“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

“MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ... “MONSTROUS AND ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS”: LAW ...

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and punish his rivals. Once again, cross-border trade and peripheral violence marched in lockstep with each other. When Rivera defeated the federalist coalition, Urquiza returned to Entre Ríos and prepared to meet the inevitable unitarist invasion. He used his commercial contacts in Corrientes in an attempt to gain influence over the Madariagas, arranging for a meeting between the correntino family and Montero in Curuzú-Cuatiá. When these negotiations failed, he prepared to meet them militarily. Urquiza decimated advancing forces from Corrientes at the battle of Pago Largo in 1839. Following the victory, Urquiza ordered the execution of hundreds of correntino prisoners. In this sense, Urquiza made clear the duality of borderlands commerce and military combat. While he developed alliances with federalist allies throughout the region to foster trade, the entrerriano merchant-general was more than willing to turn to massive acts of political violence to defend them. By turning to force, he could position himself as a defender of the rivertine trade – a necessary partner in all commercial transactions. The order encapsulated by borderlands legalities did not exist in spite of violence, but in many instances because of it. Urquiza’s support for the federalist cause on the battlefields in the Estado Oriental and Corrientes in turn created further political and commercial opportunities along the Uruguay River. Urquiza continued to consolidate ties to prominent federalists like Rosas in Buenos Aires. With Rosas’ blessing, Urquiza became governor of Entre Ríos in 1842. From this new political perch, Urquiza could again expand his trading networks. He added more ships to his commercial fleet. He then plunged his growing wealth back into politics, which in the 1840s meant military campaigning. Urquiza commanded a division under Oribe at Arroyo Grande. Urquiza also followed Oribe across the river after the victory. As the conflict between Oribe and Rivera devolved into a prolonged siege, Urquiza leveraged his political 
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alliances with the blancos to open up further trading connections into the Estado Oriental. Perhaps more importantly, when the European powers blockaded Buenos Aires in 1845, Urquiza rapidly worked to open up Entre Ríos’ ports along the Uruguay to overseas trade in defiance of Rosas. The move expanded upon the already growing rivertine trade, producing a commercial explosion connecting Entre Ríos to Corrientes and Rio Grande do Sul’s interior ports. Regarding the river trade, Urquiza wrote to Antonio Crespo, Urquiza’s handpicked successor to the entrerriano governorship, expressing his “complete satisfaction [with the commerce of our ports along the Uruguay] and for that reason disposed that things continue in the same manner.” 60 By the mid-1840s, Urquiza had established himself as the dominant political, military and commercial figure along the Uruguay River’s expanding trading networks. He had made a massive fortune. Urquiza’s commercial network reached its zenith with the establishment of Santa Cándida, a vast saladero operation along the banks of the Uruguay near Concepción. By 1849, Urquiza’s salting operations were processing around 1,000 animals per month. The plant continued to grow throughout the early 1850s. Urquiza progressively increased its efficiency by installing steam driven motors to pump water into the factory, as well as rationalizing the slaughtering process. 61 His palatial residence, the San José Palace near his saladero in eastern Entre Ríos, doubled as the de facto capital not only for Urquiza’s home province, but also for many of his trading partners throughout the borderlands. This center of authority served as one of the principal sites in the intractable sovereign conflicts between the borderlands and putative national centers like Buenos Aires for the next thirty years. 























































 60 Schmit, Ruina y Resurrección, 141. 61 Manuel Macchi, Urquiza: el Saladerista (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Macchi, 1971). 
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alliances with the blancos to open up further trading connections into the Estado Oriental.<br />

Perhaps more importantly, when the European powers blockaded Buenos Aires in 1845,<br />

Urquiza rapidly worked to open up Entre Ríos’ ports along the Uruguay to overseas trade in<br />

defiance of Rosas. The move expanded upon the already growing rivertine trade, producing<br />

a commercial explosion connecting Entre Ríos to Corrientes and Rio Grande do Sul’s<br />

interior ports. Regarding the river trade, Urquiza wrote to Antonio Crespo, Urquiza’s<br />

handpicked successor to the entrerriano governorship, expressing his “complete satisfaction<br />

[with the commerce of our ports along the Uruguay] and for that reason disposed that things<br />

continue in the same manner.” 60<br />

By the mid-1840s, Urquiza had established himself as the dominant political, military<br />

and commercial figure along the Uruguay River’s expanding trading networks. He had made<br />

a massive fortune. Urquiza’s commercial network reached its zenith with the establishment<br />

of Santa Cándida, a vast saladero operation along the banks of the Uruguay near Concepción.<br />

By 1849, Urquiza’s salting operations were processing around 1,000 animals per month. The<br />

plant continued to grow throughout the early 1850s. Urquiza progressively increased its<br />

efficiency by installing steam driven motors to pump water into the factory, as well as<br />

rationalizing the slaughtering process. 61 His palatial residence, the San José Palace near his<br />

saladero in eastern Entre Ríos, doubled as the de facto capital not only for Urquiza’s home<br />

province, but also for many of his trading partners throughout the borderlands. This center<br />

of authority served as one of the principal sites in the intractable sovereign conflicts between<br />

the borderlands and putative national centers like Buenos Aires for the next thirty years.<br />

























































<br />

60 Schmit, Ruina y Resurrección, 141.<br />

61 Manuel Macchi, Urquiza: el Saladerista (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Macchi, 1971).<br />


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