Information and liaison bulletin - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basin Ôzeti
Turkish Daily News
Mehmet Ali Birand
November 14. 2007
Military-civilian responsibility in Kurdish issue
Fikret Bila's latest book abounds with lessons to be drawn from his interviews with military commanders. Their explanations con¬
tribute significant information as to how and why the Kurdish issue became what it is today. My years-long experience helps me to
draw a few conclusions: First, the responsibility of this complex and multifaceted issue cannot be attributed to the military alone.
Second, the real responsibility for the mismanagement of the Kurdish issue belongs to civil governments that took the easy way out
by letting the military take care of it. Third, it is time for the governments to assume responsibility and take courageous steps
You must read Fikret Bila's book titled "Komutanlar
Cephesi" (The Commanders' Position). It gives you
clear insight into how the commanders of the Turkish
Armed Forces view the country, especially in relation to
many critical subjects that range from the Kurdish issue to
democracy and from the United States and the European
Union to civil governments.
The names Fikret interviewed for this book (Kenan Evren,
Dogan Gùreç, Ismail Hakki Karadayi, Hilmi Ôzkôk, Aytaç
Yalman) are among the best-educated and first rate
Turkish Armed Forces commanders of the last 25 years.
The interviews give you clear facts on how they were
educated and how they look at the world and, most impor¬
tantly, at Turkey.
The book also reveals the enormous difference between
the commanders' world and perception of Turkey and those
of civilian officers. I drew some conclusions from the
interviews of these commanders, each of whom is an
extremely well intentioned, patriotic and decent person: HH
The military point of view did not bring solutions :
The present situation indicates that the thoughts and
efforts expressed by an important section of our command¬
ers failed to settle the Kurdish issue. Their critique of
themselves also confirms this fact. We must remember that
many of these officers were in charge during the initial
stage of this issue, in other words, a time when more
effective measures could have been taken. Some meas¬
ures taken by another set of commanders (like Kenan
Evren) only served to aggravate the issue. Then there were
some who objected for security reasons to every sugges¬
tion to take measures to soften the elements that disturbed
our citizens of Kurdish origin (like the bans on people's
names, village names and the Kurdish language). The
interviews reveal that the importance they attached to
The
Economist
Nov 15th 2007
SINCE the late 19th century Turkey's
Kurds have rebelled repeatedly against
their Turkish masters. But no uprising has
been as violent or long-lasting as that
launched in 1984 by the Kurdistan Wor¬
kers' Party (PKK) in its bid to unite the
25m Kurds scattered across Turkey, Iraq,
Iran and Syria. Turkey's latest threat to
clobber the rebels in their haven in nor¬
thern Iraq has again raised the spectre of
regional war. It has also concentrated
attention on the PKK: who are these in¬
domitable fighters and what is their true
goal?
"Blood and Belief" offers unusual insight
into the rebels' shadowy universe and, by
extension, into Turkey's festering Kurdish
problem. Aliza Marcus, an American jour¬
nalist who was put on trial in Turkey for
86
security measures was an essential constituent of their
education. Another such constituent was the motto, "Re¬
gional people side with the powerful," which completely
ignored the social side of the issue. All that is very natural
and in keeping with the education and the quality of a
soldier. In fact, isn't it obvious that today's officers have
also failed to draw lessons from the experiences and selfcriticism
of yesterday's commanders? HH We can't pin the
responsibility on commanders alone :
It would be a big mistake to say that the attitude of our
commanders is wholly responsible for the current state of
the Kurdish issue. It is true that the military have contrib¬
uted to it, but they should not be made the sole target of all
criticism.
In my opinion, civil governments are a lot more to blame
for obvious reasons.
They are the ones who turned this difficult matter over to
the military out of fear of losing votes. None of them dared
to take courageous steps or to develop a policy. They were
content to let the military take their own measures. Would
the general staff have said NO if any one of them tried to
initiate a new policy? I don't think so.
The military always had the obligation to fill the gap left by
our politicians.
Despite the fact that the military warned them many times
and said, "This is all we can do. Don't expect more. You
can't solve this issue with arms alone," and in spite of the
insistent appeals of the experts and the media, the gov¬
ernments failed to produce a political, economic or a social
package. The five years since Ôcalan's arrest were also
wasted. In the end, the Iraqi wars of 1991 and 2003 revived
the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), causing the
present chaos and modifying both the nature and the
Turkey's Kurdish rebels
dimensions of the issue. It became much more difficult to
solve. All the missed opportunities have served to increase
the complexity of the present situation.
This is a new period :
Goading Ankara to overreach
her reporting on the Turkish army's abu¬
ses against ordinary Kurds, charts the
origins and evolution of the movement.
Her scholarly, gripping account is based
on interviews with, and the unpublished
diaries of, former PKK militants.
Founded in 1978 by a clutch of Turkish
university students, the PKK rapidly be¬
came one of the world's deadliest guerrilla
armies. There are several reasons for its
success. Foremost, perhaps, was Turkey's
brutal suppression of Kurdish identity: the
mass arrest and torture of Kurdish dissi¬
dents created fertile recruiting ground. In
addition, the group had the foresight to
escape to Syria before the Turkish army
took over the country in 1980, allowing its
forces to survive largely intact.
With Syria's blessing, the PKK sent its
Let's put the past aside, if you will. Let's use the experi¬
ence we've acquired in order to establish a new approach
and a new policy. The reasons are plain to see. The
Kurdish issue has changed. The PKK terror has taken on
new dimensions, and north Iraq has acquired a different
position. Circumstances were completely different 25 years
ago. Today, we face a completely different Kurdish issue,
PKK terror and structure in north Iraq. These problems
used to be primarily Turkish issues. Consequently, they
were easier to handle. The solutions were simpler. Today,
however, they've acquired international dimensions. The
colour and the contents of the problem are no longer the
same. They involve much greater actors. At this stage, the
necessarily more complicated and finer calculations require
the efforts and the participation of all our thinkers and
policy developers besides those of the military. Turkey can
make this change happen. As long as the civil government
takes courage. As long as all institutions achieve effective
coordination. As long as a new policy is established, which
extends to all cultural, social, political and economic
factors, as well as to security. As long as the Kurdish issue,
the PKK terror and the situation in north Iraq are kept
separate and rational long-term steps are taken. Can all
this be accomplished by a single step? No. We'll have to
get there step by step.The problem in north Iraq is the
easiest to solve. The PKK terror and the Kurdish issue can
be reduced to a "co-habitable" level as to dimension and
vehemence.However, if the present mentality and attitude
persist and we create deeper chaos through our lack of
vision and policy, I'm afraid that this country will have to
face the danger of an actual division.