“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...
Arambillete drew the line between credible insider and outsider around distinctly local conceptions of residence coupled with personal status connected to one’s trade. Cabral was an outsider that had only recently appeared in the town and lacked ties to the existing local elite. Cabral simply did not possess the requisite personal prestige to offer credible counsel and evidence in the tribunal. Through these types of decisions, local courts could police which individuals could establish political, social and economic ties with the forum. This power to regulate membership in the local elite and access to justice went to the heart of borderlands legalities. Rhetorical appeals to rights and justice linked up explicitly with the internal logic of localized power networks and the trading relationships they sustained. Vecindad As the Cabral case and others suggest, these various strands of personal character, economic status and connections to the local forum coalesced around vecindad. Vecindad was a complex term conveying both physical proximity – literally meaning neighbor – and a form of local citizenship and the status to match. Vecindad stood at the heart of the local systems of justice at the center of borderlands legalities. The concept of vecindad originated in Castile during the reconquest. It originally applied to settlers occupying lands recovered from retreating Muslim communities on the Iberian Peninsula as Christian armies pushed southwards. 91 As the reconquest ebbed, vecindad came to be associated more practically with membership within the community. 92 This implied not only a number of political and economic rights, such as the ability to participate in local elections, but also enhanced social 91 Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 6. 92 The mechanisms to establish vecindad varied between local communities, but one could generally acquire the status of vecino by possessing a fixed residence within a town, practicing a trade, and/or serving in the local militia. Djenderedijan, "Roots of Revolution," 647. 110
status. Public recognition of one’s status as a vecino indicated membership in the local elite. 93 As Tamar Herzog succinctly described, “being a vecino meant acceptance and not being one meant rejection.” 94 These social and political aspects of vecindad played an important part in the establishment of local governments throughout the Río de la Plata borderlands in the late- eighteenth century. The expansion of the late-colonial ranching economy, as well as the Spanish imperial government’s drive for settlement produced a growing focus on legally recognizing population centers. 95 Along with the legal establishment of towns came the creation of local cabildos, the representative bodies at the heart of the Castilian municipal system of justice. In turn, because only vecinos could participate in local elections for the cabildo, vecindad retained its critical political function. In particular, cabildos largely regulated formal access to land in the late-colonial borderlands. This ensured that vecindad carried with it access to substantial economic opportunities. It also offered the chance to improve one’s social standing. 96 In the decades following the collapse of the Spanish empire, vecindad continued to play an important role in defining social and political relationships. As such, it provided a fixed point – a familiar concept – that survived revolutionary upheavals to foster renewed commerce. Within the framework of borderlands trade, vecindad continued to play a significant, if less outwardly radical role than under Artigas, in the ensuing judicial struggles 93 Francisco Dominguez Compañy, Estudios Sobre las Instituciones Locales Hispanoamericanas (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1981), 126. For a general discussion of the role of personal status and vecindad within Latin American legal systems, see Matthew C. Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America, 1st ed ed. (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2004), 54, Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810. 94 Herzog, Defining Nations, 7. 95 Djenderedijan, "Roots of Revolution," 645-47. 96 Ibid.: 654-55. 111
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status. Public recognition of one’s status as a vecino indicated membership in the local elite. 93<br />
As Tamar Herzog succinctly described, “being a vecino meant acceptance and not being one<br />
meant rejection.” 94<br />
These social and political aspects of vecindad played an important part in the<br />
establishment of local governments throughout the Río de la Plata borderlands in the late-<br />
eighteenth century. The expansion of the late-colonial ranching economy, as well as the<br />
Spanish imperial government’s drive for settlement produced a growing focus on legally<br />
recognizing population centers. 95 Along with the legal establishment of towns came the<br />
creation of local cabildos, the representative bodies at the heart of the Castilian municipal<br />
system of justice. In turn, because only vecinos could participate in local elections for the<br />
cabildo, vecindad retained its critical political function. In particular, cabildos largely regulated<br />
formal access to land in the late-colonial borderlands. This ensured that vecindad carried with<br />
it access to substantial economic opportunities. It also offered the chance to improve one’s<br />
social standing. 96<br />
In the decades following the collapse of the Spanish empire, vecindad continued to<br />
play an important role in defining social and political relationships. As such, it provided a<br />
fixed point – a familiar concept – that survived revolutionary upheavals to foster renewed<br />
commerce. Within the framework of borderlands trade, vecindad continued to play a<br />
significant, if less outwardly radical role than under Artigas, in the ensuing judicial struggles<br />
<br />
93 Francisco Dominguez Compañy, Estudios Sobre las Instituciones Locales<br />
Hispanoamericanas (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1981), 126. For a general<br />
discussion of the role of personal status and vecindad within Latin American legal systems, see<br />
Matthew C. Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish<br />
America, 1st ed ed. (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2004), 54, Cutter, The Legal<br />
Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810.<br />
94 Herzog, Defining Nations, 7.<br />
95 Djenderedijan, "Roots of Revolution," 645-47.<br />
96 Ibid.: 654-55.<br />
111 <br />
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