“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

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complete bad faith, hurries to remove every class of cattle in his possession.” 6 Sosa likely had a point. The court in Cerro Largo certainly had labored to interpret his contractual agreements in a manner designed to protect Tavarez’s rights to move cattle across the border. Local leaders had penned briefs accusing him of violence and implicitly impugning his personal reputation. Sosa probably understood the balance of forces against him. He brought his judicial action away from Cerro Largo’s courts in Montevideo to better his own chances of victory. Tavarez’s political allies out in the borderlands responded aggressively to Sosa’s attempts to shift the case to Montevideo. They did so in a typical borderlands fashion by drawing upon webs of local connections. They secured a guarantee from Hilario Amaro de Silveira, another prominent Brazilian rancher in the region, to compensate Sosa for any cattle he might obtain through his legal action in Montevideo. 7 Amaro’s intervention again reflected the local politics of reciprocity and reputation at the heart of borderlands legalities. By guaranteeing the deposit, Amaro positioned himself to protect order in the countryside and preserve Tavarez’s cross-border trading arrangements. He further could use his prominent local position to blunt any outside interference in the local judicial decision. In short, Tavarez’s problem accorded Amaro the opportunity to manifest his role as a critical figure in maintaining borderlands commercial relationships. By obtaining such a guarantee from Amaro, Tavarez could also publicly manifest his own personal standing in the community by summoning a prominent guarantor of his character. Like in so many other commercial disputes in the borderlands, the case for Tavarez and Amaro was about defining each one’s place within their respective trading and political worlds. 























































 6 Ibid., 17bis. 7 Ibid, 140bis. 
 124
 


Sosa almost immediately responded. He filed another petition in Montevideo challenging Tavarez’s proposed deposit. In particular, Sosa argued that the embargo over the disputed assets had to remain in place until the contractual matter could be resolved because any guarantees coming from Cerro Largo were inherently unreliable. In making this argument, Sosa squarely placed the issue of whether Amaro in fact was a vecino of Cerro Largo before the Montevideo court. Sosa argued that Amaro was “an unknown person,” in essence lacking the requisite connections to the local forum. 8 Sosa elaborated that Amaro could not guarantee the debt because “he was a Brazilian citizen whose interests, in addition to being in the countryside, were located so close to the border that they disappear from one day to the next.” 9 He finally noted that if the court accepted any guarantee, the assets needed to be transferred to Montevideo and away from the lawless border and its blurred national boundaries. Tavarez was incredulous. He wrote to the court: Your honor, it is public and notorious and surely your mercy will not ignore that [Amaro] is a substantial landowner and one of the principal hacendados in Cerro Largo, possessing a large fortune consisting primarily of lands populated by considerable herds of cattle sufficient to satisfy the requested financing six times over. 10 Tavarez argued that these possessions, rooted in webs of cross-border commerce, represented the touchstone of vecindad. As proof, Tavarez pointed to fact that Amaro had served as alcalde ordinario in Cerro Largo on numerous occasions. He declared: “If the quality being a Brazilian subject was not an obstacle to fulfill that post, there is even less reason for it to preclude him from serving as a guarantor, even more so when the only thing required of 























































 8 Ibid., 140bis. 9 Ibid., 143. 10 Ibid., 141. 
 125
 


complete bad faith, hurries to remove every class of cattle in his possession.” 6 Sosa likely<br />

had a point. The court in Cerro Largo certainly had labored to interpret his contractual<br />

agreements in a manner designed to protect Tavarez’s rights to move cattle across the<br />

border. Local leaders had penned briefs accusing him of violence and implicitly impugning<br />

his personal reputation. Sosa probably understood the balance of forces against him. He<br />

brought his judicial action away from Cerro Largo’s courts in Montevideo to better his own<br />

chances of victory.<br />

Tavarez’s political allies out in the borderlands responded aggressively to Sosa’s<br />

attempts to shift the case to Montevideo. They did so in a typical borderlands fashion by<br />

drawing upon webs of local connections. They secured a guarantee from Hilario Amaro de<br />

Silveira, another prominent Brazilian rancher in the region, to compensate Sosa for any cattle<br />

he might obtain through his legal action in Montevideo. 7 Amaro’s intervention again<br />

reflected the local politics of reciprocity and reputation at the heart of borderlands legalities.<br />

By guaranteeing the deposit, Amaro positioned himself to protect order in the countryside<br />

and preserve Tavarez’s cross-border trading arrangements. He further could use his<br />

prominent local position to blunt any outside interference in the local judicial decision. In<br />

short, Tavarez’s problem accorded Amaro the opportunity to manifest his role as a critical<br />

figure in maintaining borderlands commercial relationships. By obtaining such a guarantee<br />

from Amaro, Tavarez could also publicly manifest his own personal standing in the<br />

community by summoning a prominent guarantor of his character. Like in so many other<br />

commercial disputes in the borderlands, the case for Tavarez and Amaro was about defining<br />

each one’s place within their respective trading and political worlds.<br />

























































<br />

6 Ibid., 17bis.<br />

7 Ibid, 140bis.<br />


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