Constraint ( in pragmatics) - University of Cambridge
Constraint ( in pragmatics) - University of Cambridge
Constraint ( in pragmatics) - University of Cambridge
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>Constra<strong>in</strong>t</strong> (<strong>in</strong> pragmatic theory)<br />
Rules, processes, and representations <strong>in</strong> pragmatic theory can come with conditions,<br />
or restrictions. Such restrictions, or constra<strong>in</strong>ts, perta<strong>in</strong> to the scope <strong>of</strong> application <strong>of</strong> a<br />
rule, the spread <strong>of</strong> the process, or the well-formedness <strong>of</strong> a representation. They can<br />
be seen as external restrictions delimit<strong>in</strong>g e.g. an application <strong>of</strong> a theory, or as an<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegral part <strong>of</strong> the theory (see also Pragmatics, Meta<strong>pragmatics</strong>).<br />
In optimality-theory <strong>pragmatics</strong> (e.g. Blutner 2000; Blutner and Zeevat, eds,<br />
2003), constra<strong>in</strong>ts constitute an <strong>in</strong>tegral part <strong>of</strong> the theory. S<strong>in</strong>ce l<strong>in</strong>guistic mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
underdeterm<strong>in</strong>es the proposition expressed, a pragmatic mechanism <strong>of</strong> completion <strong>of</strong><br />
this mean<strong>in</strong>g is proposed. It is conceived <strong>of</strong> as an optimization procedure, founded on<br />
the idea <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>teraction <strong>of</strong> violable and ranked constra<strong>in</strong>ts. The selected, optimal<br />
proposition is the one that best satisfies the constra<strong>in</strong>ts. This selection is performed by<br />
the pragmatic system whose role is to <strong>in</strong>terpret the semantic representation <strong>of</strong> a<br />
sentence <strong>in</strong> a given sett<strong>in</strong>g. This system is founded on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> rational<br />
communication worked out by Grice and subsequently by Horn (1984) and Lev<strong>in</strong>son<br />
(1987, 2000) <strong>in</strong> the form <strong>of</strong> the Q- and I/R-pr<strong>in</strong>ciples (see also Implicature, Inference,<br />
Grice, Neo-Gricean <strong>pragmatics</strong>, Pragmatics and Semantics). The I/R-pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
compares different <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>of</strong> an expression, while the Q-pr<strong>in</strong>ciple assesses<br />
the produced structure as compared with other unrealised possibilities: it blocks<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpretations that would be more economically connected with alternative forms.<br />
Examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation constra<strong>in</strong>ts are STRENGTH (preference for<br />
<strong>in</strong>formationally stronger read<strong>in</strong>gs), CONSISTENCY (preference for <strong>in</strong>terpretations<br />
that do not conflict with the context), FAITH- INT (faithful <strong>in</strong>terpretation,<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g all that the speaker said). FAITH-INT precedes CONSISTENCY which<br />
precedes STRENGTH <strong>in</strong> the rank<strong>in</strong>g (see Zeevat 2000, see also Optimality Theory).<br />
1
Another example <strong>of</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts that are constitutive <strong>of</strong> the theory is<br />
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (e.g. Asher and Lascarides 2003, see<br />
also Discourse Representation Theory). In SDRT, rhetorical relations spell out<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>ts on discourse <strong>in</strong>terpretation. The <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> discourse is founded on<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>ts on discourse coherence. For example, a relation between two propositions<br />
can be Narration, Explanation, or Elaboration.<br />
Theory-external constra<strong>in</strong>ts can be exemplified by particular lexical items that<br />
provide certa<strong>in</strong> restrictions on <strong>in</strong>terpretation. For example, it has been observed by<br />
Grice that there are certa<strong>in</strong> words that do not contribute to the truth-conditional<br />
content <strong>of</strong> an expression. Among such words are ‘but’, ‘moreover’, and ‘therefore’.<br />
While Grice classified them as conventional implicatures, it was subsequently<br />
suggested (Blakemore 1987) that they do not have conceptual content but <strong>in</strong>stead are<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>of</strong> pragmatic <strong>in</strong>ferences to be performed by the addressee. ‘After all’, ‘you<br />
see’, ‘also’ and other such <strong>in</strong>dicators also belong to this category:<br />
A: ‘Oscar and Luc<strong>in</strong>da is worth read<strong>in</strong>g. After all, one <strong>of</strong> the best novelists wrote it.’<br />
‘After all’ functions here as an <strong>in</strong>dicator that the second sentence is to be taken as<br />
evidence for the claim made <strong>in</strong> the first. On Blakemore’s account, such <strong>in</strong>dicators<br />
conta<strong>in</strong> procedural (rather than conceptual) mean<strong>in</strong>g and they act as constra<strong>in</strong>ts on<br />
<strong>in</strong>ference <strong>in</strong> communication (see also Conceptual and Procedural Mean<strong>in</strong>g). This<br />
approach to constra<strong>in</strong>ts on <strong>in</strong>ference has been developed and plays a major role <strong>in</strong><br />
relevance theory. Blakemore (1987) calls such <strong>in</strong>dicators constra<strong>in</strong>ts on the relevance<br />
<strong>of</strong> a proposition. Moreover, it has been s<strong>in</strong>ce observed (Wilson and Sperber 1993) that<br />
there are also procedural items that constra<strong>in</strong> the proposition expressed, such as<br />
2
pronouns, as well as markers such as ‘please’ and ‘let’s’ that constra<strong>in</strong> the process <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ferr<strong>in</strong>g the propositional attitude <strong>of</strong> the speaker or the speech act. The scope <strong>of</strong> the<br />
category <strong>of</strong> such constra<strong>in</strong>ts, as well as the b<strong>in</strong>ary conceptual-procedural dist<strong>in</strong>ction,<br />
still rema<strong>in</strong> a contentious matter (see e.g. Blakemore 2002; Lee 2002).<br />
Bibliography<br />
Asher, N. and Lascarides, A. (2003). Logics <strong>of</strong> conversation. <strong>Cambridge</strong>: <strong>Cambridge</strong><br />
<strong>University</strong> Press.<br />
Blakemore, D. (1987). Semantic constra<strong>in</strong>ts on relavance. Oxford: B. Blackwell.<br />
Blakemore, D. (2000). ‘Indicators and procedures: nevertheless and but’. Journal <strong>of</strong><br />
L<strong>in</strong>guistics 36, 463-86.<br />
Blakemore, D. 2002. Relevance and l<strong>in</strong>guistic mean<strong>in</strong>g: The semantics and<br />
<strong>pragmatics</strong> <strong>of</strong> discourse markers. <strong>Cambridge</strong>: <strong>Cambridge</strong> <strong>University</strong> Press.<br />
Blutner, R. (2000). ‘Some aspects <strong>of</strong> optimality <strong>in</strong> natural language <strong>in</strong>terpretation’.<br />
Journal <strong>of</strong> Semantics 17, 189-216.<br />
Blutner, R. and Zeevat, H. (eds) (2003). Optimality theory and <strong>pragmatics</strong>. London:<br />
Palgrave.<br />
Horn, L. R. (1984). ‘Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic <strong>in</strong>ference: Q-based and<br />
R-based implicature.’ In Schiffr<strong>in</strong>, D. (ed.) Georgetown <strong>University</strong> Round<br />
Table on Languages and L<strong>in</strong>guistics 1984. Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, D.C.: Georgetown<br />
<strong>University</strong> Press. 11-42.<br />
Lee, H.-K. (2002). ‘Towards a new typology <strong>of</strong> connnectives with special reference to<br />
conjunction <strong>in</strong> English and Korean’. Journal <strong>of</strong> Pragmatics 34, 851-866.<br />
3
Lev<strong>in</strong>son, S. C. (1987). ‘M<strong>in</strong>imization and conversational <strong>in</strong>ference.’ In Verschueren,<br />
J. & Bertuccelli-Papi, M. (eds) The pragmatic perspective: Selected papers<br />
from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference. Amsterdam: J.<br />
Benjam<strong>in</strong>s. 61-129.<br />
Lev<strong>in</strong>son, S. C. (2000). Presumptive mean<strong>in</strong>gs: The theory <strong>of</strong> generalized<br />
conversational implicature. <strong>Cambridge</strong>, Mass.: MIT Press.<br />
Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. (1993). ‘L<strong>in</strong>guistic form and relevance’. L<strong>in</strong>gua 90, 1-25.<br />
Zeevat, H. (2000). ‘The asymmetry <strong>of</strong> optimality theoretic syntax and semantics’.<br />
K.M. Jaszczolt<br />
Journal <strong>of</strong> Semantics 17, 243-262.<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> L<strong>in</strong>guistics<br />
Faculty <strong>of</strong> Modern and Medieval Languages<br />
<strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Cambridge</strong><br />
Sidgwick Avenue<br />
<strong>Cambridge</strong> CB3 9DA<br />
kmj21@cam.ac.uk<br />
4
Key words:<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>t<br />
pragmatic theory<br />
optimality theory<br />
Grice<br />
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory<br />
rhetotical relations<br />
procedural mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
5
Biography<br />
K.M. Jaszczolt is senior lecturer <strong>in</strong> semantics and <strong>pragmatics</strong> at the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Cambridge</strong> and fellow <strong>of</strong> Newnham College, <strong>Cambridge</strong>. She also taught l<strong>in</strong>guistics<br />
at the universities <strong>of</strong> Oxford, Sussex and Brighton. She is manag<strong>in</strong>g editor <strong>of</strong> the book<br />
series Current Research <strong>in</strong> the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface (CRiSPI), member <strong>of</strong><br />
the Editorial Board <strong>of</strong> Journal <strong>of</strong> Pragmatics and the book series Studies <strong>in</strong><br />
Pragmatics, all published by Elsevier Science. In 1992 she completed her DPhil<br />
dissertation Belief Sentences and the Semantics <strong>of</strong> Propositional Attitudes at the<br />
<strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Oxford. Her recent research concerns develop<strong>in</strong>g the theory <strong>of</strong> utterance<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpretation called Default Semantics (book <strong>in</strong> progress, forthcom<strong>in</strong>g from OUP).<br />
Her recent publications <strong>in</strong>clude books Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic<br />
Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription, 1999, Elsevier Science, Semantics<br />
and Pragmatics: Mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Language and Discourse, 2002, Longman, and edited<br />
books The Pragmatics <strong>of</strong> Propositional Attitude Reports, 2000, Elsevier Science, and<br />
Mean<strong>in</strong>g Through Language Contrast (2 vols, co-edited), 2003, J. Benjam<strong>in</strong>s. She<br />
also published a number <strong>of</strong> articles on the semantics and <strong>pragmatics</strong> <strong>of</strong> referr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
expressions, propositional attitudes, and presupposition, among others <strong>in</strong> Journal <strong>of</strong><br />
Pragmatics, Theoretical L<strong>in</strong>guistics, Journal <strong>of</strong> Literary Semantics, and <strong>in</strong> edited<br />
collections.<br />
6