“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
close alliances on both sides of the border in order to sustain his ranching operations in Cerro Largo. Although born in Brazil, Gonçalves had spent much of his life around the Uruguayan city. He first settled there following the 1811 Brazilian invasion, establishing a small shop in the town. He fought against Artigas during the 1816 campaign. By 1820, imperial officials named him commander of the frontier militia for the entire region around Cerro Largo and Herval. During the Cisplatine period, he further expanded his ranching operations and his connections to the vecinos in the borderlands department. 16 The riograndense rancher and officer again fought against Uruguayan rebels during the republic’s war for independence in 1825. His service, however, revealed the tensions between personal allegiances in the borderlands and more abstract, national divisions. During the war, Gonçalves had frequently received permission from both Brazilian military commanders and Uruguayan forces under Juan Antonio Lavalleja to enter his ranch lands and protect his herds. Through these transactions, Gonçalves cemented a personal friendship with Lavalleja, his putative enemy in the conflict. While perhaps disloyal, Gonçalves’ tactics were effective in ensuring that his “properties were not prejudiced in any way” by the Uruguayan general’s forces. 17 Once again, these types of personal arrangements reflected the inherent tensions over sovereignty in the borderlands. What made sense in advancing one’s economic interests and legal rights on the ground frequently clashed with national loyalties and divisions. While Gonçalves’ actions raised eyebrows during the conflict, his continuing association with Lavalleja following the war only increased doubts about his allegiances. 16 Francisco Riopardense de Macedo, Bento Gonçalves, 2d ed. (Porto Alegre: Instituto Estadual do Livro, 1996), 9-12. 17 Leitman, Raízes, 107-08. Gonçalves did claim that he sustained substantial losses during the conflict, in part to justify his own defiance of imperial orders. 128
Throughout the early 1830s, the Uruguayan commander and Fructuoso Rivera, the current president, appeared locked in an escalating struggle to control lands and cattle throughout the countryside. Whereas merchants like Agustín Guarch and his Brazilian associates around Uruguaiana and Alegrete had gravitated towards Rivera’s circle, Gonçalves served as Lavalleja’s ally and protector throughout the borderlands around Cerro Largo. When Lavalleja prepared to revolt against Rivera’s government in 1832, Gonçalves facilitated transactions between the Uruguayan commander and Brazilian merchants in order to bolster his Uruguayan allies’ military and political position. In exchange, Lavalleja promised “that all the Brazilians who assisted him in his undertaking would receive title to their lands immediately after the war.” 18 Once again, reciprocal relationships drove borderlands ties on both sides of the border. When Lavalleja’s 1832 uprising against Rivera failed, Gonçalves arranged for the Uruguayan commander to retreat across the border and take shelter in Rio Grande do Sul. 19 The imperial government quickly grew alarmed at the incursion of a foreign force into its territory. It ordered the provincial president, Manuel Antonio Galvão, to secure their disarmament and departure from Brazil. The empire could ill-afford a conflict. It was still recovering from the prolonged war with Argentina over the borderlands. In 1831, Pedro I had abdicated the throne in the face of growing opposition to his regime’s failed economic policies. At the time, his son, Pedro II, was only six years old. A regency government consisting largely of Brazilian liberals took charge of imperial affairs. The new government 18 Ibid., 109. 19 Rivera employed a similar tactic following his 1838 defeat at the hands of Manuel Oribe. In that instance, Rivera took refuge around Alegrete, reflecting his connections with the merchants and political leaders in that community. 129
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close alliances on both sides of the border in order to sustain his ranching operations in<br />
Cerro Largo. Although born in Brazil, Gonçalves had spent much of his life around the<br />
Uruguayan city. He first settled there following the 1811 Brazilian invasion, establishing a<br />
small shop in the town. He fought against Artigas during the 1816 campaign. By 1820,<br />
imperial officials named him commander of the frontier militia for the entire region around<br />
Cerro Largo and Herval. During the Cisplatine period, he further expanded his ranching<br />
operations and his connections to the vecinos in the borderlands department. 16<br />
The riograndense rancher and officer again fought against Uruguayan rebels during the<br />
republic’s war for independence in 1825. His service, however, revealed the tensions<br />
between personal allegiances in the borderlands and more abstract, national divisions.<br />
During the war, Gonçalves had frequently received permission from both Brazilian military<br />
commanders and Uruguayan forces under Juan Antonio Lavalleja to enter his ranch lands<br />
and protect his herds. Through these transactions, Gonçalves cemented a personal<br />
friendship with Lavalleja, his putative enemy in the conflict. While perhaps disloyal,<br />
Gonçalves’ tactics were effective in ensuring that his “properties were not prejudiced in any<br />
way” by the Uruguayan general’s forces. 17 Once again, these types of personal arrangements<br />
reflected the inherent tensions over sovereignty in the borderlands. What made sense in<br />
advancing one’s economic interests and legal rights on the ground frequently clashed with<br />
national loyalties and divisions.<br />
While Gonçalves’ actions raised eyebrows during the conflict, his continuing<br />
association with Lavalleja following the war only increased doubts about his allegiances.<br />
<br />
16<br />
Francisco Riopardense de Macedo, Bento Gonçalves, 2d ed. (Porto Alegre: Instituto<br />
Estadual do Livro, 1996), 9-12.<br />
17<br />
Leitman, Raízes, 107-08. Gonçalves did claim that he sustained substantial losses<br />
during the conflict, in part to justify his own defiance of imperial orders.<br />
128 <br />
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