“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
orderlands legalities and rival models emanating from Buenos Aires and the Estado Oriental. Californias and Cross-border Conflicts While calm temporarily returned to Rio Grande do Sul in 1845, tensions increasingly flared up in neighboring Uruguay over efforts to consolidate control over borderlands commercial chains. Throughout the Río de la Plata basin, the Guerra Grande continued to rage. Manuel Oribe, Rosas’ close ally, had decisively defeated Rivera and his unitarist supporters at the battle of Arroyo Grande in late 1842. The following year, Oribe had driven Rivera from the Uruguayan countryside, forcing the colorado leader to take refuge behind Montevideo’s walls. Rivera’s various attempts to break the siege and defeat Oribe by launching invasions from Rio Grande do Sul failed in the mid-1840s. By 1847, Oribe’s blancos possessed absolute control over the Uruguayan interior. Although dominant in the countryside, Oribe and his federalist allies from Argentina lacked sufficient resources to capture Montevideo itself. Protected by the British and French navies, Montevideo’s port could ensure almost indefinite colorado resistance. European naval blockades of Buenos Aires also guaranteed that the besieged city received the bulk of the trans-Atlantic trade flowing into the region. This provided the colorado government with revenues to continue the struggle. Without access to Montevideo’s customs receipts or European financial assistance, Oribe resorted to a number of unorthodox and increasingly dangerous measures to sustain his campaign. In 1845, Oribe began confiscating numerous tracts of land belonging to colorados. These moves once again began to destabilize cross- border reciprocal ties between colorados and many prominent riograndense ranchers. Inevitably, Brazilian ranchers grumbled that blanco officials had wrongly seized their properties. They loudly complained to politicians in Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro, conspicuously 134
cataloguing illegal property confiscations and violence by blanco officials. 23 An 1845 letter signed by over a hundred Brazilian landowners in the Estado Oriental complained that Oribe’s lieutenants “extorted as much as [they] needed from Brazilians, without paying them, without even providing a sheet of paper . . . considering the Brazilian fazendas to be common goods.” 24 Despite the rumblings of the powerful Brazilian ranching community, Oribe’s desperation led him to impose further revenue measures that were sure to aggravate tensions. One pressing need was to protect the country’s diminishing cattle herds. These herds constituted the blancos’ principal remaining economic resource. Their control by “foreign” ranchers was unacceptable. Anger over Brazilian ranching operations also reflected the growing “nationalist” tendencies within the blanco faction. Confronting European naval blockades, blanco party leaders like Bernardo Berro began to call for the end of foreign interventions into Uruguayan affairs altogether. In an 1847 article, Berro railed against foreign infiltrators from both Europe and Buenos Aires that “had conspired against the legal government that had housed and protected them.” 25 He demanded the “orientalization” of the republic’s domestic affairs in order to restore order to the countryside. He wrote: “the cause of the pueblo oriental is not the cause of any one person, but is the cause of order and of the laws that represent that principle.” The presence of a foreign and lawless minority threatened these ideas. Brazilian ranchers and European merchants alike would have to accept Uruguayan laws in order to remain as guests in the 23 See Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores and Brazilian Government Document Digitization Project, "Relatório da Repartição dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Anexo 'A'." (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1850), http://bibpurl.oclc.org/web/22175., Anexo A, at 40-74. 24 AHRGS. Câmara de Alegrete: Correspondência Expedida, Letter to Illmo. Exmo. Sor. Conde de Caxias, Presidente da Provincia do Rio Grande de S. Pedro do Sul, No. 456 (June 25, 1845). 25 Manuel Herrera y Obes and Bernardo Prudencio Berro, El Caudillismo y la Revoluciónn Americana: Polémica (Montevideo: Biblioteca Artigas, 1966), 122. 135
- Page 93 and 94: In short, over the course of a deca
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cataloguing illegal property confiscations and violence by blanco officials. 23 An 1845 letter<br />
signed by over a hundred Brazilian landowners in the Estado Oriental complained that<br />
Oribe’s lieutenants “extorted as much as [they] needed from Brazilians, without paying them,<br />
without even providing a sheet of paper . . . considering the Brazilian fazendas to be common<br />
goods.” 24<br />
Despite the rumblings of the powerful Brazilian ranching community, Oribe’s<br />
desperation led him to impose further revenue measures that were sure to aggravate<br />
tensions. One pressing need was to protect the country’s diminishing cattle herds. These<br />
herds constituted the blancos’ principal remaining economic resource. Their control by<br />
“foreign” ranchers was unacceptable. Anger over Brazilian ranching operations also<br />
reflected the growing “nationalist” tendencies within the blanco faction. Confronting<br />
European naval blockades, blanco party leaders like Bernardo Berro began to call for the end<br />
of foreign interventions into Uruguayan affairs altogether. In an 1847 article, Berro railed<br />
against foreign infiltrators from both Europe and Buenos Aires that “had conspired against<br />
the legal government that had housed and protected them.” 25 He demanded the<br />
“orientalization” of the republic’s domestic affairs in order to restore order to the<br />
countryside. He wrote: “the cause of the pueblo oriental is not the cause of any one person,<br />
but is the cause of order and of the laws that represent that principle.” The presence of a<br />
foreign and lawless minority threatened these ideas. Brazilian ranchers and European<br />
merchants alike would have to accept Uruguayan laws in order to remain as guests in the<br />
<br />
23 See Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores and Brazilian Government Document<br />
Digitization Project, "Relatório da Repartição dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Anexo 'A'." (Rio<br />
de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1850), http://bibpurl.oclc.org/web/22175., Anexo A, at 40-74.<br />
24 AHRGS. Câmara de Alegrete: Correspondência Expedida, Letter to Illmo. Exmo. Sor.<br />
Conde de Caxias, Presidente da Provincia do Rio Grande de S. Pedro do Sul, No. 456 (June 25, 1845).<br />
25 Manuel Herrera y Obes and Bernardo Prudencio Berro, El Caudillismo y la Revoluciónn<br />
Americana: Polémica (Montevideo: Biblioteca Artigas, 1966), 122.<br />
135 <br />
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