provide a good example. 30 The proceeding began with a complaint from Diego Lamas, Oribe’s blanco lieutenant. Lamas drafted a letter to Brazilian officials demanding justice for several incursions organized by Cardoso and Figuero to remove cattle from across the border. Lamas noted that “a considerable number of vizinhos of this frontier had cooperated for this end.” 31 Figuero’s inclusion is particularly interesting because he possessed commercial relationships dating back to the Farrapos Rebellion with Agustín Guarch and other colorado merchants across the border. 32 His alleged participation in the raids again suggests that cross-border reciprocal relationships were at work in driving the californias. Faced with Lamas’ claims, Brazilian officials filed criminal charges against the two commanders for violating the empire’s stated policy of strict neutrality in Uruguayan affairs. The nature of the trial, however, suggests that officials in Alegrete were less interested in defending Uruguayan sovereignty than in publicly manifesting Cardoso’s and Figuero’s legal protection of Brazilian property. To that end, Cardoso and Figuero appeared in the Alegrete courts in a public jury trial. Selected exclusively from property owners, the jury embodied 29 Ibid. 30 Justiça c. Hypolito Firio Cardoso e Cándido Figuero, APRGS. Alegrete. Cartório Civil e Crime. Processos Crimes. Maço 77 No. 2669 (1847). 31 Ibid., 10 32 CV-4434 (February 18, 1841). 137
- Page 95 and 96: that he had employed to first arran
- Page 97 and 98: opposite direction from Porto Alegr
- Page 99 and 100: Pinto sought to have the property d
- Page 101 and 102: dealings with Vázquez and the Carv
- Page 103 and 104: Ríos or by ship to Montero’s out
- Page 105 and 106: alliances with the blancos to open
- Page 107 and 108: connections up and down the river t
- Page 109 and 110: With his money now in limbo and his
- Page 111 and 112: honorable merchant. His associates
- Page 113 and 114: meant more than establishing a docu
- Page 115 and 116: Uruguaiana and Salto. 80 Chaves and
- Page 117 and 118: complex laws “that they only unde
- Page 119 and 120: were considered suspect, particular
- Page 121 and 122: status. Public recognition of one
- Page 123 and 124: They reasoned that “one has to re
- Page 125 and 126: unanimous and respected testimony o
- Page 127 and 128: powerful figures like Urquiza, depe
- Page 129 and 130: CHAPTER 3 SOVEREIGN CONFLICTS THE R
- Page 131 and 132: conflicts between peripheral ranche
- Page 133 and 134: further agreed to provide payments
- Page 135 and 136: Sosa almost immediately responded.
- Page 137 and 138: funds, the imperial government took
- Page 139 and 140: Throughout the early 1830s, the Uru
- Page 141 and 142: Fernandes Braga, the provincial pre
- Page 143 and 144: Frustrated by the lack of progress,
- Page 145: cataloguing illegal property confis
- Page 149 and 150: As the 1850s dawned, the persistent
- Page 151 and 152: traffic along the Uruguay. Rosas fi
- Page 153 and 154: would order, they intend to be resp
- Page 155 and 156: economic and political relationship
- Page 157 and 158: fed back into broader political dis
- Page 159 and 160: advance their visions for a new nat
- Page 161 and 162: Estado Oriental and had fought at C
- Page 163 and 164: Brazilian officials opened secret n
- Page 165 and 166: The 1855 occupation reinvigorated e
- Page 167 and 168: end political violence in the inter
- Page 169 and 170: important) but also dealt with defi
- Page 171 and 172: Ribeiros, Prado Lima possessed land
- Page 173 and 174: move to Alegrete were unclear. Duri
- Page 175 and 176: verification of filings in his foru
- Page 177 and 178: “intimate friend and relative.”
- Page 179 and 180: men. They were capable of protectin
- Page 181 and 182: Nolasco and Vianna responded that t
- Page 183 and 184: in 1834. Joaquim dos Santos Prado L
- Page 185 and 186: Vital de Oliveira, securing his ele
- Page 187 and 188: controlled the appointment of distr
- Page 189 and 190: military control. By engaging in th
- Page 191 and 192: faction’s strength. In particular
- Page 193 and 194: mattered greatly to their own power
- Page 195 and 196: the parties and the public, with ea
epublic. 26 Berro’s calls for a uniform, national system of law that dispensed with exceptions<br />
for foreigners would emerge again and again in the coming decades. 27<br />
By the late 1840s, these nationalist sentiments and economic necessities compelled<br />
Oribe to risk angering the powerful Brazilian landowners in the borderlands. Mirroring the<br />
imperial policies that had triggered the Farrapos war, Oribe first demanded tax payments for<br />
the export of cattle into Rio Grande do Sul. Frontier commanders in the northern<br />
borderlands like Diego Lamas immediately took steps to prosecute what was now<br />
contraband trade across the border. Unable to stem the flow of cattle, Oribe then<br />
prohibited their export entirely in 1848. 28<br />
Much as the imperial government had done a decade earlier, Oribe’s measures aimed<br />
to consolidate his government’s authority over economic resources in the borderlands by<br />
seeking to enforce national divisions. They provoked a similar response from the aggrieved<br />
Brazilians throughout the western campanha. Prominent local elites began to organize large-<br />
scale raids into the Estado Oriental to seize cattle. These “californias,” in reference to the<br />
ongoing gold rush in the United States, embodied borderlands legalities premised on cross-<br />
border reciprocities and local reputations. At the most basic level, the raids violently<br />
manifested the rejection of the imposition of artificial national boundaries on what was an<br />
integrated economic space. Protecting property across the border through the california raids<br />
<br />
26 Ibid., 124.<br />
27 For a discussion of the role of the Brazilian presence in propelling Uruguayan legal<br />
reforms forward, see Benton, "The Laws of This Country.", Susana Bleil de Souza and<br />
Fabrício Prado, "Las Representaciones del Brasil en el Discurso de Los Constructores de la<br />
Identidad Uruguaya en el Siglo XIX," in Fronteras, Indígenas y Migrantes en América del Sur, ed.<br />
Hector Hugo Trinchero (Córdoba, ARG: Centro de Estudios Avanzados, 2002).<br />
28 Barrán, Apogeo y Crisis, 33-34.<br />
136 <br />