Forlong - Rivers of Life

Introductory Chapter.
the learned, and many who could not only speak but write regarding them, will not,
too often, probably, from the intolerant element in our own little stream of Faith,
which looks upon enquiries into the devout thoughts of others as a pulling down of
its own cherished groves and altars, and the bringing towards and equality all the
nations of the earth. Should it be so?
Can the pious heart not find,
In each new Faith of Human kind,
Some grace that wins, some ties that bind?
For God sees Faith in all.
Lecky is justly strong on this deadness which men feel in the cause of truth.
He allows that “Hypocrites, who from interested motives profess opinions which they
do not really believe, are probably rarer than is usually supposed,” but adds, “it would be
difficult to over-estimate the number of those whose genuine convictions are due to the
unresisted bias of their interests. By the term interests, I mean not only individual
well-being, but also all those mental luxuries, all those grooves or channels of thought,
which it is easy and pleasing to follow, and painful and difficult to abandon. Such
are the love of ease, the love of certainty, the love of system, the bias of the passions,
the associations of the imagination, as well as the counter influence of social position,
domestic happiness, professional interest, party-feeling or ambition. In most men the
love of truth is so languid, and their reluctance to encounter mental prejudices is so
great, that they yield their judgements without an effort to the current, withdraw their
minds from all opinions or arguments opposed to their own, and thus speedily convince
themselves of the truth of what they wish to believe.” He, then, who would write as
I am about to do, must expect to incur obloquy and every manner of reproach, and to
here applied to himself every usual orthodox opprobrious name; for it is not in Europe,
and certainly not amongst Saxon races, that man may yet speak the truth and not
suffer for it. Thanks to education, which priests have too commonly tried to thwart,
the fate of a Sokrates is not now the European award of him who follows truth, yet
Europe has still got a Golgotha for those who expose her fallacies, more especially those
of her faiths; and the lover of truth must, even in the midst of the civilisation of this
century, take up his cross to follow her.
Come what may, however, let our motto be to “cease to profess what we have
ceased to believe. Let there be perfect veracity above all things, more especially in
matters of religion. It is not a question of courtesies which deceive no one. To
profess what is not believed, is immoral. Immorality and untruth can never lead to
morality and virtue; all language which conveys untruth either in substance or in
appearance, should be amended to that words can be understood in their recognised
meanings without equivocal explanations, or affirmatives. Let historic facts have their
true explanations.” 1 Yes! if men would but act thus! then, would all the religious
1 Westminster Review, January 1875.
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