Journal Volume 33 no. 2 (2008) - the Integrated Bar of the ...
Journal Volume 33 no. 2 (2008) - the Integrated Bar of the ... Journal Volume 33 no. 2 (2008) - the Integrated Bar of the ...
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The IBP <strong>Journal</strong><br />
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES<br />
Board <strong>of</strong> Editors<br />
ROAN I. LIBARIOS<br />
Editor-in-Chief<br />
EDUARDO A. LABITAG<br />
Managing Editor<br />
DANILO L. CONCEPCION<br />
FLORIN T. HILBAY<br />
JAIME G. HOFILEÑA<br />
MARIO C.V. JALANDONI<br />
CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA<br />
NASSER A. MAROHOMSALIC<br />
OSCAR G. RARO<br />
CARMELO V. SISON<br />
AMADO D. VALDEZ<br />
OLIVER B. SAN ANTONIO<br />
VINCENT PEPITO F. YAMBAO, JR.<br />
Associate Editors<br />
VIVIAN C. CAPIZNON VICMUND Q. CAMACHO<br />
Staff Layout/Design<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)
CONTENTS<br />
A Framework for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> National Territory:<br />
A Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem<br />
Merlin M. Magallona .....................................................................................1<br />
The On-going National Territorial Debate:<br />
Issues and Perspectives<br />
Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr. .................................................................................. 28<br />
The Exploration, Development,<br />
and Utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys<br />
Amado D. Valdez ......................................................................................... 57<br />
The Legal Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain<br />
Vicente V. Mendoza ...................................................................................... 63<br />
The Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement<br />
on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Musa I. Malayang,<br />
Carim L. Panumpang and Rasol Y. Mitmug, Jr. .......................................71<br />
Revisiting Charter Change<br />
Through People’s Initiative<br />
Froilan M. Bacungan .................................................................................100<br />
The Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA)<br />
Scheme and Its Derivatives: Deciphering<br />
Cost Recovery Mechanisms and<br />
Understanding Energy Distribution<br />
Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro ........................................................115<br />
Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court Decisions<br />
on Property and Land Registration<br />
Eduardo A. Labitag ...................................................................................159
The IBP JOURNAL (ISSN 0118-9247) is an <strong>of</strong>ficial publication<br />
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views expressed <strong>the</strong>rein.
Sy<strong>no</strong>psis<br />
(The Articles in this Issue)<br />
In this edition, <strong>the</strong> IBP <strong>Journal</strong> is dishing out a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r array <strong>of</strong> select legal<br />
articles to keep lawyers and legal scholars abreast with timely, relevant, if <strong>no</strong>t pressing,<br />
legal issues <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day.<br />
Taking center stage is <strong>the</strong> debate on <strong>the</strong> Philippine territorial integrity, which<br />
hurtled to national limelight with <strong>the</strong> spate <strong>of</strong> controversial proposals involving<br />
amendments to <strong>the</strong> existing Baseline Law, <strong>the</strong> “joint development” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement (MOA) on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Juridical Entity.<br />
Merlin M. Magallona, an ack<strong>no</strong>wledged expert in international law, opens<br />
up <strong>the</strong> debate with an extensive presentation entitled “A Framework for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
National Territory.” While traversing <strong>the</strong> entire breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine territorial<br />
claims, <strong>the</strong> article draws attention to two potential cataclysms that could submerge<br />
our claims over Sabah and Spratlys, particularly <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Islands Group (KIG).<br />
First, <strong>the</strong> approval <strong>of</strong> pending House Bill No. 3216, which deliberately eliminates<br />
Sec. 2 <strong>of</strong> R.A. 5446 (<strong>the</strong> Baseline Law) <strong>the</strong> “only legislative re-affirmation <strong>of</strong> Philippine<br />
sovereignty over Sabah.” If enacted into law, <strong>the</strong> bill – which has breezed through<br />
second reading – would “operate as a repeal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sabah provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present<br />
Baseline law, resulting in <strong>the</strong> derogation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r territories clause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution. Second, <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “regime <strong>of</strong> islands” formula as proposed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch in dealing with our claim over Spratlys. In its present form,<br />
<strong>the</strong> formula would trash into pieces our sovereign claim over <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>of</strong> internal<br />
waters around <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> province <strong>of</strong> Palawan, including <strong>the</strong><br />
seabed, subsoil and air space.<br />
Infusing historical dimension to <strong>the</strong> current debate is <strong>the</strong> disquisition <strong>of</strong> Leo<br />
Tito L. Ausan, Jr., an expert on International Maritime Law, entitled “The National<br />
Territorial Debate: Issues and Perspectives.” The article traces <strong>the</strong> debate to <strong>the</strong> longstanding<br />
dilemma facing <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago in delimiting its territorial baselines<br />
– whe<strong>the</strong>r to stick it out with <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS or with <strong>the</strong> International Treaty Limits<br />
(ITL). As to which legal approach to take, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has yet to make up its<br />
mind. As a result, <strong>the</strong> national debate on territorial outer limits rages on with <strong>no</strong><br />
immediate de<strong>no</strong>uement in sight.<br />
Amado D. Valdez, a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r scholar in international law, shares his “Alternative<br />
Perspectives on <strong>the</strong> Exploration, Development and Utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys.” Citing <strong>the</strong> military<br />
predominance <strong>of</strong> China which could scuttle <strong>the</strong> Philippine claim into a “waning and<br />
whining rhetoric,” he takes a “conciliatory” position, proposing to resolve <strong>the</strong> impasse<br />
based on a joint maritime approach, ra<strong>the</strong>r than cutting up <strong>the</strong> Spratlys islands like<br />
a big piece <strong>of</strong> real estate. The primary consideration is <strong>no</strong>t territorial integrity but<br />
joint development with o<strong>the</strong>r claimant-states <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> maritime zone teeming with rich<br />
oil reserves.
From Spratlys in South China Sea, <strong>the</strong> debate on territorial integrity shifts to<br />
a different dimension and arena where peaceful dialogues have taken <strong>the</strong> backseat<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> armed hostilities – <strong>the</strong> heartland <strong>of</strong> Muslim Mindanao.<br />
In “The Legal Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain,”<br />
Vicente V. Mendoza, a distinguished constitutionalist and a retired Justice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court, dissects <strong>the</strong> document which envisions a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity<br />
(BJE) in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Philippines. The MOA defies easy legal classifications as it can<strong>no</strong>t<br />
be upheld without amending <strong>the</strong> Constitution. To save it from nullity, <strong>the</strong> MOA has<br />
to be treated as a hybrid, “an instrument <strong>of</strong> recognition cum treaty for <strong>the</strong> recognition<br />
and declaration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE.” And that would spell a virtual sellout<br />
<strong>of</strong> territorial integrity. But as raised by <strong>the</strong> author, are we prepared to pay that<br />
stiff price in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> peace in Mindanao?<br />
Muslim scholars Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Musa Malayang, Carim L.<br />
Panumpang and Rasol Y. Mitmug, Jr., in <strong>the</strong>ir “Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement on<br />
Ancestral Domain: A Commentary,” add to <strong>the</strong> BJE debate by arguing that <strong>the</strong> MOA is<br />
constitutional. The authors present with much passion <strong>the</strong> historical and legal bases<br />
for <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong>y categorize as a “sub-state” within <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
archipelago that fully realizes <strong>the</strong> aspirations for self-determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro people.<br />
In “Revisiting Charter Change through People’s Initiative,” Froilan M. Bacungan,<br />
a former law dean and constitutionalist, shares his trenchant analysis on a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r<br />
timely topic. The article presents <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that <strong>the</strong> existing RA 6735 is adequate to<br />
cover <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> people’s initiative on amendments to <strong>the</strong> constitution but subject<br />
to <strong>the</strong> procedural and legal requirements laid down in Lambi<strong>no</strong> vs. Comelec (505 SCRA<br />
218). This means that people’s initiative may only cover proposals for amendments,<br />
<strong>no</strong>t revisions, to <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
In “Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) Scheme and Its Derivatives: Deciphering Cost<br />
Recovery Mechanisms in <strong>the</strong> Distribution <strong>of</strong> Electric Power and Undertaking Government Policy<br />
on Energy Distribution,” Juan Arturo Illuminado C. de Castro, a budding scholar<br />
on <strong>the</strong> power industry, examines <strong>the</strong> mechanics behind <strong>the</strong> “passing on <strong>the</strong> systems<br />
loss to consumers.” The issue surged to national prominence in <strong>the</strong> recent take-over<br />
bid by GSIS over Meralco which was marred by a bribery scandal that jolted <strong>the</strong><br />
entire Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals.<br />
To cap <strong>the</strong> edition, Eduardo A. Labitag, a veteran law pr<strong>of</strong>essor and managing<br />
editor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IBP Law <strong>Journal</strong>, presents a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r annual harvest <strong>of</strong> jurisprudence to<br />
enrich legal k<strong>no</strong>wledge – “Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court Decisions on Property and Land<br />
Registration.”
A Framework for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> National Territory:<br />
A Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem*<br />
Merlin M. Magallona **<br />
1. Constitutional Foundation<br />
1.1. The present Constitution defines <strong>the</strong> National Territory in Article I as<br />
follows:<br />
The national territory comprises <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, with all<br />
<strong>the</strong> islands and waters embraced <strong>the</strong>rein, and all o<strong>the</strong>r territories over<br />
which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting <strong>of</strong> its<br />
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, <strong>the</strong><br />
seabed, <strong>the</strong> subsoil, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves, and o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas. The<br />
waters around, between, and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago,<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir breadth and dimensions, form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal<br />
waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
Under this definition, <strong>the</strong> geomorphological and political base <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
State consist <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following components:<br />
(a) <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago, and<br />
(b) “all o<strong>the</strong>r territories over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or<br />
jurisdiction.”<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> this constitutional text, <strong>the</strong> appurtenances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
components are identified, thus:<br />
As to <strong>the</strong> main component, i.e., <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago, it has <strong>the</strong> following<br />
appurtenances:<br />
(a) “all <strong>the</strong> islands and waters embraced <strong>the</strong>rein;” and<br />
(b) its internal waters consisting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “waters around, between, and<br />
connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir breadth<br />
and dimensions.”<br />
* Presented during <strong>the</strong> symposium at <strong>the</strong> Malcolm Theater, U.P. College <strong>of</strong> Law on May 29, <strong>2008</strong> on <strong>the</strong> “Spratly<br />
Islands: Impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on <strong>the</strong> Territorial Integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and o<strong>the</strong>r Related Legal Issues.”<br />
** Pr<strong>of</strong>essorial Lecturer, former Dean and Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Law, College <strong>of</strong> Law, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
1
Merlin M. Magallona<br />
These appurtenances serve to demonstrate that <strong>the</strong> Constitution embodies<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> an archipelago as a unity <strong>of</strong> land and water, which is integral to <strong>the</strong><br />
historico-cultural and political elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago.<br />
There are appurtenances which <strong>the</strong> Constitution identifies as pertaining to<br />
<strong>the</strong> entire national territory, i.e., to both components. These are:<br />
(a) territorial sea;<br />
(b) fluvial domain;<br />
(c) aerial domain (air space);<br />
(d) seabed and subsoil; and<br />
(e) insular shelves and o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas.<br />
A. Constitutional History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Archipelago — The<br />
Main Component <strong>of</strong> National Territory<br />
1.2. By <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris <strong>of</strong> 10 December 1898, Spain ceded to <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands. Article III <strong>of</strong> this Treaty reads in part:<br />
Spain cedes to <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>the</strong> archipelago k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Islands lying within <strong>the</strong> following lines …. [drawing <strong>the</strong> International Treaty<br />
Limits (ITL) in technical terms].<br />
The Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris is complemented by <strong>the</strong> Treaty between <strong>the</strong> Kingdom <strong>of</strong><br />
Spain and <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America for Cession <strong>of</strong> Outlying Islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines concluded on 7 November 1900, and by <strong>the</strong> Convention between <strong>the</strong><br />
United States and Great Britain Delimiting <strong>the</strong> Boundary between <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Archipelago and <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> North Borneo concluded on 2 January 1930.<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago as <strong>the</strong> main component <strong>of</strong> national territory<br />
comprehends <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands described as archipelago in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, with <strong>the</strong> addition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> islands included by <strong>the</strong> two companion<br />
treaties referred to above. The said Spain-US Treaty <strong>of</strong> 7 November 1900 considers<br />
<strong>the</strong>se additional islands as “belonging to <strong>the</strong> [Philippine] Archipelago” even as it<br />
identifies <strong>the</strong>m as “lying outside <strong>the</strong> lines described in Article III <strong>of</strong> [<strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Paris].” It affirms that “all such islands shall be comprehended in <strong>the</strong> cession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Archipelago as fully as if <strong>the</strong>y had been expressly included within those lines.” These<br />
islands include Cagayan, Sulu and Sibutu. Under <strong>the</strong> US-Great Britain Convention<br />
<strong>of</strong> 2 January 1930, Turtle Islands and Mangsee Islands are ack<strong>no</strong>wledged “as<br />
comprised within <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago.”<br />
The US-Great Britain Treaty mentioned above describes <strong>the</strong> ITL as “<strong>the</strong><br />
boundary defined by <strong>the</strong> Treaty between <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America and Spain<br />
2 IBP JOURNAL
A Framework for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> National Territory: A Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem<br />
signed at Paris, December 10, 1898,” 1 to which is connected “<strong>the</strong> boundary between<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago … and <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> Borneo” it has established. 2<br />
Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>y define <strong>the</strong> national territory, <strong>the</strong> relevant provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
treaties, particularly <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, have been constitutionalized, embodied in<br />
Section 1, Article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution in <strong>the</strong> following text:<br />
The Philippines comprises all <strong>the</strong> territory ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain on<br />
<strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong> December eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong><br />
which are set forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> said treaty, toge<strong>the</strong>r with all <strong>the</strong> islands<br />
embraced in <strong>the</strong> treaty concluded at Washington, between <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States and Spain on <strong>the</strong> seventh day <strong>of</strong> November, nineteen hundred,<br />
and in <strong>the</strong> treaty concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Great Britain<br />
on <strong>the</strong> second day <strong>of</strong> January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory<br />
over which <strong>the</strong> present Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands exercises<br />
jurisdiction. 3<br />
In establishing <strong>the</strong> delimitation <strong>of</strong> national territory, this provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1935<br />
Constitution takes <strong>the</strong> lines described in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, referred<br />
to above as <strong>the</strong> ITL, as <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines by prescribing that “<strong>the</strong><br />
limits <strong>of</strong> which are set forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said treaty.” These agreements are<br />
<strong>no</strong>t to be treated merely as bilateral treaties <strong>of</strong> interest to <strong>the</strong> states parties. They<br />
have acquired constitutional status in <strong>the</strong> definition <strong>of</strong> national territory as elements<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine State.<br />
This understanding is reflected in <strong>the</strong> proceedings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1934 Constitutional<br />
Convention which framed <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution. For example, Committee Report<br />
No. 7 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention, submitted by <strong>the</strong> Committee on Territorial Delimitation<br />
on 31 August 1934, refers to Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris as describing “<strong>the</strong><br />
boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands.”<br />
1.3. With particular regard to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution provides for<br />
<strong>the</strong> ITL as <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, it is significant to recall that <strong>the</strong> said<br />
fundamental law was approved by <strong>the</strong> President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States pursuant to <strong>the</strong><br />
Tydings-McDuffie Law <strong>of</strong> 1934, “An Act [<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Congress] to provide for <strong>the</strong><br />
Complete Independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands, to provide for <strong>the</strong> Adoption <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Constitution and a Form <strong>of</strong> Government for <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands and for O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Purposes”. As required by Section 3 <strong>of</strong> this Act, <strong>the</strong> President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
certified that <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution conformed “substantially with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
this Act” and accordingly approved it, presumably with due regard to <strong>the</strong> definition<br />
<strong>of</strong> national territory.<br />
1 Article I. The US-Great Britain Convention is in 137 League <strong>of</strong> Nation Treaty Series 299. Emphasis added.<br />
2 Preamble. Emphasis added.<br />
3 Emphasis added.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
3
Merlin M. Magallona<br />
Preparatory to Philippine Independence, <strong>the</strong> Tydings-McDuffie Law established<br />
<strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commonwealth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. By authority <strong>of</strong> Section<br />
1 <strong>of</strong> this law, that Government –<br />
shall exercise jurisdiction over all territory ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States by<br />
<strong>the</strong> treaty <strong>of</strong> peace concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain on <strong>the</strong><br />
10 th day <strong>of</strong> December, <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> which are set forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> said<br />
treaty, toge<strong>the</strong>r with those islands embraced in <strong>the</strong> treaty between Spain<br />
and <strong>the</strong> United States concluded at Washington on <strong>the</strong> 7 th day <strong>of</strong> November<br />
1900. 4<br />
Earlier, <strong>the</strong> United States Congress enacted <strong>the</strong> Philippine Auto<strong>no</strong>my Act, or<br />
<strong>the</strong> Jones Law <strong>of</strong> 1916. It provides that –<br />
The name “The Philippines” as used in this act shall apply to … <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Islands ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States by <strong>the</strong> treaty <strong>of</strong> peace<br />
concluded between <strong>the</strong> Untied States and Spain on <strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong><br />
December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> which are<br />
set forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said treaty …. 5<br />
1.4. Major legislative enactments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Commission, <strong>the</strong> colonial<br />
civil government in <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands instituted by <strong>the</strong> US Congress under <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Bill <strong>of</strong> 1902 (Public Law No. 235), referred to <strong>the</strong> delimitation <strong>of</strong> ITL in<br />
<strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> government. The Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1916 (Act No.<br />
265) defines <strong>the</strong> “territorial jurisdiction and extent <strong>of</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Government” by providing in Section 14 that –<br />
The territory over which <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands<br />
exercises jurisdiction consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire Philippine Archipelago and is<br />
comprised in <strong>the</strong> limits defined by <strong>the</strong> treaties between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain,<br />
respectively signed in <strong>the</strong> City <strong>of</strong> Paris on <strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong> December, eighteen hundred<br />
and ninety-eight, and <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Washington on <strong>the</strong> seventh day <strong>of</strong> November, one<br />
thousand nine hundred. 6<br />
The Fisheries Act <strong>of</strong> 1932 (Act No. 4003) defines “Philippine waters or<br />
territorial waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines” in Section 6 as including –<br />
All waters pertaining to <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago, as defined in <strong>the</strong> treaties<br />
between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain, dated respectively <strong>the</strong> tenth <strong>of</strong> December,<br />
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and <strong>the</strong> seventh <strong>of</strong> November, nineteen<br />
hundred. 7<br />
4 Emphasis added.<br />
5 Emphasis added.<br />
6 Emphasis added.<br />
7 Emphasis added.<br />
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These enactments reconfirm <strong>the</strong> concrete application <strong>of</strong> governmental powers<br />
within <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction and sovereignty determined by <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris - in brief, <strong>the</strong><br />
determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ITL as such boundaries within which <strong>the</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction<br />
and sovereignty have been exercised. They reflect <strong>the</strong> understanding that <strong>the</strong> waters<br />
enclosed by <strong>the</strong> ITL are established by U.S. sovereignty as territorial waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Archipelago and that <strong>the</strong> land and waters pertaining to <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Islands are in unity as an archipelago.<br />
1.5. The necessary implications <strong>of</strong> constituting <strong>the</strong> ITL as <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines, as explained above, are contained in <strong>the</strong> two diplomatic <strong>no</strong>tes which<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Government transmitted to <strong>the</strong> Secretary-General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United<br />
Nations. The <strong>no</strong>te <strong>of</strong> 12 December 1955 from <strong>the</strong> Philippine Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign<br />
Affairs presents two points, thus:<br />
[1] “The position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Government … is that all waters around,<br />
between and connecting <strong>the</strong> different islands belonging to <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Archipelago irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir widths or dimensions, are necessary<br />
appurtenances <strong>of</strong> its land territory, forming an integral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national<br />
or inland waters, subject to <strong>the</strong> exclusive sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.”<br />
[2] “All o<strong>the</strong>r water areas embraced in <strong>the</strong> imaginary lines described in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris <strong>of</strong> December 10, 1898 … 8 [and <strong>the</strong> two companion<br />
treaties] are considered as maritime territorial waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines for <strong>the</strong><br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> our fishing rights, conservation <strong>of</strong> our fishing<br />
resources, enforcement <strong>of</strong> revenue and anti-smuggling laws, defense and<br />
security, etc.” 9<br />
In a <strong>no</strong>te verbale <strong>of</strong> 20 January 1956, <strong>the</strong> Permanent Mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
to <strong>the</strong> United Nations responded to <strong>the</strong> invitation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN Secretary-General to<br />
submit its observation on <strong>the</strong> drafts prepared by <strong>the</strong> International Law Commission<br />
on <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> high seas and on <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. The Philippine<br />
<strong>no</strong>te in reply reiterates <strong>the</strong> two points contained in <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>te <strong>of</strong> 12 December 1955<br />
transmitted to <strong>the</strong> UN Secretary General, as set out above. It declares as follows:<br />
[1] “[T]he Philippine Government assumes that high seas can<strong>no</strong>t exist<br />
within <strong>the</strong> waters comprised by <strong>the</strong> territorial limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as<br />
set down in <strong>the</strong> international treaties referred to above. In case <strong>of</strong><br />
archipelagos or territories composed <strong>of</strong> many islands like <strong>the</strong> Philippines,<br />
which has many bodies <strong>of</strong> waters enclosed within <strong>the</strong> group <strong>of</strong> islands,<br />
<strong>the</strong> State would find <strong>the</strong> continuity <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction within its own territory<br />
disrupted, if certain bodies <strong>of</strong> water located between <strong>the</strong> islands composing<br />
its territory were declared or considered as high seas.”<br />
8 Referring to <strong>the</strong> International Treaty Limits (ITL).<br />
9 Emphasis added.<br />
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[2] “The Philippine Government considers <strong>the</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong> its territorial<br />
sea as referring to those waters within <strong>the</strong> recognized treaty limits, 10 and for this<br />
reason it takes <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea may extend<br />
beyond twelve miles. It may <strong>the</strong>refore be necessary to make exceptions,<br />
upon historical grounds, by means <strong>of</strong> treaties or conventions between<br />
States ….”<br />
Again, based on <strong>the</strong> boundaries drawn by <strong>the</strong> ITL, <strong>the</strong> Philippines presented<br />
its position in <strong>the</strong> 1960 UN Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, as follows:<br />
…[S]ince … <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris was ratified, and throughout all <strong>the</strong> time<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Philippines was under <strong>the</strong> American flag and <strong>the</strong> United States was<br />
exercising sovereign rights over all <strong>the</strong> land and sea territory embraced in that treaty,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was <strong>no</strong> protest from anyone against <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> such sovereignty.<br />
And since <strong>the</strong> Philippines became independent and continued to exercise<br />
sovereignty and jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> same territory, <strong>the</strong>re has likewise<br />
been <strong>no</strong> protest by any state. The title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines to a wider<br />
extent than twelve miles <strong>of</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong>refore, has both a legal and<br />
historic basis. Such title can<strong>no</strong>t and should <strong>no</strong>t be affected adversely by<br />
any new rule on <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea that may be adopted in<br />
this conference. A historic title is a generally recognized basis <strong>of</strong> acquired<br />
or established rights.<br />
The territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, … over which my country exercises<br />
sovereignty and jurisdiction by virtue <strong>of</strong> a legal and historic title, is, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
comprised <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> waters beyond <strong>the</strong> outermost islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago but within<br />
<strong>the</strong> boundaries set by <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris. The case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines is sui<br />
generis, and can<strong>no</strong>t be covered by a general rule that may be formulated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea …. [W]e must state that it is<br />
unthinkable and impossible for us to lend our support to any proposal<br />
which may be interpreted, evenly remotely, as impairing any <strong>of</strong> our historic<br />
rights, and which may be used as an excuse by foreign vessels and<br />
fisherman to penetrate with impunity into <strong>the</strong> very heart <strong>of</strong> our<br />
archipelago.” 11<br />
1.6. The foregoing review, showing Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris 12 as<br />
defining <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines represented by <strong>the</strong> ITL, is syn<strong>the</strong>sized in<br />
<strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law - Republic Act No. 3046 as amended by Republic Act No.<br />
5446 - An Act Defining <strong>the</strong> Baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Territorial Sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. It is<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> premise that “all <strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> limits sets forth in <strong>the</strong> abovementioned<br />
treaties have always been regarded as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Islands.”<br />
10 Emphasis added. This means <strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> ITL.<br />
11 Emphasis added.<br />
12 Toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> two companion treaties already identified above.<br />
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This law defines <strong>the</strong> Philippine territorial sea as comprising “all <strong>the</strong> waters beyond<br />
<strong>the</strong> outermost islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago but within <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> boundaries set<br />
forth in <strong>the</strong> aforementioned treaties.” The territorial sea <strong>the</strong>refore extends from<br />
<strong>the</strong> baselines connecting <strong>the</strong> outermost islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago to <strong>the</strong><br />
ITL.<br />
It also defines “all <strong>the</strong> waters around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> various<br />
islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago … as necessary appurtenances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land<br />
territory, forming part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inland or internal waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.” 13<br />
Hence, when <strong>the</strong> Baseline Law provides that “all <strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> limits<br />
set forth in <strong>the</strong> abovementioned treaties have always been regarded as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands,” <strong>the</strong>se waters are <strong>of</strong> two categories, as pointed<br />
out above, namely: (a) <strong>the</strong> territorial sea and (b) <strong>the</strong> internal waters, both being<br />
regimes <strong>of</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
Again, <strong>the</strong> Philippine position provided in <strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law, outlined<br />
above, was communicated to <strong>the</strong> international community. The Philippine delegation<br />
to <strong>the</strong> UN Committee on <strong>the</strong> Peaceful Uses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea-bed and <strong>the</strong> Ocean Floor<br />
Beyond <strong>the</strong> Limits <strong>of</strong> National Jurisdiction delivered a statement on 16 August 1971,<br />
which in part reads:<br />
. . . [T]he only rule that would be consistent with <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> an<br />
archipelago as one State is that which would require and allow an<br />
archipelago to draw a single baseline around <strong>the</strong> islands that constitute it<br />
by joining appropriate points <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outermost islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago<br />
with straight lines. We have followed this rule, having defined and clarified<br />
by legislation <strong>the</strong> baselines from which our territorial sea shall commence.<br />
The waters within <strong>the</strong> baselines are internal waters; those outside proceeding seaward<br />
within defined limits constitute our territorial sea. 14<br />
B. O<strong>the</strong>r Territories Under Philippine Sovereignty<br />
or Jurisdiction – <strong>the</strong> Second Component <strong>of</strong><br />
National Territory<br />
1.7. As formulated above, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r component <strong>of</strong> national territory is subsumed<br />
under <strong>the</strong> clause “all o<strong>the</strong>r territories over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or<br />
jurisdiction” in Article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present Constitution, territories which by law or<br />
historic right pertains to <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
13 Emphasis added.<br />
14 Estelito P. Mendoza, The Base-Lines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, 46 Philippine Law <strong>Journal</strong> 628, 6<strong>33</strong> (September 1971).<br />
The Philippine statement was delivered in Sub-Committee II <strong>of</strong> this UN Committee by Pr<strong>of</strong>. Estelito P.<br />
Mendoza.<br />
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There are two legal enactments which are integrally connected to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rterritories<br />
clause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. By virtue <strong>of</strong> this interconnectivity, this<br />
constitutional clause has <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> inhibiting <strong>the</strong>ir repeal or amendment adverse<br />
to territorial sovereignty. These enactments were already in place when <strong>the</strong> 1987<br />
Constitution came into effect, and on account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r-territories clause <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have gained constitutional recognition.<br />
These enactments are:<br />
(1) The present Baseline Law – Republic Act No. 3046 <strong>of</strong> 1961, as amended<br />
by Republic Act No. 5446. Section 2 <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 5446 provides:<br />
The definition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without<br />
prejudice to <strong>the</strong> delineation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
sea around <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over<br />
which <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines has acquired dominion and<br />
sovereignty. 15<br />
(2) Presidential Decree No. 1596 which took effect on 11 June 1978. It<br />
declares that <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) “shall belong and be subject<br />
to <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines”, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> seabed, subsoil,<br />
continental margin and air space. Under this Decree, <strong>the</strong> islands<br />
comprehended by <strong>the</strong> KIG are regarded as one area and as such is<br />
“constituted as a distinct and separate municipality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Province <strong>of</strong><br />
Palawan and shall be k<strong>no</strong>wn as Kalayaan.’”<br />
1.8. Approved on second reading in <strong>the</strong> House <strong>of</strong> Representatives is House<br />
Bill No. 3216, “An Act Defining <strong>the</strong> Archipelagic Baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Archipelago, Amending for <strong>the</strong> Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as amended by<br />
Republic Act No. 5446”. Apparently mindless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interconnectivity between <strong>the</strong><br />
present Baseline Law and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r-territories clause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> bill<br />
deliberately eliminates Section 2 <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 5446 which is <strong>the</strong> only legislative<br />
affirmation <strong>of</strong> Philippine sovereignty over Sabah. If enacted into law, <strong>the</strong> bill would<br />
operate as a repeal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said Sabah provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law, resulting<br />
in <strong>the</strong> derogation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r-territories clause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
In place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sabah provision <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 5446, <strong>the</strong> bill installs a<br />
“without prejudice clause” which reads:<br />
The delineation <strong>of</strong> baselines as provided in this Act shall be without<br />
prejudice to any claims to any contested portions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national territory or maritime<br />
zones and jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines in accordance with international<br />
law and under appropriate international dispute resolution mechanisms. 16<br />
15 Emphasis added.<br />
16 Emphasis added.<br />
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The implication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bill vis-à-vis Philippine sovereignty over Sabah is that it<br />
would radically change <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> Sabah in Philippine law as recognized by <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution, from an unequivocal pro<strong>no</strong>uncement <strong>of</strong> Philippine sovereignty and<br />
dominion under <strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law to a mere statement <strong>of</strong> claim to a contested<br />
portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national territory to be settled “in accordance with international law<br />
and under appropriate international dispute resolution mechanisms.”<br />
But considering that in international law settlement <strong>of</strong> dispute is a matter<br />
addressed <strong>no</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> unilateral act <strong>of</strong> a party to <strong>the</strong> dispute but to <strong>the</strong> consent <strong>of</strong><br />
both parties, it follows that under Philippine law itself <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> Sabah is <strong>the</strong>reby<br />
reduced to indeterminate claim that may remain unsettled indefinitely for <strong>the</strong> reason<br />
that <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r claimant may refuse any “dispute resolution mechanisms.” If <strong>the</strong><br />
authors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bill have in mind <strong>the</strong> prospect <strong>of</strong> resort to <strong>the</strong> International Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Justice (ICJ), it is suggested that <strong>the</strong>y deal with <strong>the</strong> following threshold problem.<br />
In its declaration <strong>of</strong> 23 December 1971, <strong>the</strong> Philippines “recognizes as<br />
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any o<strong>the</strong>r State<br />
accepting <strong>the</strong> same obligation, <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice<br />
[ICJ] in all legal disputes” as defined by <strong>the</strong> ICJ’s Statute. However, <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
declaration is subject to reservations, among which it specifies that it shall <strong>no</strong>t apply<br />
to any dispute “Arising out <strong>of</strong> or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Philippines …. [i]n respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines,<br />
including its territorial seas and inland waters.”<br />
The bill may thus be relying on a principal mechanism <strong>of</strong> dispute settlement in<br />
international law under <strong>the</strong> ICJ Statute from which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has deliberately<br />
excluded itself by formal reservation.<br />
1.9. In <strong>the</strong> current public debate on <strong>the</strong> Spratly Islands, <strong>the</strong> same bill has<br />
stirred controversy with respect to how <strong>the</strong> baselines should be drawn in <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan<br />
Island Group (KIG). It appears that <strong>the</strong> solution preferred by <strong>the</strong> Executive<br />
Department, apparently in avoidance <strong>of</strong> friction with o<strong>the</strong>r territorial claimants, is<br />
to deal with KIG under <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> “regime <strong>of</strong> islands” to be regulated by Article<br />
121 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea (UNCLOS).<br />
By this UNCLOS provision, <strong>the</strong> islands constituted as KIG under Presidential<br />
Decree No. 1596 are to be regarded individually as “An island … naturally formed<br />
area <strong>of</strong> land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” 17 each with its<br />
own territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> contiguous zone, <strong>the</strong> exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone and <strong>the</strong><br />
continental shelf. 18<br />
The formula <strong>of</strong> “regime <strong>of</strong> islands” carries <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> disintegrating effects on<br />
KIG as a unified local government unit in that <strong>the</strong> intrusion <strong>of</strong> Article 121 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
17 UNCLOS, Article 121 (1).<br />
18 UNCLOS, Art. 121 (2).<br />
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UNCLOS may demand that <strong>the</strong> constituent areas <strong>of</strong> land and water formations<br />
within <strong>the</strong> KIG be divided into categories <strong>of</strong> islands under paragraph 1 <strong>of</strong> Article<br />
121 and <strong>of</strong> rocks under paragraph 2 <strong>of</strong> that provision, with <strong>the</strong> possible result in <strong>the</strong><br />
reduction <strong>of</strong> areas <strong>of</strong> sovereign rights and jurisdiction. Paragraph 2 provides that<br />
“Rocks which can<strong>no</strong>t sustain human habitation or eco<strong>no</strong>mic life <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own shall<br />
have <strong>no</strong> exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone or continental shelf.”<br />
Constituted as a political unit, “as a distinct and separate municipality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Province <strong>of</strong> Palawan,” KIG has a regime <strong>of</strong> internal waters around, between and<br />
connecting its constituent islands. It would appear as a result that <strong>the</strong> formula <strong>of</strong><br />
“regime <strong>of</strong> islands” may eliminate <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>of</strong> internal waters between, around<br />
and separating <strong>the</strong> constituent islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> KIG, and would have adverse effects<br />
on <strong>the</strong> sovereignty over <strong>the</strong> affected sea-bed, subsoil as well as <strong>the</strong> air space.<br />
Overall, on account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutional recognition under <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r-territories<br />
clause, territorial sovereignty over <strong>the</strong> KIG under Presidential Decree No. 1596<br />
should be beyond statutory alteration in order to prevent derogation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national<br />
territory as defined in Article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Note that <strong>the</strong> said Presidential<br />
Decree sets out in precise technical description <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> KIG, toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with <strong>the</strong> identification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>st points which, if connected by straight lines<br />
would serve or become <strong>the</strong> baselines. Hence, <strong>no</strong>t only that <strong>the</strong> changes to be<br />
introduced by <strong>the</strong> bill would prove to be superfluous, but <strong>the</strong>se would be as well<br />
inimical to territorial sovereignty.<br />
2. Reorganizing <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Territory: Shift from The Treaty<br />
<strong>of</strong> Paris to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
A. The Philippines as an Archipelago<br />
2.1. By Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, “Spain cedes to <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelago k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands.” 19 The term archipelago used as descriptive<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines pertains to a historically established entity organized into one<br />
political unit. Sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> King <strong>of</strong> Spain was proclaimed over <strong>the</strong> whole<br />
Archipelago with Manila declared as its capital, 20 and governed as such for more<br />
than three centuries as a unity <strong>of</strong> land and water. Under a centralized administration<br />
as a Spanish possession, <strong>the</strong> Philippines <strong>the</strong>n consisted <strong>of</strong> thirty-three provinces,<br />
from Luzon to Mindanao, inhabited by a population <strong>of</strong> about 5 million paying tribute<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Spanish royal treasury. 21 Following <strong>the</strong> defeat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish forces in <strong>the</strong><br />
19 Emphasis added.<br />
20 John Foreman, The Philippine Islands, 1906, p. 36.<br />
21 See Jean Mallet, The Philippines: History, Geography, Custom, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Spanish Colonies in Oceania, 1994, trans. By Pura-Santillan-Castrence, Chap. V.<br />
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battle <strong>of</strong> Manila by <strong>the</strong> US occupying forces, <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> capitulation were signed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> military authorities <strong>of</strong> both camps, <strong>the</strong> principal stipulation <strong>of</strong> which was <strong>the</strong><br />
surrender <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole Philippine Archipelago. 22<br />
Relinquishment <strong>of</strong> sovereignty to <strong>the</strong> United States over <strong>the</strong> Philippines as a<br />
political unity covered all aspects <strong>of</strong> governmental powers, including <strong>the</strong> determination<br />
<strong>of</strong> status <strong>of</strong> Spanish subjects and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native population in <strong>the</strong> entire territory<br />
ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States. 23 In transition from military government, <strong>the</strong> Instructions<br />
<strong>of</strong> US President McKinley <strong>of</strong> 7 April 1900 streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> “utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> islands”<br />
into an archipelagic unity considered as one juridical category this time to be<br />
administered by a central civil government exercising legislative authority throughout<br />
<strong>the</strong> entire archipelago, which included “<strong>the</strong> making <strong>of</strong> rules and orders having <strong>the</strong><br />
effect <strong>of</strong> law, … <strong>the</strong> raising <strong>of</strong> revenues by taxes, customs duties and imposts; <strong>the</strong><br />
appropriation and expenditure <strong>of</strong> public funds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Islands; <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong><br />
an education system to secure an efficient civil service; <strong>the</strong> organization <strong>of</strong> a system<br />
<strong>of</strong> courts; <strong>the</strong> organization and establishment <strong>of</strong> municipal and departmental<br />
governments”, and <strong>the</strong> institution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English language as a common medium <strong>of</strong><br />
communication, “[i]n view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> great member <strong>of</strong> languages” spoken by <strong>the</strong> sectors<br />
<strong>of</strong> population in various parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago.<br />
2.2. Thus, long before <strong>the</strong> international law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea has evolved <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelagic concept that is <strong>no</strong>w crystallized in Article 46(1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines was already established as an archipelago in unity <strong>of</strong> land and water as<br />
formalized in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, toge<strong>the</strong>r with its authoritative<br />
interpretation set out above.<br />
It is instructive that a study on mid-ocean archipelagos that formed part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
preparatory work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1958 UN Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea reflects <strong>the</strong><br />
politico-geologic nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago exemplified in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Islands. Prepared by Jens Evensen, it defines outlaying or mid-ocean archipelagos<br />
as “groups <strong>of</strong> islands situated out in <strong>the</strong> ocean at such distance from <strong>the</strong> coasts <strong>of</strong><br />
firm lands as to be considered as an independent whole ra<strong>the</strong>r than forming part <strong>of</strong> or<br />
outer coastline <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mainland.” 24 The study goes on to point out <strong>the</strong> geographical<br />
and historical peculiarities <strong>of</strong> outlaying [or mid-ocean] archipelagos:<br />
No hard-and-fast rule exists whereby a State is compelled to disregard <strong>the</strong> geographic,<br />
historical (and eco<strong>no</strong>mical) peculiarities <strong>of</strong> outlaying archipelagos. Frequently <strong>the</strong><br />
only natural and practical solution is to treat such outlaying archipelagos as a<br />
whole for <strong>the</strong> delimitation <strong>of</strong> territorial waters by drawing straight baselines<br />
from <strong>the</strong> outermost points <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago - that is, from <strong>the</strong> outermost<br />
points <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constituent islands, islets and rocks - and by drawing <strong>the</strong><br />
22 Foreman, op. cit., at 464-465.<br />
23 See Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, Arts. VIII and IX.<br />
24 Document A/CONF. 13/18. See UN Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, 1958, vol. I, p. 290. Emphasis added.<br />
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seaward limit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> belt <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> marginal seas at a distance <strong>of</strong> x nautical<br />
miles outside and parallel to such baselines. 25<br />
It is against <strong>the</strong> background <strong>of</strong> clashing interests in <strong>the</strong> 1958 UN Conference<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea that <strong>the</strong> Congress <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines enacted <strong>the</strong> baseline law in Republic<br />
Act No. 3046 in 1961. Supported by <strong>the</strong> Evensen study, it crystallizes into definitive<br />
legislative pro<strong>no</strong>uncement <strong>the</strong> position taken by <strong>the</strong> Philippine diplomatic <strong>no</strong>tes<br />
referred to above.<br />
B. In Syn<strong>the</strong>sis: The UNCLOS<br />
in Relation to <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris<br />
2.3. The application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS to <strong>the</strong> Philippine territorial regime has<br />
<strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> eliminating <strong>the</strong> juridical function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it<br />
established <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine State. It nullifies <strong>the</strong> authoritative<br />
interpretations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris to that effect, as reviewed above.<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> Philippines has established under its law and practice that Article III<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris defines <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> its<br />
territorial waters should extend from <strong>the</strong> baselines to <strong>the</strong> ITL. The vast expanse <strong>of</strong><br />
territorial waters within <strong>the</strong> boundaries set by <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris is spelled out by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee on National Territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1971 Constitutional Convention in its<br />
Report No. 1, thus:<br />
Now if we plot on a map <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Archipelago as set forth in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, a huge or giant rectangle will emerge, measuring<br />
about 600 miles in width and over 1200 miles in length. Inside this rectangle<br />
are <strong>the</strong> 7,100 islands comprising <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands. From <strong>the</strong> east<br />
coast <strong>of</strong> Luzon to <strong>the</strong> eastern boundary <strong>of</strong> this huge rectangle in <strong>the</strong><br />
Pacific Ocean, <strong>the</strong>re is a distance <strong>of</strong> over 300 miles. From <strong>the</strong> west coast<br />
<strong>of</strong> Luzon to <strong>the</strong> western boundary <strong>of</strong> this giant rectangle in <strong>the</strong> China<br />
Sea, <strong>the</strong>re is a distance <strong>of</strong> over 150 miles.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, when <strong>the</strong>se boundaries are set aside as a consequence <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong> territorial sea is reduced to a breadth <strong>no</strong>t<br />
extending twelve nautical miles from <strong>the</strong> baselines. The UNCLOS reduces <strong>the</strong><br />
territorial sea by 230,000 square miles, or almost by 50% – which means <strong>the</strong> collapse<br />
<strong>of</strong> territorial sovereignty as extended to <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. If <strong>the</strong> limits set forth in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris are understood in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> boundaries, as <strong>the</strong>y are, to be<br />
applied in complement with <strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law, it is calculated that <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> country’s territorial sea would cover about 520,700 squares miles. 26<br />
25 Ibid.<br />
26 See estimate in “Primer on <strong>the</strong> United Nations Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea”, published by <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, Manila, May 1991, p. 15.<br />
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C. The UNCLOS and <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
(1) Boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Territory<br />
2.4. “Boundary” is defined in international law as a line “which determines <strong>the</strong><br />
limit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sphere <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> States or o<strong>the</strong>r entities having an<br />
international status.” 27 Necessarily, boundaries “are permanent lines <strong>of</strong> de jure<br />
jurisdiction.” 28<br />
Deriving its definition <strong>of</strong> national territory from <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution, <strong>the</strong><br />
present fundamental law takes <strong>the</strong> lines drawn in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris,<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> two companion treaties, as <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. But<br />
<strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS will have <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> nullifying <strong>the</strong> legal status<br />
or function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said treaty limits. The operation <strong>of</strong> Articles 47 and 48 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS in relation to its Article 3 will have that effect in a wholesale manner.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as drawn in Article<br />
III forms an integral part <strong>of</strong> its definition as an Archipelago and becomes an element<br />
<strong>of</strong> its statehood which is built into its National Territory as described in Section 1,<br />
Article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution. The term archipelago in <strong>the</strong> definition <strong>of</strong> national<br />
territory under <strong>the</strong> 1973 and <strong>the</strong> present Constitution perpetuates <strong>the</strong> geographical,<br />
historical, political and legal context by which <strong>the</strong> 1935 fundamental law<br />
constitutionalized <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as an archipelago under <strong>the</strong> Treaty<br />
<strong>of</strong> Paris.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> Philippines is to be categorized as an archipelagic state under <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> its territorial sea would be drawn from <strong>the</strong> “archipelagic<br />
baselines”. It is from <strong>the</strong>se baselines that <strong>the</strong> territorial sea would be measured.<br />
Since under Article 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea is limited to<br />
12 nautical miles from <strong>the</strong> baselines, <strong>the</strong>n accordingly <strong>the</strong> outer limit <strong>of</strong> territorial<br />
sovereignty extends <strong>no</strong> more than 12 nautical miles from <strong>the</strong> same starting point.<br />
2.5. The claim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Government that <strong>the</strong> limits set forth in <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris are <strong>no</strong>t boundaries but merely represent “lines <strong>of</strong> allocation for <strong>the</strong><br />
islands only and do <strong>no</strong>t necessarily include <strong>the</strong> waters within,” 29 is belied by <strong>the</strong><br />
enactments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Congress indicating <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris limits <strong>the</strong> boundaries<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago. It is an act <strong>of</strong> denying its own past in <strong>the</strong> establishment<br />
and administration <strong>of</strong> Philippine Island as its colony and <strong>the</strong> legal consequences <strong>of</strong><br />
its own sovereign acts as a colonial power. Even if <strong>the</strong>se are to be regarded as<br />
unilateral acts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong>y are acts <strong>of</strong> sovereignty and<br />
27 M. Bo<strong>the</strong>, “Boundaries”, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Public International Law, Vol. I, pp. 443, 447<br />
(1992).<br />
28 Id., at 444.<br />
29 See Merlin M. Magallona, International Law Issues in Perspective, 1996, pp. 204-205.<br />
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<strong>the</strong>y would assume validity for <strong>the</strong> reason that <strong>no</strong> rule <strong>of</strong> international law at <strong>the</strong><br />
time prohibited its assertion and that <strong>the</strong>y enjoy <strong>the</strong> acquiescence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> international<br />
community.<br />
(2) Internal Waters Transformed into Archipelagic Waters:<br />
<strong>the</strong> Watered-Down Sovereignty<br />
2.6. In defining national territory, <strong>the</strong> present Constitution specifies that –<br />
The waters around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago,<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> breadth and dimensions, form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal waters <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines. 30<br />
The provision runs in continuity with <strong>the</strong> territorial principles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1935 and<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1973 Constitutions. In a position communicated to <strong>the</strong> United Nations in 1955,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines emphasized <strong>the</strong> legal status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se waters, as follows:<br />
The position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Government in <strong>the</strong> matter is that all waters<br />
around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> different islands belonging to <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Archipelago irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir width or dimensions, are<br />
necessary appurtenance <strong>of</strong> its land territory, forming an integral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national<br />
or inland waters, subject to <strong>the</strong> exclusive sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines ... 31<br />
All <strong>the</strong> more is <strong>the</strong> sovereignty over <strong>the</strong>se waters vital as a political consolidation<br />
<strong>of</strong> a State whose material base is characterized by geographic fragmentation.<br />
Waters properly characterized as “national waters” or “internal waters” are<br />
closely linked to land territory by reason <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “vital interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
sovereign concerning conditions <strong>of</strong> national and territorial integrity, <strong>of</strong> defense, or<br />
commerce and <strong>of</strong> industry.” 32 Land territory and internal waters are one under <strong>the</strong><br />
sovereignty <strong>of</strong> a State. International law strikes a difference between territorial sea<br />
and internal waters in that it permits right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage by foreign ships in<br />
<strong>the</strong> former, but <strong>no</strong>t through internal waters. <strong>33</strong> It is only upon prior permission <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> coastal State that submarine cable or pipelines may be laid in internal waters.<br />
Moreover, in customary international law “<strong>the</strong>re does <strong>no</strong>t exist a ... right <strong>of</strong> access to<br />
30 Emphasis added.<br />
31 Emphasis added.<br />
32 R. Lagoni, Internal Waters,” in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Public International Law, vol. 11<br />
(North Holland, 1989), p. 153.<br />
<strong>33</strong> See UNCLOS, Art. 17 and Convention on <strong>the</strong> Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Art. 14(1). The only<br />
exception to <strong>the</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong> right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage through internal waters pertains to a case <strong>of</strong> what used<br />
to be territorial waters, or parts <strong>of</strong> territorial sea, which has been enclosed by straight baselines as internal<br />
waters.<br />
34 Rainer Lagoni, Internal Waters, Seagoing Vessels”, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Public International<br />
Law, vol 11, 1989, pp. 155-156.<br />
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internal waters in general or to ports in particular,” 34 except in cases <strong>of</strong> distress.<br />
Warships and government ships operated for <strong>no</strong>n-commercial purposes may <strong>no</strong>t<br />
enter <strong>the</strong> internal waters <strong>of</strong> a State without its prior consent. A coastal State may<br />
allow entry to internal waters and to its ports upon certain conditions, which right<br />
may be withdrawn. 35<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS will radically change <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine internal waters by transforming <strong>the</strong>m into archipelagic waters. Under <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS, what <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution refers to as “waters around, between, and<br />
connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago” are said to be subject to <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines as an archipelagic state, 36 but that sovereignty is watered down by<br />
<strong>the</strong> following limitations:<br />
(a) Ships <strong>of</strong> all states enjoy <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage through archipelagic<br />
waters. 37 This means that as a matter right foreign ships are allowed to navigate<br />
through <strong>the</strong> Philippine waters “around, between, and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelago,” including stopping and anchoring incidental to ordinary navigation. 38<br />
In direct danger and risk to national security and environmental integrity, this right<br />
pertains to foreign submarines and “nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>r inherently dangerous or <strong>no</strong>xious substances.” 39 In making provision for<br />
<strong>the</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage <strong>of</strong> submarines and nuclear powered ships, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t expressly exclude nuclear-armed ships and may imply <strong>the</strong>y are allowed in<strong>no</strong>cent<br />
passage in <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters. It contains rules regulating <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent<br />
passage for warships, clarifying all <strong>the</strong> more that this right pertains to this category <strong>of</strong><br />
ships. 40 Oil tankers too are among <strong>the</strong> beneficiaries <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage through<br />
<strong>the</strong>se waters, posing potential environmental disasters. 41<br />
(b) In archipelagic waters, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has <strong>the</strong> duty to “recognize traditional<br />
fishing rights and o<strong>the</strong>r legitimate activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> immediately neighboring States.” 42<br />
(c) The Philippines must “respect existing submarine cables laid by o<strong>the</strong>r States<br />
and passing through its waters without making a landfall” and shall allow <strong>the</strong><br />
“maintenance and replacement <strong>of</strong> such cables upon receiving due <strong>no</strong>tice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
location and <strong>the</strong> intention to repair or replace <strong>the</strong>m.” 43<br />
35 See R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, 1983, pp. 46-47.<br />
36 See UNCLOS, Art. 49.<br />
37 UNCLOS, Art. 52(1).<br />
38 UNCLOS, Art. 57 in relation to Arts. 17 and 18.<br />
39 UNCLOS, Art. 52(1) in relation to Arts. 20 and 23.<br />
40 The right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage for warships, submarines, and nuclear-powered ships is applied to archipelagic<br />
waters by reference to <strong>the</strong> rules applicable to <strong>the</strong>se vessels in in<strong>no</strong>cent passage in <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. See reference<br />
to Part II, section 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS by Art. 52(1). See F. Ngantcha, The Right <strong>of</strong> In<strong>no</strong>cent Passage and <strong>the</strong><br />
Evolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, 1990, pp. 123-154.<br />
41 See UNCLOS, Art. 22(2).<br />
42 See UNCLOS, Art. 51(1).<br />
43 UNCLOS, Art. 52(2).<br />
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Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong> vast expanse <strong>of</strong> internal waters over which <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines has full territorial sovereignty are radically reduced to small pockets <strong>of</strong><br />
waters enclosed by straight lines drawn across <strong>the</strong> mouth <strong>of</strong> rivers directly flowing<br />
into <strong>the</strong> sea, waters in bays, and in permanent harbor works, including lagoons inside<br />
reefs. 44<br />
In <strong>the</strong> real sense, what are properly internal waters under our fundamental<br />
law will cease to be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s territorial sovereignty by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
serious restrictions. UNCLOS has <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> eliminating in a wholesale manner<br />
<strong>the</strong>se internal waters as an integral part <strong>of</strong> Philippine sovereignty.<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS presents an a<strong>no</strong>maly in that it gives a new status to<br />
Philippine internal waters, calling <strong>the</strong>m “archipelagic waters,” and subjects <strong>the</strong>m to more<br />
restrictions than it does to <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. Consequently, <strong>the</strong> territorial sea surrounds a<br />
regime <strong>of</strong> waters inside <strong>the</strong> country’s baselines burdened with more onerous duties<br />
on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines than those in <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. The view <strong>of</strong> Churchill<br />
and Lowe is <strong>of</strong> striking relevance to marine pollution from ships in <strong>the</strong>ir in<strong>no</strong>cent<br />
passage through waters interconnecting <strong>the</strong> Philippine islands:<br />
... [T]he Convention [on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea] in its provisions on pollution<br />
gives <strong>the</strong> coastal state additional enforcement jurisdiction in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
pollution over foreign vessels in its territorial sea .... This additional<br />
jurisdiction does <strong>no</strong>t apply in archipelagic waters. The result, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
is that in its archipelagic waters an archipelagic State has less enforcement<br />
jurisdiction over foreign vessels in matters <strong>of</strong> pollution than a <strong>no</strong>narchipelagic<br />
State in its territorial sea ... or than <strong>the</strong> archipelagic State<br />
itself has in its own territorial sea lying beyond its archipelagic waters. 45<br />
(3) Archipelagic Sea Lanes and Air Space - International<br />
Highways Traversing Zones <strong>of</strong> Exclusive Eco<strong>no</strong>mic Zone,<br />
Territorial Sea, Internal Waters and Air Space<br />
2.7. It is through <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes that <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS has <strong>the</strong> most<br />
devastating impact on Philippine sovereignty. In addition to <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent<br />
passage <strong>of</strong> foreign vessels through <strong>the</strong> territorial sea and <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters <strong>of</strong><br />
archipelagic states, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS creates a new maritime regime, namely, <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelagic sea lane passage. The central feature <strong>of</strong> this new regime is <strong>the</strong> duty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines as an archipelagic state to designate sea lanes and air routes “suitable<br />
for <strong>the</strong> continuous and expeditious passage <strong>of</strong> foreign ships and aircraft through or<br />
over” <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters and <strong>the</strong> adjacent territorial sea. 46 Jayewardene interprets<br />
44 UNCLOS, Arts. 50 in relation to Arts 9, 10 and 11. See H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime <strong>of</strong> Islands in International<br />
Law, 1990, p. 98.<br />
45 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit. supra, <strong>no</strong>te 34 at 96-97.<br />
46 UNCLOS, Art. 53(1).<br />
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<strong>the</strong> UNCLOS as requiring that each archipelagic sea lane be 50 nautical miles wide. 47<br />
Each archipelagic sea lane is to traverse <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters and <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
sea in order to create “continuous, expeditious and u<strong>no</strong>bstructed transit between<br />
one part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> high seas or an exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone and a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> high<br />
seas or an exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone.” 48 The right <strong>of</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage<br />
consists <strong>of</strong> two components, namely: (1) <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> all ships, and (2) <strong>the</strong><br />
right <strong>of</strong> overflight <strong>of</strong> all aircraft. Both components pertain to all States and <strong>the</strong> archipelagic<br />
state can<strong>no</strong>t “discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships,” 49 which should<br />
apply as well to foreign aircraft. It shall <strong>no</strong>t hamper <strong>no</strong>r suspend <strong>the</strong> archipelagic<br />
sea lanes passage. 50<br />
Archipelagic sea lanes are indeed in <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> international highways cutting<br />
across <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> an archipelagic state and excluded from <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its<br />
sovereign authority, so that foreign ships and aircraft, particularly those <strong>of</strong> naval<br />
powers, can maintain worldwide mobility. The proceedings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Third UN<br />
Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, which prepared <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, reveal that <strong>the</strong><br />
special character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage lies primarily in <strong>the</strong> militarysecurity<br />
demands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> US, which were accepted by <strong>the</strong> Conference in exchange for<br />
compromises and concessions.<br />
One major result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se compromises and concessions is syn<strong>the</strong>sized by<br />
Shigeru Oda, former judge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice, as follows:<br />
...<strong>the</strong> new regime on <strong>the</strong> passage through straits and archipelagic waters<br />
was introduced <strong>no</strong>t only for <strong>the</strong> navigation <strong>of</strong> commercial vessels, but, in<br />
particular, to maintain uninterrupted navigation <strong>of</strong> warships - including submarines<br />
and <strong>the</strong> free navigation <strong>of</strong> military aircraft.<br />
[In <strong>the</strong> early 1970s] <strong>the</strong> United States declared that it would accept <strong>the</strong><br />
12-mile territorial sea limit on certain conditions, among o<strong>the</strong>rs that <strong>the</strong><br />
free and uninterrupted passage for warships and military aircraft and<br />
submarines through straits used for international navigation be guaranteed.<br />
This was a basic point <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new regime <strong>of</strong> transit passage through straits.<br />
The idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lane passage developed in a similar<br />
fashion…<br />
Even this development [i.e., <strong>the</strong> proposal to define in<strong>no</strong>cent passage<br />
<strong>of</strong> vessels in <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters, sponsored principally by <strong>the</strong><br />
47 This is an interpretation <strong>of</strong> Art. 53(3) which requires that <strong>the</strong> sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by “a series<br />
<strong>of</strong> continuous axis lines from <strong>the</strong> entry points <strong>of</strong> passage routes to <strong>the</strong> exit points.” It provides that ships and<br />
aircraft “shall <strong>no</strong>t deviate more than 25 nautical miles to ei<strong>the</strong>r side <strong>of</strong> such axis lines.”<br />
48 UNCLOS, Art. 53(3).<br />
49 See UNCLOS, Art. 42(2) in relation to Art. 54.<br />
50 See UNCLOS, Art. 44 in relation to Art. 54.<br />
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Philippines and Indonesia] was unacceptable to <strong>the</strong> US Navy, because<br />
under <strong>the</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage concept its submarines would <strong>no</strong>t be able to<br />
carry out underwater operations. The US Navy would only accept <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelagic concept on <strong>the</strong> condition that <strong>the</strong> undetected and uninterrupted<br />
passage <strong>of</strong> submarines would be guaranteed throughout <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters. Thus,<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage was first introduced to permit naval<br />
vessels including submarines and military aircraft to enjoy a free and uninterrupted<br />
passage through <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters…. 51<br />
Article 53(1) and (2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS <strong>no</strong>w provides that “All ships and aircraft<br />
enjoy <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes,”<br />
which archipelagic states are under duty to designate. 52<br />
Kwiatkowska has a more concrete explanation as to <strong>the</strong> military-security<br />
motivation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage, thus:<br />
The right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage would be perfectly adequate for commercial<br />
navigation and <strong>no</strong>n-applicability <strong>of</strong> this right never hindered civil aviation.<br />
But archipelagic sea lane passage was necessary to enable a submerged<br />
navigation <strong>of</strong> submarines and maneuvering <strong>of</strong> a military aircraft which<br />
are <strong>no</strong>t permissible under <strong>the</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage regime. 53<br />
As to submarines, an a<strong>no</strong>maly in <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS arises from <strong>the</strong> fact that it<br />
requires submarines “to navigate on <strong>the</strong> surface in <strong>the</strong> territorial sea,” 54 whereas in<br />
transit through <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes <strong>the</strong>y are allowed passage in <strong>the</strong>ir submerged<br />
state, or “in <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>rmal mode.” 55 It can be generalized <strong>the</strong>n that<br />
The essential feature <strong>of</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage is that <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and possibly o<strong>the</strong>rs may send <strong>the</strong><br />
SSBNs [nuclear ballistic missile submarines] or attack submarines through<br />
archipelagic waters in <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>no</strong>rmal mode <strong>of</strong> operation. This right <strong>of</strong><br />
archipelagic sea lane passage is especially important [to such naval powers]<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Southwest Pacific archipelagos <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and Indonesia<br />
for east-west transit to and from <strong>the</strong> Indian Ocean. 56<br />
51 S. Oda, “The Passage <strong>of</strong> Warships Through Straits and Archipelagic Waters,” in J.M. Van Dyke, et als. (eds.),<br />
International Navigation: Rocks and Shoals Ahead?, 1988, pp. 155-156. Emphasis added.<br />
52 Emphasis added. Obviously, <strong>the</strong> world “all” intends to convey <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision as including<br />
military vessels and aircraft, without being explicit about <strong>the</strong>ir special character.<br />
53 B. Kwiatkowska, An Evaluation <strong>of</strong> State Legislation on Archipelagic Waters, 6 World Bulletin 22, 23<br />
(Nov. – Dec. 1990).<br />
54 UNCLOS, Art. 20.<br />
55 UNCLOS, Art. 53(3).<br />
56 D.L. Larson, “Security Issues and <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea: A General Framework”, 15 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 99, 118<br />
(1985).<br />
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As to overflight over <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes, Kwiatkowska fur<strong>the</strong>r explains<br />
<strong>the</strong> peculiar military nature <strong>of</strong> this right, thus:<br />
The requirement that air routes must be above archipelagic sea lanes<br />
was dictated <strong>no</strong>t by need <strong>of</strong> civil air navigation but by <strong>the</strong> necessity to<br />
provide maneuvering possibilities for military aircraft while <strong>the</strong> naval forces <strong>of</strong> a<br />
particular fleet are passing through <strong>the</strong> sea lanes . . . .<br />
It follows from <strong>the</strong> foregoing that, contrary to what is <strong>of</strong>ten maintained,<br />
a general right <strong>of</strong> free overflight above archipelagic waters can - due to its<br />
strict application to <strong>the</strong> air space above <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes - be<br />
implemented in practice only by military aircraft. Civil aircraft could<br />
clearly <strong>no</strong>t fulfill <strong>the</strong> zigzagging above <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes and <strong>of</strong><br />
overflying archipelagic waters without passing above archipelagic land<br />
(island) territory… 57<br />
This security concern over <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes passage is qualitatively<br />
magnified because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> expansion <strong>of</strong> sea-based nuclear weapons systems. As a<br />
United Nations study shows,<br />
The sea has <strong>no</strong>w become <strong>the</strong> operational environment <strong>of</strong> ballistic missile<br />
submarines, each <strong>of</strong> which has been estimated to be carrying <strong>the</strong> equivalent<br />
<strong>of</strong> more explosive power than was used by all <strong>the</strong> combatants in <strong>the</strong><br />
Second World War. The combination <strong>of</strong> missile and warhead design,<br />
nuclear propulsion power, highly accurate navigation and guidance systems<br />
and sophisticated hull design and construction techniques has provided<br />
<strong>the</strong> opportunity for <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> an entirely new naval capability<br />
<strong>of</strong> awesome specific power. 58<br />
Until lately, a great percentage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ICBMs is sea-borne and more than 7,000<br />
strategic nuclear warheads are carried by submarines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> five nuclear-weapon<br />
states. 59 And yet with respect to passage through <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes, <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS does <strong>no</strong>t require prior authorization - or even just <strong>no</strong>tification - for <strong>the</strong><br />
passage <strong>of</strong> submarines or warships carrying nuclear weapons or o<strong>the</strong>r dangerous or<br />
<strong>no</strong>xious cargoes. 60<br />
In this context, a more specific situation emerges in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
Under Article 53(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> air<br />
routes for overflight, “shall include all <strong>no</strong>rmal passage routes used as routes for<br />
international navigation.” Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, if <strong>the</strong> Philippines fails to designate<br />
sea lanes or air routes, <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> archipelagic sea lanes may be exercised through<br />
57 Op. cit. supra <strong>no</strong>te 53, at 41-42.<br />
58 UN Dept. <strong>of</strong> Disarmament Affairs, The Naval Arms Race (New York, 1986), p. 14.<br />
59 Id. At p. 27.<br />
60 See. H.W. H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime <strong>of</strong> Islands in International Law, 1990, pp. 170-171.<br />
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<strong>the</strong>se <strong>no</strong>rmal routes <strong>of</strong> international navigation. 61 Taking into account existing <strong>no</strong>rmal<br />
routes for international navigation, how many archipelagic sea lanes may traverse<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago? On this basis, at least four <strong>of</strong> such “international<br />
highways” each <strong>no</strong>t less than 50 nautical miles wide, are likely to cut across its territory.<br />
Between <strong>the</strong> Pacific Ocean and <strong>the</strong> South China Sea, <strong>the</strong> first route may pass through<br />
Luzon Strait (which consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bashi, Balintang, and Babuyan Channels) in<br />
Batanes. The second may go through San Bernardi<strong>no</strong> Strait and Verde Island Passage.<br />
The third, through Surigao Strait, may connect <strong>the</strong> Pacific Ocean with Mindanao and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sulu Seas from which ships may go out into <strong>the</strong> South China Sea through <strong>the</strong><br />
Balabac Strait in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Palawan. 62 Passing through Mindoro Strait, <strong>the</strong> fourth<br />
route may connect <strong>the</strong> South China Sea with <strong>the</strong> Celebes Sea through Basilan Strait.<br />
The o<strong>the</strong>r branch <strong>of</strong> this fourth route may go out through Balabac Strait into <strong>the</strong><br />
Indonesian route and on to <strong>the</strong> Singapore Strait or Malacca Strait. 63<br />
Bear in mind that <strong>the</strong>se archipelagic sea lanes are drawn across what <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Constitution characterizes as internal waters over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
exercises sovereignty as well its territorial sea.<br />
(4) Transit Passage<br />
2.8. Among <strong>the</strong> straits used for international navigation which may be used<br />
for archipelagic sea lane passage, eight are situated entirely within <strong>the</strong> archipelagic<br />
waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, or what are its internal waters under <strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, transit passage through straits used for international navigation<br />
constitutes a separate legal regime established principally for <strong>the</strong> military interests<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> naval powers. In continuity with archipelagic sea lanes passage, all ships and<br />
aircraft have <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> navigation and overflight through <strong>the</strong>se straits.” 64 Again,<br />
submarines are allowed passage in <strong>the</strong>ir “<strong>no</strong>rmal modes,” i.e., underwater, without<br />
<strong>the</strong> obligation to surface. Where <strong>the</strong>se straits do <strong>no</strong>t form part <strong>of</strong> archipelagic sea<br />
lanes, transit passage through <strong>the</strong>m constitutes an additional restriction to Philippine<br />
territorial sovereignty, quite apart from <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea lanes and in<strong>no</strong>cent<br />
passage through connecting waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s islands.<br />
2.9. On <strong>the</strong> whole, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS raises fundamental questions which bear<br />
directly on <strong>the</strong> security and integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine State. Why <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
must pay such a heavy price in <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military powers points to a review<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine position with respect to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
61 Art. 53(12).<br />
62 See B. Kwiatkowska, “An Assessment <strong>of</strong> Philippine Legislation on Archipelagic Waters,” 6 World Bulletin 28,<br />
35-36 (Sept.-Oct. 1990).<br />
63 Ibid.<br />
64 See UNCLOS, Arts. 37 and 38.<br />
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3. A Conditional Concurrence<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS by <strong>the</strong> Batasang Pambasa:<br />
Is There Concurrence At All?<br />
3.1. By Resolution No. 121, The Batasang Pambansa expressed its concurrence<br />
in <strong>the</strong> UN Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea on 27 February 1984. It reads:<br />
Resolved by <strong>the</strong> Batasang Pambansa, To concur, as it hereby concurs, in<br />
<strong>the</strong> United Nations Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea entered into and<br />
signed by <strong>the</strong> Representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine on<br />
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica, with <strong>the</strong> understanding embodied<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Declaration filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines by<br />
<strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine delegation when he signed <strong>the</strong> said Convention.<br />
It is to be assumed that this Declaration, entitled “The Philippine Declaration<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea,” has become an integral<br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Concurrence Resolution. Its full meaning may be disclosed when its<br />
content is correlated with <strong>the</strong> Declaration.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> viewpoint <strong>of</strong> national law, <strong>the</strong> Declaration, having been made an<br />
integral part <strong>of</strong> Resolution No. 121, is deemed an enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Batasang Pambansa<br />
within its constitutional authority. Its significance lies in its disclosure <strong>of</strong> a fuller<br />
legislative intent as to <strong>the</strong> limitations that will control <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
It should be obvious that <strong>the</strong> “undertakings” contained in <strong>the</strong> Declaration are in <strong>the</strong><br />
nature <strong>of</strong> conditions, such as:<br />
1. The signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention by <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines shall <strong>no</strong>t in any manner impair or prejudice <strong>the</strong> sovereign rights <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines under and arising from <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines;<br />
2. Such signing shall <strong>no</strong>t in any manner affect <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines as successor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America, under and arising out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris between Spain and <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America <strong>of</strong> December<br />
10, 1898, and <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Washington between <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong><br />
America and Great Britain <strong>of</strong> January 2, 1930;<br />
* * *<br />
3. Such signing shall <strong>no</strong>t diminish or in any manner impair or prejudice<br />
<strong>the</strong> sovereign rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines over any territory<br />
over which sovereign authority, such as <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Islands, and <strong>the</strong><br />
waters appurtenant <strong>the</strong>reto;<br />
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4. The Convention shall <strong>no</strong>t be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent<br />
laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines; …. 65<br />
* * *<br />
In <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se conditions, <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS with<br />
respect to <strong>the</strong> Philippines would run against <strong>the</strong> grain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and,<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore, contrary to <strong>the</strong> intent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Concurrence Resolution. The supremacy <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution and <strong>the</strong> laws over <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS as affirmed in <strong>the</strong><br />
Declaration would preclude <strong>the</strong> effectuation <strong>of</strong> UNCLOS in Philippine jurisdiction.<br />
The understanding in paragraph 1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration means that <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong><br />
sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as embodied in <strong>the</strong> Constitution shall prevail over its<br />
affected obligations under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, giving rise to a complete negation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS as a treaty on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. By reason <strong>of</strong> this paragraph, it<br />
would <strong>no</strong>t be legally possible for <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS to change <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal<br />
waters connecting <strong>the</strong> constituent islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago into<br />
archipelagic waters. Nei<strong>the</strong>r would it be possible for such internal waters to be<br />
traversed by archipelagic sea lanes on account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
Paragraph 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration reaffirms <strong>the</strong> legal status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Paris. It asserts <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines arising from this Treaty, which should,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> first place, pertain to territorial sovereignty as delimited by <strong>the</strong> ITL. In this<br />
respect, <strong>the</strong> Declaration confirms <strong>the</strong> premise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law that “all<br />
<strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> limits sets forth in <strong>the</strong> abovementioned treaties have always<br />
been regarded as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands.” 66<br />
Under paragraph 5 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration, it is impermissible for <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS to<br />
effect changes in <strong>the</strong> present Baseline Law which will continue to be effective, in<br />
particular with respect to <strong>the</strong> prescriptions contained in its preamble, among which<br />
are:<br />
1. “[A]ll <strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> limits set forth in <strong>the</strong> abovementioned<br />
treaties have always been regarded as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Islands;”<br />
2. “[A]ll <strong>the</strong> waters beyond <strong>the</strong> outermost islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago but<br />
within <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> boundaries set forth in <strong>the</strong> aforementioned treaties<br />
comprise <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines; . . .”<br />
65 Emphasis added.<br />
66 Referring to <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris and <strong>the</strong> two companion treaties.<br />
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Pursuing <strong>the</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Concurrence<br />
Resolution in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> national law, it would be instructive to inquire into <strong>the</strong><br />
objections <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states parties to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS against this Declaration. By <strong>the</strong>se<br />
means, <strong>the</strong> Declaration comes into clearer view as a statement <strong>of</strong> exceptions to, or<br />
<strong>of</strong> modification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legal effects <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS with respect to <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
The Declaration, according to <strong>the</strong> formal objection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Union <strong>of</strong> Soviet<br />
Socialist Republics (Russian Federation), is a statement made by <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
upon signature “and <strong>the</strong>n confirmed upon ratification.” It contains “exceptions to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Convention” and is incompatible with Article 310 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention, implying<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Declaration contains statements purporting “to exclude or to modify <strong>the</strong><br />
legal effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> this Convention” in <strong>the</strong>ir application to <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
The Russian Federation is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> Declaration “emphasizes more than<br />
once that, despite its ratification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention, <strong>the</strong> Philippines will continue to<br />
be guided in matters relating to <strong>the</strong> sea, <strong>no</strong>t by <strong>the</strong> Convention and <strong>the</strong> obligation<br />
under it, by its domestic law and by agreements it has already concluded which are<br />
<strong>no</strong>t in line with <strong>the</strong> Convention.” 67<br />
To <strong>the</strong> same effect is <strong>the</strong> objection <strong>of</strong> Czechoslovakia. 68 It points out that <strong>the</strong><br />
Declaration “indicates that in spite <strong>of</strong> having ratified <strong>the</strong> Convention, <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
intends to follow its national laws and previous agreements ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> obligations<br />
under <strong>the</strong> Convention, <strong>no</strong>t only taking into account <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r those laws and<br />
agreements are in harmony with <strong>the</strong> Convention but even, as proved in paragraph 6<br />
and 7 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine understanding [or Declaration], deliberately contravening<br />
<strong>the</strong> obligations set forth <strong>the</strong>rein.” 69<br />
Ukraine’s objection 70 pursues <strong>the</strong> same points, saying that “<strong>the</strong> statement <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines has <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> establishing<br />
unjustified exceptions for that State, and in fact <strong>of</strong> modifying <strong>the</strong> legal effect <strong>of</strong><br />
important provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention as applied <strong>the</strong>reto.”<br />
Australia’s position 71 states that “<strong>the</strong> Philippines does <strong>no</strong>t consider that it is<br />
obliged to harmonize its law with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention… [and it] is seeking<br />
to modify <strong>the</strong> legal effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention’s provisions.”<br />
While made in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> international law, <strong>the</strong> foregoing statements <strong>of</strong><br />
state parties to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, indicates as well <strong>the</strong> interpretive<br />
implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration considered as part <strong>of</strong> national law. They have<br />
syn<strong>the</strong>sized <strong>the</strong> central point <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration that it holds <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Constitution and <strong>the</strong> laws in supremacy over <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, which is impermissible<br />
67 E.D. Brown, The International Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea: Vol. II Documents, Cases and Tables, 1994, pp. 101-102.<br />
68 Raphael Perpetuo M. Lotilla (ed.), The Philippine National Territory, 1995, pp. 542-543.<br />
69 Ibid., pp. 544-545.<br />
70 Ibid., 544-545.<br />
71 Ibid., pp. 547-548.<br />
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under international law. However, from <strong>the</strong> viewpoint <strong>of</strong> national law, <strong>the</strong><br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS in <strong>the</strong> Philippine jurisdiction entails derogation <strong>of</strong><br />
sovereignty and is in conflict with <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Consequently, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS is<br />
violative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Concurrence Resolution <strong>of</strong> which it is an<br />
integral part.<br />
4. Concluding Statement<br />
4.1. Philippine sovereignty resides in its own homeland. The Philippine State<br />
is a territorial entity and <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> its integrity, its territorial sovereignty, is<br />
<strong>the</strong> seat <strong>of</strong> fundamental principles in <strong>the</strong> legal system, international or national.<br />
Philippine sovereignty is co-extensive with <strong>the</strong> nation’s territorial limits toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with its recognized extraterritorial implications. In this sense, <strong>the</strong> legal and political<br />
function <strong>of</strong> those limits - or boundaries - is to determine to what extent <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
has <strong>the</strong> competence to express its sovereign authority and to protect its independence.<br />
Its boundaries are <strong>the</strong> frontier <strong>of</strong> its sovereignty.<br />
4.2. As determined by legal, political and historical factors discussed above,<br />
<strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine State had been established and settled long before <strong>the</strong><br />
advent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS. For so long, it had been recognized by <strong>the</strong> United States,<br />
Spain, Great Britain and, as pointed out in Philippine diplomatic representation to<br />
<strong>the</strong> international community, “<strong>the</strong>re was <strong>no</strong> protest from anyone against <strong>the</strong> exercise<br />
<strong>of</strong> such sovereignty.” As an independent State, <strong>the</strong> Philippines “continued to exercise<br />
sovereignty and jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> same territory, [and] <strong>the</strong>re has been likewise<br />
<strong>no</strong> protest by any State.” The definition <strong>of</strong> national territory had thus enjoyed <strong>the</strong><br />
acquiescence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> international community.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> circumstances, national territory so established had already become<br />
an embodiment <strong>of</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as a State, an integral part <strong>of</strong> its<br />
statehood. Any transformative change or reorganization <strong>of</strong> its territorial definition<br />
as provided in its fundamental law becomes a derogation <strong>of</strong> sovereignty and an<br />
outrage on its integrity as a State. For an international conference to be allowed to<br />
impact on national territory with such consequences is impermissible and <strong>no</strong> full<br />
powers <strong>of</strong> any legitimate plenitude granted to a diplomatic delegation for any stage<br />
<strong>of</strong> treaty-making can override <strong>the</strong> demands <strong>of</strong> territorial sovereignty as embodied in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
It is beyond legal comprehension that <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS be implemented in <strong>the</strong><br />
face <strong>of</strong> fundamental objections arising from <strong>the</strong> sovereignty and integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines as a State. The impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on <strong>the</strong> Philippines is <strong>no</strong>thing<br />
short <strong>of</strong> reorganizing its entire territorial regime, including <strong>the</strong> revision <strong>of</strong> its political<br />
boundaries, with <strong>the</strong> result that Philippines becomes unrecognizable as established<br />
under its constitutional system.<br />
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4.3. In regard to <strong>the</strong> Concurrence Resolution No. 121 pertaining to <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Declaration considered as its integral part, by virtue <strong>of</strong><br />
its conditional character it can<strong>no</strong>t be given effect under <strong>the</strong> treaty clause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1973<br />
Constitution, <strong>the</strong> fundamental law at <strong>the</strong> time. The concurrence requirement under<br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution must be related to <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> ratification embodied in <strong>the</strong> Instrument<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ratification signed by <strong>the</strong> President who transmitted it to <strong>the</strong> Batasang Pambansa<br />
under <strong>the</strong> 1973 Constitution (or to <strong>the</strong> Senate under <strong>the</strong> present Constitution),<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> treaty or convention in question, with <strong>the</strong> request for concurrence<br />
<strong>of</strong> such treaty. If <strong>the</strong> Batasan or <strong>the</strong> Senate expresses concurrence subject to certain<br />
conditions or reservations, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is failure <strong>of</strong> ratification as requested by <strong>the</strong><br />
President set forth in <strong>the</strong> Instrument <strong>of</strong> Ratification. The conditions which <strong>the</strong><br />
Batasan or <strong>the</strong> Senate stipulates would be sent back to <strong>the</strong> President, toge<strong>the</strong>r with<br />
such treaty, as its response to <strong>the</strong> President’s request for concurrence in his act <strong>of</strong><br />
ratification.<br />
These conditions would have <strong>the</strong> effect - if <strong>no</strong>t explicitly specified by <strong>the</strong> Batasan<br />
or <strong>the</strong> Senate - <strong>of</strong> a request to <strong>the</strong> President for him to renegotiate <strong>the</strong> treaty<br />
pursuant to such conditions, assuming that he would persist in <strong>the</strong> ratification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
treaty in compliance with <strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Batasan or <strong>the</strong> Senate. If he does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
act on <strong>the</strong> conditions indicated by <strong>the</strong> Batasan or <strong>the</strong> Senate, his Instrument <strong>of</strong><br />
Ratification would have <strong>no</strong> legal effect. Hence, <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides <strong>no</strong> room<br />
for conditional concurrence.<br />
It would be a separate problem to consider whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> treaty in question<br />
would satisfy <strong>the</strong> standard <strong>of</strong> constitutionality or validity set forth in <strong>the</strong> substantive<br />
content <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conditions set forth in <strong>the</strong> Declaration. As an integral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Concurrence Resolution, <strong>the</strong> Declaration sets <strong>the</strong>se standards, by which <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
is shown, as pointed out above, to be incompatible with <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Thus,<br />
based on Resolution No. 121 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Batasan to which <strong>the</strong> said Declaration is integrated,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is failure <strong>of</strong> ratification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS by reason <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfulfilled conditions<br />
which <strong>the</strong> Resolution and <strong>the</strong> Declaration require.<br />
Hence, Resolution No. 121 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Batasan by its own terms can<strong>no</strong>t be binding<br />
as an act <strong>of</strong> concurrence for <strong>the</strong> reason that <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS impairs <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong><br />
sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines under <strong>the</strong> Constitution and those under <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Paris and that it effects amendments to Philippine laws, contrary to <strong>the</strong> mandates <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Declaration as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said Resolution, which has <strong>the</strong> force <strong>of</strong> law in Philippine<br />
jurisdiction.<br />
4.4. Even on <strong>the</strong> assumption that as a treaty <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS becomes binding<br />
law by virtue <strong>of</strong> ratification based on valid concurrence by <strong>the</strong> Batasan, its<br />
implementation involving as it does <strong>the</strong> reorganization <strong>of</strong> Philippine territorial<br />
sovereignty is open to question under <strong>the</strong> international law <strong>of</strong> treaties. The subjectmatter<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS implementation is <strong>the</strong> territorial status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
which has been established and settled long before <strong>the</strong> negotiations for <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
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started in <strong>the</strong> Third UN Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea and much longer before<br />
<strong>the</strong> entry into force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on 16 November 1994.<br />
Thus, UNCLOS is to be accorded retroactive application, which customary<br />
international law does <strong>no</strong>t allow. As codified in <strong>the</strong> Vienna Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law<br />
<strong>of</strong> treaties <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Philippines is a party, <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>n-retroactivity rule provides<br />
that –<br />
Unless a different intention appears from <strong>the</strong> treaty or is o<strong>the</strong>rwise<br />
established, its provisions do <strong>no</strong>t bind a party in relation to any act or<br />
fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before <strong>the</strong><br />
date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entry into force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> treaty with respect to that party. 72<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong>re appears <strong>no</strong> intention to apply its provisions<br />
retroactively. Article 308 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS stipulates that it “shall enter into force<br />
12 months after <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> deposit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sixtieth instrument <strong>of</strong> ratification or<br />
accession,” which took place on 16 November 1994.<br />
Article 310 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS allows a State party to make declarations or<br />
statements with a view “to <strong>the</strong> harmonization <strong>of</strong> its laws and regulations with <strong>the</strong><br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> this Convention.” But this provision does <strong>no</strong>t intend to define an<br />
obligation; it pertains to a unilateral act or declaration <strong>of</strong> a state party which is left<br />
to its discretion to make.<br />
The UNCLOS also provides in Article 311(2) that –<br />
This Convention shall <strong>no</strong>t alter <strong>the</strong> rights and obligations <strong>of</strong> States Parties<br />
which arise from o<strong>the</strong>r agreements compatible with this Convention and<br />
which do <strong>no</strong>t affect <strong>the</strong> enjoyment by o<strong>the</strong>r States Parties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rights<br />
or <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir obligations under this Convention.<br />
This may imply that such rights and obligations arising from agreements o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS may be subject to alteration if <strong>no</strong>t compatible with <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
Under this provision may <strong>the</strong> definition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national territory as embodied in <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, toge<strong>the</strong>r with its companion international agreements, be altered to<br />
align <strong>the</strong> territorial rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines along <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS?<br />
Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as Article 311(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, given above, purports to have<br />
retroactive application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, its operation is to be deemed controlled by<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>n-retroactivity rule in Article 28 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong><br />
Treaties (1969), which applies to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong><br />
72 Article 28.<br />
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UNCLOS entered into force on <strong>the</strong> date after <strong>the</strong> entry into force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said Vienna<br />
Convention on 27 January 1980. 73<br />
Above all, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS can<strong>no</strong>t effectuate any alteration <strong>of</strong> international<br />
agreements defining <strong>the</strong> territorial sovereignty without derogation <strong>of</strong> state<br />
sovereignty. It is a basic principle <strong>of</strong> international law under <strong>the</strong> Charter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
United Nations as affirmed in <strong>the</strong> UN Declaration on Principles <strong>of</strong> International<br />
Law that all states enjoy sovereign equality. By this principle, each state has <strong>the</strong> duty<br />
to respect <strong>the</strong> personality <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states; <strong>the</strong> territorial integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state is<br />
inviolable. 74<br />
Having in mind this principle, any claim to an obligation under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
must be subject to <strong>the</strong> supremacy clause in Article 103 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN Charter which<br />
reads that –<br />
In <strong>the</strong> event <strong>of</strong> a conflict between <strong>the</strong> obligations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
United Nations under <strong>the</strong> present Charter and <strong>the</strong>ir obligations under<br />
any o<strong>the</strong>r international agreement, <strong>the</strong>ir obligations under <strong>the</strong> present<br />
Charter shall prevail.<br />
Reinforcing <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> its territorial sovereignty and integrity, precluding<br />
alteration <strong>of</strong> its territorial status by third-party settlement or intervention is <strong>the</strong><br />
effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine reservation to its acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> compulsory jurisdiction<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice (ICJ), referred to above. To repeat, its<br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ICJ’s jurisdiction does <strong>no</strong>t apply to any dispute “Arising out <strong>of</strong> or<br />
concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by <strong>the</strong> Philippines . . . [i]n<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, including its territorial<br />
seas and inland waters.”<br />
<br />
73 As a general rule, Article 4 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> Treaties (1969) provides that this<br />
Convention “applies only to treaties, which are concluded by States after <strong>the</strong> entry into force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present<br />
Convention with regard to such States.”<br />
74 This Declaration was adopted by <strong>the</strong> UN General Assembly as Resolution 2625 (XXV) on 24 October 1970.<br />
Its full title is Declaration on Principles <strong>of</strong> International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation<br />
Among States in Accordance with <strong>the</strong> Charter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations. It declares that <strong>the</strong> principles it embodies<br />
“constitute <strong>the</strong> basic principles <strong>of</strong> international law.” For text <strong>of</strong> Declaration, see Merlin M. Magallona,<br />
Fundamentals <strong>of</strong> Public International Law, 2005, pp. 843-858.<br />
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27
Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
The On-going National<br />
Territorial Debate:<br />
Issues and Perspectives*<br />
Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.**<br />
Introduction<br />
The national territorial debate in <strong>the</strong> Philippines had its resurgence during<br />
<strong>the</strong> first half <strong>of</strong> this year. While <strong>the</strong>re could be loud disagreements on what could<br />
have possibly triggered it, many would agree that <strong>the</strong> debate is simply a redux <strong>of</strong><br />
similar verbal and written tanglings on <strong>the</strong> subject in <strong>the</strong> past – like those that once<br />
transpired in <strong>the</strong> halls where <strong>the</strong> country’s constitutions were crafted, in <strong>the</strong> chambers<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislature where bills were dissected and treaties were scrutinized, in meeting<br />
rooms where negotiating positions were processed, in studies where speeches were<br />
assembled and decrees were written, and in journals and o<strong>the</strong>r relevant publications<br />
where issues and perspectives were expressed and clashed.<br />
Today, as was in many occasions before, <strong>the</strong> debate remains as passionate and<br />
as charged with patriotic fervor. For a subject as sensitive and as controversial as<br />
national territory, this is both understandable and expected. However and again like<br />
in <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>no</strong> early end looms. The issues remain complex and befuddled even as<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir respective manifold perspectives are <strong>no</strong>t being clearly set out. Hence, serious<br />
and stoic analyses for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> arriving at a desirable resolution that would<br />
serve <strong>the</strong> country’s best interests are never undertaken. And <strong>the</strong> debate continues.<br />
This is an attempt to present in brief <strong>the</strong> debate’s issues and perspectives.<br />
This is done in <strong>the</strong> fervent hope that when presented in proper and accurate context,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are made more percipient. Perhaps this could help in fermenting a collective<br />
realization that <strong>the</strong> country could <strong>no</strong>t ig<strong>no</strong>re <strong>the</strong>m much longer and must <strong>no</strong>w act<br />
and squarely address <strong>the</strong>m in order to end <strong>the</strong> debate, once and for all.<br />
* A lecture-presentation delivered during <strong>the</strong> IBP <strong>Journal</strong> Lecture Series on <strong>the</strong> “Spratly Islands: Impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS on <strong>the</strong> Territorial Integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and o<strong>the</strong>r Related Legal Issues” at <strong>the</strong> Malcolm<br />
Theater, U.P. College <strong>of</strong> Law, Diliman Quezon City, 29 May <strong>2008</strong>.<br />
** Atty. Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr., LL.M. in International Maritime Law (International Maritime Organization-<br />
International Maritime Law Institute, Malta) is a mid-level <strong>of</strong>ficer in <strong>the</strong> Philippine Foreign Service. He is<br />
currently <strong>the</strong> Acting Executive Director <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ocean Concerns Officers (OCO), Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs.<br />
He wrote and delivered this lecture in his private capacity. The views expressed are his alone, unless due<br />
attribution is made.<br />
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The On-going National Territorial Debate: Issues & Perspectives<br />
RP’s National Territory and its Peculiarities<br />
The Philippines is a mid-ocean archipelago 1 that is geo-strategically located in<br />
<strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Asia. Its 7,107 islands are surrounded by <strong>the</strong> Pacific Ocean<br />
on <strong>the</strong> East, <strong>the</strong> South China Sea on <strong>the</strong> West and North and <strong>the</strong> Celebes Sea on <strong>the</strong><br />
South. 62 <strong>of</strong> its 81 provinces have access to <strong>the</strong> sea and <strong>the</strong>ir aggregate coastline<br />
stretches to 36,289 km. It is at <strong>the</strong> crossroads <strong>of</strong> major international navigational<br />
routes. In fact, majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world’s tankers, super or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, that pass through<br />
<strong>the</strong> Straits <strong>of</strong> Malacca and Singapore and <strong>the</strong> Sunda and Lombok Straits <strong>of</strong> Indonesia,<br />
proceed to <strong>the</strong> South China Sea at its westside and onwards. Domestically, it itself<br />
plays host to five major straits ordinarily used for international navigation. 2<br />
Exploratory geological activities abound in its southwestern waters, which possess a<br />
high yield potential for oil and gas. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, it is re<strong>no</strong>wned as <strong>the</strong> “center <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
center <strong>of</strong> marine biodiversity” and is situated at <strong>the</strong> apex <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> so-called “Coral<br />
Triangle.”<br />
The national territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, which prides itself <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aforesaid<br />
unique geo-physical peculiarities, is defined in its 1987 Constitution as “comprises<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago” and “embraces islands, waters and all o<strong>the</strong>r territories<br />
over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.” It fur<strong>the</strong>r describes it as<br />
“consisting <strong>of</strong> terrestrial (including <strong>the</strong> seabed, <strong>the</strong> subsoil, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas), fluvial (including <strong>the</strong> territorial sea) and aerial domains.” 3<br />
Surveyors determine land and water areas on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> where <strong>the</strong>y start and<br />
end, which <strong>of</strong> course must be clearly identified and established. The determination<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terrestrial domain (land area) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines at 296,340 sq. km. 4 was surely<br />
done in this manner. Similar ease does <strong>no</strong>t obtain, however, in <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> fluvial and aerial areas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. While it is a fact that <strong>the</strong> measuring <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
expanse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s waters starts where its lands end, it is uncertain where this<br />
should end as <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ national territorial boundaries — <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong><br />
its territorial sea – is, to date, <strong>no</strong>t definite. Consequently, measuring <strong>the</strong> aerial domain<br />
upwards on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fluvial domain can<strong>no</strong>t be performed<br />
accurately.<br />
1 Geographically, archipelagos can be classified into two (2), namely: (a) continental or coastal; and (b) mid-ocean<br />
or outlying archipelagos. Coastal or continental archipelagos are those situated so close to <strong>the</strong> mainland that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y may be reasonably considered to be part and parcel <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, forming more or less an outer coast line. The<br />
Norwegian Skjaergaard and <strong>the</strong> Canadian Arctic Archipelago are prominent examples <strong>of</strong> coastal archipelagos.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, mid-ocean or outlying archipelagos are defined as groups <strong>of</strong> islands situated in <strong>the</strong> ocean at<br />
such a distance from <strong>the</strong> coasts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> firm land as to be considered as an independent whole ra<strong>the</strong>r than forming<br />
part <strong>of</strong> or outer coastline <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mainland. This type <strong>of</strong> archipelagos are fur<strong>the</strong>r divided on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> political<br />
status unto those forming <strong>the</strong> whole territory <strong>of</strong> states (i.e., archipelagic states) and mid-ocean archipelagos<br />
belong to continental states. Philippines and Indonesia exemplify mid-ocean archipelagic states, while Faeroe<br />
Islands typify a mid-ocean archipelago belonging to a continental state (Denmark). (Munavaar, Mohamed, cean<br />
States: Archipelagic Regimes in <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, Martinus Nijh<strong>of</strong>f Publishers, 1993, at 15 & 17.<br />
2 Those that traverse through Luzon Strait/Bashi/Balintang & Babuyan Channels; from <strong>the</strong> Verde Island Passage<br />
to <strong>the</strong> San Bernardi<strong>no</strong> Strait; Mindoro Strait-Basilan Pass/Sibutu Pass; Surigao Strait to Balabac Strait; and<br />
through <strong>the</strong> Balut Channel.<br />
3 Art. 1, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.<br />
4 Represents <strong>the</strong> aggregate <strong>of</strong> all surfaces delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines, excluding<br />
inland water bodies (lakes, reservoirs, rivers) (CIA Factbook).<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
Discernibly, <strong>the</strong> territorial boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago are <strong>no</strong>t<br />
found in <strong>the</strong> national territory provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution. While <strong>the</strong> provision<br />
<strong>of</strong>fers some kind <strong>of</strong> basis for its determination that is “over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
exercises sovereignty or jurisdiction,” it does <strong>no</strong>t clearly supply <strong>the</strong> particular<br />
geographical limits <strong>of</strong> this exercise <strong>of</strong> “sovereignty or jurisdiction.” In fact, its<br />
manifest <strong>no</strong>n-self-executing formulation, constricted by <strong>the</strong> practice <strong>of</strong> avoiding details<br />
(e.g., geographical limits <strong>of</strong> a State’s national territory) in crafting constitutions, yearns<br />
for <strong>the</strong> satiating <strong>of</strong> this inadequacy by relevant implementing legislation.<br />
Has <strong>the</strong> legal history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 110-year old Philippine Republic produced<br />
this legislation yet? Are <strong>the</strong>se laws, if any, sufficient to fill <strong>the</strong> need for definite<br />
national territorial boundaries? If <strong>the</strong>y are sufficient, how come to date <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
can<strong>no</strong>t still pinpoint with convincing accuracy and clarity its national territorial<br />
boundaries? What issues and concerns stall <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines’<br />
establishment <strong>of</strong> territorial boundaries with exactitude? How should and could <strong>the</strong>se<br />
be addressed?<br />
A careful survey <strong>of</strong> Philippine constitutional and statute law reveals that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is indeed existing legislation on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> national territorial boundaries<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines could be determined. Regrettably, however, <strong>the</strong>re are two (2) sets<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se laws, with <strong>the</strong> application and substance <strong>of</strong> one contradicting <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby, posing a question <strong>of</strong> precedence and preference in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> law and<br />
policy and <strong>the</strong>ir implementation. They are: (a) those that collectively posit that <strong>the</strong><br />
national territorial boundaries are <strong>the</strong> limits established by relevant international<br />
treaties; and (b) those that collectively prescribe that <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
national territory be determined after projecting <strong>the</strong> territorial sea in accordance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> United Nations Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea (UNCLOS) <strong>of</strong> 1982.<br />
Legal Moorings: RP’s International Treaty Limits (ITL)<br />
The Philippines has so-called “international treaty limits” that could serve as<br />
<strong>the</strong> metes and bounds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national territory. How did <strong>the</strong>se come about? The<br />
story straddles <strong>the</strong> entire length <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s history but is worth looking into<br />
again, albeit quickly, if one is to comprehend why <strong>the</strong> national territorial debate<br />
persists and remains perplexing.<br />
On 10 December 1898, as a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish-American War, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n<br />
newly-emergent world power, <strong>the</strong> United States, and <strong>the</strong> vanquished, Spain, entered<br />
into a treaty <strong>of</strong> peace, popularly k<strong>no</strong>wn in <strong>the</strong> annals <strong>of</strong> Philippine history as <strong>the</strong><br />
“Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris.” Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> treaty provided that for a sum <strong>of</strong> twenty million<br />
dollars ($20,000,000.00), which <strong>the</strong> US will pay Spain “within three months after<br />
<strong>the</strong> exchange <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ratifications,” “Spain cedes to <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>the</strong> archipelago<br />
k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands, and comprehending <strong>the</strong> islands lying”<br />
within a specific set <strong>of</strong> lines (Map No. 1 provided at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> article), described<br />
as follows:<br />
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The On-going National Territorial Debate: Issues & Perspectives<br />
A line running from west to east along or near <strong>the</strong> twentieth parallel <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>no</strong>rth latitude, and through <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> navigable channel <strong>of</strong> Bachi,<br />
from <strong>the</strong> one hundred and eighteenth (118 th ) to <strong>the</strong> one hundred and<br />
twenty seventh (127 th ) degrees meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude east <strong>of</strong> Greenwich,<br />
<strong>the</strong>nce along, <strong>the</strong> one hundred and twenty seventh (127 th ) degree meridian<br />
<strong>of</strong> longitude east <strong>of</strong> Greenwich to <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> four degree and forty<br />
five minutes (4Ú45’) <strong>no</strong>rth latitude, <strong>the</strong>nce along <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> four<br />
degrees and forty five minutes (4Ú45’) <strong>no</strong>rth latitude to its intersection<br />
with <strong>the</strong> meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and<br />
thirty five minutes (119Ú35’) east <strong>of</strong> Greenwich, <strong>the</strong>nce along, <strong>the</strong> meridian<br />
<strong>of</strong> longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes<br />
(119Ú35’) east <strong>of</strong> Greenwich to <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> latitude seven degrees and<br />
forty minutes (7Ú40’) <strong>no</strong>rth, <strong>the</strong>nce along <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> latitude seven<br />
degrees and forty minutes (7Ú40’) <strong>no</strong>rth to its intersection with <strong>the</strong> one<br />
hundred and sixteenth (116 th ) degree meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude east <strong>of</strong><br />
Greenwich, <strong>the</strong>nce by a direct line to <strong>the</strong> intersection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tenth (10 th )<br />
degree parallel <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>rth latitude with <strong>the</strong> one hundred and eighteenth<br />
(118 th ) degree meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude east <strong>of</strong> Greenwich, and <strong>the</strong>nce along<br />
<strong>the</strong> one hundred and eighteenth (118 th ) degree meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude east<br />
<strong>of</strong> Greenwich to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> beginning.”<br />
Subsequently, on 7 November 1900, in <strong>the</strong> sole article <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> US-Spain Treaty<br />
<strong>of</strong> Cession <strong>of</strong> Outlying Islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, Spain relinquished to <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States “all title and claim <strong>of</strong> title, which she may have had at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Peace <strong>of</strong> Paris, to any and all islands belonging to <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Archipelago, lying outside <strong>the</strong> lines described in Article III <strong>of</strong> that Treaty<br />
and particularly to <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> Cagayan, Sulu & Sibutu and <strong>the</strong>ir dependencies,<br />
and agrees that all such islands shall be comprehended in <strong>the</strong> cession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Archipelago as fully as if <strong>the</strong>y had been expressly included within those lines.” For<br />
this relinquishment, <strong>the</strong> United States paid Spain <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> One Hundred Thousand<br />
dollars ($100,000.00).<br />
Thirty years later, in Article III <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> US-UK Convention Delimiting <strong>the</strong><br />
Boundary Between <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago & <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> North Borneo 1930,<br />
<strong>the</strong> States parties agreed that “All <strong>the</strong> islands to <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>rth & east” <strong>of</strong> an agreed and<br />
declared line (described in Article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention) and “all islands and rocks<br />
traversed by <strong>the</strong> said line, should <strong>the</strong>re be any such, shall belong to <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Archipelago and all islands to <strong>the</strong> south and west <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said line shall belong to <strong>the</strong><br />
State <strong>of</strong> North Borneo.” The islands referred to here are <strong>the</strong> Turtle and Mangsee<br />
Islands.<br />
The aforementioned lines collectively referred to as ITL hereinafter<br />
(Map No. 1), were accordingly embodied in <strong>the</strong> legislation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> period, as follows:<br />
Sec.14. Territorial jurisdiction and extent <strong>of</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> Philippine<br />
government. – The territory over which <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
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Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
Islands exercises jurisdiction consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire Philippine Archipelago<br />
and is comprised in <strong>the</strong> limits defined by <strong>the</strong> treaties between <strong>the</strong><br />
United States and Spain, respectively signed in <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Paris on <strong>the</strong><br />
tenth day <strong>of</strong> December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; and in <strong>the</strong><br />
city <strong>of</strong> Washington on <strong>the</strong> seventh day <strong>of</strong> November, one thousand nine<br />
hundred. 5 ; and<br />
Sec. 16. Territorial jurisdiction and extent <strong>of</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> Philippine<br />
government. - The territory over which <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Islands exercises jurisdiction consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire Philippine Archipelago<br />
and is comprised in <strong>the</strong> limits defined by <strong>the</strong> treaties between <strong>the</strong><br />
United States and Spain, respectively signed in <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Paris on<br />
<strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong> December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; and in <strong>the</strong><br />
city <strong>of</strong> Washington on <strong>the</strong> seventh day <strong>of</strong> November, one thousand nine<br />
hundred. 6<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Commonwealth, <strong>the</strong> territory<br />
comprised in <strong>the</strong> Philippines Islands was described as that which:<br />
“comprises all <strong>the</strong> territory ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States by <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Paris concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain on <strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong><br />
December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, <strong>the</strong> limits which are set<br />
forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> said treaty, toge<strong>the</strong>r with all <strong>the</strong> islands embraced<br />
in <strong>the</strong> treaty concluded at Washington between <strong>the</strong> United States and<br />
Spain on <strong>the</strong> seventh day <strong>of</strong> November, nineteen hundred, and <strong>the</strong> treaty<br />
concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Great Britain on <strong>the</strong> second<br />
day <strong>of</strong> January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which<br />
<strong>the</strong> present Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.” 7<br />
In 1961, <strong>the</strong> Congress enacted Republic Act No. 3046, which described <strong>the</strong><br />
national territory in its preamble as follows:<br />
WHEREAS, <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines describes <strong>the</strong> national<br />
territory as comprising all <strong>the</strong> territory ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States by <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain on<br />
December 10, 1898, <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> which are set forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> said<br />
treaty, toge<strong>the</strong>r with all <strong>the</strong> islands embraced in <strong>the</strong> treaty concluded at<br />
Washington, between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain on November 7, 1990,<br />
and in <strong>the</strong> treaty concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Great Britain<br />
on January 2, 1930 and all <strong>the</strong> territory over which <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands exercised jurisdiction at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adoption<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution;<br />
5 Art. IV, Act No. 2657 (Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1916).<br />
6 Art. IV, Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1917).<br />
7 Art. I (National Territory), Sec. 1.<br />
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WHEREAS, all <strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> limits set forth in <strong>the</strong> abovementioned<br />
treaties have always been regarded as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands;<br />
x x x<br />
WHEREAS, all <strong>the</strong> waters beyond <strong>the</strong> outermost islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago<br />
but within <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> boundaries set forth in <strong>the</strong> aforementioned<br />
treaties comprise <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.”<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1973 Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ first constitution after it was granted<br />
independent by <strong>the</strong> Americans in 1946, <strong>the</strong> national territory was described to<br />
comprise “<strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, with all <strong>the</strong> islands and waters embraced <strong>the</strong>rein,<br />
and all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r territories belonging to <strong>the</strong> Philippines by historic or legal title, including<br />
<strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> air space, <strong>the</strong> subsoil, <strong>the</strong> sea-bed, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves, and <strong>the</strong><br />
submarine areas over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. x x x.” 8<br />
The phrase “by historic and legal title” embraced <strong>the</strong> three (3) treaties enumerated<br />
in Article I, Section 1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution.<br />
Thereafter, <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution did away with <strong>the</strong> phrase “by historic and<br />
legal title” and substituted it with “over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or<br />
jurisdiction,” to wit:<br />
“The national territory comprises <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, with all <strong>the</strong><br />
islands and waters embraced <strong>the</strong>rein, and all o<strong>the</strong>r territories over which<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting <strong>of</strong> its terrestrial,<br />
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> seabed, <strong>the</strong><br />
subsoil, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves, and o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas.” 9<br />
Indirectly, however, <strong>the</strong> three (3) treaties remained encompassed in <strong>the</strong> later<br />
phrase. The records <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proceedings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Commission that drafted<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution would attest to this.<br />
Legal Moorings: UNCLOS-based Territorial Limits (UTL)<br />
On 10 December 1982, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS was opened for signature in Montego<br />
Bay, Jamaica and <strong>the</strong> Philippines was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first countries to sign it. Simultaneous<br />
with its signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention, <strong>the</strong> Philippines submitted a Declaration, <strong>the</strong><br />
salient paragraphs <strong>of</strong> which are as follows:<br />
The Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines hereby manifests that in<br />
signing <strong>the</strong> 1982 United Nations Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, it does so with<br />
8 Art. I (National Territory), Sec. 1.<br />
9 Art. I (National Territory), Sec. 1.<br />
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Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
<strong>the</strong> understandings embodied in this declaration, made under <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> Article<br />
10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention, to wit:<br />
1. The signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention by <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines shall <strong>no</strong>t in any manner impair or prejudice <strong>the</strong><br />
sovereign rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines under and arising<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines;<br />
2. Such signing shall <strong>no</strong>t in any manner affect <strong>the</strong> sovereign rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as successor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong><br />
America, under and arising out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris between Spain<br />
and <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America <strong>of</strong> December 10, 1898 and <strong>the</strong> Treaty<br />
<strong>of</strong> Washington between <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America and Great Britain<br />
<strong>of</strong> January 2, 1930;<br />
3. Such signing shall <strong>no</strong>t diminish or in any manner affect <strong>the</strong> rights and<br />
obligations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contracting parties under <strong>the</strong> Mutual Defense Treaty<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> America <strong>of</strong> August<br />
30, 1951, and its related interpretative instrument; <strong>no</strong>r those under<br />
any o<strong>the</strong>r pertinent bilateral or multilateral treaty or agreement to<br />
which <strong>the</strong> Philippines is a party;<br />
4. Such signing shall <strong>no</strong>t in any manner impair or prejudice <strong>the</strong><br />
sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines over any territory over<br />
which it exercises sovereign authority, such as <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Islands,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> waters appurtenant <strong>the</strong>reto;<br />
5. The Convention shall <strong>no</strong>t be construed as amending in any manner<br />
any pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines; <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines maintains and reserves <strong>the</strong> right and authority to make<br />
any amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution;<br />
6. The provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention on archipelagic passage through<br />
sea lanes do <strong>no</strong>t nullify or impair <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
as an archipelagic state over <strong>the</strong> sea lanes and do <strong>no</strong>t deprive it <strong>of</strong><br />
authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence,<br />
and security;<br />
7. The concept <strong>of</strong> archipelagic waters is similar to <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> internal<br />
waters under <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, and removes straits<br />
connecting <strong>the</strong>se waters with <strong>the</strong> eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone or high sea from <strong>the</strong><br />
rights <strong>of</strong> foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation;<br />
8. The agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines to <strong>the</strong> submission<br />
for peaceful resolution under any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> procedures provided in <strong>the</strong><br />
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Convention, <strong>of</strong> disputes under Article 298 shall <strong>no</strong>t be considered as<br />
a derogation <strong>of</strong> Philippine sovereignty.” 10<br />
Subsequently, <strong>the</strong> Batasan Pambansa ratified <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS in Resolution No.<br />
121 dated 27 February 1984, which was eventually submitted to and entered into<br />
<strong>the</strong> records <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations on 8 May 1984, to wit:<br />
WHEREAS, pursuant to paragraph (1), Section 14, Article Viii <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea shall be valid and<br />
effective if concurred in by a majority <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Batasan<br />
Pambansa: Now, <strong>the</strong>refore, be it –<br />
Resolved by <strong>the</strong> Batasan Pambansa, to concur, as it hereby concurs, in<br />
<strong>the</strong> United Nations Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea entered into and<br />
signed by <strong>the</strong> Representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines on<br />
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica, with <strong>the</strong> understandings<br />
embodied in <strong>the</strong> Declaration filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines by <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine delegation when he signed <strong>the</strong><br />
said Convention, copy <strong>of</strong> which is attached as “Annex A.” 11<br />
The UNCLOS finally entered into force on 16 November 1994.<br />
Significantly for <strong>the</strong> Philippines, <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS contained Part IV which provides<br />
for a regime <strong>of</strong> “Archipelagic States”. This came after almost three (3) decades <strong>of</strong><br />
dogged campaign by <strong>the</strong> Philippines, toge<strong>the</strong>r with o<strong>the</strong>r countries archipelago<br />
like Indonesia, to have <strong>the</strong> so-called “archipelagic doctrine” recognized in international<br />
law.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, an archipelago is defined as “a group <strong>of</strong> islands, including<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> islands, interconnecting waters and o<strong>the</strong>r natural features which are so<br />
closely interrelated that such islands, waters and o<strong>the</strong>r natural features form an<br />
intrinsic geographical, eco<strong>no</strong>mic and political entity, or which historically have been<br />
regarded as such.” 12 Correlatively, an archipelagic State is defined as “a State constituted<br />
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include o<strong>the</strong>r islands.” 13<br />
As an archipelagic State, <strong>the</strong> Philippines may draw archipelagic baselines in<br />
accordance with UNCLOS prescriptions, as follows:<br />
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining<br />
<strong>the</strong> outermost points <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outermost islands and drying reefs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
10 Lotilla, R.P.M. (ed.), The Philippine National Territory: A Collection <strong>of</strong> Related Documents, Institute <strong>of</strong><br />
International Legal Studies at 510-511 citing as source ‘Focus: The Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea’, D-1, Philippine Y.B. Int’l. L, <strong>Volume</strong>. VII (1982).<br />
11 Batas Pambansa, Acts & Resolutions, 6th Regular Session.<br />
12 Art. 46, Part IV, UNCLOS.<br />
13 Ibid.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
35
Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
archipelago provided that within such baselines are included <strong>the</strong> main<br />
islands and an area in which <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> water to<br />
<strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and<br />
9 to 1.<br />
2. The length <strong>of</strong> such baselines shall <strong>no</strong>t exceed 100 nautical miles,<br />
except that up to 3 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> baselines<br />
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a<br />
maximum length <strong>of</strong> 125 nautical miles.<br />
3. The drawing <strong>of</strong> such baselines shall <strong>no</strong>t depart to any appreciable<br />
extent from <strong>the</strong> general configuration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago.<br />
4. Such baselines shall <strong>no</strong>t be drawn to and from low-tide<br />
elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which<br />
are permanently above sea level have been built on <strong>the</strong>m or<br />
where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance<br />
<strong>no</strong>t exceeding <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea from <strong>the</strong> nearest island.<br />
5. The system <strong>of</strong> such baselines shall <strong>no</strong>t be applied by an archipelagic<br />
State in such a manner as to cut <strong>of</strong>f from <strong>the</strong> high seas or <strong>the</strong> exclusive<br />
eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r State.<br />
6. If a part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelagic waters <strong>of</strong> an archipelagic State lies between<br />
two parts <strong>of</strong> an immediately adjacent neighboring State, existing rights<br />
and all o<strong>the</strong>r legitimate interests which <strong>the</strong> latter State has traditionally<br />
exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between<br />
those States shall continue and be respected.<br />
7. For <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> computing <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> water to land under<br />
paragraph l, land areas may include waters lying within <strong>the</strong> fringing<br />
reefs <strong>of</strong> islands and atolls, including that part <strong>of</strong> a steep-sided oceanic<br />
plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain <strong>of</strong> limestone<br />
islands and drying reefs lying on <strong>the</strong> perimeter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plateau.<br />
8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown on<br />
charts <strong>of</strong> a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining <strong>the</strong>ir position.<br />
Alternatively, lists <strong>of</strong> geographical coordinates <strong>of</strong> points, specifying <strong>the</strong> geodetic<br />
datum, may be substituted. 14<br />
From its archipelagic baselines, <strong>the</strong> Philippines is allowed to project its various<br />
maritime zones such as <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone<br />
14 Art. 47, UNCLOS.<br />
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(EEZ) and continental shelves in breadths allowed by <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS for coastal<br />
states. 15 The territorial sea is up to a limit <strong>no</strong>t exceeding 12 nautical miles. 16 The<br />
contiguous zone may <strong>no</strong>t extend beyond 24 nautical miles. 17 The EEZ may <strong>no</strong>t extend<br />
beyond 200 nautical miles. 18 The juridical/legal continental shelf is coextensive with<br />
<strong>the</strong> EEZ or <strong>no</strong>t exceeding 200 nautical miles, while <strong>the</strong> extended continental shelf<br />
(ECS) could extend beyond 200 nautical miles but <strong>no</strong>t more than 350 nautical miles<br />
after <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> Art. 76 are met. 19<br />
Thenceforth, <strong>the</strong> domestic airspace (subject to <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> overflight) could be<br />
projected upwards over <strong>the</strong> country’s land territory, internal waters, archipelagic<br />
waters (Art.49 (2)) and territorial sea (Art.2). The airspace over zones beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
territorial sea is international. (Map No. 2 at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> article)<br />
Hence, pursuant to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> an archipelagic State would<br />
embrace <strong>the</strong> following: (a) its land territory and internal waters; (b) its archipelagic<br />
waters and territorial sea as well as <strong>the</strong>ir bed and subsoil; and (c) its domestic airspace.<br />
The boundaries <strong>of</strong> this territory would be <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
sea projected from its archipelagic baselines 20 although maritime zones, like<br />
<strong>the</strong> contiguous zone, EEZ and <strong>the</strong> continental shelves, extend beyond it. 21<br />
(Map No. 3 at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> article)<br />
15 Art. 48, UNCLOS.<br />
16 Art. 3, UNCLOS.<br />
17 Art. <strong>33</strong>, UNCLOS. See also P.D. 1599 (1978) and Sec. 4, par. 18, R.A. 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code <strong>of</strong> 1998).<br />
18 Art. 57, UNCLOS.<br />
19 Art. 76, UNCLOS.<br />
20 Art. 4, UNCLOS.<br />
21 It is worth adding that all waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines or “Philippine waters” is <strong>no</strong>w broadly defined as including<br />
“all bodies <strong>of</strong> water within <strong>the</strong> Philippine territory such as lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, brooks, ponds, swamps,<br />
lagoons, gulfs, bays and seas and o<strong>the</strong>r bodies <strong>of</strong> water <strong>no</strong>w existing or which may hereafter exist in <strong>the</strong><br />
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays and <strong>the</strong> waters around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> archipelago regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir breadth and dimensions, <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> sea beds, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves<br />
and all o<strong>the</strong>r waters over which <strong>the</strong> Philippine has sovereignty and jurisdiction, including <strong>the</strong> 200-nautical miles<br />
exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone and <strong>the</strong> continental shelf.” (Sec. 4, RA No. 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code <strong>of</strong> 1998)).<br />
Previously, “Philippine waters” was limitedly defined in Art. II, Sec. 6, Act No. 4003 (Fish & O<strong>the</strong>r Aquatic<br />
Resources Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands <strong>of</strong> 1932) as including “all waters pertaining to <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago,<br />
as defined in <strong>the</strong> treaties between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain, dated respectively <strong>the</strong> tenth <strong>of</strong> December,<br />
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and <strong>the</strong> seventh <strong>of</strong> November, nineteen hundred” and in Sec. 3(r), P.D. No.<br />
704 (Revised Fisheries Code <strong>of</strong> 1975) as including “all bodies <strong>of</strong> water within Philippine territory, such as rivers,<br />
streams, creeks, brooks, ponds, swamps, lagoons, gulfs, bays, and seas and o<strong>the</strong>r bodies <strong>of</strong> water <strong>no</strong>w existing,<br />
or which may hereafter exist in <strong>the</strong> provinces, cities and municipalities, municipal districts, and barrios; and <strong>the</strong><br />
sea or fresh water around between and connecting each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, irrespective<br />
<strong>of</strong> its depth, breadth, length and dimension, and all o<strong>the</strong>r waters belonging to <strong>the</strong> Philippines by historic or legal<br />
title including <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> seabed, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves and o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas over which <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.”<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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UNCLOS Minimum Expectations<br />
Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
As a party to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, an archipelagic State is accorded specific rights<br />
within each maritime zone projected from its baselines.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> archipelagic State exercises its full sovereignty. 22<br />
This includes <strong>the</strong> right to enforce laws and exercise <strong>of</strong> police control and <strong>the</strong> right to<br />
exercise criminal 23 and civil 24 jurisdiction among o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> contiguous zone, adjacent to <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> archipelagic State<br />
may exercise <strong>the</strong> control necessary to prevent or punish infringement <strong>of</strong> its customs,<br />
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations committed within its territory<br />
or territorial sea. 25<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, in <strong>the</strong> EEZ, <strong>the</strong> archipelagic State has sovereign rights for <strong>the</strong> purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing <strong>the</strong> natural resources, whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
living or <strong>no</strong>n-living, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> waters superjacent to <strong>the</strong> seabed and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seabed and its<br />
subsoil, 26 and with regard to o<strong>the</strong>r activities for <strong>the</strong> eco<strong>no</strong>mic exploitation and<br />
exploration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> zone, such as <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong> energy from <strong>the</strong> water, currents<br />
and winds. 27 And it has jurisdiction with regard to <strong>the</strong> establishment and use <strong>of</strong><br />
artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and <strong>the</strong><br />
protection and preservation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> marine environment. 28<br />
As regards both <strong>the</strong> contiguous zone and <strong>the</strong> EEZ, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has even<br />
gone far<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS by declaring that:<br />
All submerged lands within <strong>the</strong> contiguous zone and in <strong>the</strong> exclusive<br />
eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines are hereby declared to be mineral<br />
reservations. 29<br />
In <strong>the</strong> continental shelves, juridical or extended, <strong>the</strong> archipelagic State has<br />
sovereign rights for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> exploring and exploiting <strong>the</strong> mineral and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>no</strong>n-living resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seabed and subsoil toge<strong>the</strong>r with living organisms<br />
22 Art. 2(1) & Art. 49, UNCLOS.<br />
23 Art. 27, UNCLOS.<br />
24 Art. 28, UNCLOS.<br />
25 Art. <strong>33</strong>, UNCLOS.<br />
26 This (toge<strong>the</strong>r with Art. 77, UNCLOS) provides legal basis for making <strong>the</strong> Philippine Fisheries Code <strong>of</strong> 1998<br />
(RA 8550) enforceable in <strong>the</strong> EEZ and <strong>the</strong> continental shelf. (Sec. 3(a), RA 8550)<br />
27 Art. 56, UNCLOS.<br />
28 Art. 56, UNCLOS.<br />
29 Sec. 5, R.A. No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act <strong>of</strong> 1995). In <strong>the</strong> same law, “mineral reservations” would be those<br />
areas that <strong>the</strong> President may establish when <strong>the</strong> national interest so requires, such as when <strong>the</strong>re is a need to<br />
preserve strategic raw materials for industries critical to national development, or certain minerals for scientific,<br />
cultural or ecological value.<br />
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belonging to sedentary species. 30 The rights are exclusive in <strong>the</strong> sense that if <strong>the</strong><br />
coastal State does <strong>no</strong>t explore <strong>the</strong> continental shelf or exploit its natural resources,<br />
<strong>no</strong> one may undertake <strong>the</strong>se activities without <strong>the</strong> express consent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> coastal<br />
State. The rights do <strong>no</strong>t depend on occupation, effective or <strong>no</strong>tional, or on any<br />
express proclamation. 31<br />
Correspondingly, an archipelagic State has <strong>the</strong> obligation to respect <strong>the</strong> rights<br />
<strong>of</strong> ships belonging to third States to pass through its territorial sea, archipelagic and<br />
internal waters in accordance with UNCLOS prescriptions (i.e., right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent<br />
passage, 32 right <strong>of</strong> transit passage through straits <strong>no</strong>rmally used for international<br />
navigation <strong>33</strong> and archipelagic sealanes passage, 34 as may be applicable). On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hand, its domestic airspace is subject to <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> overflight <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r States. 35<br />
In <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its rights and in meeting its obligations, an archipelagic<br />
State Party to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS must necessarily meet certain expectations, one <strong>of</strong><br />
which, as succinctly put by <strong>the</strong> UN Secretary General in 1994, is <strong>the</strong> “development<br />
<strong>of</strong> a comprehensive and coordinated national oceans policy” 36 and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
being that:<br />
“3. At <strong>the</strong> very minimum, all coastal States parties should by <strong>no</strong>w have<br />
established in accordance with <strong>the</strong> Convention <strong>the</strong> baselines<br />
and <strong>the</strong> maritime zones <strong>the</strong>y wish to claim and have deposited with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Secretary-General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations charts or lists <strong>of</strong> geographical<br />
coordinates showing <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> maritime zones to which <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
entitled.” 37<br />
RP’s UNCLOS Task List<br />
Observably, almost a quarter <strong>of</strong> a century from its ratification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
in 1984, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has yet to meet <strong>the</strong> expressed “minimum expectation” <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Convention pro<strong>no</strong>unced by <strong>the</strong> UN Secretary General. To this time, <strong>the</strong> country<br />
still has to draw its archipelagic baselines and still has to accurately project and<br />
30 Organisms which, at <strong>the</strong> harvestable stage, ei<strong>the</strong>r are immobile on or under <strong>the</strong> seabed or are unable to move<br />
except in constant physical contact with <strong>the</strong> seabed or <strong>the</strong> subsoil (Art. 77(4), UNCLOS).<br />
31 Art. 77, UNCLOS.<br />
32 Art. 52(1), subject to Art. 53 and without prejudice to Art. 50, UNCLOS (in<strong>no</strong>cent passage through archipelagic<br />
waters) in accordance with Part II, Sec. 3 (Arts. 17-21), UNCLOS (in<strong>no</strong>cent passage in <strong>the</strong> territorial sea).<br />
<strong>33</strong> Art. 53(12), UNCLOS.<br />
34 Art. 53 in relation to Arts. 39, 40, 42 & 44, UNCLOS.<br />
35 Art. 53(2), (3) & (12) in relation to Arts. 39, 42 & 44, UNCLOS.<br />
36 Report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN Secretary General, A/59/62, 04 March 2004, p.5.<br />
37 Ibid, p.5.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
establish its seaward maritime zones from it. 38 In addition, it has yet to lay claim to<br />
an ECS and is undecided on whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t to adopt an archipelagic passage regime.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it still has to delimit its common maritime boundary with its<br />
neighboring States, even as it has <strong>no</strong>t considered opting for a mode <strong>of</strong> settling<br />
UNCLOS disputes.<br />
It does <strong>no</strong>t matter whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> foregoing shortfalls in meeting UNCLOS<br />
expectations, particularly <strong>the</strong> drawing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines and <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong><br />
maritime zones is attributable to ei<strong>the</strong>r lack <strong>of</strong> political decisiveness or simply<br />
unbridled indifference. What matters is for as long as <strong>the</strong> metes and bounds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
national territory remain uncertain, <strong>the</strong> spectre <strong>of</strong> multifarious problems on national<br />
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security will persist on haunting <strong>the</strong><br />
country.<br />
It is, thus, imperative to muster sufficient conviction to resolve this quandary.<br />
In this regard, it is necessary that <strong>the</strong> following principal issues, which have emerged<br />
from <strong>the</strong> national territorial debate, be categorically addressed: (a) Are RP’s ITL its<br />
national territorial boundaries?; (b) Is RP an archipelagic State yet?; (c) Is <strong>the</strong>re a<br />
deadline for <strong>the</strong> Philippines to draw its archipelagic baselines?; (d) How should RP<br />
treat its landward waters if <strong>the</strong> archipelagic baselines are eventually drawn?; (e) How<br />
should RP treat its disputed territories when drawing its archipelagic baselines?;<br />
and, finally, (f) What should be RP’s national territorial limits – <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> territorial sea reckoned from UNCLOS-prescribed baselines or <strong>the</strong> ITL?<br />
Are RP’s ITL its national territorial boundaries?<br />
Those who <strong>of</strong>fer a negative answer to this question explain that <strong>the</strong> ITL can<strong>no</strong>t<br />
be <strong>the</strong> country’s national territorial boundaries because <strong>the</strong> three (3) treaties earlier<br />
cited merely mentioned <strong>the</strong> ceding by Spain to <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> “islands,” 39<br />
“islands <strong>of</strong> Cagayan, Sulu & Sibutu” 40 and all “<strong>the</strong> islands to <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>rth & east” and<br />
38 (a) To date, <strong>the</strong> Philippines still has to enact legislation establishing a 12 nautical mile territorial sea;<br />
(b) The country also does <strong>no</strong>t have a law establishing a contiguous zone for <strong>the</strong> purposes enumerated in Article<br />
<strong>33</strong>, UNCLOS although it has legislation that defines <strong>the</strong> “contiguous zone” as referring to water, sea bottom and<br />
substratum measured twenty-four nautical miles (24 n.m.) seaward from <strong>the</strong> base line <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago.<br />
(Section 3. Definition <strong>of</strong> Terms, R.A. No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act <strong>of</strong> 1995)); (c) It has “established a zone<br />
to be k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines x x x (which) shall extend to a distance <strong>of</strong> two<br />
hundred nautical miles beyond and from <strong>the</strong> baselines from which <strong>the</strong> territorial sea is measured x x x.” (Sec.<br />
1, P.D. No. 1599 (1978)); (d) The country claims state ownership <strong>of</strong>, “All natural deposits or occurrences <strong>of</strong><br />
petroleum or natural gas in public and/or private lands in <strong>the</strong> Philippines, whe<strong>the</strong>r found in , on or under <strong>the</strong><br />
surface <strong>of</strong> dry lands, creeks, rivers, lakes, or o<strong>the</strong>r submerged lands within <strong>the</strong> territorial waters or on <strong>the</strong><br />
continental shelf or its analogue in an archipelago, seaward from <strong>the</strong> shores <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines which are <strong>no</strong>t<br />
within <strong>the</strong> territories <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries”. (R.A. No. 387 (Petroleum Act <strong>of</strong> 1949)) It has also declared as subject<br />
to its jurisdiction and control all mineral and o<strong>the</strong>r natural resources in <strong>the</strong> continental shelf <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
(Presidential Proclamation No. 370, 20 March 1968) Of <strong>the</strong> laws mentioned herein, only Proclamation No.<br />
370 and P.D. No. 1599 had been reported to <strong>the</strong> United Nations in accordance with <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
39 Art. III, Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris, 10 December 1898.<br />
40 US-Spain Treaty <strong>of</strong> Cession <strong>of</strong> Outlying Islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, 7 November 1900.<br />
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“all islands and rocks traversed” 41 and <strong>no</strong>t <strong>of</strong> waters. To <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> ITL simply<br />
served as an identifier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> geographical space within which <strong>the</strong> mentioned “islands”<br />
are located or could be found.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> proponents <strong>of</strong> an affirmative response aver that, while<br />
it may be true that <strong>the</strong> treaties were so worded to <strong>the</strong> effect that <strong>the</strong> cessions being<br />
made only involved “islands” and <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> waters around, between and connecting<br />
<strong>the</strong>m, public laws enacted during <strong>the</strong> American colonial period and <strong>the</strong>reafter<br />
categorically referred to <strong>the</strong> ITL as “boundaries”. To <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> cessions contemplated<br />
<strong>no</strong>t only <strong>the</strong> islands but also <strong>the</strong> waters within <strong>the</strong> ITL. Hence, <strong>the</strong> ITL are<br />
boundaries in a sense.<br />
Indeed, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> preambulatory paragraphs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Auto<strong>no</strong>my<br />
Act or <strong>the</strong> Jones Law (1916) provides that: “<strong>the</strong> name ‘The Philippines’ as used in<br />
this Act shall apply to and include <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
Government by <strong>the</strong> treaty <strong>of</strong> peace concluded between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain<br />
on <strong>the</strong> eleventh day <strong>of</strong> April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong><br />
which are set forth in Article III <strong>of</strong> said treaty, toge<strong>the</strong>r with those islands embraced in <strong>the</strong><br />
treaty between Spain and <strong>the</strong> United States concluded at Washington on <strong>the</strong> seventh<br />
day <strong>of</strong> November, nineteen hundred.” 42<br />
The Hare-Hawes Cutting Act (19<strong>33</strong>) followed suit by declaring that <strong>the</strong><br />
government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commonwealth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands that was to be established<br />
“x x x shall exercise jurisdiction over all territory ceded to <strong>the</strong> United States and<br />
Spain on <strong>the</strong> 10 th day <strong>of</strong> December 1898, <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> which are set forth in Article<br />
III <strong>of</strong> said treaty, toge<strong>the</strong>r with those islands embraced in <strong>the</strong> treaty between Spain<br />
and <strong>the</strong> United States concluded at Washington on <strong>the</strong> 7 th day <strong>of</strong> November 1900.” 43<br />
A year later, <strong>the</strong> Philippine Independence Act or <strong>the</strong> Tydings-McDuffie Act<br />
(1934) contained a provision that echoed verbatim <strong>the</strong> provision in <strong>the</strong> Hare-Hawes<br />
Cutting Act mentioned in <strong>the</strong> paragraph preceding. 44<br />
It is <strong>no</strong>teworthy, however, that <strong>the</strong> United States has consistently opposed <strong>the</strong><br />
aforesaid view saying that:<br />
41 Art. III, US-UK Convention Delimiting <strong>the</strong> Boundary between <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago & <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> North<br />
Borneo (1930).<br />
42 Preamble, Chapter 416, Public Law No. 240 (An Act to Declare <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> People <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
as to <strong>the</strong> Future Political Status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> People <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Auto<strong>no</strong>mous<br />
Government for those Islands).<br />
43 Sec.1, Public Law No. 311 (An Act to Enable <strong>the</strong> People <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands to Adopt a Constitution and<br />
form a Government for <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands, To Provide for <strong>the</strong> Independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same, and For O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Purposes).<br />
44 Sec. 1, Public Law No. 127 (An Act to Provide for <strong>the</strong> Complete Independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands, to<br />
Provide for <strong>the</strong> Adoption <strong>of</strong> a Constitution and A Form <strong>of</strong> Government for <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands, and for O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Purposes).<br />
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“The United States’ attitude x x x is that <strong>the</strong> lines referred to in bilateral<br />
treaties between <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom and Spain<br />
merely delimited <strong>the</strong> area within which <strong>the</strong> land areas belong to <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines and that <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>no</strong>t intended as boundary lines.<br />
The United States, in 1958, stated that it recognized only a 3-mile territorial<br />
sea for each island.” 45<br />
Objecting in seriatim to <strong>the</strong> various points raised in <strong>the</strong> Philippine’s Declaration<br />
upon signing <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on 10 December 1982, <strong>the</strong> United States, fur<strong>the</strong>r, had<br />
<strong>no</strong>ted that:<br />
“<strong>the</strong> understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
that its signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1982 Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea Convention does <strong>no</strong>t affect its<br />
sovereign rights as successor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States to <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1898 and <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Washington <strong>of</strong> 1930, as <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines is aware, <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t share its view concerning <strong>the</strong> proper interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> those treaties. As <strong>the</strong>y relate to <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
in <strong>the</strong> waters surrounding <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands. The Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
United States continues to be <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that nei<strong>the</strong>r those treaties<br />
<strong>no</strong>r subsequent practice has conferred upon <strong>the</strong> United States, <strong>no</strong>r upon<br />
<strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines as successor to <strong>the</strong> United States, greater<br />
rights in <strong>the</strong> waters surrounding <strong>the</strong> Philippine Islands than are o<strong>the</strong>rwise<br />
recognized in customary international law. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States wishes to point out that nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Mutual Defense<br />
Treaty between <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong> August 30, 1951,<br />
<strong>no</strong>r any related instrument, constitutes recognition by <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
<strong>of</strong> greater rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines in such waters than are o<strong>the</strong>rwise<br />
recognized in customary international law.” 46<br />
It is additionally significant that <strong>the</strong> 3 rd Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea<br />
(UNCLOS III), which reached agreement on <strong>the</strong> final version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, has<br />
categorically and definitively rejected <strong>the</strong> Philippine position to treat <strong>the</strong> waters<br />
within its ITL as its historical territorial waters and an exception to <strong>the</strong> 12 nautical<br />
mile rule on <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. This act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS III, in effect, turned down<br />
Philippines’ proposition that its ITL be treated as its national territorial boundaries.<br />
The best evidence <strong>of</strong> this rejection is <strong>the</strong> seething disappointment exuded in <strong>the</strong><br />
statement <strong>of</strong> Senator Arturo M. Tolenti<strong>no</strong>, Head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Delegation, during<br />
<strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS that:<br />
“Mr. President, we are happy that we have reached <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial conclusion<br />
<strong>of</strong> our labors. In utmost candor, however, I must say that my government<br />
45 Lotilla, <strong>no</strong>. 5 above at 274-275 citing (4 January 1958): 2nd Conference on LOS: Summary Record, 17 March-<br />
26 April, 1960; A/CONF. 19/8 pp.22.<br />
46 Ibid at 546.<br />
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and my delegation are <strong>no</strong>t fully satisfied with <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention<br />
that we have approved. x x x we have some problem with <strong>the</strong> 12mile<br />
breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea provided in <strong>the</strong> Convention.<br />
My government has studied <strong>the</strong> problem; it is a difficult one<br />
for us. But this <strong>no</strong>twithstanding, my government never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
decided that it shall sign <strong>the</strong> Convention.”<br />
There are two diametrically opposing views to <strong>the</strong> long lingering issue <strong>of</strong><br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t RP’s ITL are its national territorial boundaries – that <strong>the</strong>y are and<br />
that <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>no</strong>t. The existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two views does <strong>no</strong>t, however, resolve <strong>the</strong><br />
issue. The issue will only be resolved when a choice <strong>of</strong> one, over <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, is finally<br />
made.<br />
As to who should make <strong>the</strong> choice and how and when it should be made are<br />
sub-issues that <strong>the</strong> Philippines must necessarily address. Government policy makers<br />
may provide a solution. The issue’s delicate legal nature hovers as a primordial<br />
factor to consider, however, hinting that, ultimately, a judicial determination could<br />
be warranted. What remains a certainty is that until a solution is arrived at through<br />
firm and grim determination, <strong>the</strong> issue is here to stay.<br />
Is RP an archipelagic State yet?<br />
The national territorial debate has also brought into focus <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines’ archipelagic statehood, particularly, on whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t it is already an<br />
archipelagic State. What has led to <strong>the</strong> revival <strong>of</strong> this long deserved attention is <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>no</strong>tion that in as much as <strong>the</strong> Philippines has <strong>no</strong>t thus far drawn its archipelagic<br />
baselines, it may yet opt out from archipelagic statehood and go <strong>the</strong> way that o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
States archipelagos, like <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Great Britain and Japan, have taken<br />
– as if drawing <strong>the</strong> baselines is <strong>the</strong> operative act <strong>of</strong> archipelagic statehood.<br />
A brief review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> milestones on Philippines’ advocacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “archipelagic<br />
doctrine” would shed light on <strong>the</strong> issue.<br />
Firstly, in response to a query <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN Secretary General on <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine maritime territory, <strong>the</strong> Philippines, through its Permanent Mission to <strong>the</strong><br />
United Nations in New York (NYPM), in a <strong>no</strong>te verbale date 7 March 1955, <strong>of</strong>ficially<br />
described its inland/internal waters as follows:<br />
“1. All waters around, between and connecting different islands belonging<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Philippine Archipelago, irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir width or dimension,<br />
are necessary appurtenances <strong>of</strong> its land territory, forming an integral<br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national or inland waters, subject to <strong>the</strong> exclusive sovereignty<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines;”<br />
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From <strong>the</strong> description, it may be gleaned that as early as 1955 <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
has <strong>of</strong>ficially considered itself as “a unity <strong>of</strong> land and water,” basically, <strong>the</strong> very<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> an archipelagic state. This position was re-enunciated in a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r NYPM<br />
<strong>no</strong>te verbale dated 20 January 1956 addressed to <strong>the</strong> International Law Commission<br />
& to <strong>the</strong> UN Committee on Peaceful Uses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond<br />
<strong>the</strong> Limits <strong>of</strong> National Jurisdiction.<br />
Secondly, during UNCLOS I (1st UN Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea), held<br />
in 1958 47 and UNCLOS II (2 nd Conference on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea) held in 1960, 48 <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines firmly maintained <strong>the</strong> same concept on its archipelagic nature.<br />
Thirdly, it may be recalled that in 1961, R.A. No. 3046 in its preamble reaffirmed<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept, to wit:<br />
WHEREAS, all <strong>the</strong> waters around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> various<br />
islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir width or<br />
dimensions, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> land territory, forming part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inland or internal waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines;<br />
For <strong>the</strong> first time in Philippine legislation, <strong>the</strong> baselines as bases for determining<br />
<strong>the</strong> territorial sea was mentioned in <strong>the</strong> Act by adding that:<br />
WHEREAS, <strong>the</strong> baselines from which <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
is determined consist <strong>of</strong> straight lines joining appropriate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outermost<br />
islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago; and<br />
WHEREAS, <strong>the</strong> said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined<br />
and described for <strong>the</strong> information <strong>of</strong> all concerned;<br />
In fact, R.A. No. 3046 did <strong>no</strong>t only demarcate <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ internal waters<br />
from its territorial sea. It also established and firmed up <strong>the</strong> country’s state practice<br />
on baselines as a means to signify <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> a group <strong>of</strong> islands and <strong>the</strong> waters<br />
around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Fourthly, <strong>the</strong> “unity <strong>of</strong> land and waters” concept later found its way in <strong>the</strong> 1973<br />
Constitution which provided that:<br />
“The national territory comprises <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, with all <strong>the</strong><br />
islands and waters embraced <strong>the</strong>rein, and all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r territories belonging<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Philippines by historic or legal title, including <strong>the</strong> territorial sea,<br />
47 Adopted four (4) conventions namely <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong> Territorial Sea and <strong>the</strong> Contiguous Zone,<br />
Convention on <strong>the</strong> High Seas, Convention on Fishing and Convention <strong>of</strong> Living Resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> High Seas,<br />
<strong>no</strong>ne <strong>of</strong> which was signed by <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
48 Focused solely on reaching a possible agreement on <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea but failed.<br />
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<strong>the</strong> air space, <strong>the</strong> subsoil, <strong>the</strong> sea-bed, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves, and <strong>the</strong><br />
submarine areas over which <strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or<br />
jurisdiction.” 49<br />
Fifthly, eventually, <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ “unity <strong>of</strong> land and waters” concept, <strong>no</strong>w<br />
referred to as <strong>the</strong> “archipelagic doctrine,” finally found acceptance in UNCLOS III<br />
held in 1982 and was eventually enshrined in Part IV <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on<br />
“Archipelagic States.” The inclusion <strong>of</strong> Part IV in UNCLOS is perceived as <strong>the</strong><br />
crowning glory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ unstinting advocacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “archipelagic doctrine”<br />
and a recognition <strong>of</strong> its status as an “archipelagic State.” Evidently, taking pride in<br />
this status, upon signing <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS <strong>the</strong> Philippines pro<strong>no</strong>unced:<br />
6. The provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention on archipelagic passage through sea<br />
lanes do <strong>no</strong>t nullify or impair <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
as an archipelagic state over <strong>the</strong> sea lanes and do <strong>no</strong>t deprive it <strong>of</strong><br />
authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence,<br />
and security; 50<br />
Sixthly, in its present Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Philippines continues to adhere to <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelagic doctrine, thus:<br />
The national territory comprises <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, with all <strong>the</strong><br />
islands and waters embraced <strong>the</strong>rein, and all o<strong>the</strong>r territories over which<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting <strong>of</strong> its terrestrial,<br />
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> seabed, <strong>the</strong><br />
subsoil, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves, and o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas. 51<br />
Lastly, in <strong>the</strong> same Constitution it has pr<strong>of</strong>essed that it has “archipelagic waters,”<br />
as follows:<br />
The State shall protect <strong>the</strong> nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic<br />
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone, and reserve its use<br />
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipi<strong>no</strong> citizens, 52<br />
49 Art. I (National Territory), Sec. 1. This definition is echoed in toto in Sec. 5, P.D. 1587 (Revised Administrative<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> 1978).<br />
50 Par. 6, Philippine Declaration upon signing <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS on 10 December 1982.<br />
51 Art. I, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution. This definition is embodied in toto in Sec. 3, E.O. 292 (Revised Administrative<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> 1987).<br />
52 Art XII, Sec 2, par. 2, 1987 Constitution. This has found application in <strong>the</strong> Second Regular Investment<br />
Negative List issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 362, which took effect on 24 October 1996, List A:<br />
Foreign Ownership is Limited by Mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and Specific Laws. No Foreign Equity, No. 7.<br />
Utilization <strong>of</strong> marine resources in archipelagic waters, territorial sea and exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone. (Article XII,<br />
Section 2, 1987 Constitution)<br />
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Manifestly, this is a pr<strong>of</strong>ession only an archipelagic State can make. 53<br />
From <strong>the</strong> foregoing constitutional provisions, legislation, <strong>of</strong>ficial issuances and<br />
representations, it is indubitable that <strong>the</strong> Philippines has already firmly established<br />
itself as an archipelagic State through its own unilateral and voluntary machinations.<br />
International acceptance that <strong>the</strong> Philippines is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seventeen archipelagic<br />
States in <strong>the</strong> world 54 has fur<strong>the</strong>r boosted this reputation.<br />
Consequently, <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ being a signatory and ratifier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
should <strong>no</strong>t <strong>no</strong>w shirk from meeting <strong>the</strong> Convention’s rudimentary expectation to<br />
establish its archipelagic baselines and maritime zones. While holding back for longer<br />
or disavowing its archipelagic statehood due to difficulties encountered in <strong>the</strong> national<br />
territorial debate are logical policy options for a sovereign State like <strong>the</strong> Philippines,<br />
choosing ei<strong>the</strong>r would greatly affect its respectability in <strong>the</strong> international community.<br />
It could even be construed as conduct inconsistent with adherence to <strong>the</strong> principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> pacta sunt servanda, more so because it would undo more than a quarter <strong>of</strong> a century<br />
<strong>of</strong> its advocacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “archipelagic doctrine.”<br />
Is <strong>the</strong>re a deadline for <strong>the</strong> Philippines to draw its archipelagic<br />
baselines?<br />
In several instances in <strong>the</strong> past months, <strong>the</strong> national papers bannered reports<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Philippines must draw its archipelagic baselines as soon as possible in order<br />
to meet a United Nations imposed deadline and <strong>no</strong>t lose parts <strong>of</strong> its territory, referring<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in <strong>the</strong> South China Sea. Regrettably, <strong>the</strong> reports<br />
were erroneous.<br />
There is <strong>no</strong> such deadline. Strictly speaking, <strong>the</strong> drawing <strong>of</strong> archipelagic baselines<br />
is even optional to archipelagic States as may be deduced from <strong>the</strong> permissive<br />
phraseology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following relevant UNCLOS provision:<br />
An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining<br />
<strong>the</strong> outermost points <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outermost islands and drying reefs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelago provided that within such baselines are included <strong>the</strong> main<br />
islands and an area in which <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> water to <strong>the</strong> area<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 55<br />
53 It is interesting that <strong>the</strong> Philippine Mining Act <strong>of</strong> 1995 in attempting to define <strong>the</strong> term “<strong>of</strong>fshore” has made<br />
mention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “archipelagic sea”, thus: “Offshore means <strong>the</strong> water, sea bottom and subsurface from <strong>the</strong> shore<br />
or coastline reckoned from <strong>the</strong> mean low tide level up to <strong>the</strong> two hundred nautical miles (200 n.m.) exclusive<br />
eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone including <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sea and contiguous zone.” (Sec. 3(ai), R.A. No. 7942), which by itself<br />
escapes definition (unless, it is construed as equivalent to <strong>the</strong> “territorial sea”) in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> discussions that<br />
have been done so far.<br />
54 Churchill, R.R & Lowe, A.F., The Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, Manchester University Press, 1999 at 121-122.<br />
55 Art. 47 (1), UNCLOS.<br />
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It must be pointed out, however, that even absent a deadline, archipelagic<br />
States like <strong>the</strong> Philippines must, never<strong>the</strong>less, still feel impelled to draw <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
archipelagic baselines <strong>no</strong>t only because it meets a minimum UNCLOS expectation<br />
but by o<strong>the</strong>r equally compelling reasons like <strong>the</strong> following: (a) <strong>the</strong> need to definitively<br />
establish <strong>the</strong> metes & bounds <strong>of</strong> its territory (particularly, its fluvial and aerial<br />
domains), which is a fundamental element <strong>of</strong> statehood; (b) <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> meeting<br />
its treaty obligations as a State Party to a “popular” 56 international convention that<br />
is reputed as <strong>the</strong> “Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Oceans”; (c) <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> delimiting<br />
maritime jurisdictions that meet UNCLOS requirements; (d) to be able to efficiently<br />
and effectively exercise its prerogatives as a sovereign State vis-à-vis its concerns <strong>of</strong><br />
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security; (e) to be able to<br />
efficiently and effectively exercise its sovereign rights and limited jurisdiction in<br />
maritime zones beyond <strong>the</strong> territorial sea; and (f) to provide proper guidance by way<br />
<strong>of</strong> definitive boundaries to common maritime boundary delimitation negotiations<br />
with our immediate neighboring States in <strong>the</strong> near future.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, by <strong>no</strong>t drawing archipelagic baselines, <strong>the</strong> Philippines will <strong>no</strong>t<br />
lose <strong>the</strong> KIG or any o<strong>the</strong>r territory that it claims for that matter. In <strong>the</strong> same way<br />
that such <strong>no</strong>nfeasance is <strong>no</strong>t a ground to lose territory, drawing archipelagic baselines<br />
is also <strong>no</strong>t a way to acquire territory in international law.<br />
Taking hint from <strong>the</strong> papers that <strong>the</strong> “deadline” is set for next year, <strong>the</strong> reports<br />
could be referring to that deadline imposed on States Parties to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS to file<br />
with <strong>the</strong> UN Commission on <strong>the</strong> Limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Continental Shelf (CLCS) <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
respective submissions <strong>of</strong> claims to extended continental shelves, 57 an entirely<br />
different matter.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> foregoing, <strong>the</strong> baselines already drawn pursuant to<br />
R.A. No. 3046 as eventually amended by R.A. No. 5446 still serve some purpose.<br />
Instead <strong>of</strong> drawing an entirely new network <strong>of</strong> baselines, <strong>the</strong> Philippines could opt<br />
to adopt it after correcting portions (baselines) that do <strong>no</strong>t comply with<br />
UNCLOS prescriptions and making some adjustments to optimize <strong>the</strong> resulting water<br />
areas. 58<br />
56 As <strong>of</strong> this writing, 156 countries have ei<strong>the</strong>r ratified or acceded to <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
57 Meeting <strong>of</strong> States Parties to <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, SPLOS/72, 29 May 2001.<br />
58 Noticeably, it does <strong>no</strong>t meet <strong>the</strong> requirement that <strong>the</strong> length <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines does “<strong>no</strong>t exceed 100 nautical<br />
miles” with <strong>the</strong> exception “that up to 3 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> baselines enclosing any archipelago may<br />
exceed that length, up to a maximum length <strong>of</strong> 125 nautical miles” – a principal requirement under Article<br />
47(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS. The existing Philippine 80 baselines delineated under RA 3046 (as amended by RA<br />
5446) have a total length <strong>of</strong> 8,174.8974 miles. Three (3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se 80 baselines or 3.75% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong><br />
baselines, exceed 100 miles in length. Moreover, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se – <strong>the</strong> baseline to <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong> Mindanao in <strong>the</strong><br />
Gulf <strong>of</strong> Moro is <strong>of</strong> 140.05 miles in length — is over 125 miles in length.<br />
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How should RP treat its landward waters if <strong>the</strong> archipelagic<br />
baselines are eventually drawn?<br />
Since 1955, in NYPM’s <strong>no</strong>te verbale <strong>of</strong> 7 March 1955, <strong>the</strong> waters around,<br />
between and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago were de<strong>no</strong>minated<br />
as “internal (inland) waters.” This concept was retained in NYPM’s <strong>no</strong>te verbale <strong>of</strong><br />
20 January 1956. 59<br />
R.A. No. 3046 re-enunciated <strong>the</strong> concept in <strong>the</strong> 1 st paragraph <strong>of</strong> its Preamble,<br />
to wit:<br />
WHEREAS, all <strong>the</strong> waters around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> various<br />
islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine archipelago, irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir width or<br />
dimensions, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> land territory, forming part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inland or internal waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines;<br />
With baselines drawn in accordance with <strong>the</strong> Act, <strong>the</strong> Philippine concept <strong>of</strong><br />
“internal waters” has, in fact, acquired a modified meaning, that <strong>of</strong> being “all waters<br />
around, between and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands within <strong>the</strong> baselines.”<br />
Subsequently, <strong>the</strong> 1973 and 1987 Constitutions embraced <strong>the</strong> aforesaid<br />
Philippine concept <strong>of</strong> “internal waters,” respectively, as follows:<br />
“The waters around, between, and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelago, irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir breadth and dimensions, form part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> internal waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines” 60 and<br />
“The waters around, between, and connecting <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
archipelago, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir breadth and dimensions, form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
internal waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.” 61<br />
59 The <strong>no</strong>te also defined “territorial sea” and “subjacent waters”, respectively, in <strong>the</strong> following manner: “All o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
water areas embraced within <strong>the</strong> lines described in <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris <strong>of</strong> 10 December 1898, <strong>the</strong> Treaty<br />
concluded at Washington, D.C. between <strong>the</strong> United States and Spain on 7 November 1900, <strong>the</strong> Agreement<br />
between <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom <strong>of</strong> 2 January 1930 and <strong>the</strong> Convention <strong>of</strong> 6 July 1932<br />
between <strong>the</strong> United States and Great Britain, as reproduced in Section 6 <strong>of</strong> Commonwealth Act No. 4 0 0 3<br />
and article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution, are considered as maritime territorial waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines for<br />
purposes <strong>of</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> its fishing rights, conservation <strong>of</strong> its fishery resources, enforcement <strong>of</strong> its revenue and<br />
anti-smuggling laws, defense and security, and protection <strong>of</strong> such o<strong>the</strong>r interests as <strong>the</strong> Philippines may deem<br />
vital to its national welfare and security, without prejudice to <strong>the</strong> exercise by friendly vessels <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong><br />
in<strong>no</strong>cent passage over <strong>the</strong>se waters”. (TERRITORIAL WATERS); and “All natural deposits or resources <strong>of</strong><br />
petroleum or natural gas in public and/or private lands (or o<strong>the</strong>r submerged lands) within <strong>the</strong> territorial waters<br />
or on <strong>the</strong> continental shelf, or its analogue in an archipelago, seaward from <strong>the</strong> shores <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines which<br />
are <strong>no</strong>t within <strong>the</strong> territories <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries, belong inalienably and imprescriptibility to <strong>the</strong> Philippines,<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage <strong>of</strong> ships <strong>of</strong> friendly foreign States over <strong>the</strong>se waters.”<br />
(SUPERJACENTWATERS)<br />
60 Art. I (National Territory), Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution.<br />
61 Art. I (National Territory), Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.<br />
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On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> drawing <strong>of</strong> archipelagic baselines by archipelagic States<br />
in accordance with <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS will result into two kinds <strong>of</strong> landward waters namely:<br />
(a) archipelagic waters; and (b) internal waters. Archipelagic waters are those enclosed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> archipelagic baselines, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir depth or distance from <strong>the</strong> coast. 62<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, internal waters include waters <strong>of</strong> rivers and bays delimited by<br />
closing lines drawn in accordance with Articles 9 (Mouths <strong>of</strong> Rivers), 10 (Bays) and<br />
11 (Ports), UNCLOS. 63<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong>refore, “internal waters” partake <strong>of</strong> a specific meaning<br />
that is altoge<strong>the</strong>r different from its given meaning in Philippine law. Thus, when <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines signed and ratified <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, this divergence in meaning became<br />
<strong>the</strong> root cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue at hand. Should <strong>the</strong> Philippines continue to insist on its<br />
concept that all waters inside <strong>the</strong> archipelagic baselines are “internal waters” or<br />
should it apply <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS and go for “archipelagic waters” and “internal waters”<br />
classification?<br />
Faced again with a host <strong>of</strong> sub-issues – (a) Can <strong>the</strong> divergence be addressed<br />
and cured by an enactment or amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution or law?; (b) Which<br />
should be accorded due supremacy, <strong>the</strong> Constitution or <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS?; (c) Which is<br />
better in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need to accommodate international navigation’s exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
rights <strong>of</strong> passage (i.e., right <strong>of</strong> in<strong>no</strong>cent passage; archipelagic sealanes passage; and<br />
passage through routes <strong>no</strong>rmally used for international navigation), <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>of</strong><br />
archipelagic waters or <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>of</strong> internal waters?; (d) Upon drawing archipelagic<br />
baselines, should <strong>the</strong> archipelagic sealanes be established? Why or why <strong>no</strong>t? Can <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines delay <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sealanes?; (e) Was <strong>the</strong> ratification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS a correct decision for <strong>the</strong> Philippines? Could <strong>the</strong> country still reverse <strong>the</strong><br />
situation and back track, if <strong>no</strong>t withdraw from <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS?; and (f) Can a proper<br />
action in court resolve <strong>the</strong> divergence? - <strong>the</strong> country again opts for indecision and<br />
continues debating.<br />
How should RP treat its disputed territories when drawing its<br />
archipelagic baselines?<br />
In drawing its archipelagic baselines, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has to contend with <strong>the</strong><br />
stark reality that it has territories (e.g., Sabah, <strong>the</strong> KIG and <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal<br />
(also k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> “Bajo de Masinloc”)) that are being disputed by o<strong>the</strong>r States. It,<br />
thus, is constrained to decide if it must include or exclude <strong>the</strong>se disputed territories<br />
within <strong>the</strong> baselines.<br />
A. Sabah<br />
There is currently <strong>no</strong> legislation that establishes <strong>the</strong> metes and bounds <strong>of</strong><br />
Sabah as claimed by <strong>the</strong> Philippines to be part <strong>of</strong> its territory. There is, however, <strong>no</strong>t<br />
62 Art. 49(1), UNCLOS.<br />
63 Art. 50, UNCLOS.<br />
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much urgency to <strong>the</strong> drawing <strong>of</strong> baselines around it as <strong>the</strong>re is already legislation<br />
that has provided for doing so at some future time.<br />
RA 5446 (1968), which was only supposed to amend <strong>the</strong> typographical mistakes<br />
in Section 1 <strong>of</strong> RA 3046 as may be gleaned from its title, has surreptitiously introduced<br />
a provision that addresses this matter as follows:<br />
“Sec. 2. The definition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to <strong>the</strong><br />
delineation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea around <strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong><br />
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.”<br />
As may be gleaned from <strong>the</strong> provision, <strong>the</strong> Philippines declares Sabah as its<br />
territory, having acquired “dominion and sovereignty” over it. In <strong>the</strong> meantime,<br />
however, <strong>the</strong> Philippines does <strong>no</strong>t find it exigent to draw <strong>the</strong> “baselines <strong>of</strong> (its)<br />
territorial sea.” This is worthy <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>te because this approach vis-à-vis a disputed<br />
territory resembles that employed by China and Vietnam with respect to <strong>the</strong> Spratlys<br />
Archipelago, <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> KIG is part. 64<br />
China, while declaring its territory to include “<strong>the</strong> mainland and its <strong>of</strong>fshore<br />
islands, Taiwan and <strong>the</strong> various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu<br />
Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and o<strong>the</strong>r islands<br />
that belong to <strong>the</strong> People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China,” 65 subsequently, pro<strong>no</strong>unced that it<br />
“will an<strong>no</strong>unce <strong>the</strong> remaining baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> People’s Republic<br />
<strong>of</strong> China at a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r time.” 66<br />
For its part, Vietnam, which claims Hoang Sa and Troung Sa archipelagos<br />
(Spratlys and Paracel Islands) as its territory has proclaimed that “(4) The baseline<br />
for measuring <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hoang Sa and Truong Sa<br />
Archipelagos will be determined in a coming instrument in conformity with paragraph<br />
5 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 12 May 1977 statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Socialist Republic <strong>of</strong> Viet<br />
Nam.” 67<br />
64 P.D. No. 1956 only lays claim to <strong>the</strong> KIG, or those islands and waters, etc. that fall within specific boundaries<br />
(a six-sided polygon that abuts <strong>the</strong> ITL). It must be <strong>no</strong>ted that <strong>the</strong> KIG does <strong>no</strong>t include <strong>the</strong> Spratlys Island,<br />
which is at this time occupied by Vietnam.<br />
65 Art. 2, par. 2, China’s Law on <strong>the</strong> Territorial Sea and <strong>the</strong> Contiguous Zone <strong>of</strong> 25 February 1992.<br />
66 Declaration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China on <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, 15 May<br />
1996, in which law it drew an incomplete straight baselines for its mainland and a complete set <strong>of</strong> baselines<br />
around Xisha (Paracel) Islands.<br />
67 Statement <strong>of</strong> 12 November 1982 by <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Socialist Republic <strong>of</strong> Viet Nam on <strong>the</strong> Territorial<br />
Sea Baseline <strong>of</strong> Viet Nam.<br />
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Notably, <strong>the</strong> same approach is available to <strong>the</strong> Philippines as regards <strong>the</strong><br />
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) 68 and <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal 69 .<br />
B. The KIG & Scarborough Shoal<br />
In 1978, <strong>the</strong>n President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 1596, which declared<br />
<strong>the</strong> area within <strong>the</strong> following boundaries:<br />
KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP<br />
From a point [on <strong>the</strong> Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 7°40' North<br />
and longitude 116°00' East <strong>of</strong> Greenwich, <strong>the</strong>nce due West along <strong>the</strong><br />
parallel <strong>of</strong> 7°40' N to its intersection with <strong>the</strong> meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude 112°10'<br />
E, <strong>the</strong>nce due <strong>no</strong>rth along <strong>the</strong> meridian <strong>of</strong> 112°10' E to its intersection<br />
with <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> 9°00' N, <strong>the</strong>nce <strong>no</strong>r<strong>the</strong>astward to <strong>the</strong> intersection <strong>of</strong><br />
parallel <strong>of</strong> 12°00' N with <strong>the</strong> meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude 114°30' E, <strong>the</strong>nce, due<br />
East along <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> 12°00' N to its intersection with <strong>the</strong> meridian <strong>of</strong><br />
118°00' E, <strong>the</strong>nce, due South along <strong>the</strong> meridian <strong>of</strong> longitude 118°00' E<br />
to its intersection with <strong>the</strong> parallel <strong>of</strong> 10°00' N, <strong>the</strong>nce Southwestwards<br />
to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> beginning at 7°40' N, latitude and 116°00' E longitude;<br />
including <strong>the</strong> sea-bed, sub-soil, continental margin and space as belonging<br />
and subject to <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. The decree also<br />
constituted a distinct and separate municipality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Province <strong>of</strong> Palawan<br />
k<strong>no</strong>wn as “Kalayaan.”<br />
In <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> drafting its archipelagic baselines law, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has<br />
taken <strong>the</strong> KIG and <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal into consideration and many options had<br />
been looked into on how <strong>the</strong>y should be treated in <strong>the</strong> process.<br />
Presently, House Bill No. 3216 (o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Cuenco Bill), which is<br />
pending for third reading in congress, proposes that <strong>the</strong> baselines enclose <strong>the</strong> main<br />
archipelago, <strong>the</strong> KIG and <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal. 70 On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, a common<br />
position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch (CEP) processed under <strong>the</strong> auspices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CMOA) proposes that <strong>the</strong> baselines<br />
be drawn just around <strong>the</strong> main archipelago and <strong>the</strong> KIG and <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal<br />
should just be considered as a regime <strong>of</strong> islands under Part VIII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS,<br />
which goes:<br />
68 The Philippines has even gone fur<strong>the</strong>r by drawing a six-sided polygon around KIG and establishing a local<br />
government unit <strong>the</strong>reat through P.D. No. 1596 (1978).<br />
69 Formerly k<strong>no</strong>wn as “Bajo de Masinloc”, <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal can be said to have already been declared by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines as part <strong>of</strong> its territory when in <strong>the</strong> Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1916 it enumerated Masinloc as a<br />
municipality <strong>of</strong> Zambales, one <strong>of</strong> its provinces.<br />
70 Of late, counterpart bills have been filed in <strong>the</strong> Senate.<br />
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Article 121<br />
Regime <strong>of</strong> islands<br />
1. An island is a naturally formed area <strong>of</strong> land, surrounded by water,<br />
which is above water at high tide.<br />
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> contiguous<br />
zone, <strong>the</strong> exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone and <strong>the</strong> continental shelf <strong>of</strong> an island<br />
are determined in accordance with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> this Convention<br />
applicable to o<strong>the</strong>r land territory.<br />
3. Rocks which can<strong>no</strong>t sustain human habitation or eco<strong>no</strong>mic life <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own shall have <strong>no</strong> exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone or continental shelf.<br />
Expectedly, <strong>the</strong> proposal in <strong>the</strong> Cuenco Bill has gained <strong>the</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> nationalists<br />
who principally argue that it will <strong>no</strong>t only affirm and streng<strong>the</strong>n our territorial claim<br />
over <strong>the</strong> KIG and <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal but will also maximize <strong>the</strong> projection <strong>of</strong><br />
our maritime zones.<br />
Those who advocate <strong>the</strong> CEP, however, point out that drawing <strong>the</strong> baselines<br />
around <strong>the</strong> KIG will require <strong>the</strong> building <strong>of</strong> lighthouses on <strong>the</strong> Sabina and Iroquois<br />
Shoals, and could be violative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> call for “status quo” contained in <strong>the</strong> ASEAN-<br />
China Declaration <strong>of</strong> Conduct in <strong>the</strong> South China Sea. They also have expressed<br />
concern on <strong>the</strong> possibility that drawing <strong>the</strong> baselines around <strong>the</strong> Scarborough Shoal<br />
would be inconsistent with UNCLOS’ requirement that <strong>the</strong> baselines should “<strong>no</strong>t<br />
depart to any appreciable extent from <strong>the</strong> general configuration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> archipelago.” 71<br />
They fur<strong>the</strong>r underline that <strong>the</strong> CEP is less adversarial, less confrontational, less<br />
controversial, less politically motivated and less likely to aggravate <strong>the</strong> South China<br />
Sea (SCS) dispute over <strong>the</strong> KIG.<br />
The difficulties pertinent to <strong>the</strong> instant issue are <strong>no</strong>t only due to <strong>the</strong><br />
contradictions <strong>of</strong> options on how <strong>the</strong> archipelagic baselines should be drawn in relation<br />
to disputed territories. They also emerge in <strong>the</strong> crafting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bill itself, particularly,<br />
as regards <strong>the</strong> CEP, and, specifically, on how to treat <strong>the</strong> KIG and Scarborough<br />
Shoal as regime <strong>of</strong> islands <strong>the</strong>rein.<br />
Firstly, should <strong>the</strong>re be a mention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> islands as belonging to <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
or forming part <strong>of</strong> Philippine territory or this should just be presumed in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong><br />
P.D. No. 1596 and <strong>the</strong> Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1916? Should this reference be to <strong>the</strong><br />
islands as a group or to <strong>the</strong> individual islands? Secondly, how should <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>of</strong><br />
islands concept be presented in <strong>the</strong> bill? Should <strong>the</strong> islands be treated as a group <strong>of</strong><br />
islands occupying a certain portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South China Sea or as individual islands<br />
with identifiable geographical coordinates? Thirdly, should <strong>the</strong> maritime zones <strong>of</strong><br />
each and every island already be reflected in <strong>the</strong> law based on a determination <strong>of</strong><br />
71 Art. 47(3), UNCLOS.<br />
52 IBP JOURNAL
The On-going National Territorial Debate: Issues & Perspectives<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m is capable <strong>of</strong> sustaining human habitation or eco<strong>no</strong>mic<br />
life? What maritime zones should each and every island project? How would <strong>the</strong><br />
inhabitants <strong>of</strong> an existing municipality in <strong>the</strong> KIG react to a determination that<br />
some, if <strong>no</strong>t all, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> islands in <strong>the</strong> KIG are incapable <strong>of</strong> sustaining human habitation<br />
or eco<strong>no</strong>mic life? Fourthly, can’t <strong>the</strong> islands simply be covered by a <strong>no</strong>n-prejudice<br />
clause similar to that adopted in R.A. No. 5446 as regards Sabah? Can <strong>the</strong> Chinese/<br />
Vietnamese approach on <strong>the</strong> Spratlys be adopted by <strong>the</strong> Philippines?<br />
Again, it is observed that in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> clashing multifaceted arguments and<br />
sub-issues, <strong>the</strong> main issue on how to treat <strong>the</strong> KIG and Scarborough Shoal in <strong>the</strong><br />
process <strong>of</strong> drawing <strong>the</strong> baselines remains unsettled, <strong>the</strong> process itself <strong>of</strong> drawing <strong>the</strong><br />
baselines is stalled and <strong>the</strong> national territorial debate continues indefinitely.<br />
What should be RP’s national territorial limits – <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
sea reckoned from UNCLOS-prescribed baselines or <strong>the</strong> ITL?<br />
This undeniably is <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> issues in <strong>the</strong> national territorial debate.<br />
The country’s ultimate course <strong>of</strong> action that would finally settle all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r issues<br />
primarily depends on a definitive and decisive decision on this one. If <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
decides that its ITL are its territorial boundaries, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> its<br />
maritime zones, <strong>the</strong> common maritime boundary delimitation talks, its exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
prerogatives as a sovereign, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, could proceed accordingly with its<br />
guidance. The same thing obtains if UNCLOS-based territorial limits are preferred.<br />
Hence, what really matters is for this issue to be passed and decided upon once and<br />
for all.<br />
In trying to arrive at a decision on <strong>the</strong> issue, it should be recalled and considered<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ ITL position had already been taken up exhaustively and,<br />
<strong>the</strong>reafter, rejected during UNCLOS III. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Declaration upon signing<br />
<strong>the</strong> UNCLOS that sought to qualify its legal effects on <strong>the</strong> Philippines is also viewed<br />
as fundamentally flawed in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> Art. 310, UNCLOS, taken in relation to<br />
Art. 309.<br />
Article 309<br />
Reservations and exceptions<br />
No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention<br />
unless expressly permitted by o<strong>the</strong>r articles <strong>of</strong> this Convention.<br />
Article 310<br />
Declarations and statements<br />
Article 309 does <strong>no</strong>t preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this<br />
Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named,<br />
with a view, inter alia, to <strong>the</strong> harmonization <strong>of</strong> its laws and regulations with <strong>the</strong><br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements<br />
do <strong>no</strong>t purport to exclude or to modify <strong>the</strong> legal effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />
<strong>of</strong> this Convention in <strong>the</strong>ir application to that State.<br />
In fact, it had been vehemently opposed, if <strong>no</strong>t rejected by Australia, Belarus,<br />
Czechoslovakia, <strong>the</strong> Russian Federation (USSR), and Ukraine, among o<strong>the</strong>rs. 72 Hence,<br />
<strong>the</strong> prospect <strong>of</strong> obtaining international acceptance for <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ ITL seems<br />
remote.<br />
Projecting o<strong>the</strong>r maritime zones from <strong>the</strong> ITL is going to be a difficult<br />
undertaking. Maritime zones are creations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, thus, <strong>the</strong>ir establishment<br />
should, logically, be on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rules it has prescribed. In this light, projecting<br />
<strong>the</strong> contiguous zone, EEZ and <strong>the</strong> continental shelves from <strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
territorial waters or <strong>the</strong> ITL will be a “challenging” and controversial exercise,<br />
especially because it will result in vast overlaps with <strong>the</strong> maritime zones and even<br />
territories <strong>of</strong> neighboring States. In this respect, Philippine maritime zones may <strong>no</strong>t<br />
be acceptable to <strong>the</strong> international community. The a<strong>no</strong>maly that portions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine “territorial sea” within <strong>the</strong> ITL fall outside <strong>the</strong> EEZ drawn in accordance<br />
with P.D. No. 1599, underscores this concern. (Map Slide No. 4)<br />
The observation that adherence to baselines drawn in accordance with <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS will dramatically reduce <strong>the</strong> expanse <strong>of</strong> RP’s territorial sea is indeed a<br />
valid concern. 73 But <strong>the</strong>n a loss in <strong>the</strong> expanse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea will be aptly and<br />
sufficiently compensated by <strong>the</strong> expanse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EEZ <strong>no</strong>t to mention that <strong>the</strong> seaward<br />
maritime zones <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country will <strong>no</strong>w be anchored on formidable legal bases.<br />
However, to temper <strong>the</strong> concern <strong>of</strong> territorial collapse, it may help to k<strong>no</strong>w<br />
that many o<strong>the</strong>r countries like Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana,<br />
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania<br />
and Tonga had to roll back <strong>the</strong>ir territorial seas with <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS,<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby losing substantial portions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> breadth <strong>of</strong> territorial seas <strong>the</strong>y previously<br />
claimed. 74<br />
Lastly, <strong>the</strong> Philippines should <strong>no</strong>t forget that in its response to <strong>the</strong> Australian<br />
Protest in 1988, it has made a commitment to harmonize its domestic laws with <strong>the</strong><br />
UNCLOS. Its passage <strong>of</strong> an archipelagic baselines law could, thus, be deemed as an<br />
act to fulfil <strong>the</strong> commitment even as it can be construed as abandonment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ITL<br />
position. It can also be appreciated as a categorical act on its part to meet longstanding<br />
treaty obligations embodied in <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS.<br />
72 For a more exhaustive discussion, please see, Nelson, L.D.M., Declarations, Statements and ‘Disguised<br />
Reservations’ with Respect to <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea, (2001) 50 International & Comparative<br />
Law Quarterly 767-786.<br />
73 RP could lose approximately 826,000 sq. km. <strong>of</strong> its territorial sea as a result. Within <strong>the</strong> ITL, <strong>the</strong> total expanse<br />
<strong>of</strong> RP’s territorial waters is almost 938,000 sq. km., while within <strong>the</strong> 12 nautical mile limit reckoned seawards<br />
from <strong>the</strong> baselines it is only about 112,000 sq. km.<br />
74 Ashley Roach, J and Smith, R.W., International Law Studies: Excessive Maritime Claims, V. 66, Naval War<br />
College, 1994 at 96-97.<br />
54 IBP JOURNAL
Conclusion<br />
The On-going National Territorial Debate: Issues & Perspectives<br />
The principal issues in <strong>the</strong> on-going national territorial debate are clear and<br />
distinct and <strong>the</strong>ir respective perspectives have already been brought to fore in a lot<br />
<strong>of</strong> fora and media. A close scrutiny <strong>of</strong> recent developments reveals that, in fact, <strong>the</strong><br />
issues have long been joined and what remains to be done is to make a decision as to<br />
which approach <strong>the</strong> Philippines should take. It is regrettable, however, that <strong>the</strong><br />
decision-making process in this regard, since <strong>the</strong> Philippines became a signatory to<br />
<strong>the</strong> UNCLOS a quarter <strong>of</strong> a century ago, has all <strong>the</strong> while been agonizingly dragging.<br />
If only it can proceed with a sense <strong>of</strong> national urgency coupled with bold readiness<br />
to face <strong>the</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong> decisions taken, <strong>the</strong> debate can end earlier.<br />
The present generation can do <strong>the</strong> next generation a favor by ending <strong>the</strong> debate<br />
<strong>no</strong>w. All it needs to do is to make up its mind, once and for all, on <strong>the</strong> issues involved.<br />
After all, being decisive on a matter <strong>of</strong> great importance such as <strong>the</strong> national territory<br />
is a hallmark <strong>of</strong> a country worth its statehood salt.<br />
<br />
Map No. 1 - RP’s International Treaty Limits (ITL) and its territorial waters (territorial sea within <strong>the</strong> ITL +<br />
internal waters within <strong>the</strong> baselines drawn in accordance with R.A. No. 3046, as amended by R.A. No. 5446).<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Leo Tito L. Ausan, Jr.<br />
UNCLOS Maritime Zones<br />
Extended CS<br />
(350 nm)<br />
Map No. 2 - Maritime zones projected two-dimensionally in accordance with pertinent provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United<br />
Nations Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea.<br />
Philippines’ Projected Maritime Zones<br />
Map No. 3 - Philippine maritime zones projected in accordance with pertinent UNCLOS provisions.<br />
56 IBP JOURNAL
THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT,<br />
AND UTILIZATION OF THE SPRATLYS*<br />
Amado D. Valdez**<br />
I. The Legal and Historical Context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys<br />
The Spratlys Islands is actually an archipelago traversing about 1,000 kilometers<br />
from <strong>no</strong>rth to south, between latitude 4 o to 11 o 30N, and longitude 109 o 30 o E. In<br />
relation to its claimants, it is 100 kilometers west <strong>of</strong> Palawan Island, Philippines,<br />
160 kilometers from Malaysia’s Sarawak coast, 250 kilometers from <strong>the</strong> Sabah coast,<br />
650 kilometers east <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese coast, 750 kilometers south <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Paracels,<br />
and 1,000 kilometers from China’s Hainan Island.<br />
Like a persona, <strong>the</strong> Spratlys <strong>of</strong> volcanic origin and coral outcroppings seems<br />
alive and in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> growing. In fact, new unchartered islands have been<br />
formed with <strong>the</strong> passing <strong>of</strong> years. When Tomas Cloma proclaimed ownership by<br />
discovery and occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys in 1956, he reported only thirty-three islands,<br />
sand cays, sand bards and coral reefs. Twenty two years later in 1978, <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Coast and Geodetic Survey Office issued a new <strong>of</strong>ficial map increasing <strong>the</strong> number<br />
<strong>of</strong> islands, islets, reefs, shoals, cays, and rocks to about fifty-one to sixty, depending<br />
on whe<strong>the</strong>r it is high or low tide.<br />
To set <strong>the</strong> record straight, <strong>the</strong> Philippines claims only <strong>the</strong> western section <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Spratlys, which is called <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group. Kalayaan was incorporated<br />
as a municipality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Province <strong>of</strong> Palawan under a 1971 Presidential Proclamation<br />
and Presidential Decree No. 1594. It was made part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 200-mile exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic<br />
zone (EEZ) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1599. It consists <strong>of</strong> a<br />
territory <strong>of</strong> 360,000 square nautical miles. 1<br />
International observers have identified it as a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r flashpoint <strong>of</strong> controversy<br />
and armed confrontation due to conflicting claims from different countries. It is<br />
ironic that <strong>the</strong> country-claimant who happens to be <strong>the</strong> far<strong>the</strong>st from <strong>the</strong> Spratly<br />
archipelago is <strong>the</strong> “fondest” when it comes to asserting its claim. We recall <strong>the</strong> brief<br />
naval battle between China and Vietnam on March 14, 1988 which ended with three<br />
Vietnamese naval boats sunk and seventy-two Vietnamese soldiers killed but <strong>no</strong><br />
Chinese casualties reported.<br />
* Delivered as a reaction to <strong>the</strong> main presentation <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>. Merlin Magallona during <strong>the</strong> symposium at <strong>the</strong><br />
Malcolm Theater, UP College <strong>of</strong> Law on May 29, <strong>2008</strong> on <strong>the</strong> topic “Spratly Islands: Impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Territorial Integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and o<strong>the</strong>r Related Legal Issues.”<br />
** Dean, Univeristy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> East.<br />
1 Kalayaan is at least 350 nautical miles sou<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys Island group, and from Pag-Asa island, only 220<br />
nautical miles west <strong>no</strong>rthwest <strong>of</strong> Puerto Princesa, Palawan.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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The Philippines was <strong>no</strong>t spared this unpleasant Chinese tactic coming 1,000<br />
kilometers away from <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Group <strong>of</strong> Islands. In January to mid-February<br />
1995, Chinese soldiers arrested <strong>the</strong> Filipi<strong>no</strong> crew <strong>of</strong> F/B Ana Lisa who were fishing<br />
<strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> waters <strong>of</strong> Mischief Shoal (Panganiban Reef to Philippine authorities), which<br />
is part <strong>of</strong> Cloma’s claim. In <strong>the</strong> same month <strong>of</strong> February, <strong>the</strong> Princess Seagull, a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r<br />
Filipi<strong>no</strong> fishing boat which experienced engine trouble and had Kalayaan Mayor Gil<br />
Policarpio on board, was prevented by a Chinese blockade and was turned away<br />
from entry into <strong>the</strong> Panganiban reef despite displaying distress signals. Much earlier,<br />
in 1976, China warned <strong>the</strong> Philippines to stop oil exploration near <strong>the</strong> Reed Bank.<br />
The Chinese provocative actions came after Chinese Foreign Minister Quian<br />
Quichon had agreed to <strong>the</strong> ASEAN position with respect to <strong>the</strong> Spratlys issue made<br />
on July 22, 1992 which called on all claimant countries “to exercise restraint with<br />
<strong>the</strong> view to creating a positive climate for <strong>the</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> all disputes” as well as to<br />
“explore <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> cooperation relating to <strong>the</strong> safety <strong>of</strong> maritime navigation<br />
and communication, protection against pollution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> marine environment,<br />
coordination <strong>of</strong> search and rescue operations, combating piracy and armed robbery<br />
as well as collaboration in <strong>the</strong> campaign against illicit trafficking <strong>of</strong> drugs.”<br />
That China has an ally in <strong>the</strong> United States is gauged from <strong>the</strong> subsequent<br />
attitude <strong>of</strong> American private enterprise. On May 8, 1992, or three months after<br />
China passed a law in February 1992 asserting sovereignty over <strong>the</strong> entire Spratly<br />
island chain, a US company, Creston Energy Corporation entered into a contract<br />
with <strong>the</strong> China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to explore oil in a<br />
25,155 square kilometer area in <strong>the</strong> Tu Chinh bank with assurances <strong>of</strong> protection<br />
from <strong>the</strong> Chinese Navy against hostile forces.<br />
This transaction only validates <strong>the</strong> United States government’s position that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Mutual Defense Treaty does <strong>no</strong>t cover <strong>the</strong> defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spratlys because <strong>of</strong><br />
conflicting claims and that <strong>the</strong> Spratlys were <strong>no</strong>t part <strong>of</strong> Philippine territory during<br />
<strong>the</strong> forging <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> treaty. Still, <strong>the</strong> Philippines looked to <strong>the</strong> United States for support<br />
in early February 1995 after China refused to heed <strong>the</strong> Philippines’ request for it to<br />
leave <strong>the</strong> Mischief Shoal.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> present global eco<strong>no</strong>my’s reliance on oil, more US-Chinese partnership<br />
in <strong>the</strong> area may be forthcoming considering how oil-dependent <strong>the</strong>se two countries<br />
are. According to Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Teodoro Santos, formerly <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines’ National Institute <strong>of</strong> Geological Sciences (NIGS), <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island<br />
Group (KIG) is <strong>the</strong> “most promising with respect to petroleum and natural gas. The<br />
Chinese have <strong>the</strong> highest estimate at 100 to 200 billion barrels, with Russian sources<br />
estimating a low <strong>of</strong> seven billion barrels.” 2<br />
2 Philippine Graphic, Vol. 18, No. 45, April 14, <strong>2008</strong>, page 24.<br />
58 IBP JOURNAL
THOUGHTS ON THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND UTILIZATION OF THE SPRATLYS<br />
II. Spratly as Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Territory and <strong>the</strong> U.N.<br />
Convention On The Law Of The Sea<br />
Prior to Cloma’s claim, <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group was largely uncharted in<br />
international maps. Some had newly-arisen, and all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m were u<strong>no</strong>ccupied and<br />
uninhabited. They were considered terra nullius and could be claimed by discovery<br />
and occupation. The UN Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea (UNCLOS) could be<br />
said as reinforcing such claim.<br />
It is in this context that <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group is included as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
national territory in <strong>the</strong> 1973 Constitution, which definition is substantially adopted<br />
in <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution. According to <strong>no</strong>ted constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas,<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1987 version “merely removed language possibly <strong>of</strong>fensive to an ASEAN neighbor<br />
and achieved a more logical sequencing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elements that make up <strong>the</strong> territory<br />
but preserved everything else found in <strong>the</strong> 1973 Constitution.” 3<br />
The 1973 Constitution had left <strong>the</strong> territorial definition pliable to <strong>the</strong> expanding<br />
breadth <strong>of</strong> territory which could be foreseen from <strong>the</strong> developing international accord<br />
on <strong>the</strong> law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea where <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines found in Republic<br />
Act No. 3046 (1961) and Republic Act No. 5446 (1968) adopted <strong>the</strong> “straight baseline<br />
method” <strong>of</strong> fixing <strong>the</strong> territorial sea. This is a position upheld in <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice in <strong>the</strong> Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case.<br />
Then Constitutional Commission member and current Supreme Court<br />
Associate Justice Adolfo Azcuna rephrased <strong>the</strong> 1973 version in 1987 with “its<br />
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, <strong>the</strong> seabed, <strong>the</strong><br />
subsoil, <strong>the</strong> insular shelves, and o<strong>the</strong>r submarine areas,” 4 in accordance with <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>no</strong>w existing 1982 UNCLOS.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> above Convention, <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> Philippine responsibility are<br />
reckoned from a so-called baseline. To establish <strong>the</strong> baseline, a country has to first<br />
identify <strong>the</strong> outermost island, and <strong>the</strong>n identify <strong>the</strong> outermost point which is <strong>the</strong> low<br />
water mark. The low water mark is <strong>the</strong> point where <strong>the</strong> sea recedes in case <strong>of</strong> low<br />
tide.<br />
All maritime regimes or zones are reckoned from <strong>the</strong> baseline. The twelvemile<br />
territorial sea is <strong>the</strong> area where <strong>the</strong> State enforces its laws and exploits its<br />
resources. The twenty four-mile contiguous zone beyond <strong>the</strong> twelve-mile territorial<br />
sea is <strong>the</strong> area where a State can exercise its sovereign right to pursue smugglers,<br />
illegal fishers, illegal immigrants, and customs and tax evaders. The 200-mile exclusive<br />
eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone is where <strong>the</strong> State has <strong>the</strong> right to exploit and develop <strong>the</strong> resources<br />
in <strong>the</strong> sea, all <strong>the</strong> way down to <strong>the</strong> seabed.<br />
3 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, p. 34.<br />
4 Constitutional Commission <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> July 2, 1986; I Record 305.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (JANUARY - MARCH <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Amado D. Valdez<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS, <strong>the</strong> continental shelf 5 comprising up to 200 nautical miles<br />
from <strong>the</strong> archipelagic baseline automatically belongs to a State and <strong>no</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
claim is required.<br />
The Convention, however, allows coastal States to claim jurisdiction over<br />
territories 200 nautical miles, or 360 kilometers beyond <strong>the</strong>ir boundaries and extend<br />
<strong>the</strong>se by 150 miles or 270 kilometers by 2009. For <strong>the</strong> extension, a State must<br />
conduct hydro-graphic and geo-scientific studies and submit <strong>the</strong> data to <strong>the</strong> UN<br />
Commission on <strong>the</strong> Limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Continental Shelf (CLCS), a significant and critical<br />
activity considering that parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group are about 230 nautical<br />
miles from Palawan.<br />
Just what do we stand to lose in <strong>the</strong> event that <strong>the</strong> Philippines fails to meet <strong>the</strong><br />
2009 deadline in claiming <strong>the</strong> extension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> continental shelf beyond <strong>the</strong> 200<br />
nautical mile boundary? Within <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group alone, <strong>the</strong> Chinese have<br />
estimated around 100 to 200 billion barrels <strong>of</strong> oil reserve as against <strong>the</strong> Russian<br />
estimate <strong>of</strong> a low <strong>of</strong> about seven billion barrels.<br />
It has been pointed out, however, that <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea Convention does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t treat questions <strong>of</strong> sovereignty over land territory. There is still a need to prove<br />
sovereignty over <strong>the</strong> islands from where <strong>the</strong> baseline is drawn before a country<br />
could claim its exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group,<br />
<strong>the</strong> issue is <strong>no</strong>t one <strong>of</strong> overlapping continental shelves between adjacent or opposite<br />
states but one <strong>of</strong> territorial dispute among different States claiming <strong>the</strong> said island<br />
territories.<br />
III. Exploration, Development, and Utilization <strong>of</strong> Natural<br />
Resources in <strong>the</strong> Spratlys<br />
May <strong>the</strong> Philippines enter into an arrangement with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r claimant States<br />
for <strong>the</strong> exploration, development, and utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural resources in <strong>the</strong><br />
Spratlys, more particularly <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group?<br />
By <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> UNCLOS alone <strong>the</strong> Philippines may explore, develop<br />
and utilize <strong>the</strong> natural resources in <strong>the</strong> Spratlys. The problem is that China and<br />
Vietnam are <strong>no</strong>t signatories to <strong>the</strong> Convention.<br />
Both countries claim rightful ownership over <strong>the</strong> islands on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> historic<br />
title while <strong>the</strong> Philippines based its claim on discovery and occupation. If only <strong>the</strong><br />
two countries yield to propinquity as <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> ownership and sovereignty, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is <strong>no</strong> doubt that <strong>the</strong> Philippines is situated nearest to <strong>the</strong> island groups.<br />
5 The seabed and subsoil <strong>of</strong> submarine areas where it ei<strong>the</strong>r gradually descends or drops <strong>of</strong>f into ocean floor.<br />
Arbitration, (Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands/United States <strong>of</strong> America Intervening), Award <strong>of</strong> 4 April 1928.<br />
60 IBP JOURNAL
THOUGHTS ON THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND UTILIZATION OF THE SPRATLYS<br />
There is a slew <strong>of</strong> arbitral and international court decisions in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> preeminence<br />
<strong>of</strong> actual and effective occupation over claims <strong>of</strong> historic title. The<br />
Philippines <strong>the</strong>n may enjoy a favorable position but China and Vietnam had, over<br />
time, reinforced <strong>the</strong>ir respective claims likewise by occupation. The Palmas 6 and<br />
Clipperton 7 decisions both required that an inchoate title to a discovered territory<br />
must be perfected within a reasonable period, although in <strong>the</strong> later Eastern<br />
Greenland 8 decision it was sufficient for <strong>the</strong> claimant-state to establish its title to <strong>the</strong><br />
territory in <strong>the</strong> period immediately prior to occupation. Once <strong>the</strong> historic claim is<br />
abandoned <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> sovereignty becomes a question occupation terra<br />
nullius. It is <strong>no</strong>t essential that a State immediately occupy <strong>the</strong> entire claimed territory<br />
<strong>no</strong>r is it necessary that <strong>the</strong> occupying State establish a special administration for <strong>the</strong><br />
same.<br />
Claimant-states are in stalemate for failure to agree on peaceful avenues<br />
available under international customary laws and conventions. With its military<br />
predominance, China will eventually gain an irreversible upper hand. Philippine<br />
sovereignty or ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group may just become a waning<br />
and whining rhetoric.<br />
What is pumping fuel into <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> sovereignty and jurisdiction is<br />
<strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intrinsic wealth <strong>of</strong> natural resources teeming in <strong>the</strong> area. A<br />
control over <strong>the</strong> area is a control over <strong>the</strong> exploitation and utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
resources.<br />
Since nearly about only six percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed area is above sea water,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is a growing consensus to develop a maritime approach and <strong>no</strong>t cutting up <strong>the</strong><br />
South China Seas like a big piece <strong>of</strong> real estate. It was suggested during a conference<br />
in 1995 9 than an International Spratlys Authority be established, leaving aside <strong>the</strong><br />
resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> sovereignty, jurisdiction and territory to such entity, in<br />
order to jointly develop <strong>the</strong> area.<br />
There are precedents to this approach although admittedly <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>no</strong>t on all<br />
fours to <strong>the</strong> Spratlys dilemma. There is <strong>the</strong> Antarctica model in 1959 which was<br />
established subject to <strong>the</strong> precondition that all claims would be suspended. A<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r<br />
model is <strong>the</strong> condominium regime prescribed by <strong>the</strong> International Court <strong>of</strong> Justice<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Gulf <strong>of</strong> Fonseca decision which concerned <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> islands and maritime<br />
spaces in <strong>the</strong> gulf shared by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 10<br />
It is argued that <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine government are tied by <strong>the</strong> selfimposed<br />
limitations <strong>of</strong> exclusivity in <strong>the</strong> exploration, exploitation, and development<br />
7 Clipperton Islands Arbitration, (France/Mexico Intervening), Award <strong>of</strong> 28 January 1931.<br />
8 Legal Status <strong>of</strong> Eastern Greenland Arbitration, (Denmark/Norway Intervening), 5 April 19<strong>33</strong>.<br />
9 Round Table Discussion on <strong>the</strong> Spratly Islands Dispute, UP Law Centeron 27 January, 1993.<br />
10 Case Concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening),<br />
Judgment <strong>of</strong> 11 September 1992.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (JANUARY - MARCH <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
61
Amado D. Valdez<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural resources in <strong>the</strong> Kalayaan Island Group, particularly Section 2, Article<br />
XII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution, to wit:<br />
“All lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r mineral oils, all forces <strong>of</strong> potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber,<br />
wildlife, flora and fauna, and o<strong>the</strong>r natural resources are owned by <strong>the</strong><br />
State. With <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> agricultural lands, all o<strong>the</strong>r natural resources<br />
shall <strong>no</strong>t be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization <strong>of</strong><br />
natural resources shall be under <strong>the</strong> full control and supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter<br />
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with<br />
Filipi<strong>no</strong> citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum<br />
<strong>of</strong> whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a<br />
period <strong>no</strong>t exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for <strong>no</strong>t more than<br />
twenty five years. xxx”<br />
The State shall protect <strong>the</strong> nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,<br />
territorial sea, and exclusive eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment<br />
exclusively to Filipi<strong>no</strong> citizens.”<br />
It is <strong>the</strong> author’s position that this limitation would apply only to natural<br />
resources in which our sovereignty, or even our mere ownership over <strong>the</strong>se resources<br />
is unchallenged by o<strong>the</strong>r countries. Since this area is an eco<strong>no</strong>mic zone and is part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> high seas, <strong>the</strong> general principles <strong>of</strong> international law on resolution <strong>of</strong> disputes<br />
have to be taken into consideration. 11 This conciliatory intent is attuned to <strong>the</strong> spirit<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution on <strong>the</strong> national territory.<br />
The fundamental consideration <strong>of</strong> our policy planners as well as <strong>the</strong> judiciary<br />
must be to interpret <strong>the</strong>se provision <strong>no</strong>t in <strong>the</strong> framework <strong>of</strong> territorial sovereignty<br />
but in consideration <strong>of</strong> such equally critical state interests as uplifting <strong>the</strong> well-being<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people within <strong>the</strong> framework <strong>of</strong> international law.<br />
The Philippines will definitely benefit from <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil reserves<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Spratlys.<br />
<br />
11 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, p. 1140.<br />
62 IBP JOURNAL
The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
The Legal Significance<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro<br />
Ancestral Domain *<br />
Vicente V. Mendoza**<br />
No o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>ficial document perhaps has excited as intensely or as emotionally<br />
as many people as <strong>the</strong> MOA on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain. Some thought<br />
it is a sell out <strong>of</strong> a portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine territory, o<strong>the</strong>rs a move on <strong>the</strong> sly to<br />
open <strong>the</strong> door for charter change, including extension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President’s term, while<br />
still o<strong>the</strong>rs thought it is part <strong>of</strong> America’s strategic planning in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> China’s<br />
growing influence in <strong>the</strong> region. Those advocating signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hand, say it is <strong>no</strong>thing but a piece <strong>of</strong> paper requiring approval in a plebiscite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
affected areas in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Philippines (Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu) and until signed<br />
and submitted for approval should <strong>no</strong>t alarm or unduly concern anyone.<br />
Much Ado About Nothing?<br />
Depending on <strong>the</strong>ir perception and perspective, <strong>the</strong> MOA is ei<strong>the</strong>r a proposed<br />
treaty, a proposed amendment to <strong>the</strong> law 1 creating <strong>the</strong> Auto<strong>no</strong>mous Region in Muslim<br />
Mindanao, or a proposed amendment to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, or an attempt on <strong>the</strong> part<br />
<strong>of</strong> a foreign power to streng<strong>the</strong>n its position in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Asian geopolitics.<br />
Whatever it is, if it is any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong> MOA certainly can<strong>no</strong>t just be ig<strong>no</strong>red<br />
as a piece <strong>of</strong> paper containing a list <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> parties intend to do. I can<strong>no</strong>t imagine<br />
any person, much less <strong>the</strong> government, to agree to take part in an idle ceremony <strong>of</strong><br />
signing a mere list <strong>of</strong> things wished for, to be done with all <strong>the</strong> solemnity <strong>of</strong> signing<br />
a treaty in a foreign country with <strong>the</strong> attendance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> Malaysia, <strong>the</strong> host country.<br />
The fact is that <strong>the</strong> MOA is a contract. One does <strong>no</strong>t make a contract, even one that<br />
needs <strong>the</strong> ratification <strong>of</strong> one’s principal for it to be binding and effective, if one has<br />
<strong>no</strong> intention to be bound by it. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> MOA is something, and excitement<br />
about it is <strong>no</strong>t about <strong>no</strong>thing but about something, something that is important.<br />
First, if <strong>the</strong> MOA is a proposed treaty, <strong>the</strong> question is, is <strong>the</strong> government<br />
negotiating a treaty with an independent state? Is <strong>the</strong> “Bangsamoro nation,” called<br />
* Lecture delivered at <strong>the</strong> U.P. Law Center MCLE Program held on August 28, <strong>2008</strong>.<br />
** Supreme Court Associate Justice (Retired).<br />
1 R.A. No. 6734, as amended by R.A. No. 9054.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Vicente V. Mendoza<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Juridical Entity in <strong>the</strong> MOA, being recognized as a body politic<br />
possessing <strong>the</strong> attributes <strong>of</strong> a sovereign state? If so, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> assumption is that <strong>the</strong><br />
BJE is a state, which is perhaps semi-independent, and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> MOA, as any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r treaty, must be ratified by <strong>the</strong> President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and concurred in<br />
by 2/3 vote <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Senate in accordance with <strong>the</strong> Constitution. 2<br />
The problem is that this is <strong>no</strong>t provided in <strong>the</strong> MOA. What <strong>the</strong> MOA provides is<br />
that our “legal framework,” assuming <strong>the</strong> term means <strong>the</strong> Constitution, should be<br />
amended instead to make it conform to <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA and <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution or organic act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE, called <strong>the</strong> “Comprehensive Compact.”<br />
Second, if <strong>the</strong> MOA is a proposed amendment to <strong>the</strong> Organic Act for <strong>the</strong><br />
ARMM, it must be enacted into law after appropriate consultation with <strong>the</strong> local<br />
government units and be approved by a majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constituent units in accordance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Constitution. 3 However, this is <strong>no</strong>t provided ei<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> MOA. In fact <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution is <strong>no</strong>t even mentioned in <strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
Third, if <strong>the</strong> MOA is an agreement to submit a proposed amendment or revision<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution ei<strong>the</strong>r to Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, or to a<br />
constitutional convention called by Congress, and <strong>the</strong>n submit <strong>the</strong> proposed<br />
amendment to a plebiscite held throughout <strong>the</strong> country and <strong>no</strong>t only in <strong>the</strong> constituent<br />
local government units, again, this is <strong>no</strong>t provided in <strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
The irony is that while <strong>the</strong> government panel is talking <strong>of</strong> a document that is<br />
incomplete and <strong>no</strong>t effective for both sides until ratified or approved in accordance<br />
with its constitutional processes, <strong>the</strong> MILF panel is talking <strong>of</strong> a completed document<br />
that is already effective once signed although still to be ratified in accordance with<br />
<strong>the</strong> “internal processes” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government. It seems <strong>the</strong> two panels are talking on<br />
totally different wavelengths, thus preventing a meeting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir minds!<br />
So what do I think <strong>the</strong> MOA is?<br />
The MOA is an instrument <strong>of</strong> recognition cum treaty<br />
The MOA is an instrument <strong>of</strong> recognition and a proposed treaty. As an<br />
instrument <strong>of</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro as a semi-independent state, <strong>the</strong> MOA<br />
has instant effect once signed by <strong>the</strong> parties, although arguably <strong>the</strong> initials <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
chairmen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two panels, representing <strong>the</strong> two parties, might be considered as<br />
fully effective as <strong>the</strong>ir full signatures. The state recognized may be likened to <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines under <strong>the</strong> Commonwealth regime, which belonged to <strong>the</strong> United States<br />
<strong>of</strong> America as an unincorporated territory and so was subject to its sovereignty and<br />
control although allowed limited freedom to enter into relations with o<strong>the</strong>r counties.<br />
2 Art. VII, § 21.<br />
3 Art. X, § 18.<br />
64 IBP JOURNAL
The Legal Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain<br />
The BJE is contemplated, at least for <strong>no</strong>w, to be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine territory,<br />
entitled as such to <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine government. In that sense, what<br />
Stanley Kar<strong>no</strong>w said to describe Philippine auto<strong>no</strong>my during <strong>the</strong> Commonwealth<br />
era applies to <strong>the</strong> BJE’s independence: “dependent independence.” 4 Or <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro may be likened to its claim to what its former status was, as a state<br />
under <strong>the</strong> suzerainty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sultanates which were “nation-states in <strong>the</strong> modern sense,”<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
The premise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA is that <strong>the</strong> BJE is a semi-independent state. That is<br />
<strong>the</strong> reason <strong>the</strong> MOA does <strong>no</strong>t purport to be made in accord with <strong>the</strong> Constitution or<br />
<strong>the</strong> Organic Act for <strong>the</strong> ARMM. Any contrariety between <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA – and <strong>the</strong>re are many — must be removed by amending <strong>the</strong> Constitution and<br />
<strong>the</strong> laws to bring <strong>the</strong>m in conformity with <strong>the</strong> MOA. Talk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution – that<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t apply to this document. This view is reinforced by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> MOA<br />
was set for <strong>the</strong> signing “in <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong>” <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs and <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister <strong>of</strong> foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> Malaysia where <strong>the</strong> ceremony was to be held on August<br />
5, <strong>2008</strong>, attended by representatives <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
Let me <strong>no</strong>w consider <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
Salient features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA<br />
The MOA deals with three subjects: territory, resources, and governance. I<br />
will discuss <strong>the</strong> salient provisions concerning each and <strong>the</strong>ir underlying “Concepts<br />
and Principles.”<br />
1. The Moros and indige<strong>no</strong>us peoples, who are natives or original inhabitants<br />
<strong>of</strong> Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish conquest and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
descendants, constitute a distinct group k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoros 5<br />
2. Their territory embraces <strong>the</strong> regions <strong>of</strong> Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan and<br />
is composed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local government units listed in Annexes A and B <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
Its “core” is <strong>the</strong> geographic area <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ARMM. This territory consists <strong>of</strong> ancestral,<br />
communal and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains, <strong>the</strong> aerial<br />
domain, <strong>the</strong> air space above and <strong>the</strong> natural resources. 6<br />
3. This territory is <strong>the</strong> homeland <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro people. Ownership is<br />
“vested exclusively” in <strong>the</strong>m “by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir prior rights <strong>of</strong> occupation . . . since<br />
time immemorial” as <strong>the</strong> “first politically dominant occupants.” 7 The territory “does<br />
4 In Our Image 323 (1989).<br />
5 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON THE ANCESTRAL DOMAIN ASPECT OF THE GRP-MILF<br />
TRIPOLI AGREEMENT ON PEACE OF 2001 (MOA), Concepts and Principles par. 1.<br />
6 MOA, Territory par. 1; Concepts and Principles par. 13.<br />
7 Concepts and Principles par. 2.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (JANUARY - MARCH <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Vicente V. Mendoza<br />
<strong>no</strong>t [<strong>the</strong>refore] form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines under Art. XII,<br />
Sec. 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution 8 which belongs to <strong>the</strong> Philippines in accordance with <strong>the</strong><br />
Regalian doctrine.<br />
4. As owners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ancestral domain, <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro people, organized as<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, have jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> development, utilization,<br />
and disposition <strong>of</strong> all natural resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal waters which extend from <strong>the</strong><br />
coastline <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE up to 15 kilometers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. With<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> mineral resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial sea, which extends beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
baselines, <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction and authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE is concurrent or joint with that<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine government. 9 The pr<strong>of</strong>it split from production shall be shared<br />
between <strong>the</strong> government and <strong>the</strong> BJE, on <strong>the</strong> basis 75:25 percent in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE<br />
“as <strong>the</strong> party having control within its territorial jurisdiction.” 10<br />
5. The government undertakes “to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal<br />
measures,” a plebiscite in <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro territory within 12 months after <strong>the</strong> signing<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA for <strong>the</strong> approval <strong>of</strong> an enlarged territory consisting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present<br />
ARMM and <strong>the</strong> additional local government units listed in Annexes A and B <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA. 11 This is very vague, if <strong>no</strong>t obfuscating, but it seems to mean in clear language<br />
that <strong>the</strong> government obliges itself to amend <strong>the</strong> organic act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ARMM and, if<br />
necessary, <strong>the</strong> Constitution, to suit <strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
6. The Bangsamoro people have a right to “self governance” based on ancestral<br />
territoriality, exercised by <strong>the</strong>m as protectorates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sultanates and <strong>the</strong> “Pat a<br />
Pagampong ku Ranaw” which had <strong>the</strong> attributes <strong>of</strong> modern nation-states. 12<br />
7. As a juridical entity, <strong>the</strong> Bansangmoro nation has a right to enter into<br />
eco<strong>no</strong>mic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries, establish trade<br />
missions in such countries, and participate in international meetings and events,<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> ASEAN and <strong>the</strong> specialized agencies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations. 13 For its<br />
part, <strong>the</strong> government will take steps to ensure <strong>the</strong> effective exercise <strong>of</strong> this power <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> BJE in foreign trade and eco<strong>no</strong>mic relations.<br />
8. The BJE can organize its own institutions, including <strong>the</strong> civil service, electoral,<br />
financial, banking, education, legislation, legal, eco<strong>no</strong>mic, and police internal security<br />
force, judicial system and correctional institution. 14<br />
8 Id. pars. 3-4; Territory par. 1.<br />
9 Territory par. 2 (f)-(g).<br />
10 Resources pars. 5-6.<br />
11 Territory par. 2 (d).<br />
12 Concepts and Principles par. 4.<br />
13 Resources par. 4.<br />
14 Governance par. 8.<br />
66 IBP JOURNAL
The Legal Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain<br />
The BJE as a semi-independent state<br />
As I stated before, <strong>the</strong> MOA is an instrument <strong>of</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> a semiindependent<br />
state “<strong>the</strong> ultimate objective [<strong>of</strong>] which] is to secure <strong>the</strong> identity and<br />
posterity <strong>of</strong> [<strong>the</strong> Bangsamoros], to protect <strong>the</strong>ir property rights and resources as<br />
well as to establish a system <strong>of</strong> governance suitable and acceptable to <strong>the</strong>m as a<br />
distinct dominant people 15 in order to realize <strong>the</strong>ir humanitarian and eco<strong>no</strong>mic needs<br />
as well as <strong>the</strong>ir political aspirations.” 16<br />
The entity so recognized is a body politic organized by common consent for<br />
mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote <strong>the</strong> general welfare. The picture<br />
presented by <strong>the</strong> MOA fits into <strong>the</strong> accepted definition <strong>of</strong> a state as “a nation, its<br />
people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means <strong>of</strong><br />
its government will over <strong>the</strong> individuals within its territory and maintaining a separate<br />
international identity.” 17 At <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> descending into pedantry, it may be said that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is in <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, or BJE, all <strong>the</strong> elements <strong>of</strong> a state,<br />
namely, people, territory, sovereignty, and government. 18<br />
It is indeed true that <strong>the</strong> BJE is <strong>no</strong>t fully independent or sovereign and indeed<br />
it is dependent on <strong>the</strong> Philippine government for its external defense and only lacks<br />
foreign recognition, at least at <strong>the</strong> present time. None<strong>the</strong>less it is a state as <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines was a state during <strong>the</strong> Commonwealth period, which was <strong>no</strong>t a part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States although subject to its sovereignty. As a state, it<br />
was a signatory to several treaties and international agreements, such as <strong>the</strong> Charter<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations <strong>of</strong> January 1, 1942, and a participant in several conferences<br />
such as that held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 1-22, 1944, on <strong>the</strong><br />
GATT. As <strong>the</strong> U.S. Supreme Court <strong>no</strong>ted in Hooven & Allison Co. vs. Evatt, 19 <strong>the</strong><br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1935 Constitution prepared <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>the</strong> complete independence<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> government organized under it had been given, in many<br />
aspects, by <strong>the</strong> United States “<strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> an independent government which has<br />
been reflected in its relation as such with <strong>the</strong> outside world.” Similarly, <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />
Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines held in Laurel vs. Misa that “<strong>the</strong> Commonwealth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines was a sovereign government although <strong>no</strong>t absolute.” 20<br />
15 Concepts and Principles par. 4; Governance par. 7.<br />
16 Concepts and Principles par. 2.<br />
17 Collector <strong>of</strong> Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971).<br />
18 See, e.g., Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law 4 (1962); Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines 54 (1978); Isagani Cruz, Philippine Political Law 14-18 (1993).<br />
19 324 U.S. 652, 676 (1945).<br />
20 77 Phil. 856, 863 (1947).<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (JANUARY - MARCH <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
67
Vicente V. Mendoza<br />
Given this description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE as a dominant group with a distinct culture,<br />
socio-eco<strong>no</strong>mic structure, and religion, pursuing <strong>the</strong>ir own political aspirations, and<br />
occupying a definite territory over which <strong>the</strong>y have exclusive dominion, possessing a<br />
government with its own financial, monetary and banking systems, and carrying on<br />
foreign trade relations, <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA by <strong>the</strong> Philippine government could<br />
constitute an act <strong>of</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> an independent state. 21 Such recognition would be<br />
beyond <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> courts. The MOA, in short, could be <strong>the</strong> instrument<br />
<strong>of</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE under international law.<br />
The MOA as a treaty<br />
This is <strong>the</strong> reason why unlike <strong>the</strong> 1976 Tripoli Agreement with <strong>the</strong> MNLF and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Tripoli Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1996 and various o<strong>the</strong>r peace agreements with <strong>the</strong> MILF,<br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA makes <strong>no</strong> pretense at being in accord with <strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution. It<br />
stands in sharp contrast to <strong>the</strong> 1976 agreement which provides for <strong>the</strong> establishment<br />
<strong>of</strong> auto<strong>no</strong>my in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Philippines “within <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sovereignty and<br />
territorial integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.” The MOA also stands in<br />
sharp contrast to <strong>the</strong> 1998 peace agreement with <strong>the</strong> MILF, which provides that<br />
“any conflict in <strong>the</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> this Agreement shall be resolved in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution and existing laws.”<br />
In contrast, under <strong>the</strong> MOA, it is <strong>the</strong> Philippine government which is required<br />
to make <strong>the</strong> necessary changes in its “legal framework” to make it conform to <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA. The MOA seems to be saying that, as far as <strong>the</strong> MILF is concerned, everything<br />
is done (a “done deal”), and it is all up to <strong>the</strong> Philippine government to change its<br />
Constitution and laws to make <strong>the</strong>m conform to <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA and <strong>the</strong><br />
Comprehensive Compact on <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE.<br />
The MOA, a negation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
Speaking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutionality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA, definitely it is unconstitutional<br />
even if approved as an amendment to <strong>the</strong> Organic Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ARMM. 22 Mention has<br />
been made <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that under <strong>the</strong> MOA <strong>the</strong> BJE is given jurisdiction (control)<br />
over <strong>the</strong> utilization and disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural resources 23 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land and <strong>the</strong><br />
natural resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal waters which extend from <strong>the</strong> coastline <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE<br />
up 15 kilometers, and “joint jurisdiction” with <strong>the</strong> government over <strong>the</strong> utilization<br />
and disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> territorial waters which extend from<br />
<strong>the</strong> outer limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal waters up to <strong>the</strong> baselines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. That is<br />
definitely contrary to Article XII, Sec. 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, which provides that all<br />
21 Sinco, supra <strong>no</strong>te 18 at 298-300; Jovito R. Salonga & Pedro L. Yap, Public International Law 94-96 (1958).<br />
22 R.A. No. 6734, as amended by R.A. No. 9054.<br />
23 Resources pars. 1-2.<br />
68 IBP JOURNAL
The Legal Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA on <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, <strong>the</strong> waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and o<strong>the</strong>r mineral<br />
oils, forces <strong>of</strong> potential energy, fisheries, timber, wild life, flora and fauna and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
natural resources and <strong>the</strong> right to explore, develop, or use <strong>the</strong>m belong to State.<br />
But that is just <strong>the</strong> point. Under <strong>the</strong> MOA <strong>the</strong> government ack<strong>no</strong>wledges that<br />
ancestral domains and ancestral lands belong exclusively to <strong>the</strong> BJE. In one case, 24<br />
six justices expressed <strong>the</strong> view that while <strong>the</strong> State has sovereignty over <strong>the</strong> territory<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, it does <strong>no</strong>t have dominion over all <strong>the</strong> lands embraced within <strong>the</strong><br />
territory because ancestral domains and ancestral lands do <strong>no</strong>t form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
public domain but belong instead to <strong>the</strong> indige<strong>no</strong>us people by virtue <strong>of</strong> native title.<br />
The view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> six justices <strong>of</strong> course lacked <strong>the</strong> concurrence <strong>of</strong> two more Justices to<br />
constitute <strong>the</strong> majority opinion in that case. Now, by declaring that <strong>the</strong> ancestral<br />
domain and ancestral lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro people do <strong>no</strong>t form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public<br />
domain, <strong>the</strong> MOA settles <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution by fiat.<br />
More significantly, under Article I <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Philippines has<br />
sovereignty over <strong>the</strong> entire territory defined in that Article. That is <strong>the</strong> absolute<br />
power to govern persons and things within its territory, including private lands.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> MOA, <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> State is compromised by declaring that with<br />
respect to <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro ancestral domain and ancestral lands, <strong>the</strong> “relationship<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Central Government and <strong>the</strong> BJE shall be associative, characterized by<br />
shared authority and responsibility.” 25 That, in international law, is <strong>the</strong> condominium<br />
<strong>of</strong> two states (<strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Juridical Entity) over a territory<br />
(<strong>the</strong> ancestral domain and ancestral lands). Both attributes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines statehood<br />
– its dominium (or ownership) and its imperium (or authority) — are thus qualified in<br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA.<br />
The first thing a student learns in law school is that <strong>the</strong> Constitution is <strong>the</strong><br />
supreme law, anything contrary to it being void. This is <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supremacy<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution over <strong>of</strong>ficial action. Its rationale was explained early in 1803 in<br />
Marbury vs. Madison 26 by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Supreme Court, through <strong>the</strong> Chief Justice, thus:<br />
Certainly, all those who have framed constitutions contemplate <strong>the</strong>m as<br />
forming <strong>the</strong> fundamental and paramount law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation, and<br />
consequently, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> every such government must be that<br />
an act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislature, repugnant to <strong>the</strong> constitution, is void.<br />
But, under its terms, <strong>the</strong> MOA can<strong>no</strong>t be void for being contrary to <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution. It is in fact irrelevant to ask whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> MOA is <strong>no</strong>t unconstitutional.<br />
So that it will <strong>no</strong>t be unconstitutional, it requires that <strong>the</strong> Constitution be amended<br />
so as to harmonize with <strong>the</strong> MOA. Adjust <strong>the</strong> Constitution to accommodate <strong>the</strong><br />
24 Cruz vs. Secretary <strong>of</strong> Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 18 (2000).<br />
25 Governance par. 4.<br />
26 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (JANUARY - MARCH <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
69
Vicente V. Mendoza<br />
MOA, <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> MOA to make it accord with <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Even <strong>the</strong> ancient<br />
sophists could <strong>no</strong>t have concocted such a <strong>the</strong>ory to go around <strong>the</strong> doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
The significance <strong>of</strong> recognizing <strong>the</strong> BJE as a semi-independent<br />
state<br />
The only way to save <strong>the</strong> MOA from invalidity is to consider it an instrument<br />
for <strong>the</strong> recognition and declaration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE. But are we<br />
willing or minded to do that, in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> peace in Mindanao? Once signed, <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA, will immediately be effective, for under our system <strong>of</strong> government <strong>the</strong><br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> a state is <strong>the</strong> sole prerogative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President. Its exercise is a political<br />
question, which is beyond <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> judicial review. Insistence on review by <strong>the</strong><br />
courts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President can only result in a reprise <strong>of</strong> Javellana vs. Executive<br />
Secretary, 27 in which it was held that whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> 1973 Constitution had been<br />
effectively ratified by <strong>the</strong> people in so-called citizens assemblies was a political<br />
question, giving <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>no</strong> alternative but to dismiss petitions raising this question<br />
and, consequently, leaving “<strong>no</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r judicial obstacle” in considering <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution in force and effect.<br />
27 50 SCRA 30 (1973).<br />
<br />
70 IBP JOURNAL
The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
The Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement<br />
on Ancestral Domain:<br />
A Commentary<br />
Nasser A. Marohomsalic*<br />
Musa I. Malayang**<br />
Carim L. Panumpang**<br />
Rasol Y. Mitmug, Jr.**<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
A civilization can be judged<br />
by <strong>the</strong> way it treats its mi<strong>no</strong>rities.<br />
- Mahatma Gandhi***<br />
On 27 July <strong>2008</strong> and after eleven (11) years <strong>of</strong> negotiation, <strong>of</strong>ten marked, nay,<br />
marred with interregna occasioned by disagreement over <strong>no</strong>menclatures 1 and<br />
outbreaks <strong>of</strong> hostilities, <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
(GRP, for brevity) and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, for brevity)<br />
* Marohomsalic is <strong>the</strong> Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim Legal Assistant Foundation (MUSLAF) that intervened in G.R.<br />
Nos. 183591 and 183752 where petitioners assailed <strong>the</strong> constitutionality and validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, a<br />
Member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive Committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE), a Co-Conve<strong>no</strong>r<br />
and Fellow <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), a Presidential Assistant on Muslim<br />
Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Integrated</strong> <strong>Bar</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines (IBP), a founding Member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Counsels for <strong>the</strong> Defense <strong>of</strong><br />
Liberties (CODAL), a former Commissioner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, a former Commissioner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Regional Consultative Commission for Muslim Mindanao (RCCMM), and author <strong>of</strong> “Aristocrats <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Malay<br />
Race: A History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsa Moro Muslims in <strong>the</strong> Philippines” and “Towards Peace, Auto<strong>no</strong>my and Human<br />
Rights.”<br />
** The rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> authors are also executive <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MUSLAF.<br />
*** WHITEKAR, BEN, ed. 1973. The Fourth World: Victims <strong>of</strong> Group Oppression—Eight Reports from <strong>the</strong><br />
Fieldwork <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mi<strong>no</strong>rity Rights Groups. New York: Schocken Books cited in Vijapur, Abdulrahim P.,<br />
International Protection <strong>of</strong> Mi<strong>no</strong>rity Rights, International Studies 2006, 43, 367 (2006)<br />
1 In a meeting on 07 July <strong>2008</strong> at <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Presidential Adviser for Peace Process (OPAPP) at Pasig City,<br />
Secretary and Peace Adviser Esperon briefed Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic, former Secretary Amina Rasul, Atty.<br />
Carim Panumpang, former Senator Santanina Rasul and Mr. Yusoph Ledesma that <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel and<br />
<strong>the</strong> MILF Peace Panel had a long lay-<strong>of</strong>f over <strong>the</strong>ir disagreement on <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> certain words and phrases in <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA-AD. Government, he said, was aversed to <strong>the</strong> word “freedom” and <strong>the</strong> phrase <strong>the</strong> “right to selfdetermination”,<br />
which are mantras to <strong>the</strong> MILF. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> MILF objected to <strong>the</strong> phrase<br />
“constitutional process.” In <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, <strong>the</strong> word “freedom” and <strong>the</strong> phrase “right to self-determination”<br />
didn’t appear, and so was <strong>the</strong> phrase “constitutional process.” In an interview with <strong>the</strong> media, Justice Secretary<br />
Raul Gonzales disclosed that it was President Macapagal who deleted <strong>the</strong> word “freedom” from <strong>the</strong> draft MOA-<br />
AD, <strong>the</strong> President thinking that “any mention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word… might give <strong>the</strong> Muslim <strong>the</strong> idea that <strong>the</strong>y could<br />
secede [from <strong>the</strong> Philippines].” In <strong>the</strong> September 30, <strong>2008</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. A5.<br />
71
Marohomsalic, Malayang, Panumpang and Mitmug<br />
concluded and initialed a framework agreement 2 k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Memorandum <strong>of</strong><br />
Agreement on <strong>the</strong> Ancestral Domain Aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement<br />
<strong>of</strong> Peace <strong>of</strong> 2001 (MOA-AD, for brevity).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Agreement, <strong>the</strong> territorial boundary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsa Moro homeland is<br />
classified as a “territory under compact” (daru-ul ma’hada) or “territory under peace<br />
agreement” (dar-ul-sulh), 3 which shall be entrenched with fur<strong>the</strong>r territories or areas 4 ,<br />
which modality is a relative recent invention in treaty-making. 5 These geographic<br />
areas constituted also <strong>the</strong> ancestral domain and ancestral lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro<br />
over which <strong>the</strong> “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE for brevity) shall have authority<br />
and jurisdiction,” particularly exercising “proprietary or patrimonial and political<br />
sovereignty” and sharing powers with <strong>the</strong> Central Government according to some<br />
terms and over some areas <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> including its territorial waters and seabed. 6<br />
On <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Agreement is a recognition by <strong>the</strong> GRP and <strong>the</strong> MILF <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> need, nay, obligation to negotiate and conclude a Comprehensive Compact where<br />
“<strong>the</strong> mechanisms and modalities for <strong>the</strong> actual implementation <strong>of</strong> this MOA-AD<br />
shall be spelt out…” 7 including <strong>the</strong> “structure <strong>of</strong> governance” for <strong>the</strong> BJE and <strong>the</strong><br />
relationship between <strong>the</strong> Central Government and <strong>the</strong> BJE. 8<br />
The MOA-AD was scheduled for ceremonial signing on 05 August <strong>2008</strong> in<br />
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, between <strong>the</strong> representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MILF and <strong>the</strong> GRP.<br />
Mohagher Iqbal, <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Information <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MILF and Head <strong>of</strong> its<br />
Peace Panel, was set to sign <strong>the</strong> Agreement for <strong>the</strong> Liberation Front. For <strong>the</strong><br />
Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, Secretary Rodolfo Garcia, <strong>the</strong> Chair<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel, was tasked to sign it. To stand as witness-signatory for <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA-AD was Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, <strong>the</strong> Special Adviser to <strong>the</strong> Prime<br />
Minister <strong>of</strong> Malaysia. Dr. Alberto G. Romulo, Secretary <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and Dato Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> Malaysia, were named in <strong>the</strong> Agreement too as signatories –<br />
witnesses. Also, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD named Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to<br />
Organization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy<br />
for Peace Process in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Philippines, as an endorser <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said Agreement<br />
and was tasked to sign it as such.<br />
Dignitaries and diplomats were invited to witness <strong>the</strong> occasion. Among those<br />
who arrived in Malaysia included <strong>the</strong> U.S. Ambassador to <strong>the</strong> Philippines, <strong>the</strong><br />
2 See Atty. Michael O. Mastura, Brief Commentary on MOA-AD, at www.luwaran.com.<br />
3 Paragraph 8 on Terms <strong>of</strong> Reference, MOA-AD.<br />
4 Paragraph 2(c)(d)(e) on Territory, MOA-AD.<br />
5 Mastura, supra.<br />
6 Paragraph 6 on Concepts and Principles, MOA-AD and pars. 3, 5 and 6on Territory, MOA-AD.<br />
7 Paragraph 7 on Governance, MOA-AD.<br />
8 Paragraphs. 2, 4 and 8, id.<br />
72 IBP JOURNAL
The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
Japanese Ambassador to <strong>the</strong> Philippines, <strong>the</strong> Australian Ambassador to <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines, <strong>the</strong> Libyan Minister Counselor to <strong>the</strong> Philippines, Presidential Adviser<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Peace Process Secretary Esperon, Jr. and Moro leaders including former<br />
Secretary Amina Rasul, among o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> ceremonial signing did <strong>no</strong>t happen. In <strong>the</strong> after<strong>no</strong>on <strong>of</strong> 04 August<br />
<strong>2008</strong> and when everybody was in Malaysia for <strong>the</strong> purpose, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court<br />
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Secretary Rodolfo Garcia and <strong>the</strong><br />
GRP Peace Panel <strong>no</strong>t to sign <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD pursuant to a number <strong>of</strong> petitions lodged<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Agreement. 9<br />
Opposition<br />
Individually or collectively, <strong>the</strong> petitions scored <strong>the</strong> Agreement for its illegal<br />
and unconstitutional provisions, <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> government to render <strong>the</strong>m a copy<br />
<strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> in violation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir constitutional right to public information and <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong><br />
transparency or lack <strong>of</strong> consultation during <strong>the</strong> negotiation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD.<br />
Particularly, <strong>the</strong>y raised alarums over <strong>the</strong> alleged creation in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity as a separate independent state and <strong>the</strong> dismemberment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country <strong>the</strong>reby.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> media, petitioners drummed up <strong>the</strong>ir advocacy, de<strong>no</strong>uncing <strong>the</strong> Executive<br />
Department and <strong>the</strong> Presidency for arbitrarily ceding a piece <strong>of</strong> Philippine<br />
territory in <strong>the</strong> south to <strong>the</strong> MILF to establish an independent Bangsamoro State<br />
named Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. The negative coverage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> media <strong>of</strong>, and <strong>the</strong><br />
undue reaction <strong>of</strong> Christian leaders <strong>of</strong> influence to, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, muffled and<br />
drowned <strong>the</strong> Muslim perspective on <strong>the</strong> Agreement.<br />
But what is <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD all about? Why <strong>the</strong> furor? Is it a political furnace<br />
that spews out toxins on <strong>the</strong> national fabric <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country?<br />
MOA-AD is an Interim Agreement<br />
The MOA-AD is a work in progress. A lawyer-member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MILF Peace<br />
Panel Atty. Michael Mastura, so described it, thus:<br />
It is a framework agreement for entrenching later, and more detailed,<br />
comprehensive compact (and legal measures) which elaborate <strong>the</strong> principles<br />
declared in this Agreement. 10<br />
9 The petitions are docketed as G.R. Nos. 183591 and 183752 and still pending with <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court as <strong>of</strong> this<br />
writing.<br />
10 Mastura, supra..<br />
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Attorney Musib Buat, a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r lawyer-member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MILF Peace Panel,<br />
described it as an Interim Agreement, its provisions needing fur<strong>the</strong>r elaboration<br />
and entrenchment for <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact, which agreement comes at <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiation. 11<br />
The MOA-AD said as much <strong>of</strong> its nature and characteristics. In paragraph 7<br />
on Governance, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD provides, thus:<br />
The Parties agree that <strong>the</strong> mechanisms and modalities for <strong>the</strong> actual<br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive<br />
Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.<br />
Any provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD requiring amendments to <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
legal framework shall come into force upon signing <strong>of</strong> a Comprehensive<br />
Compact and upon effecting <strong>the</strong> necessary changes to <strong>the</strong> legal framework<br />
with due regard to <strong>no</strong>n-derogation <strong>of</strong> prior agreements and within <strong>the</strong><br />
stipulated timeframe to be contained in <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact.<br />
The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity is <strong>the</strong> political structure that is a component<br />
<strong>of</strong> mechanisms and modalities that will operationalize <strong>the</strong> whole concepts, principles<br />
and measures <strong>of</strong> self-determination defined in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD including <strong>the</strong> associative<br />
relationship between <strong>the</strong> Central Government and <strong>the</strong> BJE. As it is, <strong>the</strong> BJE and<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter’s fundamental structures (i.e., executive, legislative, judicial and<br />
administrative) have yet to be negotiated and agreed upon for consideration into <strong>the</strong><br />
Comprehensive Compact. 12 Paragraph 8 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD under <strong>the</strong> same Title<br />
specified <strong>the</strong> institutions that shall be devolved to <strong>the</strong> BJE but its details are made<br />
subject to future discussion. These institutions are, namely, civil service, electoral,<br />
financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, eco<strong>no</strong>mic, and police and internal<br />
security force, judicial system and correctional institutions. O<strong>the</strong>r matters concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> agreed consensus points on governance <strong>no</strong>t covered under <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA-AD including <strong>the</strong> modalities for <strong>the</strong> governance intended to settle <strong>the</strong><br />
outstanding negotiated political issues are deferred to future negotiations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Comprehensive Compact. 13<br />
Also, according to <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, <strong>the</strong> details for <strong>the</strong> management <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
territorial waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE are going to be provided in an agreement to be entered<br />
into by <strong>the</strong> Parties. 14<br />
11 This is <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> Atty. Musib Buat who spoke at a Public Forum on <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD at <strong>the</strong> Malcolm Theater,<br />
U.P. College <strong>of</strong> Law, Diliman, Quezon City, 19 August <strong>2008</strong>.<br />
12 Paragraph 4 on Governance, MOA-AD.<br />
13 Paragraphs 6 and 10, id.<br />
14 Paragraph. 2(g) on Territory, MOA-AD.<br />
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Requirement for <strong>the</strong> Enactment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE Basic Law and <strong>the</strong> Amendment/<br />
Revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
It must be emphasized that <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD does <strong>no</strong>t even consider <strong>the</strong> execution<br />
<strong>of</strong> a Comprehensive Compact as <strong>the</strong> curtains <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace talks.<br />
Paragraph 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD under <strong>the</strong> Title on Governance provides that<br />
“The Parties shall faithfully comply with <strong>the</strong>ir commitment to <strong>the</strong> associative<br />
arrangements upon entry into force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact” but <strong>the</strong> same<br />
section provides for <strong>the</strong> proviso, albeit <strong>no</strong>t in <strong>the</strong> usual legal form, that <strong>the</strong><br />
“institutions for governance in a Comprehensive Compact, toge<strong>the</strong>r with its modalities<br />
during <strong>the</strong> transition period, shall be fully entrenched and established in <strong>the</strong> basic<br />
law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE.” This means that <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact has to go through<br />
<strong>the</strong> legislative mill for its enactment into law.<br />
Paragraph 7 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same Title described <strong>the</strong> process more clearly, thus:<br />
Any provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD requiring amendments to <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
legal framework shall come into force upon signing <strong>of</strong> a Comprehensive<br />
Compact and upon effecting <strong>the</strong> necessary changes to <strong>the</strong> legal framework<br />
with due regard to <strong>no</strong>n-derogation <strong>of</strong> prior agreements and within <strong>the</strong><br />
stipulated timeframe to be contained in <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact.<br />
By any language, <strong>the</strong> “legal framework” referred to here would mean <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Constitutional System and its statutory components.<br />
In brief, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, in <strong>the</strong> above-named provision, calls for an enactment<br />
<strong>of</strong> a Basic Law for <strong>the</strong> BJE, which power belongs to <strong>the</strong> Legislature and <strong>the</strong> Executive<br />
Department, including <strong>the</strong> amendment or revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution when necessary.<br />
Our submission jives with <strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel that <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA-AD is “subject to fur<strong>the</strong>r discussions as to <strong>the</strong> details <strong>of</strong> its provisions.” 15<br />
Thus:<br />
Once <strong>the</strong> details are discussed and agreed to, <strong>the</strong>se will be incorporated,<br />
among o<strong>the</strong>rs, into <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact document. 16<br />
To implement provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Agreement, <strong>the</strong> Executive branch will<br />
undertake <strong>the</strong> necessary processes, where needed, to effect changes to<br />
<strong>the</strong> existing legal framework. This will range from <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary executive issuances (Executive Order), national laws (Republic<br />
15 Item No. 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Primer on <strong>the</strong> Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement on Ancestral Domain, prepared by OPAPP.<br />
16 Id.<br />
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Acts), and perhaps Constitutional amendment (via Constituent Assembly<br />
or Constitutional Convention) to legally entrench our arrangement on<br />
<strong>the</strong> BJE. 17<br />
The MILF is <strong>no</strong>t oblivious to <strong>the</strong> political and legal predicament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. In his article entitled The Constitutional<br />
Dilemma: Impact and Implications on <strong>the</strong> GRP and MILF Peace Process, Atty. Buat wrote<br />
e<strong>no</strong>ugh <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> liberation front on <strong>the</strong> constitutional track <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
government. Thus:<br />
The MILF as we understand is <strong>no</strong>t necessarily adverse to <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
phrase “constitutional process” but this should be meant as taking<br />
appropriate legal steps including <strong>the</strong> revision or amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine Constitution or <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> a legislation by Congress, after<br />
both Parties have signed and entered into a comprehensive peace compact,<br />
during <strong>the</strong> transition period <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity<br />
(BJE) in order to give meaning and effect <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> entrenching <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
entity while <strong>the</strong> same undergoes institution and capacity building while<br />
being devolved with appropriate powers and authority towards effective<br />
self-governance preparatory to <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> its political status<br />
via popular consultation leading to a referendum. This is in essence is<br />
along <strong>the</strong> track <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> emerging approach <strong>of</strong> “earned sovereignty” <strong>the</strong><br />
elements <strong>of</strong> which are found in several international peace agreements,<br />
such as that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> sovereignty-based disputes in South Sudan,<br />
Bougainville, Western Sahara, Kosovo and Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Ireland. 18<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> revising or amending <strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution<br />
or <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> a legislative act by Congress is internal to <strong>the</strong> Central<br />
Government and <strong>the</strong> MILF do <strong>no</strong>t wish to participate in said political<br />
exercise being consistent on its position in <strong>no</strong>t recognizing <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
as a framework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace negotiations but that <strong>of</strong> international law. It<br />
is <strong>the</strong> duty and obligation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government as a Party to <strong>the</strong> GRP-MILF<br />
Peace Talks to take appropriate legal steps or “constitutional processes”<br />
whenever appropriate to see to it that <strong>the</strong> Peace Accord reached and<br />
entered into by <strong>the</strong> contracting Parties are implemented and complied<br />
with by both sides. 19<br />
In his Brief Commentary on MOA-AD, Atty. Mastura expressed e<strong>no</strong>ugh his mind<br />
on <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD as a treaty or one evolving into a treaty 20 and <strong>no</strong>ted how government<br />
exercises or forges international relation by way <strong>of</strong> an Executive Agreement, which<br />
mode bypasses Congress, and by way <strong>of</strong> a Treaty, which requires concurrence by <strong>the</strong><br />
17 Id.<br />
18 At www.luwaran.com, 19 Dec. 2007.<br />
19 Id.<br />
20 Paragraph. 8, Mastura, supra.<br />
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Senate. 21 Atty. Mastura concedes that <strong>the</strong> government may do its part and go through<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r approach in obeisance to its constitutional traditions, explaining that –<br />
For <strong>the</strong> MILF, that is a matter internal to <strong>the</strong> Government side as a<br />
shared competence. 22<br />
He cautioned though and wrote that “procedural legitimacy obliges both GRP<br />
and MILF peace negotiating panels <strong>no</strong>t only to adhere to <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>nderogation<br />
<strong>of</strong> agreed terms/texts but more importantly to sustain closure.” 23<br />
As it is, government has repudiated <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, publicly an<strong>no</strong>uncing that it<br />
will <strong>no</strong>t sign it in its present form or in any o<strong>the</strong>r form. Even under <strong>no</strong>rmal<br />
circumstances, <strong>no</strong>body could be adequately competent e<strong>no</strong>ugh to foretell what will<br />
become <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD in <strong>the</strong> negotiation for <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact.<br />
A House <strong>of</strong> Haze<br />
In <strong>the</strong> canvas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD and as <strong>no</strong>w stand things , indeed we see a<br />
“political house,” <strong>the</strong> BJE, as a grandiose caravansary hulked in some yonder oasis<br />
but blurry under <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>onday heat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> desert, so to speak. It could turn out to be<br />
some mirage and, indeed, it can become it, a picture in <strong>the</strong> mind, where government<br />
chooses to take its political caravan astray, which it already did, reneging on its<br />
commitment to journey by <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> peace and reverting to <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> war.<br />
Indeed, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD is an Interim Agreement.<br />
MOA-AD is an International Agreement<br />
Even if <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD is considered as an Interim Agreement, it is our<br />
submission that it can stand alone, it being a Pactum de Contrahendo and an International<br />
Agreement in <strong>the</strong> category <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tripoli Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1976.<br />
In Abbas vs. Comelec, 24 <strong>the</strong> Court rendered its estimation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tripoli<br />
Agreement as binding International Agreement in this wise, thus:<br />
Assuming for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong> Tripoli Agreement is a binding<br />
treaty or international agreement, it will fall in <strong>the</strong> same class as an act <strong>of</strong><br />
Congress like R.A. 6737.<br />
21 Paragraph. 12, id.<br />
22 Id.<br />
23 Atty. Michael O. Mastura, Misdirection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Muslim Moro Agenda in Constitutionalism Commentary, at<br />
www.luwaran.com.<br />
24 179 SCRA 287, 1989.<br />
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This ruling explained that as such law, Republic Act 6737 or <strong>the</strong> Organic Act<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auto<strong>no</strong>mous Region in Muslim Mindanao has supplanted it, it being a<br />
subsequent law. 25 But this jurisprudence has been qualified in Bayan vs. Executive<br />
Secretary, which underscores <strong>the</strong> fact that “international law continues to make <strong>no</strong><br />
distinction between treaties and executive agreements; <strong>the</strong>y are equally binding<br />
obligations among nations.” 26 The Court amplifies, thus:<br />
As an integral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community <strong>of</strong> nations, we are responsible to<br />
assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our<br />
international obligation. Hence, we can<strong>no</strong>t readily plead <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
as a convenient excuse for <strong>no</strong>n-compliance with our obligations, duties<br />
and responsibilities under international law. 27<br />
Beyond this, Article 13 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Declaration <strong>of</strong> Rights and Duties <strong>of</strong> States<br />
adopted by <strong>the</strong> International Law Commission in 1948 provides: “Every<br />
State has <strong>the</strong> duty to carry out in good faith it obligations arising from<br />
treaties and o<strong>the</strong>r sources <strong>of</strong> international law and it may <strong>no</strong>t invoke<br />
provisions in its Constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform<br />
its duty. 28<br />
Equally important is Article 26 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Convention which provides that<br />
“Every Treaty in force is binding upon <strong>the</strong> parties to it and must be<br />
performed by <strong>the</strong>m in good faith.” This is k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> pacta<br />
sunt servanda which preserves <strong>the</strong> sanctity <strong>of</strong> treaties and has been one <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> most fundamental principles <strong>of</strong> positive international law, supported<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Jurisprudence <strong>of</strong> international tribunals. 29<br />
The MILF has International Personality<br />
to Enter into International Agreements<br />
The Tripoli Agreement was signed by Nur Misuari, Chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MNLF, and<br />
Undersecretary <strong>of</strong> National Defense for Civilian Relations Carmelo <strong>Bar</strong>bero for <strong>the</strong><br />
Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines. Signed in Tripoli, Libya, on 23<br />
December 2006, it was facilitated by <strong>the</strong> Libyan Arab Republic and its signing was<br />
witnessed by <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> State for Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Libyan Arab Republic<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Secretary General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Organization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Islamic Conference. Like <strong>the</strong><br />
Tripoli Agreement, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD was facilitated by <strong>the</strong> Malaysian Government and<br />
initialed for signing by <strong>the</strong> representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government and <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines and was supposed to be witnessed by <strong>the</strong> Special Adviser to <strong>the</strong><br />
25 Id.<br />
26 342 SCRA 489, 2002.<br />
27 Id., p. 493.<br />
28 Id.<br />
29 Id. Citation omitted.<br />
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Prime Minister <strong>of</strong> Malaysia, <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> Malaysia, and <strong>the</strong> Adviser to <strong>the</strong> Organization <strong>of</strong><br />
Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General, and <strong>the</strong> Special Envoy for <strong>the</strong> Peace<br />
Process in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Philippines, among o<strong>the</strong>rs. The botched signing was <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong><br />
moment, since for all intents and purposes <strong>the</strong> Agreement was au<strong>the</strong>nticated by <strong>the</strong><br />
parties, hence, agreed upon and <strong>the</strong> signing, if it happened, would <strong>the</strong>refore be only<br />
a mere formality. 30 Secondly, many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD are a<br />
reinstatement <strong>of</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> previous documents including <strong>the</strong> GRP-MILF Tripoli<br />
Agreement <strong>of</strong> Peace in 2001, <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD.<br />
Like <strong>the</strong> Moro National Liberation Front, <strong>the</strong> MILF is a liberation front and<br />
to date has surpassed <strong>the</strong> MNLF in terms <strong>of</strong> strength. It has engaged <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
military in a fierce conventional warfare for six (6) months in 2000 and held at bay<br />
<strong>the</strong> military in many battles despite <strong>the</strong> latter’s great superiority in number and<br />
equipment.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> General Framework <strong>of</strong> Agreement <strong>of</strong> Intent Between <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines (GRP) and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front<br />
(MILF), dated 27 August 1998, <strong>the</strong> government saw fit to sign <strong>the</strong> Agreement with<br />
its counterparts from <strong>the</strong> MILF that included witnesses from its hierarchy including<br />
Sheik Abukhalil Yayha, Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Majlis Al-Shura (<strong>the</strong> MILF Parliament) and<br />
Sheik Ali Ismail, <strong>the</strong> Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MILF Supreme Court.<br />
Clearly, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> MILF has earned an international personality akin to a State,<br />
or lesser to a State but impressed with its characteristics in substantive terms, granting<br />
it competence to enter into treaties or agreements pursuant to international law.<br />
Article 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna Convention on <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> Treaties recognizes that<br />
under customary international law, entities o<strong>the</strong>r than States may have international<br />
personality necessary to allow <strong>the</strong>m to enter into treaties. 31 The constituent<br />
instruments <strong>of</strong> certain international organizations authorized <strong>the</strong>m to enter into<br />
treaties. 32 The United Nations Charter specifically authorizes <strong>the</strong> organization to<br />
conclude agreements with member States and with Specialized Agencies. <strong>33</strong><br />
[Certainly, <strong>the</strong> MILF can come within <strong>the</strong> definition <strong>of</strong> an entity with<br />
international personality, to which <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
has to concede in obeisance to its commitment under <strong>the</strong> International Covenant on<br />
Civil and Political Rights that promotes <strong>the</strong> right to self-determination <strong>of</strong> peoples,<br />
and for which <strong>the</strong> U.N. Human Rights Committee has urged “all State parties [like<br />
30 During <strong>the</strong> oral arguments before <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court, Atty. Agabin, counsel for petitioner Senator Roxas,<br />
argued for this position as grounded in international law.<br />
31 Miriam Santiago and Jorge Coquia, International Law and World Organizations. 2005: Central Book Supply,<br />
p. 370.<br />
32 Id.<br />
<strong>33</strong> Id., Articles 43 and 63.<br />
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<strong>the</strong> Philippines] …to take positive action to facilitate realization <strong>of</strong> and respect for<br />
<strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> peoples to self-determination.” 34<br />
At this point, <strong>the</strong> question may be posed: To what extent is <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine bound to implement <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD? Or, what<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD bind <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
may be bound to observe and implement?<br />
It is necessarily apposite to discuss <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> peace process that governed<br />
<strong>the</strong> negotiation and <strong>the</strong> treatment both parties accorded to interim agreements or<br />
past agreements in every phase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace process.<br />
Interim Agreements in Every Phase<br />
or Strand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peace Process<br />
are Implemented<br />
The negotiation between <strong>the</strong> MILF and <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Philippines went by strands or agenda.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Agreement on Peace Between <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front, <strong>the</strong>y agreed to go by <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
process progressively, dividing <strong>the</strong> agenda into separate timeframes, first, <strong>the</strong> Security<br />
Aspect, second, <strong>the</strong> Rehabilitation Aspect, and third, <strong>the</strong> Ancestral Domain Aspect. 35<br />
They addressed a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r issue later on for its fourth strand, <strong>the</strong> Political Governance<br />
Aspect.<br />
In this Peace Agreement, both Parties committed to implement all past<br />
agreements. 36<br />
In every strand, indeed, <strong>the</strong>y have executed agreements. For <strong>the</strong> Security<br />
Aspect, <strong>the</strong>y executed <strong>the</strong> following major agreements and implemented <strong>the</strong>m,<br />
namely: Agreement for General Cessation <strong>of</strong> Hostilities, 21 July 1997; Agreement<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Gradual Repositioning <strong>of</strong> GRP Forces in Rajamuda and its Environs and <strong>the</strong><br />
Return <strong>of</strong> Evacuees, 03 September 1997; Agreement to Sustain <strong>the</strong> Quest for Peace,<br />
06 February 1998, which provided for <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> Quick Reaction Teams (QRT)<br />
to immediately address alleged violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Agreement on <strong>the</strong> General Cessation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Hostilities, among o<strong>the</strong>rs; Agreement to Reaffirm <strong>the</strong> Pursuit <strong>of</strong> Peace, 10 February<br />
1999, which activated <strong>the</strong> GRP-MILF Coordinating Committees on Cessation <strong>of</strong><br />
Hostilities (CCCH); various agreements on <strong>the</strong> ack<strong>no</strong>wledgment <strong>of</strong> MILF camps to<br />
34 General Comment 12 (21), par. 6, Ai39140(1984), p. 143, cited in McCorquodale, Self-Determination Human<br />
Rights Approach, The International Comparative Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Oct. 4, 1994, pp. 857-885).<br />
35 Said Agreement was signed on 22 June 2001 in <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> representative <strong>of</strong> Gaddafy International<br />
Foundation for Charitable Associations, <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> Malaysia and <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> Indonesia.<br />
36 Paragraph. A, id.<br />
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be covered by <strong>the</strong> cessation <strong>of</strong> hostilities for <strong>the</strong> duration <strong>of</strong> peace talks; Joint<br />
Communiqué on <strong>the</strong> isolation and interdiction <strong>of</strong> all criminal syndicates and kidnapfor-ransom<br />
groups and <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> an Ad Hoc Joint Action Group for <strong>the</strong> purpose,<br />
18 October 2001; <strong>the</strong> Agreement on <strong>the</strong> General Framework for <strong>the</strong> Resumption <strong>of</strong><br />
Peace Talks Between <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong><br />
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 24 March 2001, where both Parties suspended<br />
<strong>of</strong>fensive military operations; a Joint Statement, dated 02 December 2003, where<br />
<strong>the</strong> MILF committed support to <strong>the</strong> campaign <strong>of</strong> government against <strong>the</strong> terrorist<br />
Jemaah Al-Islamiyah.<br />
Both Parties requested Malaysia to fast track <strong>the</strong> deployment <strong>of</strong> its<br />
International Monitoring Team (IMT), which arrived in early October 2004. 37 The<br />
Team was led by Malaysia 38 with a substantial contingent from Brunei and Libya. 39<br />
Local Monitoring Team in every strategic area in <strong>the</strong> region was also organized.<br />
The presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IMT drastically reduced ceasefire violations from 500 ceasefire<br />
violations between 2002 and 2005 to only 37 mostly mi<strong>no</strong>r ceasefire violations. 40<br />
On <strong>the</strong> rehabilitation and development strand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace process, <strong>the</strong> Parties<br />
entered into many agreements including ones creating <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Development<br />
Agency tasked to manage foreign funding for rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> victims <strong>of</strong> war<br />
and <strong>the</strong> building <strong>of</strong> infrastructure and <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Multi-Do<strong>no</strong>r Trust<br />
Fund led by <strong>the</strong> World Bank. 41 Under <strong>the</strong> auspices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> Malaysia<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r do<strong>no</strong>r countries from <strong>the</strong> developed world, Moro pr<strong>of</strong>essionals were sent<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Asian Institute <strong>of</strong> Management for leadership and competence training, while<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs were sent to <strong>the</strong> United States and Australia. The strategy was designed to<br />
build a manpower pool <strong>of</strong> competent Moro pr<strong>of</strong>essionals where <strong>the</strong> BJE may draw<br />
its personnel needs.<br />
The third strand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace talks, <strong>the</strong> Ancestral Domain Aspect, produced<br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, which is <strong>no</strong>w much maligned in <strong>the</strong> national debate and reeking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
fulminations from its detractors.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, as <strong>no</strong>ted in <strong>the</strong> said Peace Agreement, <strong>the</strong> negotiation by strands<br />
described <strong>the</strong> “incremental characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace process” and, with every<br />
agreement in every phase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace process implemented, <strong>the</strong> “progressive<br />
resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro problem …” 42 rolls on.<br />
37 See Joint Statement between GRP and <strong>the</strong> MILF, 04 October 2004.<br />
38 See Joint Statement between <strong>the</strong> GRP and <strong>the</strong> MILF, o4 May 2005.<br />
39 See Joint Statement between <strong>the</strong> GRP and <strong>the</strong> MILF, o3 June 2006.<br />
40 Joint Statement between <strong>the</strong> GRP and <strong>the</strong> MILF, 11 September 2005.<br />
41 Statement <strong>of</strong> Understanding between <strong>the</strong> GRP and <strong>the</strong> MILF, 06 April 2004.<br />
42 Paragraph A(1), Agreement on Peace Between <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Moro<br />
Islamic Liberation Front, 22 August 2001.<br />
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Illegal and Unconstitutional Provisions<br />
are Excluded from Implementation<br />
Admittedly, <strong>the</strong>re are illegal and unconstitutional provisions in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD.<br />
The devolution to <strong>the</strong> BJE <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions <strong>of</strong> election, civil service, police<br />
and internal security under paragraph 8 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD on Governance, runs afoul<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Constitution which provides for <strong>the</strong>ir independence and fiscal auto<strong>no</strong>my<br />
under <strong>the</strong>ir respective governing Commissions. 43<br />
The 75-25 term <strong>of</strong> sharing in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE <strong>of</strong> income derived from strategic<br />
minerals including oil, fossil fuel and <strong>the</strong> like 44 collides with <strong>the</strong> 50-50 split provided<br />
for in Section 5(b), Article XII <strong>of</strong> Rep. Act No. 9054, <strong>the</strong> Organic Act for <strong>the</strong><br />
Auto<strong>no</strong>mous Region in Muslim Mindanao.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Organic Act, <strong>the</strong> control and supervision over <strong>the</strong> exploration, utilization,<br />
development and protection <strong>of</strong> strategic minerals such as uranium, petroleum and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r fossil fuels, mineral oils, all resources <strong>of</strong> potential energy, as well as national<br />
reserves and aquatic parks, forest and watershed reservations are vested in <strong>the</strong><br />
national government. 45 In <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, however, jurisdiction and control over,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> exploring for, exploiting, producing and obtaining all potential sources<br />
<strong>of</strong> energy, petroleum in situ, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, whe<strong>the</strong>r onshore<br />
or <strong>of</strong>fshore, is vested in <strong>the</strong> BJE, except in times <strong>of</strong> emergency, when public interest<br />
so requires, when <strong>the</strong> central government may, during <strong>the</strong> emergency, for a fixed<br />
period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed by both Parties, temporarily<br />
assume or direct <strong>the</strong> operations <strong>of</strong> such strategic resources. 46<br />
“By constitutional fiat and by <strong>the</strong> intrinsic nature <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>fice,” <strong>the</strong> Court<br />
ruled in Bayan vs. Zamora, “<strong>the</strong> President, as head <strong>of</strong> State, is <strong>the</strong> sole organ and<br />
authority in <strong>the</strong> external affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. In many ways, <strong>the</strong> President is <strong>the</strong><br />
chief architect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation’s foreign policy; his “dominance in <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> foreign<br />
relations is (<strong>the</strong>n) conceded.” Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in <strong>the</strong><br />
external affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altoge<strong>the</strong>r.” 47 In<br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, however, lesser powers <strong>of</strong> diplomacy are granted to <strong>the</strong> BJE such as<br />
<strong>the</strong> sending <strong>of</strong> trade missions to foreign countries with which it has eco<strong>no</strong>mic<br />
cooperation agreements, 48 participation in international meetings and events and in<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial Philippine missions and delegations in <strong>the</strong> negotiation <strong>of</strong> border agreements<br />
or protocols for environmental protection, equitable sharing <strong>of</strong> incomes and revenues<br />
43 See Article IX and Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Philippine Constitution.<br />
44 Paragraph 6 on Resources, MOA-AD.<br />
45 Section 5, Article XII, 1987 Philippine Constitution.<br />
46 Paragraph 5 on Resources, MOA-AD.<br />
47 Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 494, 2000. Citation omitted.<br />
48 Paragraph 3(a) on Resources, MOA-AD.<br />
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in <strong>the</strong> areas <strong>of</strong> sea, seabed and inland seas or bodies <strong>of</strong> water adjacent to or between<br />
islands forming part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ancestral domain, in addition to those pertaining to<br />
fishing rights. 49<br />
But <strong>the</strong>se illegal and unconstitutional provisions in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD are <strong>no</strong>t selfexecuting,<br />
<strong>the</strong> disregard <strong>of</strong> which can<strong>no</strong>t give rise to a cause <strong>of</strong> action in <strong>the</strong> courts; 50<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are <strong>no</strong>t intended to be implemented immediately. The MOA-AD itself<br />
proscribed it, providing conditionalities for <strong>the</strong>ir efficacy. Thus:<br />
Any provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD requiring amendments to <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
legal framework shall come into force upon signing <strong>of</strong> a Comprehensive<br />
Compact and upon effecting <strong>the</strong> necessary changes to <strong>the</strong> legal framework<br />
with due regard to <strong>no</strong>n-derogation <strong>of</strong> prior agreements and within <strong>the</strong><br />
stipulated timeframe to be contained in <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact. 51<br />
The MOA-AD is Pactum de Contrahendo<br />
The Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, however, is duty bound<br />
to implement <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD as it pertains to its commitment to pursue <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
process and implement this framework agreement on territory. This obligation on<br />
<strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> government is set out in Paragraph 2(a) on Territory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Agreement,<br />
thus:<br />
The GRP and MILF as <strong>the</strong> Parties to this Agreement commit <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
to <strong>the</strong> full and mutual implementation <strong>of</strong> this framework agreement on<br />
territory with <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> resolving outstanding issues that emanate from<br />
<strong>the</strong> consensus points on Ancestral Domain.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, <strong>the</strong> territorial core <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE would consist <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present<br />
Auto<strong>no</strong>mous Region in Muslim Mindanao including <strong>the</strong> municipalities <strong>of</strong> Baloi,<br />
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagloan and Tangkal in <strong>the</strong> province <strong>of</strong> Lanao del Norte<br />
that voted for inclusion in <strong>the</strong> ARMM during <strong>the</strong> 2001 plebiscite. 52 Without<br />
derogating from <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> prior agreements, <strong>the</strong> Government stipulates<br />
to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months<br />
following <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering <strong>the</strong> areas as enumerated<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Annex 53 The Annex constitutes an integral part <strong>of</strong> this framework agreement.<br />
Towards this end, <strong>the</strong> Parties would endeavor to complete negotiations and resolve<br />
all outstanding issues on <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months<br />
49 Paragraph 4(b), id.<br />
50 Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 564, 1995.<br />
51 Paragraph 6 on Governance, MOA-AD.<br />
52 Paragraph. 2(c) on Territory, MOA-AD.<br />
53 Paragraph. 2(d), id.<br />
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from <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD. 54 Government also committed to render special<br />
socio-eco<strong>no</strong>mic and cultural affirmative actions pending <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> a plebiscite<br />
which was slated <strong>no</strong>t earlier than 25 years from <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive<br />
Compact to determine <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir accession to <strong>the</strong> BJE. 55<br />
The Parties agree that <strong>the</strong> mechanisms and modalities for <strong>the</strong> actual<br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact<br />
to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. 56<br />
On <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD contains measures and principles both parties<br />
have committed to incorporate into <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact, which obligation<br />
makes for <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD as a Pactum de Contrahendo, an agreement by a State to<br />
conclude a later and final agreement. 57<br />
It must be emphasized that <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD is <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> only agreement where<br />
both Parties committed to pursue <strong>the</strong> quest for peace.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> General Framework <strong>of</strong> Agreement <strong>of</strong> Intent Between <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines (GRP) and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front<br />
(MILF) executed as early as 1998, “The Parties committed to pursue <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
negotiations on <strong>the</strong> substantive issues and soon as possible, and resolutely continue<br />
<strong>the</strong> negotiations until <strong>the</strong> Parties reach a negotiated political settlement.” 58 This<br />
agreement assumes legal significance with <strong>the</strong> signature <strong>of</strong> certain witnesses from<br />
<strong>the</strong> MILF side, namely, Sheikh Abukhalil Yayha, <strong>the</strong> Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Majlis Al-<br />
Shura (<strong>the</strong> MILF Parliament), and Sheikh Ali Ismail, <strong>the</strong> Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MILF<br />
Supreme Court.<br />
On 24 March 2001, <strong>the</strong> Parties entered into <strong>the</strong> Agreement on <strong>the</strong> General<br />
Framework for <strong>the</strong> Resumption <strong>of</strong> Peace Talks Between <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front where “<strong>the</strong> Parties<br />
commit to ho<strong>no</strong>r, respect and implement all past agreements and o<strong>the</strong>r supplementary<br />
agreements signed by <strong>the</strong>m” 59 and “to resume <strong>the</strong> stalled peace negotiations<br />
immediately after <strong>the</strong> signing <strong>of</strong> this Agreement, and continue <strong>the</strong> same where it<br />
had stopped before April 27, 2000 until <strong>the</strong>y shall have reached a negotiated political<br />
settlement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro problem.” 60<br />
54 Id.<br />
55 Paragraph. 2(c), id.<br />
56 Paragraph 7 on Governance, MOA-AD.<br />
57 Santiago and Coquia, supra, p. 367.<br />
58 Article 1, General Framework <strong>of</strong> Agreement <strong>of</strong> Intent Between <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 1998.<br />
59 Article IV, id.<br />
60 Article 1, id.<br />
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The point is, <strong>the</strong> Parties have laid out <strong>the</strong> path towards a political negotiated<br />
settlement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> so-called Moro Problem, and <strong>the</strong>y have in fact trodden <strong>the</strong> track<br />
too far ahead to make a turn-around and make one excuse after a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r. The rule<br />
<strong>of</strong> pacta sunt servanda requires that both <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Moro Islamic Liberation Front beat <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> peace and continue<br />
with <strong>the</strong> negotiation for <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact pursuant to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Pactum de Contrahendo <strong>the</strong>y both signed, which is <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD.<br />
A Case for Statecraft and Parens Patriae<br />
As discussed, <strong>the</strong> impaired provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD are <strong>no</strong>t self-executing<br />
and <strong>the</strong>y find expressions in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD in keeping with a new paradigm in <strong>the</strong><br />
resolution <strong>of</strong> eth<strong>no</strong>-political conflicts brought about by <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> liberation<br />
movements asserting <strong>the</strong>ir right to self-determination against <strong>the</strong> State. And <strong>the</strong><br />
government kept to this approach in its negotiation with <strong>the</strong> MILF. 61<br />
Earned-Sovereignty Approach<br />
This paradigm does <strong>no</strong>t do violence to <strong>the</strong> constitution but seeks to resolve<br />
<strong>the</strong> tension between <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> national sovereignty by insurgent ethnic communities<br />
flowing from <strong>the</strong>ir right to self-determination and <strong>the</strong> assertion <strong>of</strong> government <strong>of</strong> its<br />
State sovereignty with <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong> making adjustments to <strong>the</strong> legal frameworks for<br />
<strong>the</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> eth<strong>no</strong>-political conflicts. It does <strong>no</strong>t perceive “sovereignty” to be a<br />
unitary right, but ra<strong>the</strong>r a bundle <strong>of</strong> authority and functions which may at times be<br />
shared by <strong>the</strong> state and sub-state entities as well as international institutions. 62<br />
Earned-sovereignty encompasses six (6) elements – three (3) core elements<br />
and three (3) optional elements. 63<br />
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case <strong>of</strong> earned<br />
sovereignty <strong>the</strong> state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign<br />
authority and functions over a defined territory. In some instances,<br />
international institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and<br />
functions in addition to or in lieu <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parent state. In rare cases, <strong>the</strong><br />
international community may exercise shared-sovereignty with an<br />
internationally recognized state. 64<br />
61 Paul William, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving <strong>the</strong> Conflict Over Kosovo’s Final Status, Denv. J.<br />
Int’l L. Pol’y, Vol. 31: 3, p. 390.<br />
62 Karen D. Hey mann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear<br />
Holocaust, 19 A.M. Int’l L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall 2003. In James Hooper and Paul Williams, Earned<br />
Sovereignty: The Political Dimension, Renv. L. Int’l & Pol’y, Vol. 31: 3, 2003, p. 357.<br />
63 Hooper and William, supra, pp. 356.<br />
64 Id.<br />
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The second core element is institutional building. This element is<br />
utilized during <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> shared sovereignty prior to <strong>the</strong> determination<br />
<strong>of</strong> final status. Here <strong>the</strong> sub-state entity, frequently with <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> international community, undertakes to construct institutions for selfgovernment<br />
and to build institutions capable <strong>of</strong> exercising increasing<br />
sovereign authority and functions. 65<br />
The third core element is <strong>the</strong> eventual determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> final<br />
status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sub-state entity and its relationship to <strong>the</strong> state. In many<br />
instances <strong>the</strong> status will be determined by a referendum, while in o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
it may involve a negotiated settlement between <strong>the</strong> state and sub-state<br />
entity, <strong>of</strong>ten with international mediation. Invariably <strong>the</strong> determination<br />
<strong>of</strong> final status for <strong>the</strong> sub-state entity involves <strong>the</strong> consent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
international community in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> international recognition. 66<br />
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty<br />
entails <strong>the</strong> accumulation by <strong>the</strong> sub-state entity <strong>of</strong> increasing sovereign<br />
authority and functions over a specified period <strong>of</strong> time prior to <strong>the</strong><br />
determination <strong>of</strong> final status. 67<br />
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty.<br />
Conditionality may be applied to <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> increasing sovereign<br />
authority and functions by <strong>the</strong> sub-state entity, or it may be applied to <strong>the</strong><br />
determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sub-state entity’s final status. In ei<strong>the</strong>r case <strong>the</strong> substate<br />
is required to meet certain benchmarks before it may acquire<br />
increased sovereignty. These benchmarks may include conditions such<br />
as protecting human and mi<strong>no</strong>rity rights, developing democratic<br />
institutions, instituting <strong>the</strong> rule <strong>of</strong> law, and promoting regional stability. 68<br />
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves<br />
continued limitations on <strong>the</strong> sovereign authority and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
new state, such as continued international administrative and/or military<br />
presence, and limits on <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state to undertake territorial<br />
association with o<strong>the</strong>r states. 69<br />
This approach to conflict-resolution was used to resolve <strong>the</strong> conflict in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Ireland which resulted in <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Good Friday Accord that granted <strong>the</strong><br />
Irish Catholics in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Ireland <strong>the</strong> freedom to elect independence from <strong>the</strong><br />
United Kingdom in a referendum, or join <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> Ireland after seven years;<br />
<strong>the</strong> insurgency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian mi<strong>no</strong>rity Machakos <strong>of</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Sudan who eked<br />
65 Id.<br />
66 Id.<br />
67 Id.<br />
68 Id., p. 356-357.<br />
69 Id., p. 357.<br />
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out <strong>the</strong> Machakos Protocol that granted <strong>the</strong>m auto<strong>no</strong>my and <strong>the</strong> right to secede<br />
after six (6) years should <strong>the</strong>y choose to; <strong>the</strong> eth<strong>no</strong>-political conflict in Kosovo which<br />
brought about <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> Kosovo; and <strong>the</strong> insurgency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian<br />
East Timorese with phased sovereignty that led to full independence. 70<br />
Belfast Agreement<br />
or <strong>the</strong> Good Friday Accord<br />
Particularly, <strong>the</strong> Good Friday Accord is one model that <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD is hewing<br />
very closely to. The negotiation between <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> Ireland, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Sin Fein, <strong>the</strong> political arm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Irish Catholics in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Ireland, went<br />
by in three (3) strands. Among o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong> Agreement provides for <strong>the</strong> repeal <strong>of</strong><br />
laws and <strong>the</strong> amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> Ireland to adjust to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Accord. Government has taken <strong>no</strong>te <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> this model, thus:<br />
Peace process models in o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world (Sin Fein in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Ireland, Gam in Aceh, Fretelin in Timor Leste, etc.) have successfully<br />
showcased that in a post peace settlement scenario, it is possible for<br />
revolutionary group to later on shift <strong>the</strong>ir arena <strong>of</strong> struggle – from armed<br />
(rebel group) to parliamentary (political party) – where <strong>the</strong>y are free to<br />
advance <strong>the</strong>ir political programs and compete for political power through<br />
<strong>the</strong> electoral system. 71<br />
A Hard Ball<br />
The negotiation for <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD was <strong>the</strong> most difficult phase in <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
process. The Parties had gone through five (5) Exploratory Talks from 20 April<br />
2005 through 04 May 2006, without forging any final draft. In <strong>the</strong> 13 th Exploratory<br />
Talks on 02 October 2007, <strong>the</strong> Parties broke <strong>the</strong> impasse. 72 But in <strong>the</strong> Exploratory<br />
Talks on 15-16 December 2007, <strong>the</strong> MILF Peace Panel walked out on <strong>the</strong> GRP<br />
Peace Panel at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, when <strong>the</strong> latter submitted its own version<br />
<strong>of</strong> a Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement that did away with <strong>the</strong> consensus points on Ancestral<br />
Domain. 73<br />
Obviously, government did <strong>no</strong>t speak with one voice on <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> Moro selfdetermination.<br />
On June 17, 2007, Pr<strong>of</strong>. Rudy Rodil <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel an<strong>no</strong>unced<br />
in a public forum sponsored by <strong>the</strong> United States Institute <strong>of</strong> Peace at <strong>the</strong> Asian<br />
Institute <strong>of</strong> Management at Makati City that <strong>the</strong> government has <strong>of</strong>fered to recognize<br />
70 See Paul William, supra, p. 390; also Hooper and William, supra, pp. 359-375.<br />
71 Item No. 19, Primer on <strong>the</strong> Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement on Ancestral Domain, prepared by OPAPP.<br />
72 At www. mindanews.com, 20 December 2007. In Atty. Buat’s The Constitutional Dillema…, supra, at<br />
www.luwaran.com, 19 December 2007.<br />
73 Atty. Buat, id.<br />
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<strong>the</strong> Moro right to self-determination, except on matters <strong>of</strong> national defense, foreign<br />
affairs, monetary system and postal system. 74<br />
Finally, on July 26, <strong>2008</strong>, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD was concluded and initialed. And as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y say, <strong>the</strong> rest is history.<br />
But we do <strong>no</strong>t wish history on <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD to be a rendition <strong>of</strong> its detractors.<br />
Government has Bounden Duty<br />
to Promote Right to Self-Determination<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro<br />
The GRP Peace Panel has <strong>no</strong>t committed any grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion<br />
amounting to lack or excess <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction when it concluded and executed or initialed<br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA-AD. The act is in keeping with <strong>the</strong> right to self-determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro that’s enshrined in our Constitution. Thus:<br />
The State recognizes and promotes <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> indige<strong>no</strong>us cultural<br />
communities within <strong>the</strong> framework <strong>of</strong> national unity and development. 75<br />
Section 2, Article X <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides for a limited auto<strong>no</strong>my for<br />
Muslim Mindanao, enumerating <strong>the</strong> powers <strong>the</strong>rein devolved to <strong>the</strong> auto<strong>no</strong>mous<br />
government. But at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> list is a “catch all” provision that authorizes<br />
Congress to legislate such “o<strong>the</strong>r matters as may be authorized by law for <strong>the</strong><br />
promotion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> region.” 76 This is re-enforced by Section 1, Article<br />
XIII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, thus:<br />
The Congress shall give highest priority to <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> measures<br />
that protect and enhance <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> people to human dignity,<br />
reduce social, eco<strong>no</strong>mic and political inequalities and remove cultural<br />
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for <strong>the</strong> common<br />
good.<br />
x x x x<br />
By its plenary power, <strong>the</strong>refore, Congress can initiate and enact laws to expand<br />
<strong>the</strong> powers and jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> auto<strong>no</strong>mous government or cause <strong>the</strong> amendment<br />
or revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution to accommodate <strong>the</strong> aspirations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro.<br />
Obviously, this is what <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel had in mind when it drafted <strong>the</strong> MOA-<br />
74 Rudy Rodil, Finding New Paths to Peace: Ancestral Domain and Moro Self-Determination. In Auto<strong>no</strong>my and<br />
Peace Review, Vol. 3:3, July-September 2007, p.7.<br />
75 Section 2, Article II, 1987 Philippine Constitution.<br />
76 Section 9, Article X, 1987 Philippine Constitution.<br />
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AD and provided for <strong>the</strong> constitutional requirement for <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> a Basic<br />
Law for <strong>the</strong> BJE and <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>the</strong> amendment or revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution, as<br />
<strong>the</strong> case may be, to make effective <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD or <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact.<br />
In a manner <strong>of</strong> speaking, <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel, by negotiating with <strong>the</strong> MILF<br />
and concluding <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD with <strong>the</strong>m, was acting like it were a consultative body<br />
making expert opinion on <strong>the</strong> Moro problem and its resolution at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
day. But <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>no</strong>t just any agency sui generis; <strong>the</strong>y’re representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Executive Department and carried <strong>the</strong> magistracy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President,<br />
which branch <strong>of</strong> government participates in law-making by its certification <strong>of</strong> bills as<br />
a priority policy <strong>of</strong> government and its exercise <strong>of</strong> veto power.<br />
Indeed, we can<strong>no</strong>t extrapolate from <strong>the</strong>ir actuation any malice or despotism<br />
as would indict <strong>the</strong>m for grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion when <strong>the</strong>y took to <strong>the</strong> Earned-<br />
Sovereignty Approach in <strong>the</strong>ir negotiation with <strong>the</strong> MILF and concluded <strong>the</strong> MOA-<br />
AD. What <strong>the</strong>y did in fact was creative e<strong>no</strong>ugh to address <strong>the</strong> aspirations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro and <strong>the</strong>ir contemporary rebellion that has remained a sore in <strong>the</strong> body<br />
politic for almost 40 years.<br />
MOA-AD is within <strong>the</strong> Framework<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
To emphasize, <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel, in dealing with <strong>the</strong> MILF and introducing<br />
into <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD so-called “questionable” provisions and agreeing to <strong>the</strong> adjustment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Constitution to <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD where necessary, has <strong>no</strong>t deviated<br />
from our constitutional framework, with <strong>the</strong> Constitution providing, in <strong>the</strong> first<br />
place, for mechanisms for its amendment or revision. 77<br />
The Constitution is <strong>no</strong>t a tablet <strong>of</strong> granite or diamond <strong>of</strong> eons. “As any human<br />
production,” ruled Justice Laurel in <strong>the</strong> 1936 case <strong>of</strong> Angara vs. Electoral Commission,<br />
“our Constitution is <strong>of</strong> course lacking in perfection and perfectibility…” 78<br />
The MOA-AD is one measure too to respond to <strong>the</strong> treaty obligations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines under <strong>the</strong> International Covenant<br />
on Civil and Political Rights, <strong>the</strong> International Covenant on Social, Eco<strong>no</strong>mic and<br />
Cultural Rights and <strong>the</strong> Universal Declaration <strong>of</strong> Human Rights that all promote<br />
self-determination <strong>of</strong> all peoples.<br />
In its General Comment on Article 1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> International Covenant on Civil<br />
and Political Rights, <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations urged as<br />
early as 1984 “all State parties to <strong>the</strong> Covenant… to take positive action to facilitate<br />
77 See Article XVII, id.<br />
78 63 Phil. 157, 1936.<br />
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realization <strong>of</strong> and respect for <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> peoples to self-determination.” 79 The U.N.<br />
General Assembly issued a Friendly Relations Declaration which provides that all<br />
peoples have <strong>the</strong> right freely to determine, without external influence, <strong>the</strong>ir political<br />
status and that a people choosing to live as a State has <strong>the</strong> perfect right to do so and,<br />
in such case, every State has <strong>the</strong> duty to respect this right. 80<br />
A Redress for Historical Injustice<br />
At this juncture, it must be stated that <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD <strong>of</strong>fers less than <strong>the</strong><br />
suzerainty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> olden days, which was diminished through <strong>the</strong><br />
years owing to colonial intrusion and <strong>the</strong> complicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Filipi<strong>no</strong> Christian majority.<br />
In Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Asia, in <strong>the</strong>ir Sultanic System <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro attained <strong>the</strong> highest<br />
stage <strong>of</strong> civilization unaided. 81<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 15 th century and when most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country was a scattered, disparate<br />
barangay, <strong>the</strong> south flourished with <strong>the</strong> Sultanate <strong>of</strong> Sulu. 82 Then came <strong>the</strong> Rajahship<br />
<strong>of</strong> Buayan. The Sultanate <strong>of</strong> Maguindanao came around <strong>the</strong> second decade <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
16 th century and began its zenith during <strong>the</strong> reign <strong>of</strong> Sultan Kudarat in <strong>the</strong> 17 th<br />
century. 83 The Sultanate <strong>of</strong> Butig developed alongside Maguindanao, striding to<br />
prominence and challenging Spanish presence elsewhere and beyond its suzerainty<br />
early in <strong>the</strong> 18 th century. 84 In <strong>the</strong> opening decade <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 18 th century, Maguindanao<br />
spun out a part <strong>of</strong> its jurisdiction to become <strong>the</strong> Sultanate <strong>of</strong> Kabuntalan. 85 By <strong>the</strong><br />
third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 18 th century, nigeris in Lanao grew more independent from Butig, 17 <strong>of</strong><br />
which were ruled by potentates called Rajah and 16 by principales bearing <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong><br />
Sultan. 86 In <strong>the</strong> fight against Spain, <strong>the</strong>y confederated into what is <strong>no</strong>w called <strong>the</strong><br />
Pat a Pangampong a Ranao or <strong>the</strong> Four Principalities <strong>of</strong> Lanao. 87<br />
These sultanates forged diadic and political alliances among <strong>the</strong>mselves. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> fight over <strong>the</strong> throne <strong>of</strong> Brunei between two cousins in <strong>the</strong> opening decade <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
18 th century, <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro harkened to <strong>the</strong> call <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sultan <strong>of</strong> Sulu and organized<br />
79 General Comment 12(1) par. 6, AI39140, (1984), p. 143. Cited in Robert McCorquodale, supra, pp. 857-88.<br />
80 U.N. G.A. Res. 2614 (XXV) 24 Oct. 1970. The relevant part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resolution (“The principle <strong>of</strong> equal rights<br />
and self-determination <strong>of</strong> peoples”) provides that “in pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir right to self-determination, peoples are<br />
entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with <strong>the</strong> purposes and principles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Charter,” cited in<br />
Koskenniemi, Martti, National Self-Determination Today: Problems <strong>of</strong> Legal Theory and Practice, The<br />
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr. 1994), pp. 241-269.<br />
81 Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Aristocrats <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Malay Race: A History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsa Moro in <strong>the</strong> Philippines. 2001:<br />
Quezon City, p. 14<br />
82 Id., p. 37.<br />
83 Id., pp. 35, 55-58.<br />
84 Id., pp. 35, 58, 65 and 66.<br />
85 Id., p. 59.<br />
86 Id., pp. 84-85.<br />
87 Id., pp. 81-82.<br />
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and sent an expeditionary army to quell <strong>the</strong> regional conflict in favor <strong>of</strong> Sultan<br />
Muaddin. 88 Against Spain, <strong>the</strong>y roved <strong>the</strong> Eastern Seas and raided its tributaries<br />
and citadels in <strong>the</strong> archipelago. 89 Moro corsairs were usual sights in <strong>the</strong> domain <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Dutch and <strong>the</strong> English in <strong>the</strong> East Indies, assisting <strong>the</strong>ir Malay brethren in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
resistance against <strong>the</strong>se European powers. 90<br />
The Sultanates carried on diplomatic relation with foreign powers and concluded<br />
treaties with <strong>the</strong>m. 91 In <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> colonization, <strong>the</strong> capital <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sulu Sultanate was<br />
<strong>the</strong> emporium <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> East. European maritime fleets including men <strong>of</strong> war also<br />
frequented <strong>the</strong> port <strong>of</strong> Sultan Kudarat <strong>of</strong> Maguindanao by <strong>the</strong> Pulangi River and <strong>the</strong><br />
Tubok tributary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Illana Bay in <strong>the</strong> domain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iranuns. 92<br />
Spain coveted Moroland for vassalage and waged war against its sultanates for<br />
more than 300 years. Until its departure from its forlorn enclaves in Mindanao in<br />
1898, <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro potentates flew <strong>the</strong>ir flags, proud and free, unconquered and<br />
unbowed. Spain ceded <strong>the</strong> country including Moroland to America in <strong>the</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Paris following <strong>the</strong> defeat <strong>of</strong> its flotilla <strong>of</strong>f Manila Bay to American gunboats on<br />
May 1, 1898.<br />
Against America, <strong>the</strong> Bangsa Moro were vanquished militarily, but <strong>the</strong>y<br />
remained in <strong>the</strong> ways <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ancestors even as <strong>the</strong>y kept faith in Islam. Writes Tan,<br />
<strong>the</strong> “Muslim submission to American rule was essentially a surrender <strong>of</strong> an inferior<br />
weapon system to a superior one. The Muslim leaders and <strong>the</strong>ir followers never<br />
recognized that <strong>the</strong>ir fighting qualities were inferior or that <strong>the</strong>ir surrender to <strong>the</strong><br />
American authorities was a negation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir military tradition. Given <strong>the</strong> same<br />
sophistication in military tech<strong>no</strong>logy, <strong>the</strong> Muslim armed struggle would have thwarted<br />
American rule at least in Mindanao and Sulu.” 93 The American colonialists created<br />
<strong>the</strong> Moro Province under its military in Mindanao for a time as a protectorate.<br />
They entered into treaties with <strong>the</strong> Sultanates <strong>of</strong> Sulu where <strong>the</strong>y recognized <strong>the</strong><br />
religious and judicial authority over <strong>the</strong> realm, among o<strong>the</strong>rs. 94 Generally, <strong>the</strong> military<br />
government did <strong>no</strong>t intervene in <strong>the</strong> communal affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro as long as<br />
<strong>the</strong>se didn’t disturb <strong>the</strong> peace and its pacification campaign. 95 American Justice<br />
George Malcolm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Supreme Court summed up American policy<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> Moro, thus:<br />
88 Id., pp. 23-24, 82.<br />
89 Chapter 2, id. Also pp. 55-58, id.<br />
90 Id., pp. 14. 15, 24-25, 27, 67 and 69.<br />
91 Id., pp. 27-28, 70-71 and 109.<br />
92 Id., pp. 16, 17, 21 and 83-84.<br />
93 Samuel K. Tan, The Filipi<strong>no</strong> Muslim Armed Struggle – 1900-1972, 1977: Filipi<strong>no</strong>s Foundation, pp. 36-37.<br />
94 Marohomsalic, supra, pp. 27-28.<br />
95 Id., p. 28.<br />
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One cardinal point in <strong>the</strong> policy towards Moros has consistency been <strong>no</strong>t<br />
interfere with <strong>the</strong>ir religion. This policy has meant tacit recognition <strong>of</strong><br />
polygamy and even slavery but this could <strong>no</strong>t be helped… To emphasize<br />
<strong>the</strong> desire for unity, self-government has been partially accorded <strong>the</strong><br />
Moros. The datus and sultans have <strong>no</strong>t been molested when <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
settled <strong>the</strong> disputes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir followers. 96<br />
In <strong>the</strong> grant <strong>of</strong> Philippine independence in 1946 and despite <strong>the</strong>ir opposition<br />
and open rebellion, America made Moroland a part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new Republic whose<br />
<strong>no</strong>r<strong>the</strong>rn population migrated in great numbers to <strong>the</strong>ir homeland through <strong>the</strong> years.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> early 1900s, <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro accounted for majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population <strong>of</strong><br />
Mindanao. By <strong>the</strong> close <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 20 th century, <strong>the</strong>y have been reduced to a mi<strong>no</strong>rity.<br />
Today, <strong>the</strong>y roughly constituted 20% to 25% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population.<br />
Dislocated and marginalized by war and government policy, <strong>the</strong>ir region has<br />
become <strong>the</strong> poorest in <strong>the</strong> country. ARMM is <strong>the</strong> only region in <strong>the</strong> country that<br />
still has a poverty incidence level above 50% as <strong>of</strong> 2003. 97 In <strong>the</strong> Philippine Human<br />
Development Report <strong>of</strong> 2005, four <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> five ARMM provinces occupy <strong>the</strong> last<br />
four slots among <strong>the</strong> bottom ten provinces in <strong>the</strong> Human Development Index<br />
Ranking. 98 In <strong>the</strong> Summary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Poorest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Poor in 2003 by <strong>the</strong> National Anti-<br />
Poverty Commission, 23 out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 40 municipalities are from Muslim Mindanao.<br />
The region had <strong>the</strong> poorest health situation in terms <strong>of</strong> life expectancy, infant mortality<br />
and access to public health services. 99 Its simple literacy rate is 70.2%, significantly<br />
lower than <strong>the</strong> national average <strong>of</strong> 93.4%. 100<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> electoral democracy and <strong>the</strong> “political integration”<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro into <strong>the</strong> larger body politic, <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro kept faith with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
past, abiding by <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ancestors, <strong>the</strong> revolutionaries among<br />
<strong>the</strong>m including <strong>the</strong> MNLF and <strong>the</strong> MILF which engage in open rebellion against<br />
government.<br />
Twice, <strong>the</strong> government experimented with auto<strong>no</strong>my, albeit a limited one. First,<br />
under Marcos and <strong>the</strong>n a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r after him with <strong>the</strong> 1986 Esda Revolution, but all<br />
failed. And so did all appeasement programs including <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office on<br />
Muslim Affairs and <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> Moro <strong>of</strong>ficials into policy-making positions<br />
in <strong>the</strong> central agencies <strong>of</strong> government.<br />
96 See M.A. J. Tama<strong>no</strong>, The Government Policy <strong>of</strong> Integration Needed: Total Commitment, September 7, 1968.<br />
Included in <strong>the</strong> book by <strong>the</strong> aid author which is a collection <strong>of</strong> his speeches and writings entitled, Auto<strong>no</strong>my:<br />
To Keep This Nation Intact. 1986: Foreign Service Institute, Manila, p. 9. Cited in Marohomsalic, supra, p. 28.<br />
97 In Amina Rasul’s Broken Peace? Assessing <strong>the</strong> 1996 GRP-MNLP Final Peace Agreement, 2007, p. 82.<br />
98 Id.<br />
99 Id., p. 85.<br />
100 Id., p. 90.<br />
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The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
The MNLF struck an agreement with government in 1996, but government<br />
did <strong>no</strong>t implement many <strong>of</strong> its provisions. 101<br />
In 1997, <strong>the</strong> MILF and <strong>the</strong> government began peace negotiations. Sporadic<br />
armed hostilities always flared up even during interregna in <strong>the</strong> peace talks. Until<br />
<strong>the</strong> botched signing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD during <strong>the</strong> first week <strong>of</strong> August, friendly relation<br />
between <strong>the</strong> MILF and <strong>the</strong> government were unrealized. Now, <strong>the</strong> contemporary<br />
rebellion has gone for almost 40 years and is still raging.<br />
A great majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro people pinned high hopes on <strong>the</strong> MOA-<br />
AD for <strong>the</strong>ir liberation from <strong>the</strong> prevailing throttlehold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political system. The<br />
relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro with <strong>the</strong> Christian Filipi<strong>no</strong> majority has been one <strong>of</strong><br />
domination and discrimination against <strong>the</strong> former. They owned <strong>no</strong> symbol in <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippine flag. The eight (8) rays <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sun <strong>the</strong> first eight (8) Christian provinces<br />
that rose up against Spain. They have <strong>no</strong> name <strong>of</strong> eminence as Rizal, Bonifacio and<br />
General Luna in <strong>the</strong> long list <strong>of</strong> proclaimed Filipi<strong>no</strong> heroes.<br />
In 1987, Emmanuel Pelaez, Chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel, apologized for <strong>the</strong><br />
historical injustices committed by <strong>the</strong> Christian Filipi<strong>no</strong> majority against <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro. Thus:<br />
In all frankness, it is high time that <strong>the</strong> Christian Filipi<strong>no</strong> majority<br />
should rectify more vigorously its serious mistakes in regarding <strong>the</strong> Muslim<br />
mi<strong>no</strong>rity as being somehow inferior in <strong>the</strong>ir faith, culture and way <strong>of</strong> life.<br />
For this attitude and prejudice stem from our ig<strong>no</strong>rance <strong>of</strong> Islam and <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> great achievements <strong>of</strong> Islamic civilization and its contributions to <strong>the</strong><br />
world as a whole. Moreover, until <strong>no</strong>w many Filipi<strong>no</strong>s do <strong>no</strong>t appreciate<br />
<strong>the</strong> reality that poverty and underdevelopment in <strong>the</strong> Moro lands are<br />
traceable in part to <strong>the</strong> Moro’s historic and nationalistic resistance to<br />
Western Imperialist powers, to defend <strong>the</strong>ir freedom and to keep <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
faith and way <strong>of</strong> life as a distinctive eth<strong>no</strong>-religious mi<strong>no</strong>rity. Similarly,<br />
after independence <strong>the</strong>y expended great time and resources to fend <strong>the</strong><br />
continuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> universalistic policies <strong>of</strong> political integration, cultural<br />
assimilation and national development that were applied without due<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> distinctive characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Islamic and Moro cultures<br />
in Mindanao. 102<br />
The abandonment by <strong>the</strong> Presidency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace process and <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD<br />
has alienated <strong>the</strong> Moro public against government even as it draws a groundswell <strong>of</strong><br />
sympathy from <strong>the</strong>m for <strong>the</strong> revolutionary struggle. But all is <strong>no</strong>t lost as yet between<br />
<strong>the</strong> Moro and <strong>the</strong> Filipi<strong>no</strong>, and it is <strong>no</strong>t a grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion and it’s never too<br />
late on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> government to pick up <strong>the</strong> olive branch.<br />
101 Id., pp. 36-41.<br />
102 Marohomsalic, supra., p.293.<br />
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93
Government as Parens Patriae<br />
Marohomsalic, Malayang, Panumpang and Mitmug<br />
In law, government is idealized as a sort <strong>of</strong> a parent or guardian for <strong>the</strong><br />
disadvantaged sectors <strong>of</strong> society. 103<br />
Obviously, <strong>the</strong>re’s <strong>no</strong> better champion. And <strong>the</strong>re’s <strong>no</strong> better argument but<br />
<strong>the</strong> lowly lot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro and <strong>no</strong> better lean-on but <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> government.<br />
“For three hundred and fifty years,” wrote an American Colonel who served<br />
as Gover<strong>no</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> District <strong>of</strong> Zamboanga <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Moro Province for ten years, “[<strong>the</strong><br />
Moro] has stood at bay, defending his religion and home [against Spain]. He had <strong>no</strong><br />
time for improvement, <strong>no</strong> chance to take on <strong>the</strong> amenities <strong>of</strong> civilization. Everything<br />
has gone before <strong>the</strong> ruthless hand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> destroyer, except <strong>the</strong> one thing, that to a<br />
Mohammedan is dearer than life, his religion. In this connection, it is well to<br />
remember that any solution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Moro problem, by <strong>the</strong> American, or any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
government, must count upon <strong>the</strong> element <strong>of</strong> his life, as <strong>the</strong> largest factor in <strong>the</strong><br />
equation. In this constant struggle <strong>the</strong> Moro has retrogressed; certainly, who <strong>of</strong> us<br />
is strong e<strong>no</strong>ugh to withstand such influences? It is a well recognized fact, that after<br />
<strong>the</strong> American people had come through <strong>the</strong> Civil War, <strong>the</strong>re was a lower standard <strong>of</strong><br />
morals and an undercurrent <strong>of</strong> brutality through <strong>the</strong> whole nation, that took years<br />
<strong>of</strong> peace to overcome. We had fought four years; multiply that by a hundred and<br />
where would our boasted civilization be today?” 104<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Americans failed to appreciate <strong>the</strong> Moro and his religion 105<br />
and made war against him for his subjugation. So did <strong>the</strong> Christian Filipi<strong>no</strong> majority.<br />
His insurgency was used for <strong>the</strong> declaration <strong>of</strong> Martial Law in 1972 which resulted<br />
in <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> about 120,000 people who are mostly in<strong>no</strong>cent Moro civilians and<br />
<strong>the</strong> massive displacement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Moro race starting <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong>ir Diaspora and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r mi<strong>no</strong>ritization in Mindanao.<br />
We raised <strong>the</strong>se social arguments in all <strong>the</strong>ir poignancy to call attention to <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA-AD as an equalizing instrument to get <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro up to <strong>the</strong>ir rightful<br />
place in society. Certainly and contrary to <strong>the</strong> assumptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oppositors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Agreement, <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel has <strong>no</strong>t committed grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion<br />
amounting to lack or excess <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction in concluding or executing or initialing<br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA-AD with <strong>the</strong> MILF that is designed as it is to render equity and justice in<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir favor.<br />
103 See Government <strong>of</strong> P.I. vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 747-748, 1916; Vasco vs. C.A., 81 SCRA, 766, 1978. O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
citations omitted.<br />
104 John P. Finley, The Mohammedan Problem in <strong>the</strong> Philippines, The <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Race Development, 15 April<br />
1915, Vol., 5, No. 4, pp. 356-357.<br />
105 Id., p. 360.<br />
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The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity<br />
is <strong>no</strong>t a separate state but a sub-state<br />
Fears were expressed that <strong>the</strong> BJE comprises <strong>of</strong> geographic areas delineated<br />
and parceled out from <strong>the</strong> country as a gift to <strong>the</strong> MILF. As ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro homeland is vested exclusively in <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
prior right <strong>of</strong> occupation 106 and is going to be constituted as a political unit with a<br />
system <strong>of</strong> governance suitable and acceptable to <strong>the</strong>m, 107 some people are led to<br />
believe that <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD creates an independent Bangsa Moro State named BJE.<br />
It is our submission that <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD is replete with provisions that make for<br />
<strong>the</strong> k<strong>no</strong>wledge that <strong>the</strong> territorial domain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro are within <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
integrity and political map <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and that <strong>the</strong> BJE is only a sub-state.<br />
For example, first, its external defense is <strong>the</strong> duty and obligation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Central<br />
Government; 108 second, both parties have to forge an eco<strong>no</strong>mic cooperation<br />
agreement or arrangement over <strong>the</strong> income and revenues that are derived from <strong>the</strong><br />
exploration, exploitation, use and development <strong>of</strong> any resources for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro; 109 third, royalties, bonuses, taxes, charges, custom, duties or imposts<br />
on natural resources have to be shared by <strong>the</strong> Parties on a percentage ratio <strong>of</strong> 75-25<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro Juridical Entity; 110 fourth, in times <strong>of</strong> national emergency,<br />
when public interest so requires, <strong>the</strong> Central Government may, during <strong>the</strong> emergency,<br />
for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed by both parties,<br />
temporarily assume or direct <strong>the</strong> operations <strong>of</strong> such strategic resources which include<br />
all potential sources <strong>of</strong> energy, petroleum, in situ, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural<br />
gas, whe<strong>the</strong>r onshore or <strong>of</strong>fshore; 111 fifth, <strong>the</strong> BJE may establish and open<br />
Bangsamoro trade missions in foreign countries, 112 <strong>no</strong>t embassies; sixth, <strong>the</strong> Central<br />
Government is to take necessary steps to ensure <strong>the</strong> BJE’s participation in<br />
international meetings and events and its participation in Philippine <strong>of</strong>ficial missions<br />
and delegations in negotiations <strong>of</strong> border agreements or protocols for environmental<br />
protection, equitable sharing <strong>of</strong> incomes and revenues in <strong>the</strong> areas <strong>of</strong> sea, seabed<br />
and inland seas or bodies <strong>of</strong> water adjacent to or between islands forming part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> ancestral domain, in addition to those <strong>of</strong> fishing rights; 113 seven, beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
fifteen (15) kilometers internal waters, <strong>the</strong> Central Government and <strong>the</strong> BJE shall<br />
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over areas and all natural<br />
resources living and <strong>no</strong>n-living contained <strong>the</strong>rein. 114<br />
106 Paragraph 2 on Concepts and Principles, MOA-AD.<br />
107 Paragraph 4, id.<br />
108 Paragraph 4 on Resources, MOA-AD.<br />
109 Paragraph 3, id.<br />
110 Paragraph 6, id.<br />
111 Paragraph 5, id.<br />
112 Paragraph 4(a), id.<br />
113 Paragraph 4(b), id.<br />
114 Paragraph 2(g) on Territory, id.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
95
BJE is a Sub-State<br />
Marohomsalic, Malayang, Panumpang and Mitmug<br />
In fine, <strong>the</strong> BJE would come as a sub-state within <strong>the</strong> Philippine State, exercising<br />
many functions <strong>of</strong> a state and sharing competence with <strong>the</strong> parent state on matters<br />
<strong>of</strong> foreign trade and as member <strong>of</strong> any Philippine delegation and mission including<br />
those organized to tackle matters concerning natural resources within <strong>the</strong> BJE’s<br />
territorial waters and seabed.<br />
Indeed, this BJE, touted as a geographical area nicked out from <strong>the</strong> country is,<br />
to quote Senator Joker Arroyo, a hush-hush, nay, a formless political bugaboo in <strong>the</strong><br />
minds <strong>of</strong> those who lack understanding <strong>of</strong>, and sympathy for, <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro and <strong>the</strong> ideals <strong>of</strong> peace.<br />
The BJE is born and so named only in <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD for convenience and<br />
practical purpose. Like a baby boy or a baby girl just born and given a name-tag to<br />
distinguish it as such baby boy or baby girl. And, as in this case, a baby child <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Executive Department and <strong>the</strong> MILF.<br />
It may <strong>no</strong>t even crawl or toddle its way through, crippled this early with<br />
deadweights used in <strong>the</strong> dungeons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past.<br />
Both Parties are aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> name “BJE,” and it’s only after<br />
<strong>the</strong> ordinance <strong>of</strong> government is defined in <strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Compact will its true<br />
name and political complexion comes by. For <strong>the</strong> time being, and by definition <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, <strong>the</strong> BJE is a sub-state.<br />
A Freedom House for <strong>the</strong> Indigenes<br />
Contrary to <strong>the</strong> presumptions <strong>of</strong> detractors, <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD does <strong>no</strong>t derogate<br />
against <strong>the</strong> protection afforded by <strong>the</strong> State to <strong>the</strong> ancestral domain and <strong>the</strong> ancestral<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r indige<strong>no</strong>us people or Lumads under Republic Act 8371 or <strong>the</strong><br />
Indige<strong>no</strong>us People’s Right Act <strong>of</strong> 1997. Also, it will <strong>no</strong>t violate <strong>the</strong> Torrens System<br />
obtaining in <strong>the</strong> country. Paragraph 7 on Concepts and Principles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD<br />
sees to that, thus:<br />
Vested property rights upon <strong>the</strong> entrenchment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> BJE shall be<br />
recognized and respected subject to paragraph 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strand on<br />
Recourses.<br />
Paragraph 9 on Resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD provides that “Forest concessions,<br />
timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production<br />
and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), and o<strong>the</strong>r land tenure instruments <strong>of</strong> any kind or<br />
nature whatsoever granted by <strong>the</strong> Philippine Government including those issued by<br />
<strong>the</strong> present Auto<strong>no</strong>mous Region in Muslim by <strong>the</strong> present Auto<strong>no</strong>mous Region in<br />
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall continue to operate from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> formal<br />
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The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
entrenchment <strong>of</strong> Bangsamoro juridical entity unless o<strong>the</strong>rwise expired reviewed,<br />
modified and/or cancelled by <strong>the</strong> latter.”<br />
This provision extends protection to concessions and <strong>the</strong> like within <strong>the</strong><br />
Bangsamoro homeland, and it is <strong>no</strong>t meant to derogate against <strong>the</strong> ownership by <strong>the</strong><br />
Lumads <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ancestral lands and ancestral domain.<br />
POSTCRIPT: A Requiem to Adversarial Politics<br />
and a Hossana to Pollyanna Politics<br />
Oppositors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD from <strong>the</strong> political opposition scored against <strong>the</strong><br />
lack <strong>of</strong> transparency on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> government and <strong>the</strong> failure to consult <strong>the</strong>m in<br />
<strong>the</strong> negotiations with <strong>the</strong> MILF. Offhand, we can emphatize with <strong>the</strong>ir predicament.<br />
But what we can<strong>no</strong>t understand are <strong>the</strong> behavioral tendencies <strong>of</strong> some political<br />
leaders who easily panic and fire up people with ve<strong>no</strong>mous rhetoric that will<br />
transmogrify <strong>the</strong>m into <strong>the</strong>ir bestial ancestry. Ordinary minds may quack in<br />
trepidation or growl in anger under <strong>the</strong> strain, but leaders are leaders need to control<br />
and manage <strong>the</strong>ir emotions, and <strong>the</strong>y are expected to exhibit grace even under difficult<br />
circumstances. Particularly, <strong>the</strong>y de<strong>no</strong>unced <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel<br />
in <strong>the</strong> media for alleged incompetence and for selling <strong>the</strong> country for a song to <strong>the</strong><br />
MILF.<br />
One former Senator, who is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petitioners against <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, made<br />
his accusation that <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel committed acts <strong>of</strong> treason for <strong>the</strong>ir assent<br />
to <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD. Now, who’s guilty <strong>of</strong> treason? Unwittingly and overly carried by<br />
his emotion, he forgot his law and ascribed to <strong>the</strong> MILF <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> a foreign state.<br />
In our jurisdiction, a citizen may commit treason by giving aid and comfort to an<br />
enemy (i.e., a foreign State against which <strong>the</strong> country is at war). 115<br />
The City Mayor <strong>of</strong> Iligan threatened to declare a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace<br />
Panel, who is a resident <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> City, as persona <strong>no</strong>n grata, which is strange for a local<br />
executive who <strong>no</strong>w petitioned <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court to grant him his human rights<br />
including <strong>the</strong> right to public information. According to Rodil, he had appeared twice<br />
before <strong>the</strong> Iligan City Sanggunian and clarified matters in connection with <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
talks between <strong>the</strong> MILF and <strong>the</strong> GRP. 116<br />
115 Article 114, Revised Penal Code<br />
116 Rodil and Atty. Marohomsalic personally talked on <strong>the</strong> occasion <strong>of</strong> a Public Forum on MOA-AD at <strong>the</strong><br />
Malcolm Theatre, U.P. College <strong>of</strong> Law, Dililam, Q.C., where he spoke. He shared <strong>the</strong> information with Atty.<br />
Marohomsalic.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Marohomsalic, Malayang, Panumpang and Mitmug<br />
Cotabato Vice-Gover<strong>no</strong>r Piñol, a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r petitioner, was most hostile to <strong>the</strong><br />
MOA-AD. By <strong>the</strong> look <strong>of</strong> things, he is aware <strong>of</strong> developments on <strong>the</strong> peace process.<br />
In a ceremony on September 2005 for <strong>the</strong> outgoing Head <strong>of</strong> Mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Maysianled<br />
International Monitoring Team, MGen Dato’ Zulkifeli bin Moh’d Zin, petitioner<br />
Piñol, who was <strong>the</strong>n Gover<strong>no</strong>r <strong>of</strong> Cotabato, was <strong>the</strong> guest <strong>of</strong> ho<strong>no</strong>r and, in his<br />
speech, he “impressed his support to <strong>the</strong> on-going GRP-MILF peace talks,” explaining<br />
“that several planting seasons were missed in <strong>the</strong> past because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fight.” He<br />
called for a respite from fighting, to give way for children’s education, and to help<br />
achieve and maintain peace. 117<br />
In a public consultation in Zamboanga City, according to <strong>the</strong> Chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
MILF Secretariat and Technical Committee Al Camlian, petitioner Zamboanga City<br />
Mayor Labregat was <strong>the</strong> guest <strong>of</strong> ho<strong>no</strong>r. But he didn’t attend <strong>the</strong> affair, instead sent<br />
his representative to deliver his speech. Again, for <strong>the</strong> second time, Camlian’s party<br />
came to Zamboanga City and conducted public consultations but Mayor Lobregat<br />
snubbed it. 118<br />
Since 2001, <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel has been providing regular updates on <strong>the</strong><br />
peace process to strategic audiences, and in <strong>the</strong> process provides views and insights<br />
from <strong>the</strong> ground. 119 The Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Presidential Adviser on <strong>the</strong> Peace process has<br />
kept a record <strong>of</strong> consultations and dialogues with stakeholders. Atty. Sedfrey<br />
Candelaria, Chief Legal Consultant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRP Peace Panel for Talks with <strong>the</strong> MILF,<br />
wrote a summary <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, thus:<br />
[The MOA-AD] is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> more than a hundred consultative dialogues<br />
with various stakeholders conducted by <strong>the</strong> GRP Penal spread to about<br />
3-5 years, inclusive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> periodic technical working group meetings here<br />
and abroad between <strong>the</strong> Parties. Joint Statements are released to <strong>the</strong><br />
public on key issues tackled after every exploratory task. The GRP Panel<br />
is also in receipt <strong>of</strong> local government resolutions, statements and<br />
memoranda expressing <strong>the</strong>ir sentiments on <strong>the</strong> key issues (for example,<br />
opposition to inclusion in Bangsamoro Homeland and <strong>the</strong> need for<br />
consultations, adding representatives to <strong>the</strong> Panel, etc… 120<br />
117 Joint Statement between <strong>the</strong> MNLF and <strong>the</strong> MILF, 11 September 2005.<br />
118 Al Camlian was a Reactor in a Public Forum on MOA-AD at <strong>the</strong> Malcolm Theatre, U.P. College <strong>of</strong> Law,<br />
Diliman, Q.C., 20 August <strong>2008</strong>. He shared <strong>the</strong> information to Atty. Marohomsalic who was in <strong>the</strong> Forum.<br />
119 Item No. 5, primer on <strong>the</strong> Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Agreement on Ancestral Domain, prepared by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><br />
Presidential Adviser on <strong>the</strong> Peace Process.<br />
120 Sedfrey Candelaria, Silencing Peace: The Story <strong>of</strong> MOA-AD. Unpublished.<br />
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The Memorandum 0f Agreement on Ancestral Domain: A Commentary<br />
Politics <strong>of</strong> Polarity<br />
Finally, it may be asked: Why <strong>the</strong> brouhaha over <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD? Why did<br />
oppositors to <strong>the</strong> MOA-AD show overly negative gravitas in <strong>the</strong> propagation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir outlook? Do we see again <strong>the</strong> politics <strong>of</strong> polarity that pervades our political<br />
history?<br />
We remember, in <strong>the</strong> quest for Philippine independence President Quezon<br />
was handed <strong>the</strong> Tydings-McDuffie Law by Washington. But Senators Osmeña and<br />
Roxas rejected it and <strong>the</strong>y combined and went to Washington to lobby for a better<br />
deal. They came home with <strong>the</strong> Hares-Hawes Cutting Act. But <strong>the</strong> two (2) documents<br />
spoke <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same banana, both granting <strong>the</strong> country a ten-year transition period to<br />
independence.<br />
Our ancestors experienced <strong>the</strong> worst national leadership in our political history<br />
with <strong>the</strong>ir forced incorporation to <strong>the</strong> Philippine body politic, among o<strong>the</strong>rs. And<br />
<strong>the</strong> present generation <strong>of</strong> Bangsamoros did experience it too in <strong>the</strong> abrogation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> MOA-AD, <strong>no</strong>t to mention <strong>the</strong> oppressive policy <strong>of</strong> government.<br />
Pollyanna Politics<br />
But it is well to remember here that <strong>the</strong> Bangsamoro have hungered long e<strong>no</strong>ugh<br />
for peace and comfort. The Bangsamoro can<strong>no</strong>t <strong>no</strong>w quit from <strong>the</strong>ir pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
right to self-determination without forfeiting <strong>the</strong>ir heritage <strong>of</strong> freedom and tampering<br />
with <strong>the</strong> heroism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir forebears and <strong>the</strong> legacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir contemporary champions.<br />
<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
99
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN<br />
Revisiting Charter Change<br />
Through People’s Initiative*<br />
Froilan M. Bacungan**<br />
Introduction<br />
Our Constitution is a good Constitution. It could be <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong><br />
achievement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ideals <strong>of</strong> democracy and justice if our public <strong>of</strong>ficers and employees<br />
show <strong>the</strong>ir allegiance to <strong>the</strong> State and <strong>the</strong> Constitution at all times. But it seems that<br />
for a very long time <strong>no</strong>w, this is <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> case.<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong>re is need to introduce into our Constitution certain provisions to<br />
ensure greater accountability <strong>of</strong> our public <strong>of</strong>ficers and this could be done by using<br />
People’s Initiative as <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> amending our Constitution.<br />
But people’s initiative a possible mode for changing our Constitution, given<br />
<strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court in <strong>the</strong> cases <strong>of</strong> Santiago vs. Commission on Elections,<br />
270 SCRA 106; PIRMA vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129754, September 23,<br />
1997, and Lambi<strong>no</strong> vs. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 218?<br />
It is our position that inspite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> very negative rulings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court members in <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned cases, people’s initiative is a<br />
possible mode for changing our Constitution to ensure – it is repeated – greater<br />
accountability <strong>of</strong> our public <strong>of</strong>ficers.<br />
Analyzing Santiago vs. Comelec<br />
Antecendent Facts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Case as Stated in <strong>the</strong> Decision<br />
On 6 December 1996, an Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with Commission on<br />
Elections (COMELEC), a “Petition to Amend <strong>the</strong> Constitution, to Lift Term Limits<br />
<strong>of</strong> Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative.” Delfin asked <strong>the</strong> COMELEC for an<br />
order:<br />
1. Fixing <strong>the</strong> time and dates for signature ga<strong>the</strong>ring all over <strong>the</strong> country;<br />
2. Causing <strong>the</strong> necessary publications <strong>of</strong> said Order and <strong>the</strong> attached “Petition<br />
for Initiative on <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution, in newspapers <strong>of</strong> general and local<br />
circulation;<br />
* Lecture delivered at <strong>the</strong> U.P. Law Center MCLE Program held on August 28, <strong>2008</strong>.<br />
** Former Dean, College <strong>of</strong> Law, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
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Revisiting Charter Change Through People’s Initiative<br />
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
to assist Petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at <strong>the</strong><br />
time and on <strong>the</strong> dates designated for <strong>the</strong> purpose.<br />
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Movement<br />
for People’s Initiative, a group <strong>of</strong> citizens desirous to avail <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system intended to<br />
institutionalize people power, that he and <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Movement and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
volunteers intend to exercise <strong>the</strong> power to directly propose amendments to <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution; that <strong>the</strong><br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> that power shall be conducted in proceedings under <strong>the</strong> control and<br />
supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No.<br />
2300, signature stations shall be established all over <strong>the</strong> country, with <strong>the</strong> assistance<br />
<strong>of</strong> municipal election registrars, who shall verify <strong>the</strong> signatures affixed by individual<br />
signatories; that before <strong>the</strong> Movement and o<strong>the</strong>r volunteers can ga<strong>the</strong>r signatures,<br />
it is necessary that <strong>the</strong> time and dates to be designated for <strong>the</strong> purpose be first fixed<br />
in an order issued by <strong>the</strong> COMELEC; and that to adequately inform <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that <strong>the</strong> said order, as well as<br />
<strong>the</strong> Petition on which <strong>the</strong> signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers <strong>of</strong><br />
general and local circulation, under <strong>the</strong> control and supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> COMELEC.<br />
Delfin in his Petition fur<strong>the</strong>r alleged that <strong>the</strong> provisions sought to be amended<br />
are Sections 4 and 7 <strong>of</strong> Article VI, Section 4 <strong>of</strong> Article VII, and Section 8 <strong>of</strong> Article<br />
X <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Attached to <strong>the</strong> petition was a copy <strong>of</strong> a Petition for Initiative<br />
on <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution embodying <strong>the</strong> proposed amendments which consist in<br />
<strong>the</strong> deletion from <strong>the</strong> aforecited sections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions concerning term limits,<br />
and with <strong>the</strong> following proposition: “Do you approve <strong>of</strong> lifting <strong>the</strong> term limits <strong>of</strong> all<br />
elective government <strong>of</strong>ficials, amending for <strong>the</strong> purpose Section 4 and 7 <strong>of</strong> Article<br />
VI, Section 4 <strong>of</strong> Article VII, and Section 8 <strong>of</strong> Article X <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1987 Philippine<br />
Constitution?”<br />
According to Delfin, <strong>the</strong> said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to<br />
<strong>the</strong> people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong><br />
registered voters in <strong>the</strong> country, it will be formally filed with <strong>the</strong> COMELEC.<br />
Upon <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given <strong>the</strong> number<br />
UND 96-037 (Initiative), <strong>the</strong> COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order<br />
(a) directing Delfin “to cause <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> attached<br />
Petition for Initiative on <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution (including <strong>the</strong> proposal, proposed<br />
constitutional amendment, and <strong>the</strong> signature form), and <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice <strong>of</strong> hearing in<br />
three (3) daily newspapers <strong>of</strong> general circulation at his own expense” <strong>no</strong>t later than<br />
9 December 1996; and (b) setting <strong>the</strong> case for hearing on 12 December 1996. At <strong>the</strong><br />
hearing, <strong>the</strong> following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); interve<strong>no</strong>roppositor<br />
Senator Raul S. Roco, toge<strong>the</strong>r with his two o<strong>the</strong>r lawyers and<br />
representatives <strong>of</strong>, or counsel for, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Integrated</strong> <strong>Bar</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines (IBP),<br />
Demockrasya-Ipagtangol and Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
101
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN<br />
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipi<strong>no</strong> (LABAN). Senator Roco, on that same day, filed<br />
a Motion to Dismiss <strong>the</strong> Delfin Petition on <strong>the</strong> ground that it is <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> initiatory<br />
petition properly cognizable by <strong>the</strong> COMELEC.<br />
After hearing <strong>the</strong>ir arguments, <strong>the</strong> COMELEC directed Delfin and <strong>the</strong><br />
oppositors to file <strong>the</strong>ir “memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda” within five<br />
days.<br />
But on 18 December 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander<br />
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition which is<br />
<strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections,<br />
Santiago raised <strong>the</strong> following arguments:<br />
(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress.<br />
No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act<br />
Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by People’s<br />
Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995,<br />
was still pending before <strong>the</strong> Senate Committee on Constitutional<br />
Amendments.<br />
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems <strong>of</strong> initiative, namely,<br />
initiative on <strong>the</strong> Constitution, on Statutes, and on local legislation.<br />
However, it failed to provide any subtitle initiative on <strong>the</strong> Constitution,<br />
unlike in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r modes <strong>of</strong> initiative, which are specifically provided for<br />
in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that <strong>the</strong><br />
matter <strong>of</strong> people’s initiative to amend <strong>the</strong> Constitution was left to some<br />
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolenti<strong>no</strong> stressed this deficiency in<br />
<strong>the</strong> law in his privilege speech delivered before <strong>the</strong> Senate in 1994: “There<br />
is <strong>no</strong>t a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing<br />
[<strong>the</strong> provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions<br />
have been obviously left to a separate law.”<br />
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law after<br />
publication in print media. This indicates that <strong>the</strong> Act covers only laws<br />
and <strong>no</strong>t constitutional amendments because <strong>the</strong> latter take effect only upon<br />
ratification and <strong>no</strong>t after publication.<br />
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern<br />
“<strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> initiative on <strong>the</strong> Constitution and initiative and referendum<br />
on national and local laws, is ultra vires ins<strong>of</strong>ar as initiative on amendments<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Constitution is concerned, since <strong>the</strong> COMELEC has <strong>no</strong> power to<br />
provide rules and regulations for <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> initiative to<br />
amend <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
to pass <strong>the</strong> implementing law.<br />
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Revisiting Charter Change Through People’s Initiative<br />
(5) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>no</strong>t<br />
to revision <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. Extending or lifting <strong>of</strong> term limits constitutes a revision<br />
and is, <strong>the</strong>refore, outside <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people’s initiative.<br />
(6) Finally, Congress has <strong>no</strong>t appropriated funds for people’s initiative; nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong> COMELEC <strong>no</strong>r any o<strong>the</strong>r government department, agency, or <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
has realigned funds for <strong>the</strong> purpose.<br />
To justify <strong>the</strong>ir recourse to <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court via <strong>the</strong> special civil action for<br />
prohibition, Senator Santiago and her co-petitioners alleged that in <strong>the</strong> event <strong>the</strong><br />
COMELEC grants <strong>the</strong> Delfin Petition, <strong>the</strong> people’s initiative spearheaded by PIRMA<br />
would entail expenses to <strong>the</strong> national treasury for general re-registration <strong>of</strong> voters<br />
amounting to at least P180 million, <strong>no</strong>t to mention <strong>the</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> additional pesos<br />
in expenses which would be incurred in <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> initiative itself. Hence,<br />
<strong>the</strong> transcendental importance to <strong>the</strong> public and <strong>the</strong> nation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issues raised<br />
demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing<br />
aside technicalities <strong>of</strong> procedure and calling for <strong>the</strong> admission <strong>of</strong> a taxpayer’s and<br />
legislator’s suit. Besides, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in<br />
<strong>the</strong> ordinary course <strong>of</strong> law.<br />
On 19 December 1996, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court (a) required Delfin and o<strong>the</strong>r private<br />
respondents to comment on <strong>the</strong> Santiago petition within a <strong>no</strong>n-extendible period <strong>of</strong><br />
ten days from <strong>no</strong>tice. The Supreme Court also issued a temporary restraining order,<br />
effective immediately and continuing until fur<strong>the</strong>r orders, enjoining <strong>the</strong> COMELEC<br />
from proceeding with <strong>the</strong> Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and<br />
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people’s initiative to amend<br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
On 2 January 1997, Delfin and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r private respondents, through Atty.<br />
Quadra, filed <strong>the</strong>ir Comment submitting <strong>the</strong> following counter arguments:<br />
(1) It is <strong>no</strong>t true that it would entail expenses to <strong>the</strong> national treasury for<br />
general registration <strong>of</strong> voters amounting to at least pesos: One Hundred<br />
Eighty Million (P180,000,000.00) if <strong>the</strong> COMELEC grants <strong>the</strong> petition<br />
filed by respondent Delfin before <strong>the</strong> COMELEC.<br />
(2) Not a single centavo would be spent by <strong>the</strong> national government if <strong>the</strong><br />
COMELEC grants <strong>the</strong> petition <strong>of</strong> respondent Delfin. All expenses in <strong>the</strong><br />
signature ga<strong>the</strong>ring are all for <strong>the</strong> account <strong>of</strong> respondent Delfin and his<br />
volunteers per <strong>the</strong>ir program <strong>of</strong> activities and expenditures submitted to<br />
<strong>the</strong> COMELEC. The estimated cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daily per diem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supervising<br />
school teachers in <strong>the</strong> signature ga<strong>the</strong>ring to be deposited and to be paid<br />
by Delfin and his volunteers is P2,571,200.00.<br />
(3) The pending petition before <strong>the</strong> COMELEC is only on <strong>the</strong> signature<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>ring which by law COMELEC is duty bound to supervise closely<br />
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FROILAN M. BACUNGAN<br />
pursuant to its “initiatory jurisdiction” upheld by <strong>the</strong> Ho<strong>no</strong>rable Court in<br />
its recent September 26, 1996 Decision in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> Subic Bay Metropolitan<br />
Authority vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 125416.<br />
(4) Republic Act No. 6735 approved on August 4, 1989 is <strong>the</strong> enabling law<br />
implementing <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> people’s initiative to propose amendments to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution. Senator Defensor-Santiago’s Senate Bill No. 1290 is a<br />
duplication <strong>of</strong> what is already provided in Republic Act No. 6735.<br />
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 promulgated on January 16, 1991<br />
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6735 was upheld by <strong>the</strong> Ho<strong>no</strong>rable Court in<br />
<strong>the</strong> recent September 26, 1996 Decision in case <strong>of</strong> Subic Bay Metropolitan<br />
Authority vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 125416 where <strong>the</strong> Ho<strong>no</strong>rable Court<br />
said: “The Commission on Elections can do <strong>no</strong> less by seasonably and<br />
judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules for both national and local<br />
use, in implementing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se laws.”<br />
(6) Even Senator Defensor-Santiago’s Senate Bill No. 1290 contains a provision<br />
delegating to <strong>the</strong> COMELEC <strong>the</strong> power to “promulgate such rules and<br />
regulations as may be necessary to carry out <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> this Act.”<br />
(Sec. 12, S.B. No. 1290)<br />
(7) The lifting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> limitation on <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> elective <strong>of</strong>ficials provided<br />
under <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution is <strong>no</strong>t a “revision” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. It is<br />
only an amendment. “Amendment envisages an alteration <strong>of</strong> one or a few<br />
specific provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Revision contemplates a reexamination<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire document to determine how and to what extent<br />
it should be altered.”<br />
Considering <strong>the</strong> arguments for and against <strong>the</strong> Santiago petition, Justice Hilario<br />
G. Davide, Jr. as ponente, made <strong>the</strong> following categorical rulings:-<br />
Ruling No. 1<br />
The Instant Petition (<strong>of</strong> Senator Santiago, et. al)<br />
is Viable Despite <strong>the</strong> Pendency in <strong>the</strong> Comelec<br />
<strong>of</strong> Delfin Petition.<br />
In support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above ruling, <strong>the</strong> Davide ponencia states:<br />
(1) The COMELEC has <strong>no</strong> jurisdiction to take cognizance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition<br />
filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative<br />
to stop <strong>the</strong> COMELEC from proceeding any fur<strong>the</strong>r, and under <strong>the</strong> Rules<br />
<strong>of</strong> Court, Rules 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
remedy.<br />
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Revisiting Charter Change Through People’s Initiative<br />
(2) The writ <strong>of</strong> prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out <strong>of</strong> a<br />
court <strong>of</strong> superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for <strong>the</strong><br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> preventing <strong>the</strong> inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction<br />
with which it is <strong>no</strong>t legally vested. (People vs. Vera, supra.) In this case <strong>the</strong><br />
writ is an urgent necessity, in view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highly divisive and adverse<br />
environmental consequences on <strong>the</strong> body politic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questioned<br />
COMELEC order. The consequent climate <strong>of</strong> legal confusion and political<br />
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.<br />
Ruling No. 2<br />
R.A. No. 6735 Intended to Include <strong>the</strong> System <strong>of</strong> Initiative<br />
on Amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, But is, Unfortunately,<br />
Inadequate to Cover that System<br />
In support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above ruling, <strong>the</strong> Davide ponencia quotes extensively from<br />
<strong>the</strong> proceedings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1986 Constitutional Commission after which it carefully<br />
scrutinizes word for word R.A. 6735 which is being cited as that enabling law <strong>of</strong><br />
people’s initiative.<br />
Among o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong> Davide ponencia states:<br />
(1) While <strong>the</strong> Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum<br />
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), <strong>no</strong><br />
subtitle is provided for initiative on <strong>the</strong> Constitution. This conspicuous<br />
silence as to <strong>the</strong> latter simply means that <strong>the</strong> main thrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act is<br />
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended<br />
R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> initiative on<br />
amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle<br />
<strong>the</strong>refor, considering that in <strong>the</strong> order <strong>of</strong> things, <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> interest,<br />
or hierarchy <strong>of</strong> values, <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people to directly propose<br />
amendment, to <strong>the</strong> Constitution is far more important than <strong>the</strong> initiative<br />
on national and local laws.<br />
(2) We can<strong>no</strong>t accept <strong>the</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong> initiative on amendments to <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution is subsumed under <strong>the</strong> subtitle on National Initiative and<br />
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading <strong>of</strong> Subtitle II<br />
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and<br />
Referendum) leaves <strong>no</strong> room for doubt that <strong>the</strong> classification is <strong>no</strong>t based<br />
on <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It<br />
is “national initiative” if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a<br />
national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is “local initiative”<br />
if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or<br />
resolution which only <strong>the</strong> legislative bodies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> governments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
auto<strong>no</strong>mous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can<br />
pass.<br />
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Hence, to complete <strong>the</strong> classification under <strong>the</strong> subtitle, <strong>the</strong>re should have<br />
been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
Ruling No. 3<br />
Comelec Resolution No. 2300, Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it Prescribed Rules<br />
and Regulations on <strong>the</strong> Conduct <strong>of</strong> Initiative on Amendments<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, is Void<br />
In support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above ruling, <strong>the</strong> Davide ponencia states:<br />
It logically follows that <strong>the</strong> COMELEC can<strong>no</strong>t validly promulgate rules and<br />
regulations to implement <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people to directly propose<br />
amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution through <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> initiative. It does <strong>no</strong>t have<br />
that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on <strong>the</strong> COMELEC’s power under<br />
Section 2 (1) <strong>of</strong> Article IX-C <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution is misplaced, for <strong>the</strong> laws and<br />
regulations referred to <strong>the</strong>rein are those promulgated by <strong>the</strong> COMELEC under<br />
(a) Section 3 <strong>of</strong> Article IX-C <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate<br />
legislation is authorized and which satisfies <strong>the</strong> “completeness” and <strong>the</strong> “sufficient<br />
standard” tests.<br />
Ruling No. 4<br />
Comelec Acted Without Jurisdiction or with Grave Abuse<br />
<strong>of</strong> Discretion in Entertaining <strong>the</strong> Delfin Petition.<br />
In support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above ruling, <strong>the</strong> Davide ponencia states:<br />
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. 6735 is a full compliance with <strong>the</strong><br />
power <strong>of</strong> Congress to implement <strong>the</strong> right to initiate constitutional amendments,<br />
or that it has validly vested upon <strong>the</strong> COMELEC <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> subordinate<br />
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution 2300 is valid, <strong>the</strong> COMELEC acted<br />
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion in entertaining <strong>the</strong> Delfin<br />
Petition.<br />
Under Section 2 <strong>of</strong> Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and Section 5(b) <strong>of</strong><br />
R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on <strong>the</strong> Constitution must be signed by at<br />
least 12% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> registered voters <strong>of</strong> which every legislative district<br />
is represented by at least 3% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> registered voters <strong>the</strong>rein. The Delfin Petition<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t contain signatures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> required number <strong>of</strong> voters. Delfin himself admits<br />
that he has <strong>no</strong>t yet ga<strong>the</strong>red signatures and that <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> his petition is primarily<br />
to obtain assistance in his drive to ga<strong>the</strong>r signatures. Without <strong>the</strong> required signatures,<br />
<strong>the</strong> petition can<strong>no</strong>t be deemed validly initiated.<br />
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On <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above four Rulings, <strong>the</strong> Davide decision among o<strong>the</strong>rs –<br />
a) Declared R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> initiative on<br />
amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, and it failed to provide sufficient standard for<br />
subordinate legislation; and<br />
b) Declared void those parts <strong>of</strong> Resolution No. 2300 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission on<br />
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> initiative or amendments<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
Rulings in PIRMA vs. COMELEC<br />
In this case, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that <strong>no</strong><br />
grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion could be attributed to <strong>the</strong> COMELEC in dismissing <strong>the</strong><br />
petition filed by PIRMA, it appearing that it (meaning COMELEC) only complied<br />
with <strong>the</strong> dispositions in <strong>the</strong> Decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court in Santiago vs. Commission<br />
on Elections.<br />
The majority <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court, namely, <strong>the</strong> Chief Justice<br />
Narvasa and Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres<br />
voted that <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>no</strong> need to re-examine <strong>the</strong>ir ruling that R.A. 6735 can<strong>no</strong>t be<br />
considered as <strong>the</strong> enabling law for people’s initiative.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> PIRMA case, <strong>the</strong>re is also this angry opinion <strong>of</strong> Justice Davide:<br />
“With much more vigor do I reiterate my view that this case must be<br />
summarily dismissed and should <strong>no</strong>t be allowed to stay a moment longer<br />
before this Court. It is undeniable and inescapable that this Court already<br />
decreed, with finality, <strong>the</strong> inadequacy and insufficiency <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 6735<br />
in implementing <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people to directly propose amendments<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Constitution through <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> initiative. The petition <strong>the</strong>n<br />
makes a mockery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> judicial process and breaches <strong>the</strong> principle which<br />
bars relitigation <strong>of</strong> issues between parties and doctrines related <strong>the</strong>reto;<br />
moreover, it is a brazen insult to <strong>the</strong> intelligence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> this<br />
Court.”<br />
Analyzing Lambi<strong>no</strong> vs. COMELEC<br />
Antecedent Facts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Case as Stated in <strong>the</strong> Decision<br />
On 15 February 2006, Raul L. Lambi<strong>no</strong> and Erico B. Aumentado (“Lambi<strong>no</strong><br />
Group”) with o<strong>the</strong>r groups and individuals, commenced ga<strong>the</strong>ring signatures for an<br />
initiative petition to change <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong><br />
Group filed a petition with <strong>the</strong> COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
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initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 6735<br />
or <strong>the</strong> Initiative and Referendum Act.<br />
The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group alleged that <strong>the</strong>ir petition had <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> 6,327,952<br />
individuals constituting at least twelve percent (12%) <strong>of</strong> all registered voters, with<br />
each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) <strong>of</strong> its registered<br />
voters. The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had<br />
verified <strong>the</strong> signatures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 6.3 million individuals.<br />
The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s initiative petition changes <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution by<br />
modifying Section 1-7 <strong>of</strong> Article VI (Legislative Department) and Section 1-4 <strong>of</strong><br />
Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory<br />
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift <strong>the</strong> present Bicameral-Presidential<br />
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form <strong>of</strong> government. The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group<br />
prayed that after due publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir petition, <strong>the</strong> COMELEC should submit<br />
<strong>the</strong> following proposition in a plebiscite for <strong>the</strong> voters’ ratification:<br />
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND<br />
VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF<br />
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-<br />
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY<br />
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY<br />
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM<br />
TO THE OTHER?<br />
On 30 August 2006, <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group filed an Amendment Petition with<br />
<strong>the</strong> COMELEC indicating modifications in <strong>the</strong> proposed Article XVIII (Transitory<br />
Provisions) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir initiative.<br />
The Ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> COMELEC<br />
On 31 August 2006, <strong>the</strong> COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s petition for lack <strong>of</strong> an enabling law governing initiative<br />
petitions to amend <strong>the</strong> Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court’s ruling<br />
in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections declaring R.A. 6735 inadequate to implement<br />
<strong>the</strong> initiative clause on proposals to amend <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
In G.R. No. 174153, <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group prayed for <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> writs<br />
<strong>of</strong> certiorari and mandamus to set aside <strong>the</strong> COMELEC Resolution <strong>of</strong> 31 August<br />
2006 and to compel <strong>the</strong> COMELEC to give due course to <strong>the</strong>ir initiative petition.<br />
The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group contends that <strong>the</strong> COMELEC committed grave abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
discretion in denying due course to <strong>the</strong>ir petition since Santiago is <strong>no</strong>t a binding<br />
precedent. Alternatively, <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group claims that Santiago binds only <strong>the</strong><br />
parties to that case, and <strong>the</strong>ir petition deserves cognizance as an expression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
“will <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sovereign people.”<br />
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In his Comment to <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s petition, <strong>the</strong> Solicitor General joined<br />
causes with <strong>the</strong> petitioners, urging <strong>the</strong> Court to grant <strong>the</strong> petition despite <strong>the</strong> Santiago<br />
ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that <strong>the</strong> Court treat R.A. 6735 and its<br />
implementing rules “as temporary devises to implement <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> initiative.”<br />
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting<br />
or opposing <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s petition. The supporting interve<strong>no</strong>rs uniformly<br />
held <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> COMELEC committed grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion in relying<br />
on Santiago. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> opposing interve<strong>no</strong>rs held <strong>the</strong> contrary view<br />
and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing interve<strong>no</strong>rs also<br />
challenged (1) <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s standing to file <strong>the</strong> petition; (2) <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong><br />
Group’s compliance with <strong>the</strong> minimum requirement for <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>of</strong> voters<br />
supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1987<br />
Constitution; (3) <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed changes as revisions and <strong>no</strong>t mere<br />
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution;<br />
and (4) <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s compliance with <strong>the</strong> requirement in Section 10(a) <strong>of</strong><br />
RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.<br />
The Issues<br />
To <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court, <strong>the</strong> petitions raised <strong>the</strong> following issues:<br />
1. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s initiative petition complies with Section<br />
2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution on amendments to <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution through a people’s initiative;<br />
2. Whe<strong>the</strong>r this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA<br />
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and<br />
conditions” to implement <strong>the</strong> initiative clause on proposals to amend<br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution; and<br />
3. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> COMELEC committed grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion in<br />
denying due course to <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s petition.<br />
The Rulings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court<br />
To <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court, Justice Carpio and a majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Justices ruled that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was <strong>no</strong> merit to <strong>the</strong> petition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group. The Carpio ponencia<br />
stated.<br />
The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Groups miserably failed to comply with <strong>the</strong> basic requirements<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, <strong>the</strong>re is even <strong>no</strong> need<br />
to revisit Santiago, as <strong>the</strong> present petition warrants dismissal based alone on <strong>the</strong><br />
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Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s glaring failure to comply with <strong>the</strong> basic requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution. The Carpio ponencia emphatically stated: <strong>no</strong> grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion<br />
is attributable to <strong>the</strong> Commission on Elections.<br />
The Davide Ponencia Compared to <strong>the</strong> Carpio Ponencia<br />
The PIRMA people’s initiative petition was <strong>no</strong>t given due course because <strong>the</strong><br />
Davide ponencia emphasized that <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>no</strong> enabling law for people’s initiative as<br />
a mode for amending <strong>the</strong> 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 can<strong>no</strong>t be considered to be<br />
<strong>the</strong> required enabling law.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> case, <strong>the</strong> Carpio ponencia focused on <strong>the</strong>se two categorical<br />
findings:<br />
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,<br />
Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution on Direct Proposal by <strong>the</strong><br />
People<br />
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives<br />
The Carpio ponencia on <strong>the</strong> first categorical findings states: “clearly, <strong>the</strong> framers<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution intended that <strong>the</strong> “draft <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed constitutional<br />
amendments” should be “ready and shown” to <strong>the</strong> people “before” <strong>the</strong>y sign such<br />
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before <strong>the</strong>y sign <strong>the</strong>re is already a draft<br />
shown to <strong>the</strong>m.” The framers also “envisioned” that <strong>the</strong> people should sign on <strong>the</strong><br />
proposal itself because <strong>the</strong> proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it<br />
around for signature.”<br />
The essence <strong>of</strong> amendments “directly proposed by <strong>the</strong> people through initiative<br />
upon a petition” is that <strong>the</strong> entire proposal on its face is a petition by <strong>the</strong> people.<br />
This means two essential elements must be present. First, <strong>the</strong> people must author<br />
and thus sign <strong>the</strong> entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, <strong>the</strong> proposal must be embodied in<br />
a petition.<br />
These essential elements are present only if <strong>the</strong> full text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed<br />
amendments is first shown to <strong>the</strong> people who express <strong>the</strong>ir assent by signing such<br />
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by <strong>the</strong><br />
people through initiative upon a petition” only if <strong>the</strong> people sign on a petition that<br />
contains <strong>the</strong> full text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed amendments.<br />
The full text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed amendments may be ei<strong>the</strong>r written on <strong>the</strong> face<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition, or attached to it. If so attached, <strong>the</strong> petition must state <strong>the</strong> fact <strong>of</strong><br />
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such attachment. This is an assurance that every one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> several millions <strong>of</strong><br />
signatories to <strong>the</strong> petition had seen <strong>the</strong> full text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed amendments before<br />
signing. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, it is physically impossible, given <strong>the</strong> time constraint, to prove<br />
that every one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> signatories had seen <strong>the</strong> full text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed<br />
amendments before signing.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Carpio ponencia <strong>the</strong> second categorical finding states: “There can be <strong>no</strong><br />
mistake about it. The framers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear<br />
distinction between “amendment” and “revision” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. The framers<br />
intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose<br />
revisions to <strong>the</strong> Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people’s<br />
initiative may propose only amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Where <strong>the</strong> intent and<br />
language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution clearly withheld from <strong>the</strong> people <strong>the</strong> power to propose<br />
revisions to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> people can<strong>no</strong>t propose revisions even as <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
empowered to propose amendments.”<br />
A change in <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> government is a revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, as<br />
when <strong>the</strong> three great co-equal branches <strong>of</strong> government in <strong>the</strong> present Constitution<br />
are reduced into two. This alters <strong>the</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> powers in <strong>the</strong> Constitution. A<br />
shift from <strong>the</strong> present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary<br />
system is a revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Merging <strong>the</strong> legislative and executive<br />
branches is a radical change in <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> government.<br />
The abolition alone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President as <strong>the</strong> locus <strong>of</strong> Executive<br />
Power alters <strong>the</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> powers and thus constitutes a revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution. Likewise, <strong>the</strong> abolition alone <strong>of</strong> one chamber <strong>of</strong> Congress alters <strong>the</strong><br />
system <strong>of</strong> check-and-balances within <strong>the</strong> legislature and constitutes a revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution.<br />
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, <strong>the</strong> shift from a Bicameral-<br />
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving <strong>the</strong> abolition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President and <strong>the</strong> abolition <strong>of</strong> one chamber <strong>of</strong> Congress, is beyond<br />
doubt a revision, <strong>no</strong>t a mere amendment. On <strong>the</strong> face alone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group’s<br />
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that <strong>the</strong> changes will radically alter <strong>the</strong><br />
framework <strong>of</strong> government as set forth in <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
Concluding Statements <strong>of</strong> Justice Carpio in his ponencia<br />
The Constitution, as <strong>the</strong> fundamental law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land, deserves <strong>the</strong> utmost<br />
respect and obedience <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>of</strong> this nation. No one can trivialize <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clearly<br />
specified modes <strong>of</strong> amendment and revision laid down in <strong>the</strong> Constitution itself.<br />
To allow such change in <strong>the</strong> fundamental law is to set adrift <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group <strong>of</strong><br />
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<strong>the</strong> day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in <strong>the</strong> Constitution outside <strong>the</strong><br />
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow <strong>the</strong> new dominant political group that<br />
comes will demand its own set <strong>of</strong> changes in <strong>the</strong> same cavalier and unconstitutional<br />
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does <strong>no</strong>t augur well for <strong>the</strong> rule <strong>of</strong> law in this<br />
country.<br />
An overwhelming majority – 16,622,111 voters comprising <strong>of</strong> 76.3 percent <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> total votes cast – approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11<br />
February 1987. That approval is <strong>the</strong> unmistakable voice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people, <strong>the</strong> full<br />
expression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people’s sovereign will. That approval included <strong>the</strong> prescribed<br />
modes for amending or revising <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
No amount <strong>of</strong> signatures, <strong>no</strong>t even <strong>the</strong> 6,327,952 million signatures ga<strong>the</strong>red<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group, can change our Constitution contrary to <strong>the</strong> specific modes<br />
that <strong>the</strong> people, in <strong>the</strong>ir sovereign capacity, prescribed when <strong>the</strong>y ratified <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means<br />
subverting <strong>the</strong> people’s sovereign will and discarding <strong>the</strong> Constitution. This is one<br />
act <strong>the</strong> Court can<strong>no</strong>t and should never do. As <strong>the</strong> ultimate guardian <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect<br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution, which embodies <strong>the</strong> real sovereign will <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people.<br />
Incantations <strong>of</strong> “people’s voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or “let <strong>the</strong> people<br />
decide” can<strong>no</strong>t override <strong>the</strong> specific modes <strong>of</strong> changing <strong>the</strong> Constitution as prescribed<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Constitution itself. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong> Constitution – <strong>the</strong> people’s fundamental<br />
covenant that provides enduring stability to our society – becomes easily susceptible<br />
to manipulative changes by political groups ga<strong>the</strong>ring signatures through false<br />
promises. Then, <strong>the</strong> Constitution ceases to be <strong>the</strong> bedrock <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation’s stability.<br />
The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group claims that <strong>the</strong>ir initiative is <strong>the</strong> “people’s voice.” However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in <strong>the</strong><br />
verification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir petition with <strong>the</strong> COMELEC, that “ULAP maintains its<br />
unqualified support to <strong>the</strong> agenda <strong>of</strong> Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-<br />
Arroyo for constitutional reforms.” The Lambi<strong>no</strong> Group thus admits that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
“people’s” initiative is an “unqualified support to <strong>the</strong> agenda” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> incumbent<br />
President to change <strong>the</strong> Constitution. This forewarns <strong>the</strong> Court to be wary <strong>of</strong><br />
incantations <strong>of</strong> “people’s voice” or “sovereign will” in <strong>the</strong> present initiative.<br />
This Court can<strong>no</strong>t betray its primordial duty to defend and protect <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies <strong>the</strong> people’s sovereign will, is <strong>the</strong><br />
bible <strong>of</strong> this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect <strong>the</strong> Constitution. To<br />
allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively ga<strong>the</strong>red<br />
signatures, to alter basic principles in <strong>the</strong> Constitution is to allow a desecration <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court’s<br />
raison d’etre.<br />
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The Future <strong>of</strong> People’s Initiative<br />
On <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above presentations practically just <strong>of</strong> excerpts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Davide ponencia and <strong>the</strong> Carpio ponencia <strong>the</strong> following observations could be made:<br />
1. The Davide ponencia emphasizes that R.A. No. 6735 intended to include<br />
<strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> initiative on amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, and is<br />
unfortunately, inadequate to cover that system.<br />
2. The Carpio ponencia emphasizes two findings: (1) a People’s Initiative<br />
Petition should Comply with Section 2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
on Direct Proposal by <strong>the</strong> People; and (2) <strong>the</strong> Initiative should also<br />
comply with Section 2, Article XVII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>the</strong>re can <strong>no</strong>t be<br />
a revision, only an amendment through initiative.<br />
People’s initiative could yet be <strong>the</strong> mode for amending our Constitution to<br />
ensure – it is repeated – greater accountability <strong>of</strong> our public <strong>of</strong>ficers.<br />
To achieve <strong>the</strong> above, let us hope that <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court will agree to revisit<br />
its majority decision in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections particularly its ruling that<br />
R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> initiative on amendments to <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution, and adopt <strong>the</strong> opinion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Justice, <strong>no</strong>w Chief Justice Reynaldo<br />
Pu<strong>no</strong> who believes that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people<br />
to initiate amendments to <strong>the</strong> Constitution through initiative. Our effort to discover<br />
<strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 6735 should start with <strong>the</strong> search for <strong>the</strong> intent <strong>of</strong> our<br />
lawmakers. A k<strong>no</strong>wledge <strong>of</strong> this intent is critical, for <strong>the</strong> intent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislature is<br />
<strong>the</strong> controlling factor in its interpretation. Stated o<strong>the</strong>rwise, intent is <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> law, <strong>the</strong> spirit which gives life to its enactment.<br />
Then, those who will use people’s initiative as a mode for amending <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution should follow <strong>the</strong> advice stated in <strong>the</strong> Carpio ponencia, namely - that <strong>the</strong><br />
‘draft <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed constitutional amendments’ should be “ready and shown” to<br />
<strong>the</strong> people before <strong>the</strong>y sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before<br />
<strong>the</strong>y sign <strong>the</strong>re is already a draft shown to <strong>the</strong>m.” The framers also “envisioned”<br />
that <strong>the</strong> people should sign on <strong>the</strong> proposal itself because <strong>the</strong> proponents must<br />
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”<br />
Those interested in utilizing people’s initiative as a mode <strong>of</strong> amending our<br />
Constitution should use <strong>the</strong> provision on <strong>Bar</strong>angay Assemblies in <strong>the</strong> Local<br />
Government Code, which provides:<br />
“Sec. 397. Composition; Meetings. – (a) There shall be a barangay assembly<br />
composed <strong>of</strong> all persons who are actual residents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> barangay for at<br />
least six (6) months, fifteen (15) years <strong>of</strong> age or over, citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Philippines, and duly registered in <strong>the</strong> list <strong>of</strong> barangay assembly members.<br />
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FROILAN M. BACUNGAN<br />
(b) The barangay assembly shall meet at least twice a year to hear and<br />
discuss <strong>the</strong> semestral report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sangguniang <strong>Bar</strong>angay concerning its<br />
activities and finances as well as problems affecting <strong>the</strong> barangay. Its<br />
meeting shall be held upon call <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pu<strong>no</strong>ng barangay or <strong>of</strong> at least<br />
four (4) members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sangguniang barangay, or upon written petition <strong>of</strong><br />
at least five percent (5%) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> assembly members.<br />
Organizations like <strong>the</strong> <strong>Integrated</strong> <strong>Bar</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines and <strong>the</strong> Philippine<br />
Constitution Association should study how <strong>the</strong> present provisions in transparency<br />
can be re-worded to provide greater if <strong>no</strong>t complete transparency <strong>of</strong> information on<br />
expenses <strong>of</strong> public funds. The present provision which reads:<br />
“(a) Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, <strong>the</strong> State adopts<br />
and implements a policy <strong>of</strong> full public disclosure <strong>of</strong> all its transactions<br />
involving public interest. (Sec. 28, Article II)<br />
(b) The right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people to information on matters <strong>of</strong> public concern<br />
shall be recognized. Access to <strong>of</strong>ficial records, and to documents, and<br />
papers pertaining to <strong>of</strong>ficial acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to<br />
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be<br />
afforded <strong>the</strong> citizens, subject to such limitations as may be provided by<br />
law.” (Sec. 7, Article III)<br />
The above provisions <strong>of</strong> our Constitution should be amended to provide for<br />
full transparency re: expenditure <strong>of</strong> public funds except expenditure on national<br />
security.<br />
<br />
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The Purchased Power Adjustment<br />
(PPA) Scheme and Its Derivatives:<br />
Deciphering Cost Recovery<br />
Mechanisms and Understanding<br />
Energy Distribution<br />
Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro*<br />
Introduction<br />
The electric power industry is indispensable to <strong>the</strong> national interest. It affects<br />
<strong>the</strong> lives <strong>of</strong> every Filipi<strong>no</strong>, rich and poor alike, as it has become a necessity in daily<br />
life. As <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court stated in MERALCO vs. Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals 1 :<br />
“One can <strong>no</strong>t deny <strong>the</strong> vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO,<br />
having a mo<strong>no</strong>poly <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> electrical power in Metro Manila and<br />
some nearby municipalities, plays in <strong>the</strong> life <strong>of</strong> people living in such areas.<br />
Electricity has become a necessity to most people in <strong>the</strong>se areas, justifying<br />
<strong>the</strong> exercise by <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> its regulatory power over <strong>the</strong> business <strong>of</strong><br />
supplying electrical service to <strong>the</strong> public, in which petitioner MERALCO<br />
is engaged. Thus, <strong>the</strong> State may regulate, as it has done through Section<br />
97 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Revised Order No. 1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission, <strong>the</strong><br />
conditions under which and <strong>the</strong> manner by which a public utility such as<br />
MERALCO may effect a disconnection <strong>of</strong> service to a delinquent<br />
customer.”<br />
Given its nature and function, <strong>the</strong> electric power industry can<strong>no</strong>t be left to<br />
free market forces and has to be highly regulated. The factors necessary for laissezfaire<br />
to work are <strong>no</strong>t present as domestic competition is very limited, if <strong>no</strong>t totally<br />
absent.<br />
Firstly, <strong>the</strong> generation, transmission and distribution <strong>of</strong> electricity necessarily<br />
entails eco<strong>no</strong>mies <strong>of</strong> scale. The electric power industry is highly capital-intensive<br />
* Ll. M. Student, University <strong>of</strong> California, Berkeley (<strong>2008</strong>-2009); also admitted to <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> Michigan Law<br />
School (<strong>2008</strong>-2009); junior partner, De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices; Associate Solicitor, Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Solicitor General (2007-<strong>2008</strong>); Ll.B. (2006,UP College <strong>of</strong> Law, opf); Co-editor, Philippine Law <strong>Journal</strong> vol. 78;<br />
B.A. Political Science (UP) cum laude. The author would like to thank Mr. Wilbert S. Balilia <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Energy<br />
Regulatory Commission for his assistance in <strong>the</strong> preparation <strong>of</strong> this paper.<br />
1 157 SCRA 243, 247-248 [1988], G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988.<br />
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Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro<br />
and as such operates as a natural mo<strong>no</strong>poly. 2 Industrial inputs like coal or fuel must<br />
be purchased in large amounts to keep up with <strong>the</strong> demand for energy. Investments<br />
in power plants to generate electric power, whe<strong>the</strong>r it be coal, geo<strong>the</strong>rmal,<br />
hydroelectric or o<strong>the</strong>rwise are huge and can only be undertaken by a chosen few. For<br />
distribution <strong>of</strong> electricity, an investor would have to install <strong>the</strong> necessary infrastructure<br />
such as electric posts and electric lines along public roads and highways or rights <strong>of</strong><br />
way acquired from private parties upon payment <strong>of</strong> just compensation within <strong>the</strong><br />
vicinity to be supplied with electricity, including control stations.<br />
Secondly, generation <strong>of</strong> electricity involves <strong>the</strong> utilization <strong>of</strong> natural resources<br />
such as water, and all sources <strong>of</strong> potential energy, which are owned by <strong>the</strong> State. 3<br />
Private enterprises can<strong>no</strong>t engage in electric power generation without State<br />
intervention. Although most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fuels that are used to generate electricity in <strong>the</strong><br />
powerplants are imported and privately-owned, still, <strong>the</strong>re are o<strong>the</strong>r reasons<br />
necessitating State intervention.<br />
Thirdly, <strong>the</strong> electric power industry has a captive market because consumption<br />
<strong>of</strong> electricity is on a take-it-or-leave it basis. Generally, households can<strong>no</strong>t choose <strong>the</strong><br />
supplier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir electricity as each supplier or distributor <strong>of</strong> electricity or distributing<br />
utility has its own specific assigned locality as determined by <strong>the</strong> contract with <strong>the</strong><br />
government. Indeed, without State intervention, consumers would be left at <strong>the</strong><br />
mercy <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>iteering electric power producer and distributor whose principal motive<br />
would be to make pr<strong>of</strong>its with <strong>no</strong> or little consideration for public necessity and<br />
public service.<br />
Statement <strong>of</strong> Objectives<br />
Any individual who has seen an electric bill has been puzzled at one time or<br />
a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> entry “PPA” which adds several percentages more to <strong>the</strong> regular<br />
charges. The question arises: “Why am I paying more when in fact I already paid for<br />
<strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> electricity I used per kilowatt hour?”<br />
In Manila Electric Co. vs. CA, 4 <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court recognized <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> a<br />
consumer to be informed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> items in his electric bill. In that case, private<br />
respondent requested MERALCO to itemize <strong>the</strong> purchased power adjustment, which<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter refused prompting <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> an injunction case to restrain Manila Electric<br />
from disconnecting private respondent’s electricity. In ruling for private respondent,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Supreme Court held:<br />
2 430 SCRA 389 [2004], G.R. No. 152569, May 31, 2004.<br />
3 Const. (1987) Art. XII, Section 2.<br />
4 271 SCRA 417 [1997], G.R. No. 103595, April 18, 1997.<br />
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The right <strong>of</strong> (private respondent) CCM Gas to be informed<br />
concerning an item in its electric bill is undoubted. Revised Order No. 1,<br />
§4, which was issued by <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Public Service Commission provides:<br />
Information and assistance to customers. — Each public<br />
service shall, upon request, give its customers or users, all<br />
information and assistance pertaining to his service in order<br />
that <strong>the</strong>y may secure proper, efficient and eco<strong>no</strong>mical service.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 2004 elections, a senator vowed to eliminate <strong>the</strong> PPA as part <strong>of</strong> his<br />
campaign slogan. This may have gotten him several thousand votes, but is this feasible<br />
and wise?<br />
This article seeks to answer <strong>the</strong>se questions, by examining <strong>the</strong> nature and<br />
function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA and o<strong>the</strong>r adjustment mechanisms in <strong>the</strong> electric bill charges.<br />
An evaluation will be made as to its necessity and usefulness, as well as how each<br />
consumer can help minimize billings and charges.<br />
The PPA or Purchased Power Adjustment is an automatic cost adjustment<br />
mechanism that allows <strong>the</strong> Distributing Utilities (hereafter, DUs) to recover <strong>the</strong><br />
actual cost <strong>of</strong> electricity vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong>ir approved basic rates. Admittedly however, <strong>the</strong><br />
PPA has already been superseded by o<strong>the</strong>r adjustment mechanisms like <strong>the</strong><br />
Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM), Automatic Generation Rate<br />
Adjustment (AGRA), System Loss Rate Adjustment (SLRA), and <strong>the</strong> Transmission<br />
Rate Adjustment (TRA) brought about by <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA.<br />
Regardless, it is <strong>the</strong> PPA which consumers are most familiar with. For this reason,<br />
<strong>the</strong> author will focus on <strong>the</strong> PPA and relate it to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r adjustment mechanisms.<br />
Besides, <strong>the</strong>se new adjustment mechanisms operate on <strong>the</strong> same principles and appear<br />
merely to be <strong>the</strong> unbundled forms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA.<br />
To have better understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA, it is necessary to deal with <strong>the</strong><br />
aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric power industry and briefly examine how <strong>the</strong> State regulates<br />
electric charges. This paper will also trace <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> computation <strong>of</strong> electric<br />
charges, taking into consideration <strong>the</strong> generation and distribution aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
electric power industry but concentrating on such matters only in relation to Electric<br />
Cooperatives (hereafter, ECs) ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> privately-owned distribution utilities.<br />
Note that <strong>the</strong> principles and development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adjustment mechanisms for both<br />
sectors are similar.<br />
This article will focus on <strong>the</strong> ECs because <strong>the</strong>y account for a majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
distribution <strong>of</strong> electricity in <strong>the</strong> country as <strong>the</strong> providers <strong>of</strong> electricity in rural areas.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong>ir wide geographical reach, <strong>the</strong>y affect a vast portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s<br />
population. After laying <strong>the</strong> background on <strong>the</strong> history and development <strong>of</strong> electric<br />
charges in relation to ECs, <strong>the</strong> PPA’s nature and function will be discussed and<br />
evaluated.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro<br />
The Electric Power Industry in a Nutshell<br />
The electric power industry currently consists mainly <strong>of</strong> three aspects –<br />
generation, transmission, distribution – although <strong>the</strong> new Electric Power Reform<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> 2001, popularly k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> EPIRA divided <strong>the</strong> energy sector into four 5 by<br />
adding <strong>the</strong> “supply” sector. The first three aspects are considered as <strong>the</strong> traditional<br />
sectors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric power industry which are highly capital-intensive and as such<br />
operate as natural mo<strong>no</strong>polies. 6 However, <strong>the</strong> fourth supply sector in <strong>the</strong> EPIRA is<br />
<strong>no</strong>t yet operational and existing.<br />
The inclusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supply sector in <strong>the</strong> EPIRA gives private investors <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunity to participate in <strong>the</strong> electric industry by purchasing electric power from<br />
electric power generators and <strong>the</strong>n selling this electricity to big end-users. The idea<br />
is to open <strong>the</strong> industry to <strong>the</strong> private sector and allow <strong>the</strong> market forces to work but<br />
still subject to state regulation. The supply sector however, will have to await open<br />
access 7 to give <strong>the</strong> current players in <strong>the</strong> industry time to prepare for competition.<br />
A. Generation Aspect<br />
The generation aspect involves <strong>the</strong> various power plants that produce or<br />
generate electricity, including those powered by coal, wind, water and geo<strong>the</strong>rmal<br />
energy. Upon generation, electricity is <strong>the</strong>n transported to <strong>the</strong> various DUs by<br />
transmission lines. The DUs <strong>the</strong>n distribute electricity to <strong>the</strong> consumers and endusers.<br />
Prior to <strong>the</strong> EPIRA, 8 <strong>the</strong> generation and transmission aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric<br />
power industry were both handled by <strong>the</strong> National Power Corporation. Currently,<br />
generation is still handled by <strong>the</strong> NPC with <strong>the</strong> addition <strong>of</strong> various independent<br />
power producers (hereafter, IPPs). The transmission aspect is <strong>no</strong>w handled separately.<br />
B. Transmission Aspect<br />
The EPIRA created <strong>the</strong> National Transmission Corporation (NTC) or Transco, 9<br />
a government-owned and controlled corporation, which assumed <strong>the</strong> NPC’s electrical<br />
transmission functions, including <strong>the</strong> planning, construction and centralized operation<br />
and maintenance <strong>of</strong> high-voltage transmission facilities, grid interconnections and<br />
ancillary services. It has been operating separately from <strong>the</strong> NPC since March 1,<br />
2003, with <strong>the</strong> unique and crucial role <strong>of</strong> linking power plants owned by <strong>the</strong> NPC<br />
5 Rep. Act No. 9136, sec. 5. Organization. – The electric power industry shall be divided into four (4) sectors,<br />
namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.<br />
6 Milwaukee Industries Corp. vs. Pampanga III Electric Cooperative, Inc. 430 SCRA 389 [2004], G.R. No.<br />
152569, May 31, 2004.<br />
7 See Rep. Act No. 9136, sec. 31.<br />
8 Rep. Act No. 9136 [2001]..<br />
9 Rep. Act No. 9136, sec. 8 [2001].<br />
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and IPPs to <strong>the</strong> nineteen (19) privately-owned distribution utilities and 120 electric<br />
cooperatives 10 which in turn deliver electricity to end-users. 11<br />
The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)<br />
manages <strong>the</strong> sale, disposition, and privatization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se transmission assets based<br />
on terms and conditions which shall optimize <strong>the</strong> assets’ value and sale prices.<br />
C. Distribution Aspect<br />
The distribution aspect involves setting up <strong>of</strong> power lines and allotment <strong>of</strong><br />
electricity to <strong>the</strong> various end-users, including households and businesses. The<br />
distribution utilities are ei<strong>the</strong>r privately-owned enterprises or electric cooperatives.<br />
The privately-owned enterprises are generally business enterprises that operate in<br />
urban areas, while <strong>the</strong> ECs operate primarily in rural areas. 12<br />
The formation <strong>of</strong> electric cooperatives was patterned after <strong>the</strong> National Rural<br />
Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, which took charge<br />
<strong>of</strong> electrifying rural areas which were unattractive ventures for private business<br />
entities. 13 However, <strong>the</strong>re are also government-owned utilities and existing local<br />
government units 14 which have exclusive franchises to operate a distribution system<br />
in accordance with <strong>the</strong> EPIRA. 15<br />
The electric power industry can be illustrated, as follows:<br />
Generation Transmission Distribution<br />
10 As <strong>of</strong> November 2007.<br />
11 http://www.transco.ph/aboutus.asp<br />
12 http://www.nea.gov.ph/home.htm<br />
13 Ibid.<br />
14 e.g., Public Utility Department (PUD) <strong>of</strong> Olongapo City<br />
15 See Guidelines for AGRA and SLR, infra. and Guidelines for Transmission Rates, infra.<br />
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State Regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electric Power Industry<br />
It is a settled principle that <strong>the</strong> electric power industry, which necessarily<br />
involves public utilities, is imbibed with national interest, and <strong>the</strong>refore, subject to<br />
regulation by <strong>the</strong> State. This was <strong>the</strong> pro<strong>no</strong>uncement in Republic vs. MERALCO, 16<br />
where <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court through Chief Justice Pu<strong>no</strong> stated:<br />
The business and operations <strong>of</strong> a public utility are imbued with public<br />
interest. In a very real sense, a public utility is engaged in public service<br />
providing basic commodities and services indispensable to <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> general public. For this reason, a public utility submits to <strong>the</strong> regulation<br />
<strong>of</strong> government authorities and surrenders certain business prerogatives,<br />
including <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> rates that may be charged by it. It is <strong>the</strong> imperative<br />
duty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> State to interpose its protective power whenever too much<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>its become <strong>the</strong> priority <strong>of</strong> public utilities.<br />
The EPIRA<br />
On <strong>the</strong> same premise <strong>of</strong> “national interest,” Philippine Congress passed <strong>the</strong><br />
Electric Power Industry Reform Act <strong>of</strong> 2001 (EPIRA). The EPIRA aims to reform<br />
<strong>the</strong> power industry and boost power delivery services to customers by privatizing<br />
<strong>the</strong> electric industry allowing market forces to maintain a feasible supply subject to<br />
state regulation.<br />
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC)<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> EPIRA, <strong>the</strong> Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) 17 was created. It<br />
is an independent quasi-judicial regulatory body and an administrative agency vested<br />
with broad regulatory and monitoring functions over <strong>the</strong> Philippine electric industry.<br />
It aims to restructure and modernize <strong>the</strong> said industry while promoting consumer<br />
interest. 18<br />
The ERC mandate is found in Section 43 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA:<br />
Section 43. Functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ERC. – The ERC shall promote competition,<br />
encourage market development, ensure customer choice and penalize<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> market power in <strong>the</strong> restructured electricity industry. In<br />
appropriate cases, <strong>the</strong> ERC is authorized to issue cease and desist order<br />
after due <strong>no</strong>tice and hearing. x x x<br />
16 401 SCRA 130, 141 [2003], G.R. No. 141314, April 9, 2003.<br />
17 Rep. Act No. 9136 [2001], Sec. 38.<br />
18 Rep. Act No. 9136, Whereas Clauses.<br />
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When <strong>the</strong> EPIRA took effect on June 26, 2001, <strong>the</strong> ERC replaced and succeeded<br />
<strong>the</strong> Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), which was created in 1987 by Executive Order<br />
No. 172. Prior to <strong>the</strong> ERB, <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> rates for privately owned entities was<br />
made by Board <strong>of</strong> Power and Waterworks, 19 and <strong>the</strong> Board <strong>of</strong> Energy. 20 The ERC<br />
inherited <strong>the</strong> functions 21 <strong>of</strong> its predecessor. With <strong>the</strong> inherited powers from <strong>the</strong><br />
ERB, <strong>the</strong> ERC likewise inherited <strong>the</strong> cases and o<strong>the</strong>r matters from <strong>the</strong> ERB, including<br />
<strong>the</strong> pending verification and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA charges and oversight <strong>of</strong> electric<br />
cooperatives.<br />
For ECs, regulation was made first by Congress which regulated <strong>the</strong>m through<br />
<strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> franchises. 22 Former President Marcos <strong>the</strong>n transferred this authority<br />
to <strong>the</strong> National Electrification Administration (NEA). 23 Later on, <strong>the</strong> power to set<br />
<strong>the</strong> rates <strong>of</strong> ECs was transferred to <strong>the</strong> ERB under <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Energy Act <strong>of</strong><br />
1993. 24 The EPIRA Law subsequently transferred such responsibility to <strong>the</strong> ERC. 25<br />
The ERC has <strong>the</strong> following powers and functions relevant to <strong>the</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Purchased Power Adjustment charges which are passed on to consumers:<br />
Section 43. x x x Towards this end, it (ERC) shall be responsible for <strong>the</strong><br />
following key functions in <strong>the</strong> restructured industry.<br />
xxx<br />
(f) In <strong>the</strong> public interest, establish and enforce a methodology for setting<br />
transmission and distribution wheeling rates and retail rates for <strong>the</strong> captive<br />
market <strong>of</strong> a distribution utility, taking into account all relevant<br />
considerations, including <strong>the</strong> efficiency or inefficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulated<br />
entities. The rates must be such as to allow <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> just and<br />
reasonable costs and a reasonable return on rate base (RORB) to enable<br />
<strong>the</strong> entity to operate viably. The ERC may adopt alternative forms <strong>of</strong><br />
internationally-accepted rate-setting methodology as it may deem<br />
appropriate. The rate-setting methodology so adopted and applied must<br />
ensure a reasonable price <strong>of</strong> electricity. The rates prescribed shall be<br />
<strong>no</strong>n-discriminatory. To achieve this objective and to ensure <strong>the</strong> complete<br />
removal <strong>of</strong> cross subsidies, <strong>the</strong> cap on <strong>the</strong> recoverable rate <strong>of</strong> system<br />
losses prescribed in Section 10 <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 7832, is hereby<br />
19 Pres. Dec. 269, sec. 3(l) [1973].<br />
20 Pres. Dec. 1206, sec. 9 [1980].<br />
21 Rep. Act No. 9136, Sec. 44 [2001].<br />
22 http://www.nea.gov.ph/home.htm.<br />
23 P.D. No. 269; see Milwaukee Industries vs. Pampanga III Electric Cooperative, 430 SCRA 389 [2004], G.R. No.<br />
152569, May 31, 2004.<br />
24 R.A. No. 7638 [1993].<br />
25 See NASECORE vs. ERC, 481 SCRA 480 [2006], G.R. No. 163936, February 2, 2006, and Motion for<br />
Reconsideration 499 SCRA 103 [2006], G.R. No. 16395, August 16, 2006.<br />
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amended and shall be replaced by caps which shall be determined by <strong>the</strong><br />
ERC based on load density, sales mix, cost <strong>of</strong> service, delivery voltage<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r technical considerations it may promulgate. The ERC shall<br />
determine such form or rate-setting methodology, which shall promote<br />
efficiency. In case <strong>the</strong> rate setting methodology used is RORB, it shall be<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> following guidelines:<br />
(i) For purposes <strong>of</strong> determining <strong>the</strong> rate base, <strong>the</strong> TRANSCO or<br />
any distribution utility may be allowed to revalue its eligible assets<br />
<strong>no</strong>t more than once every three (3) years by an independent appraisal<br />
company: Provided, however, That ERC may give an exemption in<br />
case <strong>of</strong> unusual devaluation: Provided, fur<strong>the</strong>r, That <strong>the</strong> ERC shall<br />
exert efforts to minimize price shocks in order to protect <strong>the</strong><br />
consumers;<br />
(ii) Interest expenses are <strong>no</strong>t allowable deductions from permissible<br />
return on rate base;<br />
(iii) In determining eligible cost <strong>of</strong> services that will be passed on to<br />
<strong>the</strong> end-users, <strong>the</strong> ERC shall establish minimum efficiency<br />
performance standards for <strong>the</strong> TRANSCO and distribution utilities<br />
including systems losses, interruption frequency rates, and collection<br />
efficiency;<br />
(iv) Fur<strong>the</strong>r, in determining rate base, <strong>the</strong> TRANSCO or any<br />
distribution utility shall <strong>no</strong>t be allowed to include management<br />
inefficiencies like cost <strong>of</strong> project delays <strong>no</strong>t excused by force majeure,<br />
penalties and related interest during construction applicable to <strong>the</strong>se<br />
unexcused delays; and<br />
(v) Any significant operating costs or project investments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
TRANSCO and distribution utilities which shall become part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> rate base shall be subject to verification by <strong>the</strong> ERC to ensure<br />
that <strong>the</strong> contracting and procurement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equipment, assets and<br />
services have been subjected to transparent and accepted industry<br />
procurement and purchasing practices to protect <strong>the</strong> public interest.<br />
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xxx<br />
(h) Review and approve any changes on <strong>the</strong> terms and conditions <strong>of</strong><br />
service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> TRANSCO or any distribution utility;<br />
xxx<br />
(k) Monitor and take measures in accordance with this Act to penalize<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> market power, cartelization, and anti-competitive or
The Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) Scheme and Its Derivatives:<br />
Deciphering Cost Recovery Mechanisms and Understanding Energy Distribution<br />
discriminatory behavior by any electric power industry participant;<br />
(l) Impose fines or penalties for any <strong>no</strong>n-compliance with or breach<br />
<strong>of</strong> this Act, <strong>the</strong> IRR <strong>of</strong> this Act and <strong>the</strong> rules and regulations which<br />
it promulgates or administers;<br />
xxx<br />
(r) In <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its investigative and quasi-judicial powers, act<br />
against any participant or player in <strong>the</strong> energy sector for violations<br />
<strong>of</strong> any law, rule and regulation governing <strong>the</strong> same, including <strong>the</strong><br />
rules on cross-ownership, anti-competitive practices, abuse <strong>of</strong> market<br />
positions and similar or related acts by any participant in <strong>the</strong> energy<br />
sector or by any person, as may be provided by law, and require<br />
any person or entity to submit any report or data relative to any<br />
investigation or hearing conducted pursuant to this Act; (emphasis<br />
supplied)<br />
Judicial Treatment <strong>of</strong> “Specialized Technical Agency”<br />
Applicable to <strong>the</strong> ERC<br />
The regulatory bodies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric power industry, <strong>the</strong> NEA, <strong>the</strong> ERB and<br />
<strong>the</strong> ERC, are specialized administrative agencies which have acquired expertise and<br />
technical k<strong>no</strong>w-how. The doctrine in Beautifont, Inc., vs. Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals 26 , applies<br />
to <strong>the</strong>m as follows:<br />
“There is moreover so strong a presumption respecting <strong>the</strong> correctness<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> acts and determinations <strong>of</strong> administrative agencies x x x that <strong>the</strong><br />
policy has been adopted for courts <strong>no</strong>t to interfere <strong>the</strong>rewith unless <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is a clear showing <strong>of</strong> arbitrary action or palpable and serious error. The<br />
legal presumption is that <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial duty has been duly performed; and<br />
it is ‘particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x x vested<br />
with powers set to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with <strong>the</strong><br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> laws, affecting particular fields <strong>of</strong> activity, <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
regulations and/or promotion <strong>of</strong> which requires a technical or special<br />
training, aside from a good k<strong>no</strong>wledge and grasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> over-all conditions,<br />
relevant to said field, obtaining in <strong>the</strong> nation (Pangasinan Transportation<br />
vs. Public Utilities Commission, 70 Phil. 221). The consequent policy and<br />
practice underlying our Administrative Law is that court <strong>of</strong> justice should<br />
respect <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> said administrative agencies, unless <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
absolutely <strong>no</strong> evidence in support <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> or such evidence is clearly,<br />
manifestly and patently insubstantial (Heacock vs. NLU, 95 Phil. 553).<br />
26 157 SCRA 481 [1988], G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988.<br />
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Hence, ‘(c)ourts <strong>of</strong> justice will <strong>no</strong>t generally interfere with purely<br />
administrative matters which are addressed to <strong>the</strong> sound discretion <strong>of</strong><br />
government agencies unless <strong>the</strong>re is a clear showing that <strong>the</strong> latter acted<br />
arbitrarily or with grave abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion or when <strong>the</strong>y have acted in a<br />
capricious and whimsical manner such that <strong>the</strong>ir action may amount to<br />
an excess or lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction.’”<br />
This was reiterated by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court in Republic vs. Manila Electric<br />
Company 27 and MERALCO vs. Lualhati 28 taking into consideration <strong>the</strong> highly<br />
technical aspect <strong>of</strong> rate fixing and regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric power industry:<br />
We again stress <strong>the</strong> long established doctrine that findings <strong>of</strong><br />
administrative or regulatory agencies on matters which are within <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
technical area <strong>of</strong> expertise are generally accorded <strong>no</strong>t only respect but<br />
finality if such findings and conclusions are supported by substantial<br />
evidence. Rate fixing calls for a technical examination and a specialized<br />
review <strong>of</strong> specific details which <strong>the</strong> courts are ill-equipped to enter, hence,<br />
such matters are primarily entrusted to <strong>the</strong> administrative or regulating<br />
authority.<br />
Rate Fixing<br />
Pursuant to <strong>the</strong> EPIRA, <strong>the</strong> ERC <strong>no</strong>w has <strong>the</strong> authority to review, verify, and<br />
confirm whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> basic power cost and system loss as estimated by <strong>the</strong> Purchased<br />
Power Adjustment (PPA) formula were <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> actual basic power cost and<br />
system loss. This is <strong>the</strong> methodology it adopted for public interest in setting<br />
transmission and distribution wheeling rates and retail rates for <strong>the</strong> captive market<br />
<strong>of</strong> a distribution utility, taking intro account all relevant considerations.<br />
The ERC regulates <strong>the</strong> retail rates <strong>of</strong> electric distribution utilities, both<br />
privately-owned and <strong>the</strong> ECs, for <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> electricity to <strong>the</strong>ir customers based<br />
on <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> full recovery <strong>of</strong> prudent and reasonable eco<strong>no</strong>mic costs incurred,<br />
or such o<strong>the</strong>r principles that promote efficiency.<br />
As mandated by Section 43 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA, <strong>the</strong> rates which are set by <strong>the</strong><br />
EPIRA must be such as to allow <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> just and reasonable costs and a<br />
reasonable return on rate base (RORB) to enable <strong>the</strong> entity to operate viably, while<br />
ensuring a reasonable price <strong>of</strong> electricity. In <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consuming public,<br />
any over-recovery by DUs and ECs must be refunded to its captive market.<br />
27 401 SCRA 130, [ 2003 ], G.R. No. 141369, April 9, 2003.<br />
28 510 SCRA 455 [2006], G.R. No. 166769, December 6, 2006.<br />
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Fixing Rates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA and its Derivatives: GRAM and AGRA<br />
The Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) and its derivative adjustment<br />
mechanisms such as <strong>the</strong> Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM), and<br />
subsequently, <strong>the</strong> Automatic Adjustment <strong>of</strong> Generation Rates (AGRA), <strong>the</strong> System<br />
Loss Rate Adjustment (SLRA) and <strong>the</strong> Transmission Rate Adjustment (TRA), are<br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power charges that are billed to <strong>the</strong> consumer. It is actually an in<strong>no</strong>vative<br />
mechanism allowing DUs to recover <strong>the</strong>ir costs and maintain <strong>the</strong>ir business while<br />
protecting public interest against pr<strong>of</strong>iteering.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court succinctly puts it:<br />
Rate regulation calls for a careful consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> totality <strong>of</strong> facts<br />
and circumstances material to each application for an upward rate revision.<br />
Rate regulators should strain to strike a balance between <strong>the</strong> clashing<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public utility and <strong>the</strong> consuming public and <strong>the</strong> balance<br />
must assure a reasonable rate <strong>of</strong> return to public utilities without being<br />
unreasonable to <strong>the</strong> consuming public. 29<br />
An Examination <strong>of</strong> Rate Fixing Methodology<br />
<strong>of</strong> Electric Cooperatives<br />
To better understand <strong>the</strong> PPA and o<strong>the</strong>r cost adjusting mechanisms, tracing<br />
<strong>the</strong> history and background on rate fixing is indispensable. The electric cooperatives<br />
first used <strong>the</strong> cash based methodology, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> multiplier scheme and ultimately<br />
<strong>the</strong> PPA. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, privately-owned DUs utilized <strong>the</strong> Return on Rate Base<br />
methodology and o<strong>the</strong>r mechanisms aside from <strong>the</strong> multiplier scheme. The difference<br />
in origin and nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se DUs explains <strong>the</strong> difference in <strong>the</strong> adjustment schemes<br />
<strong>the</strong>y used.<br />
The Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission<br />
Line/Materials Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong> 1994<br />
On January 15, 1995, <strong>the</strong> Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Line/<br />
Materials Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong> 1994 or Republic Act No. 7832 went into effectivity. It<br />
aimed to gradually phase out pilferage losses as a component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs’ recoverable<br />
system losses.<br />
The manner <strong>of</strong> rate fixing has been greatly affected by <strong>the</strong> Anti-Electricity and<br />
Electric Transmission Line/Materials Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong> 1994 30 which instituted caps<br />
on <strong>the</strong> systems losses and which overhauled <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> fixing rates by encouraging<br />
29 Republic vs. MERALCO, 401 SCRA 130, G.R. No. 141314 &141369, April 9, 2003.<br />
30 Rep. Act No. 7832 [1994]. 5% Reinvestment Fund, taken from <strong>the</strong> Gross Revenue, is money allocated by a DU<br />
for use in financing <strong>the</strong> rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> its distribution system and o<strong>the</strong>r capital programs, after covering<br />
operation expenses, debt service and increases in working capital. The fund allows preparation for future<br />
contingencies as regards <strong>the</strong>ir equipment.<br />
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DUs and ECs to be efficient in minimizing <strong>the</strong> losses. Previous to <strong>the</strong> institution <strong>of</strong><br />
caps, DUs had <strong>no</strong> incentive to minimize <strong>the</strong> losses because <strong>the</strong>y were able to pass <strong>the</strong><br />
entire burden <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> losses to <strong>the</strong> consumers as all <strong>the</strong> losses it incurred were built in<br />
<strong>the</strong> power rates. Under R.A. 7832, <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> losses which a DU can input in <strong>the</strong><br />
charges to <strong>the</strong> consumers was limited by a cap, thus encouraging <strong>the</strong>se utilities to<br />
minimize losses within <strong>the</strong> limit which <strong>the</strong>y can pass on to consumers.<br />
Power rates prior to <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> “Anti-Electricity<br />
and Electric Transmission Line/Materials<br />
Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong> 1994”<br />
A. Cash Based Methodology<br />
The core business <strong>of</strong> DUs consists <strong>of</strong> putting up and maintaining <strong>the</strong> distribution<br />
network to be able to distribute to its customers as <strong>the</strong> end-users, <strong>the</strong> electricity<br />
that it purchases from <strong>the</strong> National Power Corporation or <strong>the</strong> generation companies,<br />
or both.<br />
Previously, <strong>the</strong> transmission sector <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric industry was dependent on<br />
and integral to <strong>the</strong> generation cost because <strong>the</strong> NPC owned both <strong>the</strong> generation and<br />
transmission lines. This can be illustrated, as follows:<br />
Generation Transmission Distribution<br />
<br />
<br />
Generation Cost Distribution Cost<br />
The monthly electric bill that <strong>the</strong> DUs issue to its electricity consumers accounts<br />
for both <strong>the</strong> generation costs and distribution costs it incurred in providing <strong>the</strong><br />
service. The components <strong>of</strong> generation costs include <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power purchased<br />
from NPC (or o<strong>the</strong>r generation companies, if this is <strong>the</strong> case, as well as from its own<br />
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generation, if it has a generation plant) and <strong>the</strong> cost for using <strong>the</strong> transmission system.<br />
The distribution cost accounts for <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs in putting up, operating, and<br />
maintaining <strong>the</strong> distribution network, which made <strong>the</strong> delivery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electricity to<br />
<strong>the</strong> end-user possible.<br />
National Electrification Administration (NEA)<br />
Rate Fixing Policies<br />
Prior to <strong>the</strong> ERB and ERC’s assumption <strong>of</strong> rate fixing functions, <strong>the</strong> task<br />
pertained to <strong>the</strong> National Electrification Administration (NEA). Under <strong>the</strong> NEA,<br />
<strong>the</strong> basic monthly rates that an EC can charge its customers for <strong>the</strong>ir electricity<br />
consumption are set using <strong>the</strong> Cash Based Methodology. This methodology allows<br />
an EC to recover from its customers only its actual and allowable cash expenses.<br />
There is <strong>no</strong> return on <strong>the</strong> assets it puts up. The cost data <strong>of</strong> an EC, or <strong>the</strong> cost<br />
components that NEA allows an EC to recover consist primarily <strong>of</strong> two items:<br />
(a) generation cost and (b) distribution cost.<br />
The generation cost and distribution cost are embodied in <strong>the</strong> cost components<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cost data, which comprises <strong>the</strong> basic rates that DUs are allowed to charge<br />
consisting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following: (a) basic cost; (b) allowance for system loss; (c) <strong>no</strong>n-power<br />
cost; (d) debt service or amortization cost; and (e) five percent (5%) reinvestment<br />
fund. 31<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Cash Based Methodology system <strong>of</strong> setting power rates, <strong>the</strong>re arises<br />
<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> inflexibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rate set because it is <strong>no</strong>t sensitive to <strong>the</strong> changes in<br />
basic power cost and variation in system losses. Variable costs in power generation,<br />
like <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> fuel, lead to changes in <strong>the</strong> basic power cost on a regular basis.<br />
Higher prices for fuel mean higher basic power costs because <strong>the</strong> power producers<br />
impute such increases to <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> power transmitted to ECs. As regards variations<br />
in system losses, <strong>the</strong>se depend on <strong>the</strong> rampancy <strong>of</strong> pilferage, wea<strong>the</strong>r, and age <strong>of</strong><br />
equipment used in transmission.<br />
31 a. Basic Power Cost;<br />
Basic Power Cost refers to costs incurred by a DU for <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> power from its power suppliers, which is<br />
mainly <strong>the</strong> NPC. Some have <strong>the</strong>ir own generation.<br />
b. Allowance for System Loss;<br />
Allowance for System Loss is <strong>the</strong> loss ratio that an EC is allowed to recover. System Loss refers to electricity<br />
purchased from power suppliers, which <strong>the</strong> DU is <strong>no</strong>t able to sell to its end-users because <strong>the</strong>se electrons are lost<br />
as <strong>the</strong>y pass through <strong>the</strong> wires, whe<strong>the</strong>r caused naturally or through pilferage.<br />
c. Non-power Cost;<br />
Non-power Cost pertains to operation, maintenance, administrative and customer-related expenses which an<br />
EC incurs in performing its responsibility <strong>of</strong> providing electricity to its consumers.<br />
d. Debt Service or Amortization Cost; and<br />
Debt Service or Amortization Cost relates to cost which an EC bears in amortizing <strong>the</strong> loans it had availed,<br />
usually from <strong>the</strong> NEA.<br />
e. Five Percent (5%) Reinvestment Fund.<br />
5% Reinvestment Fund, taken from <strong>the</strong> Gross Revenue, is money allocated by a DU for use in financing <strong>the</strong><br />
rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> its distribution system and o<strong>the</strong>r capital programs, after covering operation expenses, debt<br />
service and increases in working capital. The fund allows preparation for future contingencies as regards<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir equipment.<br />
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The inflexibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power rates poses great risk to <strong>the</strong> feasibility <strong>of</strong><br />
operations <strong>of</strong> ECs. Even if <strong>the</strong> EC’s actual generation cost inflates because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
rise in basic power costs and systems losses, <strong>the</strong> power rates approved remains <strong>the</strong><br />
same. The EC can<strong>no</strong>t unilaterally adjust <strong>the</strong> rates to recover incremental costs without<br />
dealing with <strong>the</strong> NEA. It would be too tedious and impractical to petition for revision<br />
<strong>of</strong> cost data to increase <strong>the</strong> allowable rates charged every time <strong>the</strong>re is a change in<br />
generation cost as <strong>the</strong> DU concerned would have to file for increase <strong>of</strong> power rates<br />
almost every month.<br />
To address <strong>the</strong> issue, <strong>the</strong> NEA issued Resolution No. 1 sometime in January<br />
1994, which was later superseded by NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, which allowed<br />
DUs to use a multiplier scheme.<br />
B. Multiplier Scheme<br />
The multiplier scheme allows <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> incremental costs in <strong>the</strong> power<br />
purchased from <strong>the</strong> NPC and consequent system losses that are <strong>no</strong>t included in <strong>the</strong><br />
EC’s approved basic rates. This mechanism relieves <strong>the</strong> EC from <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong><br />
filing rate applications with <strong>the</strong> NEA every time <strong>the</strong>re are increases in its generation<br />
costs. With <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> multiplier, an EC is allowed to automatically adjust its<br />
rates when <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> power purchased from <strong>the</strong> NPC changes.<br />
Under this multiplier scheme, <strong>the</strong> ECs can use multipliers ranging from 1.2 to<br />
1.4, depending on <strong>the</strong>ir actual system losses, as follows:<br />
1.2 Multiplier - For ECs with system loss <strong>of</strong> 15% and below;<br />
1.3 Multiplier - For ECs with system loss ranging from 16% to 22%;<br />
1.4 Multiplier - For ECs with system loss ranging from 23% and above. 32<br />
To illustrate how <strong>the</strong> multiplier scheme works, assume for example that a DU<br />
has <strong>the</strong> following NEA-approved basic rate effective January 1991:<br />
Cost Data<br />
Particulars PhP/kWh<br />
Power Cost 1.00<br />
System Loss (20%) 0.20<br />
Non-power Cost (ex. Payroll, Operation and Maintenance) 1.00<br />
Amortization Cost 1.00<br />
5% Reinvestment Cost 0.48<br />
Total Basic Rate 3.68<br />
32 NEA Memorandum No. 1-A [1994].<br />
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Considering its system loss to be at 20%, <strong>the</strong> multiplier that applies to such EC<br />
is 1.3. If <strong>the</strong> NPC increased its rates by Php 0.25/kWh in December 1991, applying<br />
<strong>the</strong> multiplier scheme to <strong>the</strong> incremental increase <strong>of</strong> PhP0.25/kWh in NPC’s rates,<br />
<strong>the</strong> EC’s Basic Rate is adjusted by three centavos, thus:<br />
Loss Levy Charge<br />
Cost Data<br />
Particulars PhP/kWh<br />
Power Cost 1.00<br />
System Loss (20%) 0.20<br />
Non-power Cost (ex. Payroll, Operation and Maintenance) 1.00<br />
Amortization Cost 1.00<br />
5% Reinvestment Cost 0.48<br />
Add:<br />
1. NPC Increase (December 1991) (PhP0.025 x 1.3) 0.03<br />
Total Basic Rate 3.71<br />
A<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r pricing mechanism implemented by <strong>the</strong> NEA is <strong>the</strong> loss levy charge.<br />
ECs are <strong>no</strong>n-stock and <strong>no</strong>n-pr<strong>of</strong>it entities which source <strong>the</strong>ir financial requirements<br />
mostly from <strong>the</strong> government or from o<strong>the</strong>r finance institutions, including <strong>the</strong> Asian<br />
Development Bank (ADB).<br />
As part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loan covenant, <strong>the</strong> ECs that avail <strong>of</strong> loans from <strong>the</strong> ADB, for<br />
instance, agree to have <strong>the</strong>ir recoverable system loss limited to 15%. To allow <strong>the</strong>se<br />
ECs to recover <strong>the</strong>ir system loss in excess <strong>of</strong> 15%, <strong>the</strong> NEA has approved <strong>the</strong> inclusion<br />
in <strong>the</strong> basic rates <strong>of</strong> a separate item for loss levy charge. In short, <strong>the</strong> excess systems<br />
loss was imputed into <strong>the</strong> basic rate in a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r form.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> ERB took over <strong>the</strong> NEA’s rate-setting function over <strong>the</strong> ECs, it<br />
adopted and continued <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above procedures and policies for<br />
setting and adjusting <strong>the</strong> ECs’ rates.<br />
Power rates under <strong>the</strong> “Anti-Electricity<br />
and Electric Transmission Line/Materials<br />
Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong> 1994”<br />
Institution <strong>of</strong> System Loss Caps<br />
The Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Line/Materials Pilferage Act<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1994 (Republic Act No. 7832), which became effective in 1995, gradually phased<br />
out pilferage losses as a component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs’ recoverable system losses by instituting<br />
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system loss caps. With <strong>the</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se caps, it was <strong>no</strong> longer possible to use<br />
<strong>the</strong> Multiplier Scheme because system losses which DUs could pass on to <strong>the</strong><br />
consumers were already limited. It was <strong>no</strong> longer possible to use <strong>the</strong> approved<br />
multiplier to <strong>the</strong> corresponding systems losses which were beyond <strong>the</strong> caps.<br />
C. Purchase Power Adjustment (PPA)<br />
The Guide Formula<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> multiplier scheme was <strong>no</strong> longer feasible, <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> inflexibility<br />
and incapability to adjust to changes would resurface. Thus, <strong>the</strong> ERB came out with<br />
a guide formula <strong>33</strong> for <strong>the</strong> DUs. The guide formula allows <strong>the</strong>m to implement<br />
adjustments in <strong>the</strong>ir rates to recover <strong>the</strong> incremental costs in generation and <strong>the</strong><br />
associated system losses, subject to <strong>the</strong> applicable system loss cap under <strong>the</strong> law.<br />
This would be <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula as<br />
utilized by DUs. The guide formula reads: 34<br />
Section 2. Automatic Cost Adjustment Formula. – Each and every utility<br />
shall file with <strong>the</strong> ERB, on or before September 30, 1995, an application<br />
for approval <strong>of</strong> an amended Generation Charge or Power Cost Adjustment<br />
formula that would reflect <strong>the</strong> new system loss cap to be included in its<br />
schedule <strong>of</strong> rates.<br />
The automatic cost adjustment clause <strong>of</strong> every utility shall be guided<br />
by <strong>the</strong> following formula:<br />
Generation Charge<br />
Subsidizing consumption shall be charged a generation charge per<br />
kWh equal to:<br />
Where:<br />
A 1<br />
x - E<br />
B – (C+D) 1-FT<br />
A = Cost <strong>of</strong> electricity purchased and generated for <strong>the</strong> previous month<br />
less revenue from subsidized kWh on generation charge applicable<br />
B = Total kiloWatt Hours (kWh) purchased and generated for <strong>the</strong> previous<br />
month<br />
<strong>33</strong> Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 7832.<br />
34 R.A. 7832, Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule IX, Sec. 2.<br />
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C = The actual system loss but <strong>no</strong>t to exceed <strong>the</strong> maximum recoverable<br />
rate <strong>of</strong> system loss in kWh plus actual company use in kWh but <strong>no</strong>t<br />
to exceed 1% <strong>of</strong> total kWh purchased and generated<br />
D = kWh consumed by subsidized consumers<br />
E = applicable base cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> amount incorporated into <strong>the</strong>ir basic rate<br />
per kWh<br />
FT =Franchise tax rate<br />
The PPA is an automatic cost adjustment mechanism that allows <strong>the</strong> DUs to<br />
recover <strong>the</strong> actual cost <strong>of</strong> electricity vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong>ir approved basic rates. DUs are <strong>no</strong>t<br />
supposed to earn additional revenue but only recover <strong>the</strong>ir actual costs to keep <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
operations financially feasible.<br />
The above guide formula 35 became basis for <strong>the</strong> Purchased Power Adjustment<br />
PPA formula which <strong>the</strong> DUs submitted to <strong>the</strong> ERC for approval. As directed in <strong>the</strong><br />
Implementing Rules and Regulations <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 7832, <strong>the</strong> ECs filed with <strong>the</strong> ERB<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir applications for approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir PPA or <strong>the</strong>ir proposed formula to recover<br />
adjustments in <strong>the</strong> power costs subject to <strong>the</strong> system loss cap under <strong>the</strong> law. Their<br />
proposed formula for PPA was similar to <strong>the</strong> guide formula provided in <strong>the</strong> IRR <strong>of</strong><br />
R.A. No. 7832.<br />
Instead <strong>of</strong> filing individual applications, <strong>the</strong> Regional Electric Cooperatives<br />
Associations in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to which each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ECs belonged<br />
filed <strong>the</strong>ir respective consolidated applications on behalf <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong>ir member-ECs.<br />
This reflected a similarity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir situation given <strong>the</strong>ir geographical proximity. 36<br />
35 as prescribed under <strong>the</strong> Implementing Rules and Regulations <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832, Rule IX, Sec. 2 Western Visayas<br />
Electric Cooperatives Association (WEVECA), Central Visayas Electric Cooperatives Association (CEVECA)<br />
and Leyte Samar Electric Cooperatives Association (LESECA) filed ERB Case No. 96-43 which was redocketed<br />
as ERC Case No. 2001-341. c. For Mindanao, Association Of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives (AMRECO)<br />
filed ERB Case No. 96-49 which was redocketed as ERC Case No. 2001-343. gg) Zamboanga del Sur I Electric<br />
Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMSURECO I); hh) Bukid<strong>no</strong>n II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BUSECO); ii) Camiguin<br />
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CAMELCO); jj) Dinagat Island Electric Cooperative, Inc. (DIELCO); kk) First<br />
Bukid<strong>no</strong>n Electric Cooperative, Inc. (FIBECO); and ll) Davao Oriental Electric Cooperative, Inc. (DORECO).<br />
36 a. For Luzon, There were three applications: a. <strong>the</strong> Association <strong>of</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Tagalog Electric Cooperatives<br />
(ASTEC) and Bicol Electric Cooperatives Association (BECA) filed ERB Case No. 96-35 redocketed as ERC<br />
Case No. 2001-<strong>33</strong>8; b. North Western Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association (NWELECA) and North<br />
Eastern Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association (NLECA) were <strong>the</strong> applicants in ERC Case No. 2001-<strong>33</strong>9<br />
(formerly ERB Case No. 96-36); c. Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association (CLECA) initiated ERB<br />
Case No. 96-37 which was redocketed as ERC Case No. 2001-340.<br />
b. For <strong>the</strong> Visayas, Western Visayas Electric Cooperatives Association (WEVECA), Central Visayas Electric<br />
Cooperatives Association (CEVECA) and Leyte Samar Electric Cooperatives Association (LESECA) filed<br />
ERB Case No. 96-43 which was redocketed as ERC Case No. 2001-341.<br />
c. For Mindanao, Association Of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives (AMRECO) filed ERB Case No.<br />
96-49 which was redocketed as ERC Case No. 2001-343.<br />
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On February 19, 1997, in an Order issued in ERB Cases Nos. 96-35, 96-36, 96-<br />
43, and 96-49, <strong>the</strong> ERB provisionally authorized <strong>the</strong> ECs to use and implement <strong>the</strong><br />
PPA formula. For ERB Case No. 96-37, <strong>the</strong> ERB provisionally authorized <strong>the</strong> ECs<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association (CLECA) to implement <strong>the</strong><br />
PPA formula in its Order dated April 25, 1997.<br />
The authority granted to <strong>the</strong> ECs was provisional. The adjustments to be<br />
implemented by <strong>the</strong> ECs using <strong>the</strong> PPA formula were conditional and subject to <strong>the</strong><br />
review, verification, and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ERB and later on, <strong>the</strong> ERC. There is a<br />
need to verify whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> projected power cost as estimated by <strong>the</strong> PPA formula is<br />
equal to <strong>the</strong> actual power cost.<br />
For example, if <strong>the</strong> PPA Formula yields <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> PhP 2.25/kWh,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is a need to verify whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> actual power cost is indeed PhP2.25/kWh as<br />
allowed and computed in accordance with <strong>the</strong> formula. If it turned out during <strong>the</strong><br />
confirmation process that this should only be PhP2.15/kWh, <strong>the</strong> correct PPA<br />
should only have been PhP0.15/kWh and <strong>no</strong>t PhP0.25/kWh as earlier implemented<br />
by <strong>the</strong> EC. Considering this over-recovery, <strong>the</strong> EC should refund to its customers<br />
PhP0.10/kWh, o<strong>the</strong>rwise it would be earning or recovering more than what was<br />
allowed.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> same order, <strong>the</strong> ERB and later on, <strong>the</strong> ERC, required <strong>the</strong> ECs to submit<br />
on or before <strong>the</strong> 20 th day <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> month <strong>the</strong>ir implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA formula in<br />
<strong>the</strong> previous month for purposes <strong>of</strong> review, verification, and confirmation. The<br />
adjustments implemented by <strong>the</strong> ECs using <strong>the</strong> PPA formula were <strong>no</strong>t final, until<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were subsequently reviewed, verified, and confirmed.<br />
By reason <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisional authority granted to ECs in <strong>the</strong> ERB’s order<br />
dated February 19, 1997 in ERB Cases Nos. 96-35, 96-36, 96-43 and 96-49, and in its<br />
order dated April 25, 1997 in ERB Case No. 96-37, <strong>the</strong> ECs started collecting <strong>the</strong><br />
PPA charge from <strong>the</strong> customers.<br />
To monitor that <strong>the</strong> DUs’ and ECs’ implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA was<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>it-neutral as well as to guard against pr<strong>of</strong>iteering, <strong>the</strong> ERB reviewed,<br />
verified and confirmed <strong>the</strong> PPA charged and collected by <strong>the</strong> respective DUs and<br />
ECs. By its nature, <strong>the</strong> PPA was just an estimate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> incremental costs. Thus it<br />
was necessary to confirm and verify whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> incremental cost as estimated by<br />
<strong>the</strong> PPA would approximate, if <strong>no</strong>t equal its actual cost when <strong>the</strong> data was already<br />
available.<br />
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On various dates from 1999 to 2001, <strong>the</strong> ERB verified and confirmed <strong>the</strong> PPA<br />
charges <strong>of</strong> thirty-eight (38) ECs. 37<br />
In confirming <strong>the</strong> PPA implementation, <strong>the</strong> ERB considered most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> costs<br />
included by <strong>the</strong> ECs in <strong>the</strong>ir computation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir actual power cost/allowable kWh.<br />
The following factors were considered:<br />
(a) <strong>the</strong> previous month’s data (and <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> current month’s data) for<br />
determining <strong>the</strong> killowatts purchased;<br />
(b) corresponding cost;<br />
(c) 12 months’ average System Loss; and<br />
(d) coop use – consequently, while most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> confirmation orders issued by<br />
<strong>the</strong> ERB found <strong>the</strong> ECs to have over-recovered, <strong>the</strong> amounts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
over-recoveries were only minimal.<br />
37 a ) Abra Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ABRECO);<br />
b) Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO);<br />
c) Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISECO);<br />
d) Mountain Province Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOPRECO);<br />
e) Pangasinan I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PANELCO I);<br />
f) Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENPELCO);<br />
g) Pangasinan III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PANELCO III);<br />
h) Pampanga I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PELCO I);<br />
i) Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC II);<br />
j) Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO I);<br />
k) Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO II);<br />
l) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ORMECO);<br />
m) Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO);<br />
n) Camarines Sur I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO I);<br />
o) Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II);<br />
p) Camarines Sur III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO III);<br />
q) Camarines Sur IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO IV);<br />
r) First Catanduanes Electric Cooperative, Inc. (FICELCO)<br />
s) Masbate Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MASELCO);<br />
t) Sorsogon I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SORECO I);<br />
u) Ticao Island Electric Cooperative, Inc. (TISELCO);<br />
v) Biliran Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BILECO);<br />
w) Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ESAMELCO);<br />
x) Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NORSAMELCO);<br />
y) Samar I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO I);<br />
z) Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II);<br />
aa) Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Leyte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SOLECO);<br />
bb) Leyte I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO I);<br />
cc) Leyte II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO II);<br />
dd) Leyte III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO III);<br />
ee) Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO IV);<br />
ff) Leyte V Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO V);<br />
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When <strong>the</strong> EPIRA took effect in 2001, <strong>the</strong> ERC took over <strong>the</strong> review, verification<br />
and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA implementation from <strong>the</strong> ERB. Before proceeding with<br />
<strong>the</strong> verification and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ECs’ PPA charges, <strong>the</strong> ERC reviewed <strong>the</strong><br />
ERB’s procedures and policies. To protect public interest, <strong>the</strong> ERC adopted its own<br />
policies which were to be applied to its verification and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA.<br />
This ensured that <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA formula would <strong>no</strong>t result to any gain<br />
or loss to <strong>the</strong> ECs and that <strong>the</strong> PPA implementation would be purely cost-recovery<br />
and revenue-neutral for <strong>the</strong> ECs.<br />
The ERC <strong>the</strong>reafter issued <strong>the</strong> Orders dated June 17, 2003 and January 14,<br />
2005, to embody and clarify its procedure and policies for <strong>the</strong> verification and<br />
confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs’ PPA charges.<br />
Cost <strong>of</strong> electricity purchased and/or generated-<br />
“Net” <strong>of</strong> discounts <strong>no</strong>t “Gross”<br />
In <strong>the</strong> June 17, 2003 Order, <strong>the</strong> ERC <strong>no</strong>ted that <strong>the</strong> PPA formula was silent on<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> calculation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> electricity purchased and/or generated<br />
(variable “A”) should be “gross” or “net” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discounts. Although <strong>the</strong> ERB in <strong>the</strong><br />
past used “gross”, <strong>the</strong> ERC resolved to use “net” <strong>of</strong> discounts, as this was more in<br />
keeping with <strong>the</strong> policy that <strong>the</strong> PPA is pr<strong>of</strong>it-neutral and DUs should <strong>no</strong>t gain from<br />
<strong>the</strong> PPA implementation, but only recover <strong>the</strong>ir actual costs.<br />
Note that <strong>the</strong> variable “A” is a “dividend” in <strong>the</strong> formula, and thus, <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
direct proportion. If “A” is greater, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> allowable PPA would also be greater. If<br />
on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand “A” is smaller, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> PPA would also lessen. Necessarily, <strong>the</strong><br />
cost <strong>of</strong> electricity purchased and/or generated gross <strong>of</strong> discounts is greater than cost<br />
<strong>of</strong> electricity net <strong>of</strong> discounts as <strong>the</strong> latter has to be deducted from <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong><br />
discounts. Thus, it was more in <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA to consider net <strong>of</strong> discounts to<br />
keep it pr<strong>of</strong>it neutral. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong> DUs would be able to take <strong>the</strong> discounts given<br />
to <strong>the</strong>m by <strong>the</strong> power producers as pr<strong>of</strong>its since <strong>the</strong>y are passing on to consumers<br />
more than <strong>the</strong> actual costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power purchased and/or generated.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> January 14, 2005 Order, <strong>the</strong> ERC clarified its policies in <strong>the</strong> verification<br />
and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ECs’ unconfirmed PPAs, as follows:<br />
a) The computation and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA prior to <strong>the</strong> Commission’s<br />
Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on <strong>the</strong> approved PPA formula;<br />
b) The computation and confirmation <strong>of</strong> PPA after <strong>the</strong> Commission’s Order<br />
dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on <strong>the</strong> power cost “net” <strong>of</strong> discount;<br />
and<br />
c) If <strong>the</strong> approved PPA formula is silent in terms <strong>of</strong> discount, <strong>the</strong> computation<br />
and confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA shall be based on <strong>the</strong> power cost at “gross”<br />
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reduced by <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> discounts extended to customers, subject to <strong>the</strong><br />
submission <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> that said discounts are being extended to customers.<br />
The ERC <strong>the</strong>n proceeded with <strong>the</strong> review, verification, and confirmation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> ECs’ charges. The ERC requested each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs to submit additional data<br />
and information necessary to establish and determine <strong>the</strong>ir actual costs, and to<br />
compare such data and information with <strong>the</strong> actual PPA charges. These data and<br />
information became basis to determine <strong>the</strong> accuracy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs’ charges.<br />
After requesting additional data and information in support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA, <strong>the</strong><br />
ERC conducted exit conferences with <strong>the</strong> ECs to give <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> additional opportunity<br />
to comment on <strong>the</strong> preliminary figures arrived at by staff and to submit additional<br />
data, clarifications, and requests for recalculation. Clearly, <strong>the</strong> ECs are given every<br />
opportunity to justify <strong>the</strong>ir PPA charges and implementation, all in <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong><br />
due process.<br />
Refund To Customers <strong>of</strong> Over-recoveries or<br />
Collect Under-recoveries from Customers.<br />
As a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> review, verification and confirmation, <strong>the</strong> ERC issued a PPA<br />
Confirmation Order for each DU. The Confirmation Order contained its findings<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re was over-recovery or under-recovery in <strong>the</strong> respective DU’s PPA<br />
implementation. If <strong>the</strong>re was over-recovery, <strong>the</strong> ERC’s Confirmation Order directed<br />
<strong>the</strong> DU to issue a refund. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong> ERC authorized <strong>the</strong> electric cooperatives<br />
to collect <strong>the</strong> deficiency. The respective DUs were also allowed to ask for <strong>the</strong><br />
reconsideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir PPA Confirmation Order. In some instances, <strong>the</strong> ERC granted<br />
partial reconsideration and conducted a recalculation based on <strong>the</strong> submissions <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> EC.<br />
It is in this factual and historical milieu that <strong>the</strong> PPA and its successor adjustment<br />
mechanisms will be examined.<br />
PPA Implementation<br />
Review / Verification, and Confirmation Process<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> approved PPA formula was implemented without <strong>the</strong> ERB or ERC’s<br />
prior supervision and approval, <strong>the</strong> ERB and subsequently, <strong>the</strong> ERC reviewed, verified<br />
and confirmed such implementation to ensure that <strong>the</strong> PPA would only be to <strong>the</strong><br />
extent necessary for <strong>the</strong> DU to recover its incremental generation costs and system<br />
loss subject to <strong>the</strong> systems loss cap under R.A. 7832.<br />
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The review, verification, and confirmation process is necessitated fur<strong>the</strong>r by<br />
an inherent limitation in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA formula. The resulting PPA is actually<br />
a mere estimate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actual incremental costs incurred by <strong>the</strong> DU for <strong>the</strong> current<br />
month. This is so because at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> DU computes <strong>the</strong> PPA for <strong>the</strong> current<br />
month, <strong>the</strong> actual billings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DU’s power suppliers for <strong>the</strong> current month are <strong>no</strong>t<br />
yet available. As a proxy for this figure, <strong>the</strong> DU is allowed under <strong>the</strong> formula to use<br />
<strong>the</strong> previous month’s data or information.<br />
As necessarily implied by its nature, <strong>the</strong> PPA is revenue-neutral and only covers<br />
its actual costs for purchasing power. The respective DUs should <strong>no</strong>t incur any overor<br />
under-recoveries in its PPA implementation. To ensure this, <strong>the</strong> DU’s PPA is<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> regulator’s review, verification, and confirmation. If <strong>the</strong> confirmation<br />
results in a finding <strong>of</strong> over recovery, <strong>the</strong> DU is obliged to return to its customers <strong>the</strong><br />
excess by implementing a reduction in its rates.<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> system loss and coop use, <strong>the</strong> proper implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
PPA formula used <strong>the</strong> running average <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> previous twelve months in <strong>the</strong><br />
computation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current billing month’s PPA. This neutralizes <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> system<br />
losses on <strong>the</strong> PPA considering that system losses abruptly fluctuate every month.<br />
Both <strong>the</strong> system loss and <strong>the</strong> coop use are subject to caps. System loss is capped to<br />
encourage DUs to minimize <strong>the</strong>ir incurred losses. The coop use is capped to discourage<br />
<strong>the</strong> DUs from inflating <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>no</strong>n-power costs including operations, administrative<br />
and maintenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir equipment and personnel.<br />
Considering <strong>the</strong> PPA to be a mere estimate, using historical data <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DU’s<br />
incremental costs at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> actual implementation, <strong>the</strong> confirmation process<br />
considers all <strong>the</strong> needed actual data. It is <strong>no</strong>ted that <strong>the</strong>se data and information were<br />
<strong>no</strong>t available at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> implementation because <strong>the</strong> power producers have <strong>no</strong>t<br />
billed <strong>the</strong>m for power costs at that time. Such data were available only during <strong>the</strong><br />
confirmation process when <strong>the</strong> basic power costs have already been charged by <strong>the</strong><br />
power producers to <strong>the</strong> DU involved. As regards <strong>the</strong> systems losses and coop use,<br />
<strong>the</strong> DU would already have such actual data at <strong>the</strong> confirmation process even if<br />
<strong>the</strong>se were merely estimated at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> its implementation. Thus, <strong>the</strong> confirmation<br />
process serves as <strong>the</strong> true value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> incremental costs in <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> basic<br />
power cost using data on <strong>the</strong> actual costs incurred by <strong>the</strong> DU and <strong>no</strong>t just mere<br />
estimates.<br />
Provisional Rate Increases<br />
The system <strong>of</strong> allowing provisional rate increases prior to ERC approval was<br />
recognized by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court in MERALCO vs. Lualhati 38 as follows:<br />
38 510 SCRA 455 [2006], G.R. Nos. 166769 & 166818, December 6, 2006.<br />
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The established rule in this jurisdiction is that findings <strong>of</strong> administrative<br />
or regulatory agencies on matters within <strong>the</strong>ir technical area <strong>of</strong> expertise<br />
are generally accorded <strong>no</strong>t only respect but finality if such findings are<br />
supported by substantial evidence. Rate-fixing calls for a technical<br />
examination and a specialized review <strong>of</strong> specific details which <strong>the</strong> courts<br />
are ill-equipped to enter; hence, such matters are primarily entrusted to<br />
<strong>the</strong> administrative or regulating authority. Thus, this Court finds <strong>no</strong><br />
reversible error on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> ERC in rendering its assailed decision and<br />
order.<br />
However, while ruling in said manner, this Court is cognizant that such<br />
ruling has far-reaching effects and is <strong>of</strong> utmost significance to <strong>the</strong> public,<br />
especially to <strong>the</strong> poor, who face <strong>the</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> deeper wallowing in <strong>the</strong><br />
quagmire <strong>of</strong> financial distress once <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> electricity rate increases<br />
is passed on to <strong>the</strong>m. Better judgment, <strong>the</strong>refore, calls for this Court to<br />
temper <strong>the</strong> rigidity <strong>of</strong> its decision.<br />
Although affirming <strong>the</strong> decision and <strong>the</strong> order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ERC approving <strong>the</strong><br />
rate increases for electricity, this Court is <strong>no</strong>t closing its eyes to <strong>the</strong><br />
fundamental principle <strong>of</strong> social justice so emphatically expressed by <strong>the</strong><br />
late President Magsaysay in his statement: “He who has less in life should<br />
have more in law.”<br />
The concern for <strong>the</strong> poor is recognized as a public duty, and <strong>the</strong> protection<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> those marginalized members <strong>of</strong> society have always<br />
dutifully been pursued by <strong>the</strong> Court as a sacred mission. Consistent with<br />
this duty and mission, <strong>the</strong> Court deems it proper to approve <strong>the</strong> rate<br />
increases applied for by MERALCO provisionally, i.e., MERALCO to<br />
impose provisional rate increases while directing <strong>the</strong> ERC, at <strong>the</strong> same<br />
time, to seek <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong> COA in conducting a complete audit on<br />
<strong>the</strong> books, records and accounts <strong>of</strong> MERALCO to see to it that <strong>the</strong> rate<br />
increases that MERALCO has asked for are reasonable and justified.<br />
Stated o<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong> provisional rate increases will continue to be subject<br />
to its being reasonable and just until after <strong>the</strong> ERC has taken <strong>the</strong><br />
appropriate action on <strong>the</strong> COA Report.<br />
How <strong>the</strong> PPA Formula Works<br />
Applying <strong>the</strong> PPA Formula<br />
As an automatic cost adjustment mechanism <strong>the</strong> PPA allows <strong>the</strong> DUs to recover<br />
<strong>the</strong> actual cost <strong>of</strong> electricity vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong>ir approved basic rates but does <strong>no</strong>t allow<br />
DUs to earn additional revenue. DUs should only recover <strong>the</strong>ir actual costs to keep<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir operations financially feasible.<br />
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The PPA Formula that was provisionally authorized to be used and implement<br />
on February 19, 1997, in an Order issued in ERB Cases Nos. 96-35, 96-36, 96-43,<br />
and 96-49, and on April 25, 1997 in an Order issued in ERB Case No. 96-37, is as<br />
follows:<br />
Where:<br />
PPA = A - E<br />
B – (C + C1 + D)<br />
“A” = represents <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> power purchased and generated for <strong>the</strong><br />
previous month less amount recovered from pilferages if any.<br />
“B” = represents <strong>the</strong> total monthly kilowatt hours (kWhrs) <strong>of</strong> electricity<br />
purchased and generated for <strong>the</strong> previous month.<br />
“C” = represents <strong>the</strong> actual system loss but <strong>no</strong>t to exceed <strong>the</strong> maximum<br />
recoverable rate <strong>of</strong> system loss in kWh<br />
“C1” = represents <strong>the</strong> actual company use in kWhrs but <strong>no</strong>t to exceed 1%<br />
<strong>of</strong> total kWhrs purchased and generated.<br />
“D” = represents <strong>the</strong> kWh consumed by subsidized consumers.<br />
“E” = represents <strong>the</strong> base cost <strong>of</strong> power equal to <strong>the</strong> amount incorporated<br />
into <strong>the</strong>ir basic rate per kWh.<br />
To summarize, <strong>the</strong> PPA is just <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> EC’s actual power<br />
cost (translated into a PhP/kWh rate) and its basic power cost such that if for example<br />
<strong>the</strong> EC’s actual power is PhP2.25/kWh and its basic power cost is PhP2.00/kWh,<br />
<strong>the</strong> PPA it can implement is PhP0.25/kWh.<br />
Variables<br />
There are five (5) variables in <strong>the</strong> PPA formula:<br />
PPA = A - E<br />
B – (C + C1 + D)<br />
(Actual power cost/allowable kWh) less (basic power rate)<br />
The variable “A” in <strong>the</strong> formula represents <strong>the</strong> actual monthly cost<br />
which <strong>the</strong> DUs incur in purchasing electricity from <strong>the</strong>ir power suppliers<br />
(NPC and o<strong>the</strong>r IPPs) and cost <strong>of</strong> generation for those with own generation<br />
capacity. Pilferage recoveries and collections from those caught pilfering<br />
electricity are deducted from this variable.<br />
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The variable “B” in <strong>the</strong> formula is <strong>the</strong> corresponding monthly<br />
kilowatthours (kWh) <strong>of</strong> electricity which <strong>the</strong> DUs purchased from <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
power suppliers for distribution to <strong>the</strong>ir consumers.<br />
The variable “C” in <strong>the</strong> formula is <strong>the</strong> system loss 39 that <strong>the</strong> ECs<br />
may recover subject to <strong>the</strong> caps mandated by R.A. No. 7832. The<br />
recoverable system loss is <strong>the</strong> mandated caps or <strong>the</strong> actual system loss,<br />
whichever is lower. The variable “C1” in <strong>the</strong> formula refers to Coop Use<br />
or <strong>the</strong> kWh consumption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs which <strong>the</strong>y are allowed to recover.<br />
This is also subject to a cap to promote efficiency.<br />
The variable “D” pertains to discounts or subsidized kWhs which<br />
<strong>the</strong> DUs were mandated to make available to <strong>the</strong>ir consumers. Normally,<br />
<strong>the</strong>se subsidies are provided to marginalized consumers.<br />
The variable “E” pertains to <strong>the</strong> basic power cost component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
ECs that are integrated into <strong>the</strong>ir restructured basic rates. This variable<br />
in <strong>the</strong> PPA formula is fixed by <strong>the</strong> ERC. This can only be changed once a<br />
new basic rate is approved for <strong>the</strong> DU.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> caps on recoverable system loss under R.A. No. 7832, <strong>the</strong> ERB<br />
restructured <strong>the</strong> basic rates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs as previously approved by <strong>the</strong> NEA to<br />
implement <strong>the</strong> caps, while maintaining <strong>the</strong> ECs’ existing rate levels.<br />
The PPA rate per kWh that is determined using <strong>the</strong> PPA formula aims to<br />
capture <strong>the</strong> incremental cost in purchased and generated electricity plus recoverable<br />
system loss in excess <strong>of</strong> what had already been included as <strong>the</strong> power cost component<br />
in <strong>the</strong> ECs’ basic rates.<br />
As can be seen, <strong>the</strong> PPA is just <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> approved recoverable<br />
power cost and system loss pegged at a certain rate, which are incorporated in <strong>the</strong><br />
DUs’ approved basic rates, and <strong>the</strong> prevailing purchased power cost incurred by <strong>the</strong><br />
DUs and <strong>the</strong>ir allowable system loss for a particular billing month, as estimated<br />
using <strong>the</strong> previous month’s data. This would <strong>the</strong>n be subject to review, verification,<br />
and confirmation by <strong>the</strong> ERC.<br />
39 System loss is equal to <strong>the</strong> KWh purchased less kWh sales and coop Use. The percent (%) system loss is<br />
determined by getting <strong>the</strong> quotient <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> kWh system loss and <strong>the</strong> kWh Purchased multiplied by 100. Using <strong>the</strong><br />
above data and assuming that <strong>the</strong> kWh sales is 84,500, <strong>the</strong> system loss will be computed as follows:<br />
SL(kWh) = 100,000<br />
– 84,500<br />
– 500<br />
SL(kWh) = 15,000<br />
SL(%) = (15,000/100,000) x 100<br />
SL(%) = 15%<br />
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For example, assume that an EC computes its PPA charge using <strong>the</strong> May 2000<br />
power supplier’s bill for <strong>the</strong> billing month <strong>of</strong> June 2000, and previous 12 months’<br />
average system loss and coop use, as follows:<br />
Particulars Data PPA Formula<br />
Purchased Cost @ P2.50/kWh PhP 250,000 “A”<br />
kWh Purchased kWh 100,000 “B”<br />
Actual Average System Loss (@ 15%) kWh 15,000 “C”<br />
System Loss @ 14% cap kWh 14,000<br />
Actual Average Coop Use kWh 500 “C1”<br />
Coop Use @ 1% cap kWh 1,000<br />
Subsidized Consumption kWh 0 “D”<br />
Basic Power Cost Component PhP/kWh 2.00 “E”<br />
The PPA charge to be implemented by <strong>the</strong> EC, on top <strong>of</strong> its PhP2.00/kWh<br />
Basic Power Cost Component, is computed, as follows:<br />
PPA = PhP 250,000 - PhP2.00/kWh<br />
100,000 kWh – (14,000 kWh+ 500 kWh+0)<br />
PPA = PhP2.92/kWh – PhP2.00/kWh<br />
PPA = PhP0.92/kWh<br />
The system loss recovery is governed by caps, which R.A. No. 7832 mandated.<br />
In applying <strong>the</strong> PPA formula, <strong>the</strong> principle observed in considering system losses is<br />
<strong>the</strong> actual system loss or <strong>the</strong> caps, whichever is lower. This is also observed in coop<br />
use, which is capped at 1% <strong>of</strong> kWh purchased for a particular billing month. In <strong>the</strong><br />
example above, <strong>the</strong> actual system loss incurred by <strong>the</strong> DU is 15%, which is in excess<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recoverable cap <strong>of</strong> 14%. Given this, <strong>the</strong> system loss cap <strong>of</strong> 14% or <strong>the</strong> equivalent<br />
kWh <strong>of</strong> 14,000 was adopted in <strong>the</strong> computation. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> coop use, <strong>the</strong> actual<br />
data is less than <strong>the</strong> set cap <strong>of</strong> 1% <strong>of</strong> kWh purchased, hence <strong>the</strong> actual coop use was<br />
considered and used in <strong>the</strong> computation.<br />
The Rule on Caps<br />
There are two caps relevant to <strong>the</strong> PPA formula: The systems loss cap (variable<br />
“C”) and <strong>the</strong> coop use cap (variable “C-1”). Both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m seek to promote efficiency<br />
and avoid electric wastage for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consuming public by limiting <strong>the</strong><br />
systems loss and <strong>no</strong>n-power costs which cooperatives can pass on to <strong>the</strong> consumers.<br />
A. System Loss Caps<br />
Systems losses are part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> DUs, both privately-owned and ECs.<br />
They constitute <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> electricity it bought from <strong>the</strong><br />
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power producers, and <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> electricity it actually delivers to its end-users.<br />
The loss is due to electricity lost as <strong>the</strong>y pass through <strong>the</strong> wires, ei<strong>the</strong>r through<br />
natural causes or pilferage.<br />
The law allows this loss to be passed on to consumers as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir monthly<br />
bill. Under <strong>the</strong> NEA and sometime under <strong>the</strong> ERB, <strong>the</strong> entire system losses, regardless<br />
<strong>of</strong> amount, could be imputed in <strong>the</strong> basic rate and passed on to <strong>the</strong> consumers. In<br />
1994, <strong>the</strong> Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Line/Materials Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong><br />
1994 instituted a cap to <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> system losses which a DU or EC can pass on<br />
to its consumers. Note <strong>the</strong> diminishing rates as time passes clearly indicating <strong>the</strong><br />
gradual phasing out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system loss as an item in <strong>the</strong> power charges.<br />
Under R.A. 7832, <strong>the</strong> system loss caps are as follows:<br />
a. For private electric utilities:<br />
(i) Fourteen and a half percent (14 1/2 %) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first year<br />
following <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832;<br />
(ii) Thirteen and one-fourth percent (13 1/4%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
second year following <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832;<br />
(iii) Eleven and three-fourths percent (11 3/4%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
third year following <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832; and<br />
(iv) Nine and a half percent (9 1/2%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fourth year<br />
following <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832. 40<br />
Thus, for privately-owned cooperatives <strong>the</strong> rates were as follows: Fourteen<br />
and Half percent (14.5%) effective on February 1996 billing; Thirteen and Half percent<br />
(13.5%) effective on February 1997 billing; Eleven and Three-Fourths (11.75%) effective<br />
on February 1998 billing; Nine and a half (9.5%) effective on February 1999 billing. 41<br />
After <strong>the</strong> fourth year, <strong>the</strong> ERB determines whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> cap should be reduced fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
in <strong>no</strong> case lower than 9%.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> calculation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> system loss for private electric utilities, direct sales <strong>of</strong><br />
electricity shall be excluded. Direct sales are electricity sold within <strong>the</strong> following<br />
conditions: (1) <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> metering by <strong>the</strong> NPC or any o<strong>the</strong>r utility is less than one<br />
thousand (1,000) meters from <strong>the</strong> consumer; or (2) <strong>the</strong> consumer’s electric<br />
consumption is three percent (3%) or more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total load consumption <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong><br />
customers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> utility; or (3) <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r consumer connected to <strong>the</strong> distribution<br />
40 Rep. Act. No. 7832 [1994], sec. 10 (a).<br />
41 IRR <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832, Rule IX, sec. 1.<br />
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line <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> utility which connects to <strong>the</strong> NPC or any o<strong>the</strong>r utility point <strong>of</strong> metering to<br />
<strong>the</strong> consumer meter. 42<br />
b. For rural electric cooperatives:<br />
(i) Twenty-two percent (22%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first year following<br />
<strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832;<br />
(ii) Twenty percent (20%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second year following <strong>the</strong><br />
effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832;<br />
(iii) Eighteen percent (18%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> third year following <strong>the</strong><br />
effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832;<br />
(iv) Sixteen percent (16%) at <strong>the</strong> end at <strong>the</strong> fourth year following <strong>the</strong><br />
effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832; and<br />
(v) Fourteen percent (14%) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fifth year following <strong>the</strong><br />
effectivity <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832. 43<br />
Thus, for rural cooperatives <strong>the</strong> rates were as follows: Twenty-two percent<br />
(22%) effective on February 1996 billing; Twenty percent (20%) effective on February<br />
1997 billing; Eighteen percent (18%) effective on February 1998 billing; Sixteen percent<br />
(16%) effective on February 1999 billing; and Fourteen percent (14%) effective on<br />
February 2000 billing.” 44<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> EPIRA, <strong>the</strong> ERC has sufficient leeway and discretion to set <strong>the</strong> caps<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> load density, sales mix, cost <strong>of</strong> service, delivery voltage and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
technical considerations as well as <strong>the</strong> efficiency or inefficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulated<br />
entities. The rates must be such as to allow <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> just and reasonable costs<br />
and a reasonable return on rate base (RORB) to enable <strong>the</strong> entity to operate viably. 45<br />
In exercising its discretion, <strong>the</strong> ERC may adopt alternative forms <strong>of</strong><br />
internationally-accepted rate-setting methodology as it may deem appropriate to<br />
ensure a reasonable price <strong>of</strong> electricity. The rates prescribed must also be <strong>no</strong>ndiscriminatory<br />
and must promote efficiency. 46<br />
42 Rep. Act. No. 7832, sec. 10 (a), para. 2.<br />
43 Rep. Act No. 7832, sec. 10 (b).<br />
44 IRR <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832, Rule IX, sec. 4.<br />
45 Rep. Act No. 9136 [2001], Section 43 (f).<br />
46 Rep. Act No. 9136 [2001], Section 43 (f).<br />
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B. Coop use<br />
The coop use is <strong>the</strong> electricity used for operations, administration, and<br />
maintenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cooperatives’ equipment and personnel. These reflect <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>npower<br />
cost <strong>of</strong> operating an electric cooperative. For coop use, <strong>the</strong>re was always a 1%<br />
cap instituted by <strong>the</strong> ERB and <strong>the</strong> ERC to avoid any possible abuse and carelessness<br />
in incurring operating expenses. Thus, a DU can only pass on a maximum <strong>of</strong> 1% <strong>of</strong><br />
its own usage to <strong>the</strong> public. This discourages a DU from incurring and using electricity<br />
beyond 1% as it would <strong>the</strong>n have to bear its own costs.<br />
How <strong>the</strong> Caps work<br />
Both <strong>the</strong> systems loss cap and <strong>the</strong> coop use cap are limits to systems loss and<br />
coop use which a DU could pass on to its consumers. By necessary implication, DUs<br />
can only recover its actual system loss/coop use or <strong>the</strong> applicable cap whichever is<br />
lower. This method <strong>of</strong> implementing <strong>the</strong> caps for system losses and coop use is in<br />
accord with <strong>the</strong> nature, function and ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said caps as instituted by law.<br />
Their respective “caps” set <strong>the</strong> limit for <strong>the</strong> DUs recoverable rate <strong>of</strong> system<br />
losses and coop use. The cap did <strong>no</strong>t replace <strong>the</strong> actual data which a DU incurred as<br />
system loss or coop use. Thus, an EC can only recover its actual system loss or coop<br />
use subject only to <strong>the</strong> cap or limit. If <strong>the</strong> actual system loss or coop use is lower,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> actual loss should be <strong>the</strong> percentage considered as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA. If <strong>the</strong><br />
cap is lower, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> cap is <strong>the</strong> input used in <strong>the</strong> PPA formula.<br />
As regards systems losses, <strong>the</strong> interpretation that <strong>the</strong> DU can only recover its<br />
actual loss or <strong>the</strong> cap whichever is lower is in accord with <strong>the</strong> spirit behind Section<br />
10 <strong>of</strong> R.A. 7832 which aims to promote a more efficient distribution <strong>of</strong> electricity by<br />
phasing out pilferage losses as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> charges to <strong>the</strong> consumers. The cap<br />
discourages DUs to incur more system losses by limiting what it could pass on to its<br />
consumers, thus promoting a more efficient distribution <strong>of</strong> electricity since any excess<br />
in system losses will be borne by <strong>the</strong> DUs, encouraging it to minimize system losses.<br />
Moreover, allowing a DU to recover only its actual system loss or <strong>the</strong> cap<br />
whichever is lower is consonant with <strong>the</strong> policy that DUs can only be allowed<br />
reasonable rate <strong>of</strong> return by being purely cost-recovery and revenue-neutral for <strong>the</strong><br />
DUs. If <strong>the</strong> cap is used when <strong>the</strong> actual loss is lower, <strong>the</strong>re would result a surplus on<br />
what <strong>the</strong> DU can recover from <strong>the</strong> public.<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> coop use cap, DUs are <strong>no</strong>t allowed to impute <strong>the</strong>ir own use <strong>of</strong><br />
electricity to <strong>the</strong> consumers indiscriminately. Any electricity a DU uses in excess <strong>of</strong><br />
1% will have to be borne directly by such DU without <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> transferring<br />
such burden to <strong>the</strong> public. Thus, DUs would be more conscious in minimizing <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own use <strong>of</strong> electricity and are encouraged to utilize cost cutting measures to maximize<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1% electricity allowed for <strong>the</strong>ir own consumption which can be imputed in <strong>the</strong><br />
power charges to <strong>the</strong> consuming public.<br />
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Successors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA<br />
Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro<br />
1. The Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM)<br />
On February 24, 2007, <strong>the</strong> ERC recognized <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA<br />
mechanism. While R.A. 9136 requires <strong>the</strong> unbundling <strong>of</strong> rates, <strong>the</strong> continuation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n current PPA process would result in generation, transmission and certain<br />
distribution costs to be bundled. The goals <strong>of</strong> any automatic adjustment mechanism<br />
should balance <strong>the</strong> need for timely recoveries <strong>of</strong> costs by <strong>the</strong> utilities with <strong>the</strong><br />
commission’s need to review reasonableness and prudence <strong>of</strong> such costs. 47 Thus,<br />
<strong>the</strong> ERC observed:<br />
“The Commission believes it difficult to assure <strong>the</strong> public that <strong>the</strong> current<br />
PPA process meets this goal for several reasons. First, <strong>the</strong> current PPA<br />
process is <strong>no</strong>t implemented uniformly due to <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> different formulas<br />
by different distribution utilities. Second, <strong>the</strong> confirmation process is<br />
conducted long after <strong>the</strong> costs have already been recovered from customers.<br />
Third, rates are changed without an Order from <strong>the</strong> Commission. Lastly,<br />
<strong>the</strong> rates established by <strong>the</strong> formulas may <strong>no</strong>t generate <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
level <strong>of</strong> recovery given <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> estimates in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> calculations. In<br />
order to address <strong>the</strong>se concerns <strong>the</strong> commission developed an alternative<br />
recovery process.” 48<br />
The alternative formula was devised and called <strong>the</strong> “Generation Rate<br />
Adjustment Mechanism” (GRAM). In <strong>the</strong> same order, <strong>the</strong> ERB adopted <strong>the</strong><br />
Incremental Currency Exchange Recovery Adjustment (ICERA) which aims to cope<br />
with changes in <strong>the</strong> valuation and devaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peso.<br />
The GRAM had <strong>the</strong> same objective as <strong>the</strong> PPA in <strong>the</strong> ultimate goal <strong>of</strong> passing<br />
costs <strong>of</strong> generation to <strong>the</strong> consumers. They differ only as to how <strong>the</strong> passing <strong>of</strong> costs<br />
is done, as follows:<br />
a. Under <strong>the</strong> GRAM, <strong>the</strong> costs must be reviewed by <strong>the</strong> ERC prior to<br />
<strong>the</strong> levying <strong>of</strong> such costs on <strong>the</strong> consumers; whereas under <strong>the</strong> PPA,<br />
costs were reviewed by <strong>the</strong> ERC only after <strong>the</strong> same has already been<br />
imposed on <strong>the</strong> consumers.<br />
b. As regards <strong>the</strong> change in rates, DUs could only change rates quarterly<br />
under <strong>the</strong> GRAM, unlike under <strong>the</strong> PPA when <strong>the</strong>y were allowed to<br />
change rates monthly.<br />
c. Unlike <strong>the</strong> PPA, <strong>the</strong> change in recovery <strong>of</strong> fixed costs <strong>of</strong> generation<br />
was <strong>no</strong> longer automatic under <strong>the</strong> GRAM. This change is possible<br />
47 See Order in ERC Case No. 2003-44 dated February 24, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as GRAM Order)<br />
48 GRAM Order<br />
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only through a petition to adjust generation rate subject to approval<br />
by <strong>the</strong> ERC within a maximum period <strong>of</strong> forty-five days (45) days.<br />
d. Since <strong>the</strong> problem with <strong>the</strong> PPA was that it was unbundled in so many<br />
respects, <strong>the</strong> GRAM excludes Transmission Component, System Loss,<br />
and Franchise Tax.<br />
e. The PPA had <strong>no</strong> carrying cost while <strong>the</strong> GRAM had carrying costs. 49<br />
To summarize, <strong>the</strong> GRAM has <strong>the</strong> following salient features:<br />
a. This excludes stranded costs under Section 32 and <strong>33</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA.<br />
Stranded costs are <strong>the</strong> excess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contracted cost <strong>of</strong> electricity<br />
under eligible contracts over <strong>the</strong> actual selling price <strong>of</strong> such contracts<br />
in <strong>the</strong> market. These costs are recoverable only at <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> open<br />
access or <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> market is in place. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong><br />
GRAM will be implemented after <strong>the</strong> unbundling <strong>of</strong> a distribution<br />
utility’s rates and continues indefinitely.<br />
b. GRAM is applicable only to DUs which have a composite or mixed<br />
source <strong>of</strong> power, i.e., DUs which source power from <strong>the</strong> NPC and <strong>the</strong><br />
IPPs.<br />
c. The system loss rate was fixed during GRAM’s implementation<br />
without regard for its volatility.<br />
The GRAM mechanism was adopted in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that generation costs<br />
are also charged by IPPs to <strong>the</strong> DUs which <strong>the</strong>y supply. The ERC only approves<br />
contracts between <strong>the</strong> IPPs and DUs but it does <strong>no</strong>t fix <strong>the</strong> rates or prices <strong>of</strong> electricity.<br />
The formula for adjustments and o<strong>the</strong>r terms and conditions <strong>of</strong> engagement between<br />
<strong>the</strong> IPP and DU are governed by <strong>the</strong> contract between <strong>the</strong>m. ERC’s regulation <strong>of</strong><br />
rates comes in only when <strong>the</strong> DU charges <strong>the</strong> end-users and consumers.<br />
Unlike <strong>the</strong> NPC, <strong>the</strong> power rates for IPPs are <strong>no</strong>t preapproved. Thus, this<br />
generation cost is volatile and subject to change as <strong>the</strong> ERC does <strong>no</strong>t fix <strong>the</strong> rates<br />
which IPPs charge <strong>the</strong> DUs for <strong>the</strong> electricity supplied to <strong>the</strong>m. This volatility in<br />
generation cost is <strong>no</strong>t present for DUs sourcing <strong>the</strong>ir electricity solely from NPC at<br />
a pre-approved rate. Note however that <strong>the</strong> GRAM was also applicable to NPC<br />
because it sources some <strong>of</strong> its electricity from <strong>the</strong> IPPs at a volatile rate.<br />
The GRAM entailed <strong>the</strong> calculation <strong>of</strong> Adjustments for Generation Rate at<br />
<strong>the</strong> following formula:<br />
49 Ibid.<br />
GR = BR + FC period I + PP period i + DAA<br />
kWh sales period i<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Where:<br />
Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro<br />
GR = Generation rate for test period i<br />
BR = Base Rate per Grid based on CY2000 costs<br />
FC = Fuel Costs (if applicable) as approved by <strong>the</strong> ERC subject to heat<br />
rate cap.<br />
PP = Purchased Power costs as approved by <strong>the</strong> ERC<br />
DAA = Deferred accounting adjustment.<br />
In turn, <strong>the</strong> Deferred Accounting Adjustment is computed as follows:<br />
Where:<br />
DAA =<br />
146 IBP JOURNAL<br />
DB<br />
DAA = Deferred Accounting Adjustment<br />
DB = The balance in <strong>the</strong> deferred generation cost account as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> test period<br />
T = The total estimated sales for <strong>the</strong> recovery period.<br />
The GRAM was <strong>the</strong> crux <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> controversy in NASECORE vs. ERC, 50<br />
where <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court declared <strong>the</strong> ERC order approving MERALCO’s<br />
generation charge from PhP 3.1886 per kiloWatthour (kWh) to Php 3.3213 (kWh) as<br />
void for violating <strong>the</strong> publication requirements <strong>of</strong> Section 4(e) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Implementing<br />
Rules <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA. While recognizing ERC’s jurisdiction to promulgate rules,<br />
guidelines or methodologies such as <strong>the</strong> GRAM for <strong>the</strong> recovery by <strong>the</strong> distribution<br />
utilities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir fuel and purchased power costs, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court held that “<strong>the</strong>se<br />
rules, guidelines or methodologies so adopted should conform to requirements <strong>of</strong><br />
pertinent laws, including Section 4(e), Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IRR <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA” 51 which<br />
required publication for all applications for rate changes without any distinction.<br />
In that case, <strong>the</strong> ERC pointed out <strong>the</strong> logistical nightmare <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court that publication is required for all applications for rate adjustment,<br />
including those which are volatile such as <strong>the</strong> distribution utilities’ applications to<br />
recover purchased power or fuel costs, to wit:<br />
50 481 SCRA 480 [2006], G.R. No. 163936, February 2, 2006, and Motion for Reconsideration 499 SCRA 103<br />
[2006], G.R. No. 16395, August 16, 2006.<br />
51 499 SCRA 103, 25 [2006], G.R. No. 16395, August 16, 2006.<br />
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Among o<strong>the</strong>rs, it (ERC) envisioned a scenario where, in a given year, it<br />
would allegedly be required to travel to and conduct 1,680 hearings in<br />
various localities all over <strong>the</strong> country for cost recovery filings alone. It<br />
would allegedly take <strong>the</strong> ERC 4 1/2 years to decide <strong>the</strong> 1,680 cost recovery<br />
filings made in just a year even if it would render decisions on Saturdays<br />
and Sundays. By <strong>the</strong> Court’s declaration that applications <strong>of</strong> distribution<br />
utilities for adjustments to recover <strong>the</strong>ir purchased power or fuel<br />
adjustment costs are covered by Section 4(e), Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA IRR,<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> ERC, it is being required to enforce something that<br />
can<strong>no</strong>t be accomplished, given <strong>the</strong> insurmountable time, budgetary and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r logistical constraints it faces. In such a case, it would allegedly be<br />
impossible for <strong>the</strong> ERC to attend to its o<strong>the</strong>r equally important<br />
responsibilities and functions under <strong>the</strong> EPIRA, i.e., to ensure <strong>the</strong><br />
successful restructuring <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electric power industry.<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> reason for invalidity was <strong>the</strong> Implementing Rules and Regulations <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> EPIRA, which can be amended by <strong>the</strong> President through <strong>the</strong>n Energy Secretary<br />
Raphael Lotilla promulgated amendments to Section 4(e) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Implementing Rules<br />
and Regulations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA. 52 The said section <strong>no</strong>w expressly excludes several<br />
automatic adjustment mechanisms including <strong>the</strong> GRAM from <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong><br />
such provision. Thus, unlike in <strong>the</strong> NASECORE case, lack <strong>of</strong> publication is <strong>no</strong> longer<br />
a ground to annul adjustments <strong>of</strong> rates involving volatile costs like <strong>the</strong> GRAM. This<br />
amendment by <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Energy does <strong>no</strong>t contravene EPIRA and is in<br />
accordance with <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> ERC is given wide latitude in performing its duties<br />
and functions.<br />
2. AGRA<br />
On October 13, 2004, <strong>the</strong> ERC promulgated <strong>the</strong> Guidelines for <strong>the</strong> Automatic<br />
Adjustment <strong>of</strong> Generation Rates (AGRA) and System Loss Rates (SLR) by DUs<br />
superseding <strong>the</strong> GRAM. The GRAM was replaced for two reasons:<br />
a. It was inflexible and burdensome for DUs because it had to bridge<br />
finance costs. The manner <strong>of</strong> adjusting rates lagged behind <strong>the</strong> volatility<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> generation costs. DUs had to bear <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> having to pay<br />
electricity supply costs pending <strong>the</strong> approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new rate by <strong>the</strong><br />
ERC.<br />
b. It did <strong>no</strong>t provide for <strong>the</strong> adjustment <strong>of</strong> System Loss Rates<br />
disregarding <strong>the</strong> volatility <strong>of</strong> such costs. System Loss varies on account<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r, rampancy <strong>of</strong> pilferage, and o<strong>the</strong>r causes beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs. For example, data shows that pilferage is higher<br />
52 Amendments to Sec. 4 (e) <strong>of</strong> Rule 3 and Section 7 <strong>of</strong> Rule 18 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)<br />
<strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 9136, o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as EPIRA promulgated on June 21, 2007.<br />
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Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro<br />
in December and lower in January. Perhaps, this is caused by <strong>the</strong><br />
Christmas season. It would <strong>no</strong>t be feasible for DUs to operate when<br />
it could pass on <strong>the</strong> consumers only a fixed system loss rate insensitive<br />
to its volatility.<br />
To address <strong>the</strong>se problems in <strong>the</strong> GRAM, <strong>the</strong> ERC promulgated <strong>the</strong> Guidelines<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Automatic Adjustment <strong>of</strong> Generation Rates and System Loss Rates by<br />
Distribution Utilities 53 (hereinafter AGRA and SLR Guidelines). For <strong>the</strong> adjustment<br />
mechanism <strong>of</strong> transmission costs, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> Guidelines for <strong>the</strong> Adjustment <strong>of</strong><br />
Transmission Rates by Distribution Utilities. 54 The itemization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adjustment<br />
mechanisms for generation under <strong>the</strong> AGRA, system loss under SLR, and transmission<br />
rates are in consonance with <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA to unbundled <strong>the</strong> rates. 55<br />
Thus, adjustments in generation cost, system loss, and transmission rates are <strong>no</strong>w<br />
independently computed, whereas before <strong>the</strong>y were all imputed and considered in<br />
<strong>the</strong> PPA.<br />
Note, however, that <strong>the</strong> GRAM is still used as adjustments for <strong>the</strong> NPC which<br />
is differently situated from <strong>the</strong> DUs. Although <strong>the</strong> NPC also sources power from<br />
<strong>the</strong> IPPs, <strong>the</strong> former passes <strong>the</strong> same power or electricity to DU’s at a pre-approved<br />
rate. The mechanics governing <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> power by <strong>the</strong> IPPs to <strong>the</strong> NPC is different<br />
than that supplied by IPPs to <strong>the</strong> DUs.<br />
1. Adjustment for Generation Rates<br />
The adjustment for generation rates is allowed through <strong>the</strong> AGRA using <strong>the</strong><br />
following formula: 56<br />
On or before <strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong> each calendar month 57 , distribution utilities<br />
shall calculate new generation rates based on <strong>the</strong> following formula:<br />
Where:<br />
GR = AGC + OGA<br />
GR = Generation Rate to be charged per kWh<br />
53 Promulgated by <strong>the</strong> ERC on October 13, 2007 as amended by Resolution No. 10-01 (October 20, 2007) and<br />
Resolution No. 10-04 (October 27, 2007), Series <strong>of</strong> 2004.<br />
54 ERC Resolution No. 19, Series <strong>of</strong> 2005 (September 28, 2005) in relation to ERC Case No. 2005-06 RM.<br />
55 Rep. Act No. 9136 [2001], Sec. 36.<br />
56 Guidelines for AGRA and SLRA, Art. III, Sec. 1.<br />
57 ERC, Reso. No. 10-01, Series <strong>of</strong> 2004, October 20, 2007 amending <strong>the</strong> Guidelines for AGRA and SLR.<br />
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AGC = Adjusted Generation Cost, automatically computed without need <strong>of</strong><br />
prior ERC verification and Confirmation as follows:<br />
AGC =<br />
Where:<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
[ (GCi +GCii+ ….+GCn) – (PPD*50%)<br />
TP<br />
GC i to n = The Generation Cost in Pesos from source <strong>of</strong><br />
power 1 through source <strong>of</strong> power n for <strong>the</strong> previous<br />
month, excluding power sourced from self-generating<br />
facilities.<br />
PPD = Prompt Payment Discounts availed by <strong>the</strong><br />
Distribution Utility, net <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Prompt Payment<br />
Discounts passed on to <strong>the</strong> end customers relative to<br />
<strong>the</strong> previous month’s generation cost.<br />
TP = Total Purchase in kWh for <strong>the</strong> previous month<br />
OGA = O<strong>the</strong>r Generation Rate Adjustments, which refer to adjustments<br />
deemed necessary by <strong>the</strong> Commission after prior verification and<br />
confirmation, which shall include, but shall <strong>no</strong>t be limited to,<br />
under(over)-recoveries in generation costs and recoveries from<br />
violation <strong>of</strong> contracts and o<strong>the</strong>r pilferages. The OGA shall <strong>no</strong>t be<br />
subject to any carrying charge.<br />
2. Adjustment for System Loss Rates<br />
For system loss rates, <strong>the</strong> Guidelines for AGRA and SLRA 58 have already<br />
been amended only two weeks after its promulgation. 59 Presently, <strong>the</strong> formula reads:<br />
On or before <strong>the</strong> tenth (10 th ) day <strong>of</strong> each calendar month, Distribution<br />
Utilities shall calculate new System Loss Rates based on <strong>the</strong> following<br />
formula:<br />
Where:<br />
SLR = ( GR * U ) + ( ATR * U )<br />
SLR = System Loss Rate<br />
58 Promulgated on October 13, 2007.<br />
59 ERC Resolution No. 10-04, Series <strong>of</strong> 2004, October 27, 2007.<br />
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Juan Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro<br />
GR = Generation Rate calculated in accordance with Article<br />
III as cited above.<br />
ATR = Average Transmission Rate based on <strong>the</strong> most recent<br />
unbundling decision in Peso per kWh, computed as<br />
Transmission Costs per unbundling divided by <strong>the</strong><br />
Annualized Sales in kWh per unbundling.<br />
U = Gross Up Factor = (%System Loss / [1-%System Loss])<br />
The % System Loss is based on <strong>the</strong> actual System Loss or <strong>the</strong> System<br />
Loss cap whichever is lower plus actual company use or <strong>the</strong> company use<br />
cap <strong>of</strong> 1% whichever is lower. The actual System Loss and company use<br />
are based on <strong>the</strong> average <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most recent twelve (12) month period for<br />
which information is available. Actual System Loss can be calculated on<br />
an individual customer class level if <strong>the</strong> Distribution Utility has <strong>the</strong><br />
requisite information to support individual System Loss Rates.<br />
The Guidelines for AGRA and SLRA remedied <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> GRAM<br />
because it <strong>no</strong>w expressly provides for system loss rate adjustments whereas <strong>the</strong><br />
GRAM did <strong>no</strong>t, thus recognizing <strong>the</strong> volatility <strong>of</strong> system loss although it is still<br />
subject to a cap.<br />
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> inflexibility under <strong>the</strong> GRAM caused by <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong><br />
quarterly applications to, and approval by, <strong>the</strong> ERC is inexistent under <strong>the</strong> AGRA.<br />
Whereas <strong>the</strong> changes in adjustment rates required quarterly application and approval<br />
by <strong>the</strong> ERC, <strong>the</strong> adjustment <strong>of</strong> generation rates and system loss rates are automatic<br />
and prior approval by <strong>the</strong> ERC is <strong>no</strong>t necessary. ERC regulation is made through<br />
subsequent review, verification and confirmation. The only item which needs prior<br />
approval is <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r Generation Rate Adjustments (OGA) mechanism, which refers<br />
to adjustments deemed necessary by <strong>the</strong> Commission after prior verification and<br />
confirmation. It includes under or over-recoveries in generation costs and recoveries<br />
from violations <strong>of</strong> contracts and o<strong>the</strong>r pilferages.<br />
3. Adjustment for Transmission Rates<br />
Adjustment <strong>of</strong> Transmission Rates (ATR) by DUs is indispensable in discussing<br />
<strong>the</strong> PPA because transmission costs were essential components <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA when <strong>the</strong><br />
rates were still bundled. As mentioned, <strong>the</strong> charges on consumers were required to<br />
be unbundled by <strong>the</strong> EPIRA. 60 This entailed severing <strong>the</strong> items which were included<br />
in one rate, and itemizing <strong>the</strong>m with <strong>the</strong>ir own separate and distinct formula.<br />
60 Rep. Act No. 9136 [2001], Sec. 36.<br />
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A formula for transmission rate adjustment is necessary because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> volatility<br />
<strong>of</strong> costs entailed in transmission. Transmission is <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> electricity from <strong>the</strong><br />
source, ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> National Power Corporation or IPPs, to <strong>the</strong> DUs like electric<br />
cooperatives and privately-owned corporations. This function is mainly handled by<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Transmission Corporation (NTC) or Transco which has been operating<br />
separately from <strong>the</strong> NPC since March 1, 2003.<br />
Transmission rates emanate from costs in <strong>the</strong> planning, construction and<br />
centralized operation and maintenance <strong>of</strong> high-voltage transmission facilities, grid<br />
interconnections and ancillary services. 61 This varies depending on <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong><br />
electrification within <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> transmission, or <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r and system loss.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> electrification is low, <strong>the</strong>re would entail more costs in building<br />
various electricity-related infrastructure. As regards <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r, if storms rampage<br />
<strong>the</strong> country <strong>the</strong>re would be more costs in repairs and maintenance. The transmission<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power industry also suffers system loss on account <strong>of</strong> pilferage. These<br />
are only some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> factors causing volatility in transmission charges beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DUs which <strong>the</strong> latter can pass on to <strong>the</strong> consumers.<br />
Note, however, that <strong>the</strong> main cause for variation in transmission costs is <strong>the</strong><br />
amount loaned to acquire assets and equipment for transmission <strong>of</strong> electricity. These<br />
are outstanding loans subject to interest and affected by changes in currency. As<br />
such, transmission costs are also subject to periodic adjustments affected by pertinent<br />
indices like <strong>the</strong> consumer price index.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> transmission costs, <strong>the</strong> following were formulated depending<br />
on how <strong>the</strong> transmission rates were expressed:<br />
1. Peso/kWh - Customer classes with Transmission Rates expressed in<br />
Peso per Kilowatt Hour (Peso/kWh):<br />
Where:<br />
TRn =<br />
tn + OTCA<br />
TRn = Transmission Rate expressed in Peso/Kwh<br />
tn = Current TRANSCO Transmission Rate x billing<br />
determinant for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12) months<br />
ending December 31 multiplied by <strong>the</strong> Coincident<br />
Peak (CP) demand allocation factor for customer<br />
61 See http://www.transco.ph/aboutus.asp<br />
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classn corresponding to <strong>the</strong> same period, if<br />
available, or <strong>the</strong> CP demand allocation factor as<br />
reflected in <strong>the</strong> last approved unbundled rates <strong>of</strong><br />
DUs.<br />
OTCA = O<strong>the</strong>r Transmission Cost Adjustment<br />
P = kWh purchased for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12)<br />
months ending December 31 for customer classn.<br />
2. Peso/kW - Customer classes with Transmission Rates expressed in<br />
Peso per kiloWatt (Peso/kW):<br />
Where:<br />
TRn =<br />
(tn + OTCA)<br />
Dn<br />
TRn = Transmission Rate expressed in Peso/Kw<br />
tn = Current TRANSCO Transmission Rate x billing<br />
determinant for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12) months<br />
ending December 31 multiplied by <strong>the</strong> Coincident<br />
Peak (CP) demand allocation factor for customer<br />
classn corresponding to <strong>the</strong> same period, if<br />
available, or <strong>the</strong> CP demand allocation factor as<br />
reflected in <strong>the</strong> last approved unbundled rates<br />
<strong>of</strong> DUs<br />
OTCA = O<strong>the</strong>r Transmission Cost Adjustment<br />
Dn = kW billing demand for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12)<br />
months ending December 31 for customer classn.<br />
3. Mixed = Peso/kWh & Peso/kW: Customer classes with transmission<br />
rates expressed in both Peso/kWh and Peso/kW. The component<br />
expressed in Peso/kWh shall remain constant. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong><br />
component expressed in Peso/kW shall be adjusted using <strong>the</strong> following<br />
formula.<br />
TWRn =<br />
tn - [TKRn *Sn) + OTCA]<br />
152 IBP JOURNAL<br />
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The Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) Scheme and Its Derivatives:<br />
Deciphering Cost Recovery Mechanisms and Understanding Energy Distribution<br />
Where:<br />
TWRn = Transmission Rate component in Peso/Kw<br />
tn = Current TRANSCO Transmission Rate x billing<br />
determinant for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12) months<br />
ending December 31 multiplied by <strong>the</strong><br />
Coincident Peak (CP) demand allocation factor<br />
for customer classn corresponding to <strong>the</strong> same<br />
period, if available, or <strong>the</strong> CP demand allocation<br />
factor as reflected in <strong>the</strong> last approved<br />
unbundled rated <strong>of</strong> DUs<br />
TKRn = Current Transmission Rate component<br />
expressed in Peso/kWh<br />
Sn = kWh sales for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12) months<br />
ending December 31 for customer classn<br />
OTCA = O<strong>the</strong>r Transmission Cost Adjustment In <strong>the</strong><br />
case <strong>of</strong> OTCA, <strong>the</strong> DUs shall calculate OTCA<br />
from <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se guidelines.<br />
Dn = kW billing demand for <strong>the</strong> previous twelve (12)<br />
months ending December 31 for customer classn<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r Adjustment Mechanisms<br />
Note that AGRA, SLR, and ATR are <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> only automatic adjustment<br />
mechanisms by which costs are shifted to <strong>the</strong> consumers by DUs. There are many<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r adjustment mechanisms which are recognized as valid and reasonable<br />
considering <strong>the</strong>ir volatility and objectivity. In NASECORE, <strong>the</strong> ERC discussed <strong>the</strong><br />
criteria for valid for automatic adjustment mechanisms, thus:<br />
Automatic adjustment clauses have been adopted for <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong><br />
certain utility costs only under <strong>the</strong> following limited and well-recognized<br />
circumstances: (1) when such costs are extremely volatile, changing rapidly<br />
over short periods <strong>of</strong> time, e.g., <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> coal or o<strong>the</strong>r fuel burned to<br />
generate electricity or <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> natural gas; (2) when such volatile cost<br />
changes represent significant portions <strong>of</strong> total utility operating expenses,<br />
and (3) when such volatile cost changes are beyond <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
utility to control, e.g., a utility must purchase coal or gas at whatever<br />
prices that procedures or pipelines are willing to sell (Re Mountain States<br />
Telephone. & Teleg. Co., 78 PUR 4th 287, 1986). The Oregon Public<br />
Utility Commission recently described <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> an “escalator”<br />
clause, which it euphemistically called a “tracker” as follows: “It purports<br />
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to track a particular cost, increasing or decreasing revenues just e<strong>no</strong>ugh<br />
to <strong>of</strong>fset <strong>the</strong> alleged change in cost. The isolated cost is ordinarily one<br />
over which <strong>the</strong> utility has <strong>no</strong> influence and about which <strong>the</strong>re is little<br />
likelihood <strong>of</strong> dispute” (Re Portland General Electric Co., 104 PUR 4th<br />
266, 268, Or. P.U.C., 1989).<br />
It is clear from <strong>the</strong> foregoing that “escalator” or “tracker” or any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
similar automatic adjustment clauses are merely cost recovery or cost<br />
“flow-through” mechanisms; that what <strong>the</strong>y purport to cover are operating<br />
costs only which are very volatile and unstable in nature and over which<br />
<strong>the</strong> utility has <strong>no</strong> control; and that <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said clauses is deemed<br />
necessary to enable <strong>the</strong> utility to make <strong>the</strong> consequent adjustments on<br />
<strong>the</strong> billings to its customers so that ultimately its rate <strong>of</strong> return would <strong>no</strong>t<br />
be quickly eroded by <strong>the</strong> escalations in said costs <strong>of</strong> operation. The total<br />
<strong>of</strong> all rate adjustments should <strong>no</strong>t operate to increase overall rate <strong>of</strong><br />
return for a particular utility company above <strong>the</strong> basic rates approved in<br />
<strong>the</strong> last previous rate case (Re Adjustment Clause in Telephone Rate<br />
Schedules, 3 PUR 4th 298, N.J. Bd. <strong>of</strong> Pub. Util. Comm’rs., 1973. Affirmed<br />
66 N.J. 476, <strong>33</strong> A.2d 4, 8 PUR 4th 36, N.J.,1975).<br />
Note, however, that <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> escalator clauses are still dependent on<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> law expressly provides for it and whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t its imposition<br />
was in accordance with law. Thus, even if <strong>the</strong> foregoing criteria were present, <strong>the</strong><br />
adjustment or escalator clause would still be null and void if it does <strong>no</strong>t have basis in<br />
law or if it did <strong>no</strong>t comply with <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law like in NASECORE<br />
where <strong>the</strong> adjustment rate granted to MERALCO violated <strong>the</strong> publication<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IRR.<br />
As <strong>of</strong> date, <strong>the</strong> following adjustment mechanisms have been implemented<br />
without prior approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ERC:<br />
a. Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM) but applicable only<br />
sale <strong>of</strong> electricity by IPPs to NAPOCOR<br />
b. Incremental Currency Exchange Recovery Adjustment (ICERA)<br />
c. Transmission Rate Adjustment Mechanism<br />
d. Transmission True-up Mechanism<br />
e. System Loss Rate Adjustment Mechanism<br />
f. Lifeline Rate Recover Mechanism<br />
g. Cross-subsidy Mechanism<br />
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h. Local Franchise Tax Recovery Mechanism<br />
i. Business Tax Recovery Mechanism<br />
j. Automatic Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism<br />
k. VAT Recovery Mechanism<br />
l. Incremental Generation Cost Adjustment Mechanism<br />
m. Recovery <strong>of</strong> Deferred Accounting Adjustment for Fuel Cost and Power<br />
Producers by NPC and NPC SPUG. 62<br />
These adjustment mechanisms, one way or a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r, will become part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
billing charges to <strong>the</strong> consumers. For all intents and purposes, <strong>the</strong> PPA has <strong>no</strong>t been<br />
eliminated but merely transformed into different forms in accordance with <strong>the</strong><br />
unbundling policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EPIRA.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r charges, particularly those pertaining to “true-up” mechanisms arose on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> adjustments for volatile costs. These are recovery<br />
mechanisms by which DUs could pass on <strong>the</strong> costs to consumers which DUs were<br />
<strong>no</strong>t able to pass on under <strong>the</strong> previous system <strong>of</strong> rate fixing. An example would be<br />
<strong>the</strong> Transmission True-Up Mechanism which seeks to recover volatile costs which<br />
were <strong>no</strong>t considered under <strong>the</strong> previous bundled system. Remember that Transmission<br />
Costs were bundled toge<strong>the</strong>r with generation costs on account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that both<br />
sectors were owned by <strong>the</strong> NPC or NAPOCOR.<br />
The unbundling <strong>of</strong> rates and allowance <strong>of</strong> adjustment mechanisms finds its<br />
basis and rationale in <strong>the</strong> same philosophy behind <strong>the</strong> EPIRA as enunciated in<br />
Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. Energy Regulation Commission: 63<br />
One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> landmark pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation enacted by Congress in recent<br />
years is <strong>the</strong> EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and<br />
regulatory framework for <strong>the</strong> electric power industry.<br />
The new thrust is to tap private capital for <strong>the</strong> expansion and improvement<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> industry as <strong>the</strong> large government debt and <strong>the</strong> highly capitalintensive<br />
character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> industry itself have long been ack<strong>no</strong>wledged as<br />
<strong>the</strong> critical constraints to <strong>the</strong> program. To attract private investment,<br />
largely foreign, <strong>the</strong> jaded structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> industry had to be addressed.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> generation and transmission sectors were centralized and<br />
mo<strong>no</strong>polistic, <strong>the</strong> distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities,<br />
62 Amendments to Section 4 (e) <strong>of</strong> Rule 3 and Section 7 <strong>of</strong> Rule 18 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Implementing Rules and Regulations<br />
(IRR) <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 9136 or EPIRA, June 21, 2007<br />
63 432 SCRA 157,171-172 [2004], G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004.<br />
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mostly small and uneco<strong>no</strong>mic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low<br />
utilization <strong>of</strong> existing generation capacity; extremely high and<br />
uncompetitive power rates; poor quality <strong>of</strong> service to consumers; dismal<br />
to forgettable performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government power sector; high system<br />
losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming <strong>the</strong>se<br />
shortcomings.<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong> EPIRA provides a framework for <strong>the</strong> restructuring <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
industry, including <strong>the</strong> privatization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Power<br />
Corporation (NPC), <strong>the</strong> transition to a competitive structure, and <strong>the</strong><br />
delineation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> roles <strong>of</strong> various government agencies and <strong>the</strong> private<br />
entities. The law ordains <strong>the</strong> division <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> industry into four (4) distinct<br />
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.<br />
Corollarily, <strong>the</strong> NPC generating plants have to privatized and its<br />
transmission business spun <strong>of</strong>f and privatized <strong>the</strong>reafter. (citations<br />
omitted)<br />
The adjustment mechanisms allow recovery <strong>of</strong> costs by DUs and o<strong>the</strong>r players<br />
in <strong>the</strong> power industry from <strong>the</strong> consumers. All <strong>the</strong> costs in generation, transmission,<br />
distribution, and supply are passed on to <strong>the</strong> consumers from big end-users like<br />
large companies to <strong>the</strong> ordinary person in far-flung provinces. Note, however, <strong>the</strong><br />
consumers are protected by <strong>the</strong> State whenever too much pr<strong>of</strong>it becomes <strong>the</strong> priority<br />
<strong>of</strong> such public utilities. DUs including <strong>the</strong> ECs can<strong>no</strong>t overcharge at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> public and worse, <strong>the</strong>y can<strong>no</strong>t complain that <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>no</strong>t overcharging e<strong>no</strong>ugh. 64<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> flip-flop in adopting different computation methodologies, it is<br />
important to <strong>no</strong>te <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> rate regulation as follows:<br />
xxx<br />
… <strong>the</strong> rule <strong>the</strong>n as it is <strong>no</strong>w, is that rate regulating authorities are <strong>no</strong>t<br />
hidebound to use any single formula or combination <strong>of</strong> formulas for<br />
property valuation purposes because <strong>the</strong> rate-making process involves<br />
<strong>the</strong> balancing <strong>of</strong> investor and consumer interests which takes into account<br />
various factors that may be unique or peculiar to a particular rate revision<br />
application. 65<br />
What <strong>the</strong> Ordinary Consumer Can Do<br />
Obviously, it always pays to conserve electricity and maximize its use. Less<br />
obvious however is consumer participation in system loss which has its own<br />
64 See Republic vs. MERALCO, 401 SCRA 130 [2003], G.R. Nos. 141314, April 9, 2003.<br />
65 See Republic vs. MERALCO, ibid.<br />
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adjustment mechanism. System Loss accounts for <strong>the</strong> difference in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong><br />
electricity purchased from source and <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> electricity sold to its end-users.<br />
These is <strong>the</strong> electricity lost in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> transmission and distribution to <strong>the</strong><br />
consumers attributable to natural causes and pilferage. The natural causes for loss<br />
are beyond anyone’s control. It is in <strong>the</strong> pilferage that consumers play a more direct<br />
and material role.<br />
Electric pilferage has been criminalized by <strong>the</strong> Anti-Electricity and Electric<br />
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act <strong>of</strong> 1994 which imposes a penalty <strong>of</strong><br />
prisión mayor or a fine ranging from en thousand pesos to twenty thousand pesos or<br />
both, at <strong>the</strong> discretion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court, for illegal use <strong>of</strong> electricity, 66 and an imprisonment<br />
<strong>of</strong> reclusión temporal or a fine ranging from fifty thousand pesos to one hundred thousand<br />
pesos or both at <strong>the</strong> discretion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court for <strong>the</strong>ft <strong>of</strong> electric power transmission<br />
lines and materials. 67<br />
Despite this criminalization pilferage persists. It even has peak and low seasons.<br />
December registers <strong>the</strong> highest rate <strong>of</strong> pilferage while January has <strong>the</strong> lowest due to<br />
<strong>the</strong> holiday season. Apparently, pilferers also use Christmas lights.<br />
Perhaps a common misperception is that electric pilferage is a victimless crime.<br />
The only obvious victim would be MERALCO or <strong>the</strong> DU concerned. With this<br />
perception, households become indifferent to <strong>the</strong> illegal connections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
neighbors because <strong>the</strong>se households believe <strong>the</strong>y would <strong>no</strong>t be affected.<br />
To curb pilferage, <strong>the</strong> public must be made aware that <strong>the</strong>y are directly affected<br />
by <strong>the</strong>ir neighbor’s illegal connections. Consumers actually bear <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
pilferage because <strong>the</strong>se losses are just passed on and imputed in <strong>the</strong>ir power charges<br />
or billings by MERALCO or o<strong>the</strong>r DUs. In reality, it is <strong>the</strong> consumers who pay for<br />
<strong>the</strong> illegal connections.<br />
The direct effect <strong>of</strong> pilferage to <strong>the</strong> consumers should be e<strong>no</strong>ugh incentive for<br />
reporting illegal connections to <strong>the</strong> NPC or <strong>the</strong> police authorities. As additional<br />
incentive, a monetary scheme has been devised by R.A. No. 7832. A monetary reward<br />
in <strong>the</strong> minimum amount <strong>of</strong> five thousand pesos will be given to any person who shall<br />
report to <strong>the</strong> NPC or law enforcement authorities any act which constitutes <strong>the</strong>ft <strong>of</strong><br />
electric power transmission lines and materials.<br />
66 Rep. Act 7832 [1994], Sec. 7 (a) in relation to Section. 2.<br />
67 Rep. Act 7832 [1994], Sec. 7 (b) in relation to Section 3.<br />
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Conclusion<br />
This paper sought to decipher <strong>the</strong> nature and function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PPA and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
adjustment mechanisms amidst <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical mysticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power charges as<br />
experienced by consumers. Apparently, <strong>the</strong>y are accommodations to DUs. The<br />
interplay among <strong>the</strong> DUs which are public utilities, <strong>the</strong> government regulators such<br />
as <strong>the</strong> ERC, and <strong>the</strong> consuming public has been encapsulated by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court<br />
in Republic vs. MERALCO:<br />
“Rate regulation calls for a careful consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> totality <strong>of</strong> facts<br />
and circumstances material to each application for an upward rate revision.<br />
Rate regulators should strain to strike a balance between <strong>the</strong> clashing<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public utility and <strong>the</strong> consuming public and <strong>the</strong> balance<br />
must assure a reasonable rate <strong>of</strong> return to public utilities without being<br />
unreasonable to <strong>the</strong> consuming public. What is reasonable or<br />
unreasonable depends on a calculus <strong>of</strong> changing circumstances that ebb<br />
and flow with time. Yesterday can<strong>no</strong>t govern today, <strong>no</strong> more than today<br />
can determine tomorrow. x x x”<br />
The rapid pace <strong>of</strong> transition from one formula or system <strong>of</strong> computation to<br />
a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r indicates a continuing effort to search for <strong>the</strong> correct formula that<br />
approximates and reflects actual costs. Apparently, <strong>the</strong> perfect and all-encompassing<br />
formula continues to elude state regulators.<br />
An important feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> policy behind <strong>the</strong> electric power industry is <strong>the</strong><br />
bundling and unbundling <strong>of</strong> rates. Prior to EPIRA, <strong>the</strong> components <strong>of</strong> each power<br />
charge have been lumped and imputed into a more universal rate. Under <strong>the</strong> bundled<br />
rates, consumers do <strong>no</strong>t have <strong>the</strong> opportunity to examine <strong>the</strong> particular components<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power charge and billings as all <strong>the</strong>se components are already included in one<br />
item <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir charge. The bundled rates contravene <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> consumers to be<br />
informed on <strong>the</strong> items in <strong>the</strong>ir electric bill. Thus, unbundling became indispensable<br />
in reforming <strong>the</strong> electric power industry.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> effort to understand <strong>the</strong> interplay between <strong>the</strong> DUs, regulators and<br />
consumers, what comes to mind is <strong>the</strong> fact that each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m plays a crucial role in<br />
<strong>the</strong> goal <strong>of</strong> charging reasonable electricity rates. The DUs must incur operational<br />
costs in <strong>the</strong> most efficient manner. The regulator must continue <strong>the</strong> search for <strong>the</strong><br />
perfect formula that strikes a balance between <strong>the</strong> business interest <strong>of</strong> DUs and <strong>the</strong><br />
consumers. For <strong>the</strong>ir part, consumers must contribute in guarding against pilferage,<br />
an integral part <strong>of</strong> system loss which DUs are authorized to impute in <strong>the</strong>ir power<br />
charges. Only when <strong>the</strong>se players run in harmony with each o<strong>the</strong>r will <strong>the</strong> electric<br />
power industry truly be reformed.<br />
<br />
158 IBP JOURNAL
Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court<br />
Decisions on Property<br />
and Land Registration<br />
I. Classification <strong>of</strong> Property<br />
Eduardo A. Labitag*<br />
A. Property <strong>of</strong> Public Dominion<br />
1. Property For Public Use For Public Purpose and for <strong>the</strong> Development <strong>of</strong><br />
National Wealth<br />
a. Forest Land<br />
In several cases last year <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court had occasion to restate <strong>the</strong> rule<br />
on <strong>no</strong>n-appropriability <strong>of</strong> inalienable lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain.<br />
Republic vs. Naguiat<br />
G.R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006<br />
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive<br />
act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government so that <strong>the</strong>y may form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disposable agricultural<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, are <strong>no</strong>t capable <strong>of</strong> private appropriation. As to <strong>the</strong>se<br />
assets, <strong>the</strong> rules on confirmation <strong>of</strong> imperfect title do <strong>no</strong>t apply. Given this postulate,<br />
<strong>the</strong> principal issue is whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> areas in question have ceased to have <strong>the</strong><br />
status <strong>of</strong> forest or o<strong>the</strong>r inalienable lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain.<br />
Forests, in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> Public Land Act and <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
classifying lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain into “agricultural, forest or timber, mineral<br />
lands and national parks,” do <strong>no</strong>t necessarily refer to a large tract <strong>of</strong> wooded land or<br />
an expanse covered by dense growth <strong>of</strong> trees and underbrush. In Heirs <strong>of</strong> Amunategui,<br />
___ SCRA 19__, as ruled by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court:<br />
“A forested area classified as forest land <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it<br />
<strong>of</strong> its forest cover. Parcels <strong>of</strong> land classified as forest land may actually be<br />
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
farmers. “Forest lands” do <strong>no</strong>t have to be on mountains or in out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
way places. . . . . The classification is merely descriptive <strong>of</strong> its legal nature<br />
* Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Law, College <strong>of</strong> Law, University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
or status and does <strong>no</strong>t have to be descriptive <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> land actually<br />
looks like. . . .”<br />
Under Section 2, Article XII <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, which embodies <strong>the</strong> Regalian<br />
doctrine, all lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain belong to <strong>the</strong> State — <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> any<br />
asserted right to ownership <strong>of</strong> land. All lands <strong>no</strong>t appearing to be clearly <strong>of</strong> private<br />
dominion presumptively belong to <strong>the</strong> State. Accordingly, public lands <strong>no</strong>t shown to<br />
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a<br />
private person by <strong>the</strong> State remain part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inalienable public domain. Under<br />
Section 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Land Act, <strong>the</strong> prerogative <strong>of</strong> classifying or reclassifying lands<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,<br />
belongs to <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government and <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> court. Needless to<br />
stress, <strong>the</strong> onus to overturn by incontrovertible evidence, <strong>the</strong> presumption that <strong>the</strong><br />
land subject <strong>of</strong> an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with<br />
<strong>the</strong> applicant.<br />
The Court emphasized that unwarranted appropriation <strong>of</strong> public lands has<br />
been a <strong>no</strong>torious practice resorted to in land registration cases. For this reason, <strong>the</strong><br />
Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification <strong>of</strong> forest<br />
and mineral lands, as <strong>the</strong> case may be, and <strong>the</strong>ir conversion into alienable and<br />
disposable lands need an express and positive act from <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
The foregoing considered, <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t respondent and her<br />
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> parcels <strong>of</strong> land in question is <strong>no</strong>w <strong>of</strong> little moment. For, unclassified land, as<br />
here, can<strong>no</strong>t be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> in<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> owner, however long, can<strong>no</strong>t ripen into private ownership and be<br />
registered as title.<br />
Heirs <strong>of</strong> Palanca vs. Republic<br />
G.R. No. 151312, August 30, 2006<br />
On July 1973, <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> Pedro S. Palanca, (PETITIONERS) filed an<br />
application to bring <strong>the</strong> pieces <strong>of</strong> land <strong>the</strong>y allegedly owned under <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Land Registration Act. These are: a two hundred thirty-nine thousand nine<br />
hundred eighty (239,980) square meter parcel <strong>of</strong> land situated in <strong>Bar</strong>rio Panlaitan,<br />
Municipality <strong>of</strong> Busuanga, Province <strong>of</strong> Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000074,<br />
and a one hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square<br />
meter land in <strong>Bar</strong>rio <strong>of</strong> Panlaitan (Island <strong>of</strong> Capari), Municipality <strong>of</strong> New Busuanga,<br />
Province <strong>of</strong> Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000073.<br />
The petitioners acquired said realties by inheritance from <strong>the</strong> late Pedro S.<br />
Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly and continuously in <strong>the</strong><br />
concept <strong>of</strong> an owner since 1934, or 39 years before <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> said application, and<br />
planted on said lands about 1,200 coconut trees on each land, declared <strong>the</strong> same for<br />
taxation purposes and paid <strong>the</strong> taxes <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
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In Civil Case No. 573 entitled “Heirs <strong>of</strong> Pedro Palanca, vs. Guillamac” for “Recovery<br />
<strong>of</strong> Possession <strong>of</strong> a Parcel <strong>of</strong> Land” <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance <strong>of</strong> Palawan rendered<br />
a decision on March 4, 1970, declaring <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> Pedro S. Palanca, as <strong>the</strong> rightful<br />
possessors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land at Talampulan Island, <strong>Bar</strong>io <strong>of</strong> Panlaitan<br />
After trial, <strong>the</strong> CFI <strong>of</strong> Palawan issued a decision on December 1977 declaring<br />
petitioners as <strong>the</strong> owners in fee simple <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two parcels <strong>of</strong> land in question.<br />
On December 2000, or after almost twenty-three years, respondent Republic<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines filed with <strong>the</strong> CA a petition for annulment <strong>of</strong> judgment, cancellation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration and title, and reversion. Respondent sought to annul<br />
<strong>the</strong> December 15, 1977 decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CFI, arguing that <strong>the</strong> decision was null and<br />
void because <strong>the</strong> two lands in question were unclassified public forest land and, as<br />
such, were <strong>no</strong>t capable <strong>of</strong> private appropriation. On July 2001, <strong>the</strong> CA rendered a<br />
decision in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents<br />
The issue presented to <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court was whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> land<br />
in dispute is alienable. The Court ruled in <strong>the</strong> negative.<br />
The validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CFI (RTC <strong>no</strong>w) decision was impugned on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
court’s lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction. If <strong>the</strong> properties were alienable public lands, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
CFI, acting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong>m and could validly<br />
confirm petitioners’ imperfect title. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, if <strong>the</strong> properties were indeed public<br />
forests, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> CA was correct in declaring that <strong>the</strong> land registration court never<br />
acquired jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> subject matter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case and, as a result, its decision<br />
decreeing <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> properties in favor <strong>of</strong> petitioners was be null and<br />
void.<br />
The reason for this is <strong>the</strong> fact that public forests are inalienable public lands.<br />
The possession <strong>of</strong> public forests on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> claimant, however long, can<strong>no</strong>t<br />
convert <strong>the</strong> same into private property. Possession in such an event, even if spanning<br />
decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. Unless and until <strong>the</strong> land<br />
classified as forest is released in an <strong>of</strong>ficial proclamation to that effect so that it may<br />
form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disposable lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, <strong>the</strong> rules on confirmation <strong>of</strong><br />
imperfect title do <strong>no</strong>t apply.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> Court found that Land Classification Map No. 839,<br />
Project 2-A indicated that <strong>the</strong> Talampulan and Capari Islands on which <strong>the</strong> properties<br />
are located were unclassified public lands as <strong>of</strong> December 9, 1929. It was by virtue<br />
<strong>of</strong> Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 that <strong>the</strong>se islands were<br />
subsequently classified as national reserves. Based on <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong>se properties have<br />
never been released for public disposition. Obviously, from <strong>the</strong> time that petitioners<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir predecessor-in-interest were occupied <strong>the</strong> properties in 1934 until <strong>the</strong> time<br />
that an application for registration was filed in 1973, <strong>the</strong>se properties remained as<br />
inalienable public lands.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
The ponencia ruled that it is true that <strong>the</strong> land classification map does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
categorically state that <strong>the</strong> islands are public forests, <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y were unclassified<br />
lands leads to <strong>the</strong> same result. In <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> classification as mineral or<br />
timber land, <strong>the</strong> land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to<br />
disposition. When <strong>the</strong> property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants<br />
may have had, and however long, still can<strong>no</strong>t ripen into private ownership. This is<br />
because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain belong<br />
to <strong>the</strong> State, and <strong>the</strong> State is <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> any asserted right to ownership in such<br />
lands and is charged with <strong>the</strong> conservation <strong>of</strong> such patrimony. Thus, <strong>the</strong> Court has<br />
emphasized <strong>the</strong> need to show in registration proceedings that <strong>the</strong> government,<br />
through a positive act, has declassified inalienable public land into disposable land<br />
for agricultural or o<strong>the</strong>r purposes.<br />
To reiterate, where <strong>the</strong>re is a showing that lots sought to be registered are<br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, <strong>the</strong> applicant for land registration under Section 48 <strong>of</strong><br />
Commonwealth Act No. 141 must secure a certification from <strong>the</strong> government that<br />
<strong>the</strong> lands claimed to have been possessed by <strong>the</strong> applicant as owner for more than<br />
30 years are alienable and disposable. Petitioners’ failure to do so in this case, when<br />
taken with <strong>the</strong> evidence adduced by respondent showing that <strong>the</strong> lands in question<br />
indeed remain part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain and form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national reserves,<br />
confirms that <strong>the</strong> CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> such<br />
lands in favor <strong>of</strong> petitioners, and certainly justifies <strong>the</strong>ir reversion to <strong>the</strong> State.<br />
b. Public Plaza<br />
Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo Aklan vs. Municipality <strong>of</strong> Buruanga, Aklan<br />
G.R. No. 149145, March 31, 2006<br />
In 1894, <strong>the</strong> Roman Catholic Church <strong>of</strong> Buruanga, Aklan was built in <strong>the</strong><br />
middle portion <strong>of</strong> a lot, with an area <strong>of</strong> 9,545 square meters, and is a block bounded<br />
by four streets on all sides, and has been in existence since <strong>the</strong>n up to <strong>the</strong> present.<br />
In 1978, <strong>the</strong> Municipality <strong>of</strong> Buruanga constructed its municipal building on<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>r<strong>the</strong>astern portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject lot after it obtained <strong>the</strong> permission <strong>of</strong> Fr.<br />
Jesus Patiño, <strong>the</strong>n parish priest <strong>of</strong> Buruanga.<br />
In October 1989, <strong>the</strong> said municipal building was razed by fire allegedly<br />
perpetrated by members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New People’s Army. On November 25, 1989, <strong>the</strong><br />
Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo, through its counsel, wrote to <strong>the</strong> Municipal Mayor<br />
<strong>of</strong> Buruanga requesting <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said municipality to refrain from<br />
constructing its new building on <strong>the</strong> same site because it is <strong>the</strong> property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> church.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, it needed <strong>the</strong> said land for its social action projects.<br />
On March 12, 1990, <strong>the</strong> Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo wrote <strong>the</strong><br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Public Works and Highways <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said province requesting <strong>the</strong> said<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>no</strong>t to issue any building permit to <strong>the</strong> Municipal Mayor and/or <strong>the</strong> Municipality<br />
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<strong>of</strong> Buruanga in connection with <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> its municipal building on <strong>the</strong><br />
land owned by <strong>the</strong> Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo.<br />
The construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new municipal building on <strong>the</strong> same site proceeded. In<br />
1990, <strong>the</strong> Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo, Aklan, filed with <strong>the</strong> RTC <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> a<br />
complaint for declaration <strong>of</strong> ownership and quieting <strong>of</strong> title to land with prayer for<br />
preliminary injunction against <strong>the</strong> Municipality <strong>of</strong> Buruanga, Aklan.<br />
On November 29, 1990, <strong>the</strong> lower court appointed Geodetic Engineer Santiago<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands as Commissioner and directed him to identify and delineate<br />
<strong>the</strong> lot in question. The sketch submitted by Engr. Santiago showed <strong>the</strong> delineation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Lot 138 into three parts: Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C. The municipal building<br />
stood on Lot 138-A; <strong>the</strong> Roman Catholic Church stood on Lot 138-B and <strong>the</strong> municipal<br />
health center and <strong>the</strong> Buruanga Community Medicare building stood on Lot 138-C.<br />
It also showed that portions <strong>of</strong> Lots 138-A and 138-C were being used as public<br />
plaza.<br />
The trial court ruled that The Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo, Aklan is <strong>the</strong><br />
lawful owner and possessor <strong>of</strong> Lot 138-B while it declared that <strong>the</strong> Municipality <strong>of</strong><br />
Buruanga is declared <strong>the</strong> lawful owner and possessor <strong>of</strong> Lot 138-A and Lot 138-C,<br />
said lots being public plaza destined for public use.<br />
On appeal by <strong>the</strong> petitioner, <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals affirmed <strong>the</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Roman Catholic Bishop <strong>of</strong> Kalibo over Lot 138-B but reversed <strong>the</strong> court a quo’s<br />
ruling relative to <strong>the</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> Lots 138-A and 138-C. The appellate court declared<br />
<strong>the</strong> said lots property <strong>of</strong> public dominion, hence, <strong>no</strong>t owned by ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s claim <strong>of</strong> ownership over<br />
Lots 138-A and 138-C should be sustained, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court ruled<br />
against <strong>the</strong> petitioner Roman Catholic Church.<br />
The Court found that <strong>the</strong> petitioner has <strong>no</strong>t shown that, at one time after <strong>the</strong><br />
church was built in 1894 in <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong> Lot 138 (<strong>no</strong>w Lot 138-B), it exercised acts<br />
<strong>of</strong> ownership or possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C as well. It emphasized that<br />
<strong>the</strong> petitioner’s allegation that it merely tolerated <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>t only <strong>the</strong><br />
municipal building but also <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r improvements <strong>the</strong>reon, e.g., <strong>the</strong> rural health<br />
center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument<br />
and grandstand, has remained unsubstantiated.<br />
The Court ruled that <strong>the</strong> petitioner has <strong>no</strong>t shown that it exercised proprietary<br />
acts or acts <strong>of</strong> dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C, to <strong>the</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs, to<br />
buttress its claim <strong>of</strong> ownership over <strong>the</strong>se lots; Contrary to its submission, <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner has <strong>no</strong>t acquired ipso jure or by operation <strong>of</strong> law a government grant or<br />
title to <strong>the</strong> entire Lot 138.<br />
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One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> important requisites for <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pertinent provisions<br />
<strong>of</strong> Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874 (<strong>the</strong> old Public Land laws) is <strong>the</strong> “open, continuous,<br />
exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land by <strong>the</strong> applicant.<br />
Actual possession <strong>of</strong> land consists in <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> acts <strong>of</strong> dominion over it <strong>of</strong><br />
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.<br />
Since <strong>the</strong> law speaks <strong>of</strong> “possession and occupation.” and <strong>the</strong>se words are<br />
separated by <strong>the</strong> conjunction, <strong>the</strong> clear intention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law is <strong>no</strong>t to make one<br />
sy<strong>no</strong>nymous with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes<br />
constructive possession. When, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong> law adds <strong>the</strong> word occupation, it seeks<br />
to delimit <strong>the</strong> all-encompassing effect <strong>of</strong> constructive possession. Taken toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with <strong>the</strong> words open, continuous, exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious, <strong>the</strong> word occupation serves<br />
to highlight <strong>the</strong> fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aforesaid<br />
section, his possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land must <strong>no</strong>t be mere fiction.<br />
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, <strong>no</strong>torious and <strong>no</strong>t<br />
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and <strong>no</strong>t intermittent or<br />
occasional; exclusive when <strong>the</strong> adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over<br />
<strong>the</strong> land and an appropriation <strong>of</strong> it to his own use and benefit; and <strong>no</strong>torious when<br />
it is so conspicuous that it is generally k<strong>no</strong>wn and talked <strong>of</strong> by <strong>the</strong> public or <strong>the</strong><br />
people in <strong>the</strong> neighborhood.<br />
Use <strong>of</strong> land is adverse when it is open and <strong>no</strong>torious.<br />
Indisputably, <strong>the</strong> petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and<br />
<strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by <strong>the</strong><br />
church structure built <strong>the</strong>reon. However, <strong>the</strong> record is bereft <strong>of</strong> any evidence that<br />
would tend to show that such possession and occupation extended to Lots<br />
138-A and 138-C beginning <strong>the</strong> same period. No single instance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exercise by<br />
<strong>the</strong> petitioner <strong>of</strong> proprietary acts or acts <strong>of</strong> dominion over <strong>the</strong>se lots was established.<br />
Its unsubstantiated claim that <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> municipal building as well as<br />
<strong>the</strong> subsequent improvements <strong>the</strong>reon, e.g., <strong>the</strong> rural health center, Buruanga<br />
community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand,<br />
was by its tolerance does <strong>no</strong>t constitute pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> possession and occupation on its<br />
part.<br />
Absent <strong>the</strong> important requisite <strong>of</strong> open, continuous, exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious<br />
possession and occupation <strong>the</strong>reon since 1894, <strong>no</strong> government grant or title to Lots<br />
138-A and 138-C had vested upon <strong>the</strong> petitioner ipso jure or by operation <strong>of</strong> law.<br />
Possession under paragraph 6 <strong>of</strong> section 54 <strong>of</strong> Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph<br />
(b) <strong>of</strong> section 45 <strong>of</strong> Act No. 2874, is <strong>no</strong>t gained by mere <strong>no</strong>minal claim.<br />
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On <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t Lots 138-A and 138-C are property <strong>of</strong><br />
public dominion, hence, <strong>no</strong>t susceptible to private ownership <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />
Court ruled that:<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
The appellate court correctly declared that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise<br />
<strong>the</strong> public plaza and are property <strong>of</strong> public dominion; hence, <strong>the</strong>y may <strong>no</strong>t be <strong>the</strong><br />
object <strong>of</strong> appropriation ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> petitioner or respondent municipality.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> Bishop <strong>of</strong> Calbayog vs. Director <strong>of</strong> Lands (45 SCRA 418, 19___)<br />
involving <strong>the</strong> same question <strong>of</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land which surrounded <strong>the</strong> parish<br />
church <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> town, <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court <strong>the</strong>rein declared that <strong>the</strong> public plaza and<br />
public thoroughfare are <strong>no</strong>t subject to registration by <strong>the</strong> church; that since nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong> Church <strong>no</strong>r <strong>the</strong> municipality presented positive pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> ownership or exclusive<br />
possession for an appreciable period <strong>of</strong> time, and <strong>the</strong> only indubitable fact is <strong>the</strong><br />
free and continuous use <strong>of</strong> Lot 2 by residents <strong>of</strong> Catarman, and <strong>the</strong> town had <strong>no</strong><br />
public plaza to speak <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> disputed parcel <strong>of</strong> land, <strong>the</strong>re was a strong<br />
presumption that <strong>the</strong> same had been segregated as a public plaza upon <strong>the</strong> founding<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> municipality <strong>of</strong> Catarman.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> following improvements <strong>no</strong>w stand on Lots 138-A and<br />
138-C: <strong>the</strong> municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare<br />
hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand. Except for <strong>the</strong><br />
construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> municipal building, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r improvements were made on Lots<br />
138-A and 138-C, and continuously used by <strong>the</strong> public without <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s<br />
objection. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> that <strong>the</strong> petitioner merely tolerated <strong>the</strong><br />
construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se improvements.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> free and continuous use by <strong>the</strong> public <strong>of</strong> Lots 138-A<br />
and 138-C, as found by <strong>the</strong> court a quo and affirmed by <strong>the</strong> appellate court,<br />
incontrovertibly establishes that <strong>the</strong>y are property for public use.<br />
Property for public use <strong>of</strong> provinces and towns are governed by <strong>the</strong> same<br />
principles as property <strong>of</strong> public dominion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same character. The ownership <strong>of</strong><br />
such property, which has <strong>the</strong> special characteristics <strong>of</strong> a collective ownership for <strong>the</strong><br />
general use and enjoyment, by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir application to <strong>the</strong> satisfaction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
collective needs, is in <strong>the</strong> social group, whe<strong>the</strong>r national, provincial, or municipal.<br />
Their purpose is <strong>no</strong>t to serve <strong>the</strong> State as a juridical person, but <strong>the</strong> citizens; <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are intended for <strong>the</strong> common and public welfare, and so <strong>the</strong>y can<strong>no</strong>t be <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong><br />
appropriation, ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> State or by private persons.<br />
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2. Lakebed<br />
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Republic vs. Candy Maker Inc.<br />
G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006<br />
Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> land in question may be <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> registration.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
Applicants for confirmation <strong>of</strong> imperfect title must, <strong>the</strong>refore, prove <strong>the</strong><br />
following: (a) that <strong>the</strong> land forms part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disposable and alienable agricultural<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain; and (b) that <strong>the</strong>y have been in open, continuous, exclusive,<br />
and <strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same under a bona fide claim <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership ei<strong>the</strong>r since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Regalian doctrine, all lands <strong>no</strong>t o<strong>the</strong>rwise appearing to be clearly<br />
within private ownership are presumed to belong to <strong>the</strong> State. The presumption is<br />
that lands <strong>of</strong> whatever classification belong to <strong>the</strong> State. Unless public land is<br />
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by <strong>the</strong><br />
State, it remains part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inalienable public domain. Property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain<br />
is beyond <strong>the</strong> commerce <strong>of</strong> man and <strong>no</strong>t susceptible <strong>of</strong> private appropriation and<br />
acquisitive prescription. Occupation <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> owner <strong>no</strong> matter how<br />
long can<strong>no</strong>t ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The statute <strong>of</strong><br />
limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does <strong>no</strong>t operate against <strong>the</strong><br />
State unless <strong>the</strong> occupant proves possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same after a<br />
claim <strong>of</strong> ownership for <strong>the</strong> required number <strong>of</strong> years to constitute a grant from <strong>the</strong><br />
State.<br />
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from <strong>the</strong><br />
government, whe<strong>the</strong>r express or implied. It is indispensable that <strong>the</strong>re be a showing<br />
<strong>of</strong> a title from <strong>the</strong> State. The rationale for <strong>the</strong> period “since time immemorial or<br />
since June 12, 1945” lies in <strong>the</strong> presumption that <strong>the</strong> land applied for pertains to <strong>the</strong><br />
State, and that <strong>the</strong> occupants or possessor claim an interest <strong>the</strong>reon only by virtue<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir imperfect title as continuous, open and <strong>no</strong>torious possession.<br />
To prove that <strong>the</strong> land subject <strong>of</strong> an application for registration is alienable, an<br />
applicant must conclusively establish <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> a positive act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government<br />
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action,<br />
investigation reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.<br />
Until <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> rules on confirmation <strong>of</strong> imperfect title do <strong>no</strong>t apply. A certification<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in <strong>the</strong> Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Environment and Natural Resources stating that <strong>the</strong> land subject <strong>of</strong> an application<br />
is found to be within <strong>the</strong> alienable and disposable site per a land classification project<br />
map is sufficient evidence to show <strong>the</strong> real character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
application.<br />
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The applicant is burdened to <strong>of</strong>fer pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> specific acts <strong>of</strong> ownership to<br />
substantiate <strong>the</strong> claim over <strong>the</strong> land. Actual possession consists in <strong>the</strong> manifestation<br />
<strong>of</strong> acts <strong>of</strong> dominion over it <strong>of</strong> such a nature as a party would actually exercise over<br />
his own property. A mere casual cultivation <strong>of</strong> portions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land by <strong>the</strong> claimant<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t constitute sufficient basis for a claim <strong>of</strong> ownership; such possession is <strong>no</strong>t<br />
exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from <strong>the</strong> State.<br />
Under Section 6 <strong>of</strong> P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850, <strong>the</strong> LLDA is<br />
empowered to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively<br />
carry out <strong>the</strong> policies and programs <strong>the</strong>rein provided including <strong>the</strong> policies and<br />
projects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> LLDA, subject to <strong>the</strong> approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Eco<strong>no</strong>mic Development<br />
Authority.<br />
In 1996, <strong>the</strong> Board <strong>of</strong> Directors <strong>of</strong> LLDA approved Resolution No. 113, series<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1996 relating to <strong>the</strong> Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work<br />
and Financial Plan for its operationalization in <strong>the</strong> Laguna de Bay Basin. Section 5 <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Resolution provides that <strong>the</strong> LLDA as a matter <strong>of</strong> policy is to maintain all<br />
shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in consonance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> LLDA policies, plans programs for <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> water quality<br />
and pollution and conservation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> water resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Laguna de Bay.<br />
As gleaned from <strong>the</strong> Survey Report <strong>of</strong> Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> LLDA based on <strong>the</strong> ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
Memorandum <strong>of</strong> Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, <strong>the</strong> property is located below<br />
<strong>the</strong> reglementary level <strong>of</strong> 12.50 m.; hence, part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Laguna de Bay, and,<br />
as such, is public land.<br />
Under R.A. No. 4850 and <strong>the</strong> issuances <strong>of</strong> LLDA, registerable rights acquired<br />
by occupants before <strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law are recognized. However, <strong>the</strong> respondent<br />
failed to adduce pro<strong>of</strong> that its predecessors-in-interest had acquired registerable<br />
title over <strong>the</strong> property before July 18, 1966<br />
3. Lakebed; Definition <strong>of</strong> Continuous and Notorious Possession<br />
PELBEL Manufacturing Corp. vs. Republic<br />
G.R. No. 141174, July 31, 2006<br />
Petitioners, in this case, applied for registration <strong>of</strong> title to two parcels <strong>of</strong> land<br />
covered by Plan Psu-240345. Both parcels <strong>of</strong> land are located in San Juan, Taytay,<br />
Rizal, near <strong>the</strong> shore <strong>of</strong> Laguna de Bay. The controlling law in <strong>the</strong> instant case is<br />
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Public Land Act.<br />
It governs what were used to be k<strong>no</strong>wn as public agricultural lands, or what are<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as alienable and disposable lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Public Land Act, <strong>the</strong>re is a presumption that <strong>the</strong> land applied for<br />
belongs to <strong>the</strong> state, and that <strong>the</strong> occupants and possessors can only claim an interest<br />
in <strong>the</strong> land by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir imperfect title or continuous, open, and <strong>no</strong>torious<br />
possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> for a period prescribed by law. This principle is rooted in <strong>the</strong><br />
Regalian doctrine, under which <strong>the</strong> State is <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> any asserted right to<br />
ownership <strong>of</strong> land. The basic doctrine is that all lands <strong>no</strong>t o<strong>the</strong>rwise appearing to be<br />
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to <strong>the</strong> State.<br />
Any applicant for judicial confirmation <strong>of</strong> an imperfect title has <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong><br />
proving, by incontrovertible evidence, that <strong>the</strong> (a) land applied for is alienable and<br />
disposable public land; and, (b) <strong>the</strong> applicant, by himself or through his predecessorsin-interest<br />
had occupied and possessed <strong>the</strong> land, in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> owner, openly,<br />
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945, or earlier.<br />
We hold that petitioners failed to show that <strong>the</strong> parcels <strong>of</strong> land subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
application are alienable and disposable. The government, through <strong>the</strong> Laguna Lake<br />
Development Authority, established that <strong>the</strong> areas sought to be registered are below<br />
<strong>the</strong> statutory minimum elevation <strong>of</strong> 12.50 meters, hence formed part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bed <strong>of</strong><br />
Laguna Lake under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. In a Report dated<br />
November 19, 1985, Laguna Lake Development Authority Geodetic Engineer Joel<br />
G. Merida stated that one-half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> Lot 1 and <strong>the</strong> entire area <strong>of</strong> Lot 2, Psu-<br />
240345, are covered by mud and lake water at an elevation <strong>of</strong> 11.77 meters, and <strong>the</strong><br />
highest observed elevation is 12.19 meters. This means that <strong>the</strong> subject lots form<br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lake bed or basin <strong>of</strong> Laguna Lake. Sec. 41(11) <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 4850 sets <strong>the</strong><br />
minimum water elevation at 12.50 meters. Lands located at and below such elevation<br />
are public lands which form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bed <strong>of</strong> said lake.<br />
Art. 502 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code enumerates <strong>the</strong> bodies <strong>of</strong> water that are properties<br />
<strong>of</strong> public dominion, as follows:<br />
The following are <strong>of</strong> public dominion:<br />
(1) Rivers and <strong>the</strong>ir natural beds;<br />
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters <strong>of</strong> springs and brooks running in<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir natural beds and <strong>the</strong> beds <strong>the</strong>mselves;<br />
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands <strong>of</strong> public<br />
dominion;<br />
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and <strong>the</strong>ir beds;<br />
xxx xxx xxx<br />
The SC agreed with <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appellate court that <strong>the</strong> fact that a few <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r estates in <strong>the</strong> vicinity had succeeded in being registered, and that <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
already existing houses and roads between Laguna Lake and <strong>the</strong> subject lots, does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t prove that <strong>the</strong> subject lots are <strong>no</strong>t part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Laguna Lake bed. Mr. Ananias<br />
Maria<strong>no</strong> registered 6,993 square meters <strong>of</strong> land in his name under Original Certificate<br />
<strong>of</strong> Title (OCT) No. 8906 which land appears to be even located far<strong>the</strong>r from <strong>the</strong><br />
lake than <strong>the</strong> subject lots, while Juvencio Ortañez registered 84,238 square meters<br />
<strong>of</strong> land in his name under OCT No. 55351 which land is situated near <strong>the</strong> margins <strong>of</strong><br />
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Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court Decisions on Property and Land Registration<br />
<strong>the</strong> Laguna Lake. The land titles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two individuals only prove that <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
<strong>the</strong> owners in fee simple <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective real properties described <strong>the</strong>rein,<br />
free from all liens and encumbrances except such as may be expressly <strong>no</strong>ted <strong>the</strong>reon<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>rwise reserved by law. They do <strong>no</strong>t prove petitioners’ title to <strong>the</strong> subject<br />
lots.<br />
In Ledesma vs. Municipality <strong>of</strong> Iloilo, <strong>the</strong> SC held that “simple possession <strong>of</strong> a<br />
certificate <strong>of</strong> title, under <strong>the</strong> Torrens System, does <strong>no</strong>t make <strong>the</strong> possessor <strong>the</strong> true<br />
owner <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> property described <strong>the</strong>rein. If a person obtains a title, under <strong>the</strong><br />
Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can<strong>no</strong>t be<br />
registered under <strong>the</strong> Torrens System, he does <strong>no</strong>t, by virtue <strong>of</strong> said certificate alone,<br />
become <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lands illegally included.”<br />
Possession is open when it is visible and apparent to a common observer.<br />
Continuous possession consists <strong>of</strong> uninterrupted acts <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>npermissive possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> property by <strong>the</strong> current occupants and <strong>the</strong>ir predecessors.<br />
To be <strong>no</strong>torious, possession must be so conspicuous that it is generally k<strong>no</strong>wn<br />
and talked <strong>of</strong> by <strong>the</strong> public or at least by <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> vicinity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises.<br />
Mere possession <strong>of</strong> land and <strong>the</strong> making <strong>of</strong> vague assertions to <strong>the</strong> public that a<br />
possessor is claiming <strong>the</strong> land are <strong>no</strong>t sufficient to satisfy <strong>the</strong> requirement <strong>of</strong> open<br />
and <strong>no</strong>torious possession.<br />
4. Foreshore Land<br />
SIAIN Enterprises vs. F.F. Cruz<br />
G.R. No. 146616, August 31, 2006<br />
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed on September 1973<br />
a foreshore lease application over <strong>the</strong> foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered<br />
in its name, located in La Paz, Iloilo City, including Lot <strong>33</strong>09. Later, it withdrew <strong>the</strong><br />
application and filed on March 1976 a petition for registration over <strong>the</strong> same<br />
foreshore land with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance <strong>of</strong> Iloilo. The case was, however,<br />
archived as WESVICO’s representative could <strong>no</strong> longer be contacted.<br />
WESVICO ceased to hold operations and its properties including Lot <strong>33</strong>09<br />
were foreclosed by <strong>the</strong> Development Bank <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines (DBP) which later<br />
consolidated its ownership <strong>the</strong>reon.<br />
On July 1983, F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. CRUZ) filed with <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands,<br />
Iloilo City, a foreshore lease application over a foreshore land, a portion <strong>of</strong> which is<br />
adjacent to Lot <strong>33</strong>09.<br />
Petitioner Siain Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN), who purchased from <strong>the</strong> DBP <strong>the</strong><br />
properties previously owned by WESVICO including Lot <strong>33</strong>09, filed on September<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
1986 a foreshore lease application 7over <strong>the</strong> foreshore land adjacent to <strong>the</strong> properties<br />
it bought from DBP.<br />
When SIAIN learned that 130 linear meters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreshore land subject <strong>of</strong><br />
F.F. Cruz’s foreshore lease application overlapped that covered by its foreshore<br />
lease application, it filed on January 1987 a protest alleging that it being <strong>the</strong> owner<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property adjoining <strong>the</strong> overlapping area, it should be given preference in its<br />
lease.<br />
On March 1987, <strong>the</strong> Sangguniang Panglungsod <strong>of</strong> Iloilo City, by Resolution<br />
No. 174, approved <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> its Committee on Finance that “for <strong>the</strong><br />
mutual interest” <strong>of</strong> F.F. Cruz and SIAIN, SIAIN would get 70 linear meters and F.F.<br />
Cruz would get 60 linear meters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed area, in light <strong>of</strong> its finding that,<br />
among o<strong>the</strong>r things, both SIAIN and F.F. Cruz would “contribute substantially to<br />
<strong>the</strong> eco<strong>no</strong>mic growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> City <strong>of</strong> Iloilo.”<br />
The Land Management Bureau (LMB) through its Director dismissed SIAIN’s<br />
protest. SIAIN appealed to <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Environment and<br />
Natural Resources (DENR).<br />
On May 1997, <strong>the</strong>n DENR Acting Secretary Antonio G.M. La Viña set aside<br />
<strong>the</strong> LMB Order, and rendered a decision in favor <strong>of</strong> SIAIN.<br />
F.F. Cruz appealed to <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President. The Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President,<br />
through <strong>the</strong>n Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, reversed <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
DENR Acting Secretary and reinstated that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> LMB<br />
SIAIN filed a petition for review before <strong>the</strong> CA. The CA dismissed SIAIN’s<br />
petition.<br />
Issue: Who has better right over <strong>the</strong> foreshore land, SIAIN or F.F. Cruz<br />
Ruling: SIAIN.<br />
The key to <strong>the</strong> present controversy lies in <strong>the</strong> classification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed<br />
area. The DENR Secretary found that <strong>the</strong> disputed area is a “natural foreshore,”<br />
hence, it concluded that SIAIN, being a littoral owner (owner <strong>of</strong> land bordering <strong>the</strong><br />
sea or lake or o<strong>the</strong>r tidal waters), has preferential right to lease it as provided in paragraph<br />
32 <strong>of</strong> Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936 which reads:<br />
32. Preference <strong>of</strong> Riparian Owner. — The owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property adjoining<br />
foreshore lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or<br />
banks <strong>of</strong> navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for<br />
such lands adjoining his property as may <strong>no</strong>t be needed for <strong>the</strong> public<br />
service, subject to <strong>the</strong> laws and regulations governing lands <strong>of</strong> this nature,<br />
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provided that he applies <strong>the</strong>refore within sixty (60) days from <strong>the</strong> date he<br />
receives a communication from <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands advising him <strong>of</strong> his<br />
preferential right.<br />
The Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President went on to hold that since <strong>the</strong> disputed area is<br />
already reclaimed land, it can<strong>no</strong>t be subject to littoral claim, SIAIN, <strong>no</strong>t being <strong>the</strong><br />
littoral owner within <strong>the</strong> contemplation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law, citing Santulan vs. The Executive<br />
Secretary which elucidated on <strong>the</strong> principal reason for giving a riparian or littoral<br />
owner preferential right, thus:<br />
Now, <strong>the</strong>n, is <strong>the</strong>re any justification for giving to <strong>the</strong> littoral owner <strong>the</strong><br />
preferential right to lease <strong>the</strong> foreshore land abutting on his land? That<br />
rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish Law <strong>of</strong><br />
Waters <strong>of</strong> 1866 which provides that, while lands added to <strong>the</strong> shores by<br />
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by <strong>the</strong> action <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea form part<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, such lands, when <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>no</strong> longer washed by <strong>the</strong><br />
waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea are <strong>no</strong>t necessary for purposes <strong>of</strong> public utility, or for<br />
<strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> special industries, or for <strong>the</strong> coast guard service,”<br />
shall be declared by <strong>the</strong> Government “to be <strong>the</strong> property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owners <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> estates adjacent <strong>the</strong>reto and as increment <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.”<br />
In o<strong>the</strong>r words, article 4 recognizes <strong>the</strong> preferential right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> littoral (riparian<br />
according to paragraph 32) to <strong>the</strong> foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial<br />
deposits due to <strong>the</strong> action <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea. The reason for <strong>the</strong> preferential right is <strong>the</strong><br />
same as <strong>the</strong> justification for giving accretions to <strong>the</strong> riparian owner for <strong>the</strong> diminutions<br />
which his land suffers by reason <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> destructive force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> waters. So, in <strong>the</strong> case<br />
<strong>of</strong> littoral lands, he who loses by <strong>the</strong> encroachments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea should gain by its<br />
recession.<br />
That <strong>the</strong> foreshore area had been reclaimed does <strong>no</strong>t remove it from its<br />
classification <strong>of</strong> foreshore area subject to <strong>the</strong> preferential right to lease <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> littoral<br />
owner.<br />
It bears <strong>no</strong>ting that it was <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> reclamation that brought <strong>the</strong> disputed<br />
foreshore area into existence. Such foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz<br />
undertook its reclamation. It was “formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to<br />
<strong>the</strong> action <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea.” Following Santulan, <strong>the</strong> littoral owner has preferential right<br />
to lease <strong>the</strong> same.<br />
Contrary to <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President, as affirmed by <strong>the</strong> appellate<br />
court, littoral owner WESVICO can<strong>no</strong>t be considered to have waived or abandoned<br />
its preferential right to lease <strong>the</strong> disputed area when it subsequently filed an<br />
application for registration <strong>the</strong>reover. For being a part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, ownership<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area could <strong>no</strong>t be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right remained,<br />
however. Its move to have <strong>the</strong> contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in<br />
fact more than proves its interest to utilize it.<br />
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A. Right to Recover Property<br />
1. In general<br />
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
II. Ownership/Possession<br />
Ramos-Balalio vs. Ramos<br />
G.R. No. 168464, January 23, 2006<br />
Issue: WON Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be considered<br />
as having any right to <strong>the</strong> land occupied, which may entitle her to sue in<br />
courts for <strong>the</strong> return <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong><br />
Ruling:<br />
Zenaida has proven prior possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> portion <strong>of</strong> land she claims as her<br />
share, which possession antedates <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> homestead application. She<br />
produced evidence showing that she has filed a verified application for <strong>the</strong> registration<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land with <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands on August 10, 1971, which is still pending. The<br />
documents remain uncontested and <strong>the</strong> application has <strong>no</strong>t been assailed by any <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> parties to <strong>the</strong> case. She alleged that during <strong>the</strong> lifetime <strong>of</strong> her mo<strong>the</strong>r, she and<br />
her maternal grandfa<strong>the</strong>r cultivated and occupied <strong>the</strong> land.<br />
Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that <strong>of</strong> her<br />
predecessor-in-interest (mo<strong>the</strong>r Susana Bue<strong>no</strong>) covering <strong>the</strong> property. Time and again,<br />
we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax payments <strong>of</strong> property are<br />
<strong>no</strong>t conclusive evidence <strong>of</strong> ownership, never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>y are good indicia <strong>of</strong> possession<br />
in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> owner for <strong>no</strong> one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a<br />
property that is <strong>no</strong>t in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute<br />
at least pro<strong>of</strong> that <strong>the</strong> holder has a claim <strong>of</strong> title over <strong>the</strong> property. The voluntary<br />
declaration <strong>of</strong> a piece <strong>of</strong> property for taxation purposes manifests <strong>no</strong>t only one’s<br />
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to <strong>the</strong> property and an<strong>no</strong>unces his adverse<br />
claim against <strong>the</strong> State and all o<strong>the</strong>r interested parties, but also <strong>the</strong> intention to<br />
contribute needed revenues to <strong>the</strong> Government.<br />
Zenaida’s uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent coupled<br />
with her open and <strong>no</strong>torious occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land convinces us <strong>of</strong> her preferential<br />
right to possess <strong>the</strong> land claimed, which entitles her to be protected by <strong>the</strong> law in<br />
such possession.<br />
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2. Collateral Attack<br />
Erasusta vs. Amorin<br />
G.R. No. 149231, July 17, 2006<br />
Subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> controversy are 4 lots (Lot 11, Lot 19-A, Lot 19-C, and Lot 34-D)<br />
located at Maria Luisa Street, Sampaloc, Manila. These lots originally formed part<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Prieto Estate owned by <strong>the</strong> late Antonio Prieto, Sr. (Prieto). The Prieto Estate<br />
was subdivided into separate lots and sold to tenants on installment basis.<br />
De Los Reyes is among <strong>the</strong> tenants who purchased lots from Prieto under<br />
separate contracts <strong>of</strong> sale on installment. Lot 11 was sold to her as early as April<br />
1955, while Lot 19-A, Lot 19-C and Lot 34-D were purchased by her on December<br />
1960, September 1959 and October 1959, respectively.<br />
De Los Reyes later transferred her rights over Lot 19-C to Fortunato A. Amorin,<br />
<strong>the</strong> late husband <strong>of</strong> respondent Amparo J. Amorin. The next day, Prieto executed a<br />
deed <strong>of</strong> sale in favor <strong>of</strong> Fortunato and, by virtue <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, TCT No. 91454/T-732 was<br />
issued in Fortunato’s name.<br />
The Amorins took possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> house located at No. 9<strong>33</strong> Maria Luisa<br />
Street, supposedly <strong>the</strong> place where Lot 19-C is located, and erected <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
residential house <strong>the</strong>reon. After <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> Fortunato, <strong>the</strong> Amorins executed an<br />
Extrajudicial Partition. On January 1969, TCT No. 95422 was issued in <strong>the</strong> Amorins’<br />
names.<br />
In September 1973, a representative from <strong>the</strong> Bank went to <strong>the</strong> Amorins’<br />
house at No. 9<strong>33</strong>, informing <strong>the</strong>m that <strong>the</strong>y are occupying Lot 19-A which had been<br />
mortgaged to and foreclosed by <strong>the</strong> Bank. In 1974, <strong>the</strong> Bank sent a formal demand<br />
letter for <strong>the</strong> Amorins to vacate <strong>the</strong> premises, insisting that <strong>the</strong>y were occupying Lot<br />
19-A and that <strong>the</strong> Bank was <strong>no</strong>w <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> said lot.<br />
Apparently, De Los Reyes was deceived by a certain Valenzuela into entrusting<br />
to <strong>the</strong> latter <strong>the</strong> documents evidencing her rights over Lot 11, Lot 19-A, and Lot 34-<br />
D on Valenzuela’s representation that he would assist De Los Reyes in transferring<br />
<strong>the</strong> titles <strong>of</strong> said lots to her three (3) children. Valenzuela, thru a forged deed <strong>of</strong><br />
assignment, fraudulently transferred <strong>the</strong> rights over <strong>the</strong> 3 lots to his own name.<br />
The subdivision owner, Prieto, unaware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fraud and forged instrument, executed<br />
a deed <strong>of</strong> sale over <strong>the</strong> same 3 lots in favor <strong>of</strong> Valenzuela who eventually secured<br />
TCTs in his own name. Valenzuela <strong>the</strong>n mortgaged <strong>the</strong> 3 lots to respondent Bank as<br />
collaterals for a loan obtained by him.<br />
De Los Reyes filed two (2) criminal complaints for estafa through falsification<br />
<strong>of</strong> public documents against Valenzuela. Valenzuela was later convicted in both<br />
cases.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
On 1970, <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank foreclosed Valenzuela’s real estate mortgages.<br />
On account <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, Lot 11, Lot 19-A and Lot 34-D were sold at a public auction to<br />
<strong>the</strong> respondent Bank as <strong>the</strong> highest bidder. The Bank consolidated its ownership<br />
over <strong>the</strong> 3 lots and was issued new TCTs.<br />
Amparo checked <strong>the</strong> records in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subdivision owner and with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Land Registration Commission (LRC). The records <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> LRC confirmed <strong>the</strong><br />
mix-up in <strong>the</strong> designations <strong>of</strong> Lot 19-C and Lot 19-A. It turned out that Lot 19-C<br />
was, in fact, <strong>the</strong> one located at No. 925 Maria Luisa St. and Lot 19-A was <strong>the</strong> one<br />
located at No. 9<strong>33</strong> Maria Luisa Street.<br />
Amparo, demanded that De Los Reyes and <strong>the</strong> latter’s tenants surrender and<br />
vacate <strong>the</strong> premises at No. 925 Maria Luisa Street, which is actually Lot 19-C, but<br />
De Los Reyes refused. De Los Reyes insisted that <strong>the</strong> lot being occupied by <strong>the</strong><br />
Amorins at No. 9<strong>33</strong> Maria Luisa Street is Lot 19-C.<br />
The Amorins filed in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n CFI <strong>of</strong> Manila, an action for Recovery <strong>of</strong><br />
Ownership with Damages, against De Los Reyes, <strong>the</strong> latter’s tenants at No. 925<br />
Maria Luisa Street, and <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank.<br />
On January 1986, <strong>the</strong> TC rendered a decision ordering <strong>the</strong> cancellation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
3 certificates <strong>of</strong> title issued to <strong>the</strong> Bank, <strong>the</strong> correction by <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Amorins to correspond to <strong>the</strong> master plan <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> LRC and <strong>the</strong><br />
correction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subdivision plan pertaining to <strong>the</strong> property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Amorins to<br />
correspond to <strong>the</strong> master plan <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> LRC. The trial court ruled that “What was<br />
actually sold to <strong>the</strong> Amorins by Lucena delos Reyes was Lot 19-A located at 9<strong>33</strong><br />
Maria Luisa Street and <strong>no</strong>t Lot 19-C located at 925 Maria Luisa Street.”<br />
In a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r Order dates August 1996, <strong>the</strong> TC modified its earlier decision by<br />
(1) ordering <strong>the</strong> cancellation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank’s TCT on Lot 11 and Lot 34-D<br />
and Valenzuela’s TCTs on Lot 11, Lot 19-A, and Lot 34-D for having been obtained<br />
from fraudulent source; and (2) ordering <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds to interchange <strong>the</strong><br />
technical descriptions <strong>of</strong> Lot 19-A and Lot 19-C<br />
On appeal, <strong>the</strong> CA rendered a decision reversing that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> trial court and<br />
granting <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank’s appeal and dismissing <strong>the</strong> separate appeal <strong>of</strong> De Los<br />
Reyes<br />
Issue 1: Who has better right over <strong>the</strong> lot, <strong>the</strong> Bank or De Los Reyes?<br />
Ruling: De Los Reyes.<br />
While it is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent document may become<br />
<strong>the</strong> root <strong>of</strong> a valid title if <strong>the</strong> property has already been transferred from <strong>the</strong> name<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owner to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forger, <strong>the</strong> same does <strong>no</strong>t always hold true. The doctrine<br />
likewise emphasizes that only a person who deals with registered property in good<br />
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faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens<br />
title.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> final analysis, <strong>the</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> this case depends on <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong> respondent Bank is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith<br />
It is a matter <strong>of</strong> judicial <strong>no</strong>tice that a banking institution, before approving a<br />
loan, sends its representative to <strong>the</strong> premises <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land <strong>of</strong>fered as collateral, and<br />
investigates who are <strong>the</strong> true owners and actual possessors <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. Here, evidence<br />
is wanting that <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank did make any such investigation. Quite<br />
significantly, it was established during trial that an employee <strong>of</strong> respondent Bank by<br />
<strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Jesus Ortega was a close friend <strong>of</strong> swindler Valenzuela. In fact, it was<br />
never disputed that <strong>no</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer or employee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank inspected <strong>the</strong><br />
premises before accepting <strong>the</strong> same as collaterals for <strong>the</strong> loan it extended to<br />
Valenzuela.<br />
It can<strong>no</strong>t be overemphasized that <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank, being in <strong>the</strong> business<br />
<strong>of</strong> extending loans secured by real estate mortgages, is familiar with <strong>the</strong> rules on<br />
land registration. As such, it was, as here, expected to exercise more care and prudence<br />
than ordinary private individuals in its dealing with registered lands. Given, inter<br />
alia, <strong>the</strong> suspicious-provoking presence <strong>of</strong> occupants, o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> owner, on <strong>the</strong><br />
land to be mortgaged, it behooved <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank to conduct a more exhaustive<br />
investigation on <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mortgagor’s title. That <strong>the</strong> respondent Bank<br />
accepted in mortgage <strong>the</strong> properties in question, <strong>no</strong>twithstanding <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong><br />
structures <strong>the</strong>reon and <strong>the</strong> actual and visible presence <strong>the</strong>reat <strong>of</strong> persons o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
<strong>the</strong> mortgagor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith.<br />
Respondent claims that, being an in<strong>no</strong>cent mortgagee, it should <strong>no</strong>t be required<br />
to conduct an exhaustive investigation on <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mortgagor’s title before<br />
it could extend a loan. Respondent, however, is <strong>no</strong>t an ordinary mortgagee; it is a<br />
mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is expected to exercise greater<br />
care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking<br />
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage<br />
contract. The ascertainment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> status or condition <strong>of</strong> a property <strong>of</strong>fered to it as<br />
security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part <strong>of</strong> its operations.<br />
Issue 2: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Bank’s titles over Lot 11, Lot 19-A and Lot 34-D<br />
can be collaterally attacked?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
The concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>n-collateral attack <strong>of</strong> title is based on Section 48, PD 1529,<br />
21 which provides:<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Certificate <strong>no</strong>t Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate <strong>of</strong> title shall<br />
<strong>no</strong>t be subject to collateral attack. It can<strong>no</strong>t be altered, modified, or<br />
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.<br />
Clear it is from <strong>the</strong> above that what can<strong>no</strong>t be collaterally attacked is <strong>the</strong><br />
certificate <strong>of</strong> title and <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> title itself. As it is, a certificate <strong>of</strong> title is <strong>the</strong> document<br />
issued by <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds in case <strong>of</strong> conveyance <strong>of</strong> real estates and is k<strong>no</strong>wn as<br />
TCT. But by title, <strong>the</strong> law refers to <strong>the</strong> ownership which a certificate <strong>of</strong> title merely<br />
represents. Apparently, respondent Bank confuses a certificate <strong>of</strong> title with <strong>the</strong> title<br />
itself. Placing a parcel <strong>of</strong> land under <strong>the</strong> mantle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens system does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
mean that ownership <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> can <strong>no</strong> longer be disputed. Ownership is different<br />
from a certificate <strong>of</strong> title.<br />
Also, Bank did <strong>no</strong>t raise <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>n-collateral attack on its titles as a<br />
defense in <strong>the</strong> trial court. Hence, it can<strong>no</strong>t be raised for <strong>the</strong> first time on appeal.<br />
This defense, if at all, is deemed waived.<br />
3. Accion Reivindicatoria<br />
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Ponferrada<br />
G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006<br />
Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed Santos, and Sonia<br />
Santos-Wallin, represented by Enrique G. Santos, filed a complaint for Quieting <strong>of</strong><br />
Title and/or Accion Reivindicatoria before <strong>the</strong> RTC <strong>of</strong> QC against <strong>the</strong> Iglesia Ni<br />
Cristo (INC). From <strong>the</strong> complaint, plaintiffs appear to be <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> Enrique Santos,<br />
represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter signed <strong>the</strong> Verification and Certificate<br />
<strong>of</strong> Non-Forum Shopping. Defendant moved to dismiss on <strong>the</strong> ground that <strong>the</strong> case<br />
involved more than one plaintiff but <strong>the</strong> verification and certification against forum<br />
shopping incorporated in <strong>the</strong> complaint was signed only by Enrique Santos. Although<br />
<strong>the</strong> complaint alleges that plaintiffs are represented by Enrique Santos, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong><br />
showing that he was, indeed, authorized to so represent <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r plaintiffs to file<br />
<strong>the</strong> complaint and to sign <strong>the</strong> verification and certification <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>n-forum shopping.<br />
RTC denied <strong>the</strong> MTD. It declared that since Enrique Santos was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> heirs,<br />
his signature in <strong>the</strong> verification and certification constitutes substantial compliance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Rules. The court, likewise, held that prescription had <strong>no</strong>t set in and that<br />
failure to state <strong>the</strong> address <strong>of</strong> plaintiffs in <strong>the</strong> complaint does <strong>no</strong>t warrant <strong>the</strong> dismissal<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint. CA affirmed <strong>the</strong> lower court.<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r verification executed by one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs is<br />
sufficient?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
The general rule is that <strong>the</strong> certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a<br />
case and <strong>the</strong> signature <strong>of</strong> only one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m is insufficient. However, <strong>the</strong> Court has<br />
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Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court Decisions on Property and Land Registration<br />
also stressed in a number <strong>of</strong> cases that <strong>the</strong> rules on forum shopping were designed<br />
to promote and facilitate <strong>the</strong> orderly administration <strong>of</strong> justice and thus should <strong>no</strong>t<br />
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and<br />
legitimate objective. The rule <strong>of</strong> substantial compliance may be availed <strong>of</strong> with respect<br />
to <strong>the</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certification. This is because <strong>the</strong> requirement <strong>of</strong> strict<br />
compliance with <strong>the</strong> provisions merely underscores its mandatory nature in that <strong>the</strong><br />
certification can<strong>no</strong>t be altoge<strong>the</strong>r dispensed with or its requirements completely<br />
disregarded. The Court applied <strong>the</strong> rule on substantial compliance because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
commonality <strong>of</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> parties with respect to <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> controversy.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> instant case, both parties have <strong>the</strong>ir respective TCTs over <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
They have a common interest over <strong>the</strong> property being <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late Enrique<br />
Santos, <strong>the</strong> alleged registered owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property as shown in one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
TCTs. As such heirs, <strong>the</strong>y are considered co-owners pro indiviso <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole property<br />
since <strong>no</strong> specific portion yet has been adjudicated to any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> heirs. Consequently,<br />
as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> heirs and principal party, <strong>the</strong> lone signature <strong>of</strong> Enrique G. Santos in<br />
<strong>the</strong> verification and certification is sufficient for <strong>the</strong> RTC to take cognizance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
case. The commonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir interest gave Enrique G. Santos <strong>the</strong> authority to<br />
inform <strong>the</strong> RTC on behalf <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r plaintiffs <strong>the</strong>rein that <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>no</strong>t<br />
commenced any action or claim involving <strong>the</strong> same issues in a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r court or tribunal,<br />
and that <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r pending action or claim in a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r court or tribunal involving<br />
<strong>the</strong> same issues.<br />
Considering that at stake in <strong>the</strong> present case is <strong>the</strong> ownership and possession<br />
over a prime property in Quezon City, <strong>the</strong> apparent merit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> substantive aspects<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case should be deemed as a special circumstance or compelling reason to<br />
allow <strong>the</strong> relaxation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rule.<br />
Issue 2: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re is a need to show Enrique G Santos’ authority to<br />
represent his co-heirs.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
Respondents herein are co-owners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property. As such co-owners,<br />
each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and<br />
detainer, or any kind <strong>of</strong> action for <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject properties.<br />
Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r coowners<br />
as co-plaintiffs, because <strong>the</strong> suit is deemed to be instituted for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong><br />
all.<br />
We uphold <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following circumstances:<br />
<strong>the</strong> caption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> instant case is Heirs <strong>of</strong> Enrique Santos vs. Iglesia ni<br />
Cristo;<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
<strong>the</strong> opening statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint states that plaintiffs are <strong>the</strong><br />
heirs <strong>of</strong> Enrique Santos and likewise names <strong>the</strong> particular heirs <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> latter who instituted <strong>the</strong> complaint below;<br />
<strong>the</strong> case involves a property owned by <strong>the</strong> predecessor-in-interest <strong>of</strong><br />
plaintiffs <strong>the</strong>rein; and<br />
<strong>the</strong> verification signed by Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is<br />
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> children <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late Enrique Santos and that he represents<br />
<strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> said Enrique Santos<br />
Issue 3: Whe<strong>the</strong>r prescription has set in?<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
A cloud is said to be a semblance <strong>of</strong> a title, ei<strong>the</strong>r legal or equitable, or a cloud<br />
<strong>of</strong> an interest in land appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded,<br />
or which it would be inequitable to enforce. An action for quieting <strong>of</strong> title is<br />
imprescriptible until <strong>the</strong> claimant is ousted <strong>of</strong> his possession.<br />
Admittedly, respondents interposed that <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> a real property, as<br />
plaintiff, is entitled to <strong>the</strong> relief <strong>of</strong> quieting <strong>of</strong> title even if, at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> his action, he was <strong>no</strong>t in actual possession <strong>of</strong> real property. After<br />
all, under Article 477 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Civil Code, <strong>the</strong> owner need <strong>no</strong>t be in possession <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> property. If on <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> TCT under <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> plaintiff, its invalidity does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t appear but rests partly in pais, an action for quieting <strong>of</strong> title is proper. As gleaned<br />
from <strong>the</strong> averments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint, <strong>the</strong> action <strong>of</strong> respondents was one for quieting<br />
<strong>of</strong> title under Rule 64 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rules <strong>of</strong> Court, in relation to Article 476 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New<br />
Civil Code<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, respondent alleged in <strong>the</strong>ir complaint, that <strong>the</strong>ir fa<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
Enrique Santos, was <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property based on TCT issued on July 27,<br />
1961; and that, after his death on February 9, 1970, <strong>the</strong>y inherited <strong>the</strong> property;<br />
Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and respondents, after <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former,<br />
had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property until 1994<br />
when petitioner claimed ownership based on TCT issued on September 18, 1984<br />
and barred respondents from fencing <strong>the</strong>ir property.<br />
The alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An accion reinvindicatoria<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t necessarily presuppose that <strong>the</strong> actual and material possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> such possession<br />
from defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking<br />
<strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well.<br />
It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel <strong>of</strong> land and seeks<br />
recovery <strong>of</strong> its full possession. Thus, <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> real property in actual and material<br />
possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> may file an accion reinvindicatoria against a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r seeking ownership<br />
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over a parcel <strong>of</strong> land including jus vindicandi, or <strong>the</strong> right to exclude defendants from<br />
<strong>the</strong> possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. In this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory<br />
action claiming ownership over <strong>the</strong> property and <strong>the</strong> cancellation <strong>of</strong> TCT under <strong>the</strong><br />
name <strong>of</strong> petitioner. In fine, <strong>the</strong>y sought to enforce <strong>the</strong>ir jus utendi and jus vindicandi<br />
when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented <strong>the</strong>m from fencing <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property when <strong>the</strong>y<br />
filed <strong>the</strong>ir complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, <strong>the</strong> prescriptive period<br />
for <strong>the</strong> reinvindicatory action had <strong>no</strong>t even commenced to run, even if petitioner<br />
was able to secure TCT over <strong>the</strong> property in 1984<br />
Petition denied.<br />
2. Forcible Entry/ Unlawful Detainer<br />
a. difference between forcible entry and unlawful detainer<br />
Cajayon vs. Santiago<br />
G.R. No. 149118, February 16, 2006<br />
Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constanti<strong>no</strong> (PETITIONERS) and<br />
Isagani Candelaria (CANDELARIA) were co-owners <strong>of</strong> a 260-square meter lot, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
covered by Transfer Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title (TCT) No. C-10870.<br />
On February 1995, a partition agreement was entered into by petitioners and<br />
Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area <strong>of</strong> 100 square meters,<br />
more or less, was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing<br />
an area <strong>of</strong> 160 square meters, more or less, was given to petitioners. TCT No. C-<br />
10870 was cancelled and TCT No. 288500 was issued in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> petitioners.<br />
On May 1995, Candelaria sold his property, including <strong>the</strong> improvements<br />
<strong>the</strong>reon, to Spouses Santiago and Fortunata Batuyong (RESPONDENTS). TCT No.<br />
294743 was issued in <strong>the</strong>ir names over <strong>the</strong> said parcel <strong>of</strong> land.<br />
On 21 May 1996, petitioners started <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a seven (7)-door<br />
bungalow-type building that allegedly intruded into <strong>the</strong> lot <strong>of</strong> respondents. The<br />
parties were summoned by barangay <strong>of</strong>ficials to a meeting on <strong>the</strong> matter. It was <strong>the</strong>n<br />
agreed upon that petitioners would defer <strong>the</strong> construction work pending <strong>the</strong> result<br />
<strong>of</strong> a relocation survey to be conducted by a government surveyor.<br />
The verification survey yielded <strong>the</strong> findings that Lot 6-A (Candelaria’s) and<br />
Lot 6-B (petitioners’) were <strong>no</strong>t correctly positioned geographically on <strong>the</strong> ground<br />
with respect to TCT No. 294743. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area <strong>of</strong><br />
10.43 square meters serves as right <strong>of</strong> way <strong>of</strong> Lot 6-B (petitioners’ lot) while sub-lot<br />
C with an area <strong>of</strong> 10.18 square meters was <strong>the</strong> portion <strong>of</strong> Lot 6-A (respondents’ lot)<br />
presently occupied by petitioners.<br />
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Despite <strong>the</strong> delineation <strong>of</strong> said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with <strong>the</strong><br />
forestalled construction, allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters <strong>of</strong><br />
respondents’ lot, including <strong>the</strong> portion being used as right <strong>of</strong> way for petitioners’<br />
tenants.<br />
The demands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents for <strong>the</strong> petitioners to vacate <strong>the</strong> encroached<br />
portion were left unheeded.<br />
On, 14 April 1997, <strong>the</strong> respondents filed an ejectment case against <strong>the</strong> petitioners<br />
before <strong>the</strong> Metropolitan Trial Court <strong>of</strong> Caloocan City.<br />
The MeTC rendered a decision ordering <strong>the</strong> petitioners to vacate and surrender<br />
possession <strong>of</strong> a portion <strong>of</strong> respondents’ lot. On appeal, <strong>the</strong> RTC affirmed <strong>the</strong> decision<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MeTC.<br />
Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> court acquired jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> ejectment case<br />
filed by <strong>the</strong> respondents<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with <strong>the</strong> textbook<br />
distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that <strong>the</strong> complaint<br />
makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer. The distinctions<br />
between <strong>the</strong> two forms <strong>of</strong> ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible entry, <strong>the</strong> plaintiff<br />
must prove that he was in prior physical possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises until he was<br />
deprived <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> by <strong>the</strong> defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, <strong>the</strong> plaintiff need<br />
<strong>no</strong>t have been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, <strong>the</strong> possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land by <strong>the</strong> defendant is unlawful from <strong>the</strong> beginning as he acquires possession<br />
<strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer,<br />
<strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> his right to <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property under his contract<br />
with <strong>the</strong> plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, <strong>the</strong> law does <strong>no</strong>t require a previous demand<br />
for <strong>the</strong> defendant to vacate <strong>the</strong> premises, but in unlawful detainer, <strong>the</strong> plaintiff must<br />
first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.<br />
Respondents had been in prior physical possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property in <strong>the</strong> concept<br />
<strong>of</strong> owner prior to petitioners’ intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners encroached<br />
upon respondents’ lot and started construction works <strong>the</strong>reon <strong>the</strong> latter was<br />
dispossessed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area involved. Despite various demands by respondents to vacate,<br />
petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly, petitioners’ entry into <strong>the</strong> said<br />
property was illegal from <strong>the</strong> beginning, precluding an action for unlawful detainer.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, to establish a case <strong>of</strong> forcible entry, <strong>the</strong> complaint must<br />
allege that one in physical possession <strong>of</strong> a land or building has been deprived <strong>of</strong> that<br />
possession by a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is<br />
<strong>no</strong>t essential, however, that <strong>the</strong> complaint should expressly employ <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong><br />
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<strong>the</strong> law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up showing that dispossession took<br />
place under said conditions.<br />
The words “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” include every<br />
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property<br />
and exclude a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r, who has had prior possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. To constitute <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong><br />
“force” as contemplated in <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned provision, <strong>the</strong> trespasser does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
have to institute a state <strong>of</strong> war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence against<br />
<strong>the</strong> person <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> party in possession. The act <strong>of</strong> going on <strong>the</strong> property and excluding<br />
<strong>the</strong> lawful possessor <strong>the</strong>refrom necessarily implies <strong>the</strong> exertion <strong>of</strong> force over <strong>the</strong><br />
property, and this is all that is necessary.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case at bar, petitioners’ encroachment into respondents’ property in an<br />
oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with <strong>the</strong>ir refusal to vacate <strong>the</strong> premises<br />
despite k<strong>no</strong>wledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proper boundaries and heedless <strong>of</strong> respondents’ serious<br />
objections, indelibly con<strong>no</strong>tes “force” within <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law.<br />
Petitioners contend that while <strong>the</strong>y concede <strong>the</strong>y might have intruded on<br />
respondents’ property, <strong>the</strong> action is barred by prescription because it was filed more<br />
than one (1) year after <strong>the</strong> occurrence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> alleged intrusion. The contention is<br />
baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rules <strong>of</strong> Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action<br />
in <strong>the</strong> proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1)<br />
year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding <strong>of</strong> possession. In<br />
forcible entry, <strong>the</strong> one-year period is counted from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> actual entry on <strong>the</strong><br />
land. Records show that <strong>the</strong> ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners’<br />
actual entry into <strong>the</strong> property, according to <strong>the</strong> complaint, took place on 21 May<br />
1996. Thus, <strong>the</strong> suit was filed well within <strong>the</strong> one (1)-year period mandated by law.<br />
b. issues to be decided in ejectment cases<br />
Copuyoc vs. De Sola<br />
G.R. No. 151322, October 11, 2006<br />
The principal issue to be resolved in forcible entry cases is mere physical or<br />
material possession (possession de facto) and <strong>no</strong>t juridical possession (possession de<br />
jure) <strong>no</strong>r ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property involved. Title is <strong>no</strong>t involved.<br />
In David vs. Cordova, <strong>the</strong> SC explained:<br />
The only question that <strong>the</strong> courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings<br />
is — who is entitled to <strong>the</strong> physical possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises, that is, to<br />
<strong>the</strong> possession de facto and <strong>no</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> possession de jure. It does <strong>no</strong>t even<br />
matter if a party’s title to <strong>the</strong> property is questionable, or when both<br />
parties intruded into public land and <strong>the</strong>ir applications to own <strong>the</strong> land<br />
have yet to be approved by <strong>the</strong> proper government agency. Regardless <strong>of</strong><br />
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<strong>the</strong> actual condition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title to <strong>the</strong> property, <strong>the</strong> party in peaceable<br />
quiet possession shall <strong>no</strong>t be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or<br />
terror. Nei<strong>the</strong>r is <strong>the</strong> unlawful withholding <strong>of</strong> property allowed. Courts<br />
will always uphold respect for prior possession.<br />
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession<br />
even against <strong>the</strong> owner himself. Whatever may be <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> his possession, if<br />
he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has <strong>the</strong> security that entitles him to<br />
remain on <strong>the</strong> property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To<br />
repeat, <strong>the</strong> only issue that <strong>the</strong> court has to settle in an ejectment suit is <strong>the</strong> right to<br />
physical possession.<br />
It is also well settled that in civil cases, <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> is on <strong>the</strong> plaintiff<br />
to establish his case by a preponderance <strong>of</strong> evidence. If <strong>the</strong> plaintiff claims a right<br />
granted or created by law, <strong>the</strong> same must be proven by competent evidence. The<br />
plaintiff must rely on <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> his own evidence and <strong>no</strong>t on <strong>the</strong> weakness <strong>of</strong><br />
that <strong>of</strong> his opponent.<br />
3. Building, Planting, Sowing<br />
a. Useful Improvements by Lessee<br />
Programme Inc. vs. Province <strong>of</strong> Bataan<br />
G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006<br />
BASECO was <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge, both located<br />
in Mariveles, Bataan. BASECO granted petitioner a contract <strong>of</strong> lease over Piazza<br />
Hotel from January 1, 1986 to January 1, 1989, subject to renewal by mutual<br />
agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties. After <strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three-year lease period, petitioner<br />
was allowed to continue operating <strong>the</strong> hotel on monthly extensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease.<br />
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a sequestration order<br />
against BASECO pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 <strong>of</strong> former President Corazon<br />
C. Aqui<strong>no</strong>. Among <strong>the</strong> properties provisionally seized and taken over was <strong>the</strong> lot on<br />
which Piazza Hotel stood. However, Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for<br />
<strong>no</strong>n-payment <strong>of</strong> taxes to Province <strong>of</strong> Bataan. BASECO’s TCT was cancelled and a<br />
new TCT was issued to <strong>the</strong> Province <strong>of</strong> Bataan. Petitioner filed a complaint for<br />
preliminary injunction and collection <strong>of</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> money against BASECO. Respondent,<br />
as <strong>the</strong> new owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property, filed a motion for leave to intervene. After its<br />
motion was granted, respondent filed a complaint-in-intervention praying, inter alia,<br />
that petitioner be ordered to vacate Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge for lack <strong>of</strong><br />
legal interest. During <strong>the</strong> pre-trial <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint-in-intervention, <strong>the</strong> parties agreed<br />
that <strong>the</strong> case be tried on <strong>the</strong> sole issue <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r respondent province, as complainantinterve<strong>no</strong>r,<br />
was <strong>the</strong> legitimate owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge. Trial<br />
court rendered judgment in favor <strong>of</strong> respondent. CA affirmed.<br />
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Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Province <strong>of</strong> Bataan can claim ownership <strong>of</strong> Piazza<br />
Hotel and Mariveles Lodge?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
Time and again, we have ruled that factual matters are best evaluated by trial<br />
courts which can scrutinize evidence and hear testimony presented and <strong>of</strong>fered by<br />
<strong>the</strong> parties (in this case, on <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property). All <strong>the</strong><br />
more does this principle ring true in this petition since such factual determination<br />
by <strong>the</strong> RTC was upheld by <strong>the</strong> CA. Only questions <strong>of</strong> law are <strong>the</strong> proper subject <strong>of</strong><br />
a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, unless any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> k<strong>no</strong>wn exceptions<br />
is extant in this case.<br />
The evidence clearly established respondent’s ownership <strong>of</strong> Piazza Hotel. First,<br />
<strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land on which Piazza Hotel stands was in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> respondent.<br />
Second, Tax Declaration No. 12782 was in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> respondent as owner <strong>of</strong><br />
Piazza Hotel.<br />
Third, petitioner was doubtlessly just a lessee. In <strong>the</strong> lease contract annexed<br />
to <strong>the</strong> complaint, petitioner in fact admitted BASECO’s (respondent’s predecessorin-interest)<br />
ownership <strong>the</strong>n <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property.<br />
The Rules <strong>of</strong> Court states that “an admission, verbal or written, made by a<br />
party in <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proceedings in <strong>the</strong> same case, does <strong>no</strong>t require pro<strong>of</strong>. The<br />
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable<br />
mistake or that <strong>no</strong> such admission was made. To be considered as a judicial admission,<br />
<strong>the</strong> same must be made in <strong>the</strong> same case in which it is <strong>of</strong>fered. In its own complaint<br />
for preliminary injunction and sum <strong>of</strong> money, petitioner ack<strong>no</strong>wledged that it was<br />
<strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property when it stated that “BASECO leased to petitioner <strong>the</strong><br />
building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles Lodge xxx for monthly rentals <strong>of</strong><br />
P6,500.00.” Petitioner could <strong>no</strong>t possibly be <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> a building merely leased<br />
to it.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, petitioner’s reference to Article 448 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code to justify<br />
its supposed rights as “possessor in good faith” was erroneous.<br />
The benefits granted to a possessor in good faith can<strong>no</strong>t be maintained by <strong>the</strong><br />
lessee against <strong>the</strong> lessor because, such benefits are intended to apply only to a case<br />
where one builds or sows or plants on land which he believes himself to have a claim<br />
<strong>of</strong> title and <strong>no</strong>t to lands wherein one’s only interest is that <strong>of</strong> a tenant under a rental<br />
contract, o<strong>the</strong>rwise, it would always be in <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> a tenant to improve his<br />
landlord out <strong>of</strong> his property. Besides, as between lessor and lessee, <strong>the</strong> Code applies<br />
specific provisions designed to cover <strong>the</strong>ir rights.<br />
Hence, <strong>the</strong> lessee can<strong>no</strong>t claim reimbursement, as a matter <strong>of</strong> right, for useful<br />
improvements he has made on <strong>the</strong> property, <strong>no</strong>r can he assert a right <strong>of</strong> retention<br />
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until reimbursed. His only remedy is to remove <strong>the</strong> improvement if <strong>the</strong> lessor does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t choose to pay its value; but <strong>the</strong> court can<strong>no</strong>t give him <strong>the</strong> right to buy <strong>the</strong> land.<br />
Petitioner’s assertion that Piazza Hotel was constructed “at (its) expense” found<br />
<strong>no</strong> support in <strong>the</strong> records. Nei<strong>the</strong>r did any document or testimony prove this claim.<br />
At best, what was confirmed was that petitioner managed and operated <strong>the</strong> hotel. There<br />
was <strong>no</strong> evidence that petitioner was <strong>the</strong> one which spent for <strong>the</strong> construction or<br />
re<strong>no</strong>vation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property. And since petitioner’s alleged expenditures were never<br />
proven, it could <strong>no</strong>t even seek reimbursement <strong>of</strong> one-half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
improvements upon termination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease under Article 1678 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code.<br />
Petition denied.<br />
b. Mutual Bad Faith<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> vs. Zaldivar<br />
G.R. No. 162593. September 26, 2006<br />
Action for Declaration <strong>of</strong> Nullity <strong>of</strong> TCT; Art. 440 CC Applied<br />
Remegia Y. Felicia<strong>no</strong> (FELICIANO) filed against <strong>the</strong> spouses Aurelio and Luz<br />
Zaldivar a complaint for declaration <strong>of</strong> nullity <strong>of</strong> TCTNo. T-17993 and reconveyance<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property consisting <strong>of</strong> 243 square meters <strong>of</strong> lot situated in Cagayan de Oro<br />
City. The said title is registered in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Aurelio Zaldivar.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> alleges that she was <strong>the</strong> registered owner <strong>of</strong> a parcel <strong>of</strong> land in Cagayan<br />
de Oro City with an area <strong>of</strong> 444 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-8502.<br />
Sometime in 1974, Aurelio, allegedly through fraud, was able to obtain TCT No. T-<br />
17993 covering <strong>the</strong> 243-sq-m portion <strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong>’s lot as described in her TCT No.<br />
T-8502.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> also contends that <strong>the</strong> subject lot was originally leased from her by<br />
Pio Dalman, Aurelio’s fa<strong>the</strong>r-in-law, for P5.00 a month, later increased to P100.00 a<br />
month in 1960. She fur<strong>the</strong>r alleged that she was going to mortgage <strong>the</strong> subject lot to<br />
Ignacio Gil for P100.00, which, however, did <strong>no</strong>t push through because Gil took<br />
back <strong>the</strong> money without returning <strong>the</strong> receipt she had signed as evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
supposed mortgage contract. Thereafter, in 1974, Aurelio filed with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Court<br />
<strong>of</strong> First Instance <strong>of</strong> Misamis Oriental a petition for partial cancellation <strong>of</strong> TCT No.<br />
T-8502. It was allegedly made to appear <strong>the</strong>rein that Aurelio and his spouse Luz<br />
acquired <strong>the</strong> subject lot from Dalman who, in turn, purchased it from Gil. The petition<br />
was granted and TCT No. T-17993 was issued in Aurelio’s name.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> denied that she sold <strong>the</strong> subject lot ei<strong>the</strong>r to Gil or Dalman. She<br />
likewise impugned as falsified <strong>the</strong> joint affidavit <strong>of</strong> confirmation <strong>of</strong> sale that she and<br />
her uncle, Narciso Labuntog, purportedly executed before a <strong>no</strong>tary public, where<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> appears to have confirmed <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property to Gil. She<br />
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alleged that she never parted with <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title and that it was never lost.<br />
As pro<strong>of</strong> that <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject lot never transpired, Felicia<strong>no</strong> pointed out that<br />
<strong>the</strong> transaction was <strong>no</strong>t an<strong>no</strong>tated on TCT No. T-8502.<br />
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor <strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong>. On appeal, <strong>the</strong> CA<br />
reversed <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> RTC and ruled in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals was correct in ruling that <strong>the</strong><br />
land in dispute was correctly registered in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Aurelio Zaldivar.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
It should be recalled that respondent Aurelio Zaldivar filed with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n CFI<br />
<strong>of</strong> Misamis Oriental a petition for issuance <strong>of</strong> a new owner’s duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> TCT<br />
No. T-8502, alleging that <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate copy was lost. In <strong>the</strong> Order dated<br />
March 20, 1974, <strong>the</strong> said CFI granted <strong>the</strong> petition and consequently, a new owner’s<br />
duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. T-8502 was issued. However, as <strong>the</strong> trial court correctly<br />
held, <strong>the</strong> CFI which granted Aurelio’s petition for <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a new owner’s<br />
duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. T-8502 did <strong>no</strong>t acquire jurisdiction to issue such order.<br />
It has been consistently ruled that “when <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate certificate <strong>of</strong> title<br />
has <strong>no</strong>t been lost, but is in fact in <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r person, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
reconstituted certificate is void, because <strong>the</strong> court that rendered <strong>the</strong> decision had <strong>no</strong><br />
jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case <strong>of</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original<br />
certificate.” In such a case, <strong>the</strong> decision authorizing <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a new owner’s<br />
duplicate certificate <strong>of</strong> title may be attacked any time.<br />
The new owner’s duplicate TCT No. T-8502 issued by <strong>the</strong> CFI in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong><br />
Aurelio is thus void. As Felicia<strong>no</strong> averred during her testimony, <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. T-8502 was never lost and was in her possession from <strong>the</strong> time it<br />
was issued to her.<br />
The court a quo correctly nullified TCT No. T-17993 in Aurelio’s name,<br />
emanating as it did from <strong>the</strong> new owner’s duplicate TCT No. T-8502, which Aurelio<br />
procured through fraud. Aurelio can<strong>no</strong>t raise <strong>the</strong> defense <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> title<br />
because “<strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> a Torrens title does <strong>no</strong>t apply where<br />
fraud attended <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title. The Torrens title does <strong>no</strong>t furnish a shield<br />
for fraud.” As such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled.<br />
Nei<strong>the</strong>r can <strong>the</strong> respondents spouses Zaldivar rely on <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong><br />
indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 17793 which was issued in favor <strong>of</strong> Aurelio. As it is, <strong>the</strong><br />
subject lot is covered by two different titles: TCT No. T-8502 in Felicia<strong>no</strong>’s name<br />
covering an area <strong>of</strong> 444 sq m including <strong>the</strong>rein <strong>the</strong> subject lot, and TCT No. 17793<br />
in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Aurelio covering <strong>the</strong> subject lot. Aurelio’s title over <strong>the</strong> subject lot<br />
has <strong>no</strong>t become indefeasible, by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that TCT No. T-8502 in <strong>the</strong> name<br />
<strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong> has remained valid.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
The claim <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s title under <strong>the</strong> Torrens land<br />
title system would be correct if previous valid title to <strong>the</strong> same parcel <strong>of</strong> land did <strong>no</strong>t<br />
exist. The respondent had a valid title . . . It never parted with it; it never handed or<br />
delivered to anyone its owner’s duplicate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transfer certificate <strong>of</strong> title; it could<br />
<strong>no</strong>t be charged with negligence in <strong>the</strong> keeping <strong>of</strong> its duplicate certificate <strong>of</strong> title or<br />
with any act which could have brought about <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r certificate<br />
upon which a purchaser in good faith and for value could rely. If <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s<br />
contention as to indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> his title should be upheld, <strong>the</strong>n registered owners<br />
without <strong>the</strong> least fault on <strong>the</strong>ir part could be divested <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir title and deprived <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir property. Such disastrous results which would shake and destroy <strong>the</strong> stability<br />
<strong>of</strong> land titles had <strong>no</strong>t been foreseen by those who had endowed with indefeasibility<br />
land titles issued under <strong>the</strong> Torrens system<br />
Issue 2: What are <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong> over <strong>the</strong> house built by <strong>the</strong><br />
Zaldivar spouses over <strong>the</strong> land in dispute?<br />
Ruling:<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Court is <strong>no</strong>t unmindful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that respondents had built<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir house on <strong>the</strong> subject lot and, despite k<strong>no</strong>wledge <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, Felicia<strong>no</strong> did <strong>no</strong>t lift<br />
a finger to prevent it. Article 453 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code is applicable to <strong>the</strong>ir case:<br />
ART. 453. If <strong>the</strong>re was bad faith, <strong>no</strong>t only on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person who<br />
built, planted or sowed on <strong>the</strong> land <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r, but also on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
owner <strong>of</strong> such land, <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> one and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r shall be <strong>the</strong> same as<br />
though both had acted in good faith.<br />
It is understood that <strong>the</strong>re is bad faith on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> landowner whenever<br />
<strong>the</strong> act was done with his k<strong>no</strong>wledge and without opposition on his part.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> circumstances, respondents and Felicia<strong>no</strong> are in mutual bad faith<br />
and, as such, would entitle <strong>the</strong> former to <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> Article 448 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil<br />
Code governing builders in good faith:<br />
ART. 448. The owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land on which anything has been built, sown<br />
or planted in good faith, shall have <strong>the</strong> right to appropriate as his own<br />
<strong>the</strong> works, sowing or planting, after payment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indemnity provided<br />
for in Articles 546 29 and 548, 30 or to oblige <strong>the</strong> one who built or<br />
planted to pay <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land, and <strong>the</strong> one who sowed, <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
rent. However, <strong>the</strong> builder or planter can<strong>no</strong>t be obliged to buy <strong>the</strong> land if<br />
its value is considerably more than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> building or trees. In such a<br />
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
choose to appropriate <strong>the</strong> building or trees after <strong>the</strong> proper indemnity.<br />
The parties shall agree upon <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease and in case <strong>of</strong><br />
disagreement, <strong>the</strong> court shall fix <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
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Felicia<strong>no</strong> is obliged to exercise ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following options: (1) to appropriate<br />
<strong>the</strong> improvements, including <strong>the</strong> house, built by <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars on <strong>the</strong> subject lot by<br />
paying <strong>the</strong> indemnity required by law, or (2) sell <strong>the</strong> subject lot to <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> can<strong>no</strong>t refuse to exercise ei<strong>the</strong>r option and compel respondents to remove<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir house from <strong>the</strong> land. In case Felicia<strong>no</strong> choose to exercise <strong>the</strong> second option,<br />
Zaldivars are <strong>no</strong>t obliged to purchase <strong>the</strong> subject lot if its value is considerably more<br />
than <strong>the</strong> improvements <strong>the</strong>reon and in which case, <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars must pay rent to<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong>. If <strong>the</strong>y are unable to agree on <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease, <strong>the</strong> court shall fix <strong>the</strong><br />
terms <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
4. Action to Quiet Title<br />
Rumarate vs. Hernandez<br />
G.R. No. 168222, April 18, 2006<br />
Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by Teodulo Rumarate’s<br />
(Teodulo) godfa<strong>the</strong>r, Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Rumarate family in San Pablo City. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied<br />
Lot No. 379 cultivating five hectares <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon in 1929, Santiago orally bequea<strong>the</strong>d<br />
his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy <strong>of</strong> a Decision <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance (CFI) <strong>of</strong> Tayabas dated April 21, 1925 recognizing his<br />
(Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379. Since Teodulo was only 14 years old <strong>the</strong>n, his<br />
fa<strong>the</strong>r helped him cultivate <strong>the</strong> land. Their family <strong>the</strong>reafter cleared <strong>the</strong> land, built a<br />
house and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables <strong>the</strong>reon.<br />
From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children possessed <strong>the</strong> land as<br />
owners and declared <strong>the</strong> same for taxation, <strong>the</strong> earliest being in 1961.<br />
In 1960, Santiago executed an “Affidavit (quit-claim)” ratifying <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong><br />
his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo.<br />
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipria<strong>no</strong> Hernandez and Julia Zoleta,<br />
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379.<br />
He did <strong>no</strong>t immediately file a case against respondents because he was advised to<br />
just remain on <strong>the</strong> land and pay <strong>the</strong> corresponding taxes <strong>the</strong>reon.<br />
On September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo Teodulo and Rosita<br />
Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance <strong>of</strong> real property and/or quieting <strong>of</strong> title<br />
with damages against respondent heirs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late spouses Cipria<strong>no</strong> Hernandez and<br />
Julia Zoleta<br />
Respondents claimed that on November 11, 1964, Santiago sold <strong>the</strong> questioned<br />
lot to <strong>the</strong>ir parents, <strong>the</strong> spouses Cipria<strong>no</strong> Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for P9,000.00.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
The trial court rendered a decision in favor <strong>of</strong> petitioners. On appeal to <strong>the</strong><br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals, <strong>the</strong> CA reversed <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> trial court.<br />
Issue 1: To whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners who<br />
possessed and cultivated <strong>the</strong> lot since 1929 up to <strong>the</strong> present, but do <strong>no</strong>t<br />
have a certificate <strong>of</strong> title over <strong>the</strong> property, or to respondents who have<br />
a certificate <strong>of</strong> title but are <strong>no</strong>t in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed lot?<br />
Ruling: The land should be awarded to <strong>the</strong> petitioners.<br />
In an action for quieting <strong>of</strong> title, <strong>the</strong> court is tasked to determine <strong>the</strong> respective<br />
rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties so that <strong>the</strong> complainant and those claiming under him may be<br />
forever free from any danger <strong>of</strong> hostile claim.<br />
Under Article 476 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code, <strong>the</strong> remedy may be availed <strong>of</strong> only when,<br />
by reason <strong>of</strong> any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears<br />
valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is <strong>the</strong>reby<br />
cast on <strong>the</strong> complainant’s title to real property or any interest <strong>the</strong>rein. Article 477 <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> same Code states that <strong>the</strong> plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest<br />
in <strong>the</strong> real property which is <strong>the</strong> subject matter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> suit.<br />
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,<br />
namely: (1) <strong>the</strong> plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest<br />
in <strong>the</strong> real property subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action; and (2) <strong>the</strong> deed, claim, encumbrance or<br />
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact<br />
invalid or i<strong>no</strong>perative despite its prima facie appearance <strong>of</strong> validity or legal efficacy.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, The SC found that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive,<br />
<strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 379, in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> an owner for<br />
more than 30 years vested him and his heirs title over <strong>the</strong> said lot.<br />
The law applicable at <strong>the</strong> time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from<br />
1929 to 1959) <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 379, in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> an owner was Sec. 48(b) <strong>of</strong><br />
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or <strong>the</strong> Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act<br />
(RA) No. 1942, effective June 22, 1957 30 which provides:<br />
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, occupying<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest<br />
<strong>the</strong>rein, but whose titles have <strong>no</strong>t been perfected or completed, may apply<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance (<strong>no</strong>w Regional Trial Courts) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> province<br />
where <strong>the</strong> land is located for confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir claims and <strong>the</strong> issuance<br />
<strong>of</strong> a certificate <strong>of</strong> title <strong>the</strong>reafter, under <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Act (<strong>no</strong>w<br />
Property Registration Decree), to wit:<br />
xxx xxx xxx<br />
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(b) Those who by <strong>the</strong>mselves or through <strong>the</strong>ir predecessors-in-interest<br />
have been, in continuous, exclusive, and <strong>no</strong>torious possession and<br />
occupation <strong>of</strong> agricultural lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, under a bona fide<br />
claim <strong>of</strong> acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately<br />
preceding <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> application for confirmation <strong>of</strong> title, except<br />
when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively<br />
presumed to have performed all <strong>the</strong> conditions essential to a government<br />
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate <strong>of</strong> title under <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
this chapter.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> conditions specified <strong>the</strong>rein are complied with, <strong>the</strong> possessor is<br />
deemed to have acquired, by operation <strong>of</strong> law, a right to a government grant, without<br />
necessity <strong>of</strong> a certificate <strong>of</strong> title being issued, and <strong>the</strong> land ceases to be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a<br />
formality, at <strong>the</strong> most limited to ascertaining whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> possession claimed is <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> required character and length <strong>of</strong> time; and registration <strong>the</strong>reunder would <strong>no</strong>t<br />
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would <strong>no</strong>t<br />
originally convert <strong>the</strong> land from public to private land, but only confirm such<br />
conversion already effected by operation <strong>of</strong> law from <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> required period<br />
<strong>of</strong> possession became complete.<br />
A careful examination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed<br />
and occupied Lot No. 379 in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated<br />
<strong>the</strong> controverted land, built his home, and raised his 11 children <strong>the</strong>reon. In 1957,<br />
he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but failed to pursue <strong>the</strong> same.<br />
After his demise, all his 11 children continued to till <strong>the</strong> land. From 1929 to 1960,<br />
Santiago never challenged Teodulo’s possession <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 379 <strong>no</strong>r demanded or<br />
received <strong>the</strong> produce <strong>of</strong> said land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is <strong>no</strong> longer<br />
interested in asserting any right over <strong>the</strong> land by executing in favor <strong>of</strong> Teodulo a<br />
quitclaim.<br />
All <strong>the</strong>se prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated <strong>the</strong> land as owner <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong><br />
since 1929. While <strong>the</strong> oral donation in 1929 as well as <strong>the</strong> 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot<br />
No. 379 to Teodulo are void for <strong>no</strong>n-compliance with <strong>the</strong> formalities <strong>of</strong> donation,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y never<strong>the</strong>less explain Teodulo and his family’s long years <strong>of</strong> occupation and<br />
cultivation <strong>of</strong> said lot and <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
There is <strong>no</strong> question that <strong>the</strong> donation in question is invalid because it involves<br />
an immovable property and <strong>the</strong> donation was <strong>no</strong>t made in a public document as<br />
required by Article 6<strong>33</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
same Code, but it does <strong>no</strong>t follow that said donation may <strong>no</strong>t serve as basis <strong>of</strong><br />
acquisitive prescription when on <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> donee has taken possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property adversely and in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> owner.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
In <strong>the</strong> instant case, Santiago’s short-lived possession and cultivation <strong>of</strong> Lot<br />
No. 379 could <strong>no</strong>t vest him title. While he tilled <strong>the</strong> land in 1925, he ceased to<br />
possess and cultivate <strong>the</strong> same since 1928. He abandoned <strong>the</strong> property and allowed<br />
Teodulo to exercise all acts <strong>of</strong> ownership. His brief possession <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 379 could<br />
<strong>no</strong>t thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. No one<br />
can transfer a greater right to a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r than he himself has. Hence, spouses Cipria<strong>no</strong><br />
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did <strong>no</strong>t acquire any right over<br />
<strong>the</strong> questioned lot and <strong>the</strong> title issued in <strong>the</strong>ir names are void, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legal<br />
truism that <strong>the</strong> spring can<strong>no</strong>t rise higher than <strong>the</strong> source.<br />
Issue 2: WON <strong>the</strong> action for quieting <strong>of</strong> title has already prescribed<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
An action for quieting <strong>of</strong> title is imprescriptible, as in <strong>the</strong> present case, where<br />
<strong>the</strong> person seeking relief is in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed property.<br />
A person in actual possession <strong>of</strong> a piece <strong>of</strong> land under claim <strong>of</strong> ownership may<br />
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to<br />
vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him <strong>the</strong> continuing<br />
right to seek <strong>the</strong> aid <strong>of</strong> a court <strong>of</strong> equity to ascertain and determine <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
adverse claim <strong>of</strong> a third party and its effect on his title.<br />
Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since<br />
1929 up to <strong>the</strong> present, <strong>the</strong>ir right to institute a suit to clear <strong>the</strong> cloud over <strong>the</strong>ir title<br />
can<strong>no</strong>t be barred by <strong>the</strong> statute <strong>of</strong> limitations.<br />
Ragasa vs. Sps. Roa<br />
G.R. No. 141964, June 30, 2006<br />
On May 1989, Spouses Edesito and Consorcia (RAGASA SPOUSES) entered<br />
into a contract with Oakland Development Resources Corporation for <strong>the</strong> purchase<br />
in installments <strong>of</strong> a piece <strong>of</strong> property, with improvements covered by TCT No.<br />
27946.<br />
The Ragasa Spouses took possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property covered by TCT No.<br />
27946 and resided <strong>the</strong>reat toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong>ir relatives who continued to occupy <strong>the</strong><br />
same whenever <strong>the</strong> Ragasa Spouses would leave for Italy where <strong>the</strong>y both worked.<br />
In March 1992, Ragasa Spouses were able to fully pay for <strong>the</strong> agreed purchase<br />
price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property and a Deed <strong>of</strong> Absolute Sale dated March 12, 1992 was executed<br />
by and between Oakland Development Resources Corporation and <strong>the</strong> original<br />
owner’s copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 27946 was turned over to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
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Despite <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Deed <strong>of</strong> Absolute Sale, <strong>the</strong> Corporation failed to<br />
cause <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> title to plaintiffs. On <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> plaintiffs, all <strong>the</strong> while <strong>the</strong>y<br />
thought that <strong>the</strong> Deed <strong>of</strong> Absolute Sale and possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owner’s<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 27946 was more than sufficient to protect <strong>the</strong>ir rights and interests<br />
over <strong>the</strong> property<br />
Sometime March <strong>of</strong> 1999 Consorcia Ragasa decided to cause <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong><br />
registration <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 27946, upon learning that Oakland Development Resources<br />
Corporation was <strong>no</strong> longer functional as a corporate entity. She was surprised to<br />
learn from <strong>the</strong> Registry <strong>of</strong> Deeds for Quezon City that on April 14, 1995, <strong>the</strong> property<br />
in question was sold by defendant Ex-Officio Sheriff <strong>of</strong> Quezon City] to defendants<br />
Gerardo and Rodriga Roa (ROA SPOUSES) as <strong>the</strong> highest bidder.<br />
The Ragasa Spouses filed a complaint against <strong>the</strong> Roa Spouses before <strong>the</strong> QC<br />
RTC. The Roa Spouses moved for <strong>the</strong> dismissal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint on <strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong><br />
prescription and laches. The RTC granted <strong>the</strong> motion. Characterizing <strong>the</strong> suit as an<br />
action “upon an injury to <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plaintiff” which, according to Article 1146<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code, must be filed within four years, <strong>the</strong> RTC held that Ragasa Spouses’<br />
action was barred by prescription for having been filed more than four years after<br />
<strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> execution sale.<br />
Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> suit filed by <strong>the</strong> Ragasa Spouses has already<br />
prescribed.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
A reading <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> allegations in petitioners’ complaint reveals that <strong>the</strong> action<br />
was essentially one for quieting <strong>of</strong> title to real property under Article 476 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Civil Code which states:<br />
Whenever <strong>the</strong>re is a cloud on title to real property or any interest <strong>the</strong>rein,<br />
by reason <strong>of</strong> any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding<br />
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,<br />
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said<br />
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet <strong>the</strong> title.<br />
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud being cast upon title to real<br />
property or any interest <strong>the</strong>rein.<br />
To make out an action to quiet title under <strong>the</strong> foregoing provision, <strong>the</strong> initiatory<br />
pleading has only to set forth allegations showing that (1) <strong>the</strong> plaintiff has “title to<br />
real property or any interest <strong>the</strong>rein” and (2) <strong>the</strong> defendant claims an interest <strong>the</strong>rein<br />
adverse to <strong>the</strong> plaintiff’s arising from an “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance,<br />
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,<br />
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable.”<br />
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Thus, <strong>the</strong> averments in petitioners’ complaint that (1) <strong>the</strong>y acquired ownership<br />
<strong>of</strong> a piece <strong>of</strong> land by tradition or delivery as a consequence <strong>of</strong> sale and (2) private<br />
respondents subsequently purchased <strong>the</strong> same piece <strong>of</strong> land at an allegedly void<br />
execution sale were sufficient to make out an action to quiet title under Article 476.<br />
This being <strong>the</strong> case, Article 1146, which refers to actions “upon an injury to<br />
<strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plaintiff” and “upon a quasi-delict”, did <strong>no</strong>t apply.<br />
It is an established rule <strong>of</strong> American jurisprudence (made applicable in this<br />
jurisdiction by Art. 480 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Civil Code) 12 that actions to quiet title to<br />
property in <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plaintiff are imprescriptible.<br />
The prevailing rule is that <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> a plaintiff to have his title to land<br />
quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien <strong>the</strong>reon, is <strong>no</strong>t<br />
barred while <strong>the</strong> plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land,<br />
claiming to be owners <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> reason for this rule being that while <strong>the</strong> owner in<br />
fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon <strong>the</strong> adverse claim, he has<br />
a continuing right to <strong>the</strong> aid <strong>of</strong> a court <strong>of</strong> equity to ascertain and determine <strong>the</strong><br />
nature <strong>of</strong> such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his<br />
favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before<br />
taking steps to vindicate his right. But <strong>the</strong> rule that <strong>the</strong> statute <strong>of</strong> limitations is <strong>no</strong>t<br />
available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked<br />
by a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in <strong>the</strong><br />
possession <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r must, it seems, invoke his remedy within <strong>the</strong> statutory period.<br />
Diaz vs. Virata<br />
G.R. No. 162037, August 7, 2006<br />
An action for quieting <strong>of</strong> title is a remedy which may be availed <strong>of</strong> only when<br />
by reason <strong>of</strong> any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears<br />
valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is <strong>the</strong>reby<br />
cast on <strong>the</strong> complainant’s title to real property or any interest <strong>the</strong>rein.<br />
Article 476 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code provides:<br />
Article 476. Whenever <strong>the</strong>re is a cloud on title to real property or any<br />
interest <strong>the</strong>rein, by reason <strong>of</strong> any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance<br />
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in<br />
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial<br />
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet<br />
<strong>the</strong> title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being<br />
cast upon title to real property or any interest <strong>the</strong>rein.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, Article 477 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same Code mandates that in an action to quiet<br />
title, <strong>the</strong> party bringing <strong>the</strong> action must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title to<br />
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<strong>the</strong> real property subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action and that <strong>the</strong> alleged cloud on his title must be<br />
shown to be in fact invalid.<br />
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,<br />
namely: (1) <strong>the</strong> plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest<br />
in <strong>the</strong> real property subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action; and (2) <strong>the</strong> deed, claim, encumbrance or<br />
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact<br />
invalid or i<strong>no</strong>perative despite its prima facie appearance <strong>of</strong> validity or legal efficacy.<br />
Time and again, we have upheld <strong>the</strong> fundamental principle in land registration<br />
that a certificate <strong>of</strong> title serves as evidence <strong>of</strong> an indefeasible and incontrovertible<br />
title to <strong>the</strong> property in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person whose name appears <strong>the</strong>rein. It becomes<br />
<strong>the</strong> best pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> a parcel <strong>of</strong> land. Well-established is <strong>the</strong> principle that<br />
<strong>the</strong> person holding a prior certificate is entitled to <strong>the</strong> land as against a person who<br />
relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong><br />
title. Absent any muniment <strong>of</strong> title issued prior to 1959 in favor <strong>of</strong> appellants [Enrique,<br />
et al.] which could prove <strong>the</strong>ir ownership over <strong>the</strong> contested lots, this Court is left<br />
with <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r alternative but to declare appellants’ claim over <strong>the</strong> properties as<br />
void.<br />
By express provision <strong>of</strong> Section 48 <strong>of</strong> Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate<br />
<strong>of</strong> title can<strong>no</strong>t be subject to a collateral attack, thus:<br />
SEC. 48. Certificate <strong>no</strong>t subject to collateral attack. — A certificate <strong>of</strong><br />
title shall <strong>no</strong>t be subject to collateral attack. It can<strong>no</strong>t be altered, modified,<br />
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.<br />
When is an action a direct attack and when is it collateral? This Court made a<br />
distinction, to wit:<br />
An action is deemed an attack on a title when <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action or<br />
proceeding is to nullify <strong>the</strong> title, and thus challenge <strong>the</strong> judgment pursuant<br />
to which <strong>the</strong> title was decreed. The attack is direct when <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action<br />
to obtain a different relief, an attack on <strong>the</strong> judgment is never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
made as an incident <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
Laches is defined as <strong>the</strong> failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and<br />
unexplained length <strong>of</strong> time, warranting a presumption that <strong>the</strong> party entitled to<br />
assert it has ei<strong>the</strong>r abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is<br />
based upon grounds <strong>of</strong> public policy, which requires <strong>the</strong> discouragement <strong>of</strong> stale<br />
claims for <strong>the</strong> peace <strong>of</strong> society. Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is<br />
indefeasible and imprescriptible, <strong>the</strong> registered landowner may lose his right to<br />
recover <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> his registered property by reason <strong>of</strong> laches. However, In<br />
<strong>the</strong> case at bar, laches can<strong>no</strong>t be appreciated in petitioners’ favor.<br />
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For laches to apply, it must be shown that <strong>the</strong>re was lack <strong>of</strong> k<strong>no</strong>wledge or<br />
<strong>no</strong>tice on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> defendant that complainant would assert <strong>the</strong> right in which<br />
he bases his suit.<br />
B. Right to Just Compensation in Case <strong>of</strong> Expropriation<br />
MIAA vs. Rodriguez<br />
G.R. No. 161836, February 28, 2006<br />
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), <strong>the</strong> government-owned and<br />
controlled corporation managing and operating <strong>the</strong> Ni<strong>no</strong>y Aqui<strong>no</strong> International<br />
Airport Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway. MIAA received<br />
a letter from Joaquin Rodriguez (Rodriguez) proposing to sell one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lots already<br />
occupied by <strong>the</strong> expanded runway but assumed as <strong>no</strong>t yet expropriated by <strong>the</strong> MIAA.<br />
The proposal did <strong>no</strong>t ripen to a deal. Subsequently Rodriguez bought <strong>the</strong> bigger lot<br />
a portion <strong>of</strong> which was occupied by <strong>the</strong> runway, as well as all <strong>the</strong> rights to claim<br />
reasonable rents and damages for <strong>the</strong> occupation, from its owner <strong>the</strong>n, Buck Estate,<br />
Inc. The property purchased had a portion already occupied by <strong>the</strong> runway. This<br />
occupied portion is hereinafter referred to as <strong>the</strong> subject lot. Through a letter,<br />
Rodriguez, through counsel, demanded from <strong>the</strong> MIAA full payment for <strong>the</strong> property<br />
and back rentals for 27 years, amounting to P468,800,000.00. As he did <strong>no</strong>t reach<br />
an agreement with <strong>the</strong> MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case for accion reinvindicatoria with<br />
damages. RTC rendered judgment in favor <strong>of</strong> Rodriguez. CA partially granted <strong>the</strong><br />
MR by including <strong>the</strong> legal rate <strong>of</strong> interest.<br />
Issue: WON Rodriguez should be awarded compensation for <strong>the</strong> subject<br />
lot?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
While <strong>the</strong> instant case stemmed from <strong>the</strong> accion reinvindicatoria that Rodriguez<br />
had filed, it essentially revolves around <strong>the</strong> taking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject lot by <strong>the</strong> MIAA.<br />
There is “taking” when <strong>the</strong> expropriator enters private property <strong>no</strong>t only for a<br />
momentary period but for a more permanent duration, or for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> devoting<br />
<strong>the</strong> property to a public use in such a manner as to oust <strong>the</strong> owner and deprive him<br />
<strong>of</strong> all beneficial enjoyment <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. In this context, <strong>the</strong>re was taking when <strong>the</strong> MIAA<br />
occupied a portion <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> for its expanded runway.<br />
The value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property must be determined ei<strong>the</strong>r as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
taking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property or <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint, “whichever came first.” Even<br />
before <strong>the</strong> new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Public Highways vs.<br />
Burgos that <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> taking, <strong>no</strong>t its value after <strong>the</strong> passage<br />
<strong>of</strong> time, represents <strong>the</strong> true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
error for <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals to rule that <strong>the</strong> just compensation to be paid to<br />
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respondent should be determined as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint in 1990, and <strong>no</strong>t<br />
<strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> its taking by <strong>the</strong> NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in<br />
its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed <strong>the</strong> complaint. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> Burgos, it was also <strong>the</strong> property owner who brought <strong>the</strong> action for<br />
compensation against <strong>the</strong> government after 25 years since <strong>the</strong> taking <strong>of</strong> his property<br />
for <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a road.<br />
Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r damages should be awarded?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
Undeniably, <strong>the</strong> MIAA’s illegal occupation for more than twenty (20) years<br />
has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his predecessors-in-interest. Such<br />
pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> actual or<br />
compensatory damages, which in this case should be <strong>the</strong> legal interest (6%) on <strong>the</strong><br />
value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> taking, from said point up to full payment by <strong>the</strong><br />
MIAA. This is based on <strong>the</strong> principle that interest “runs as a matter <strong>of</strong> law and<br />
follows from <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> landowner to be placed in as good position as money<br />
can accomplish, as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> taking.”<br />
Petitioners claim that Rodriguez is a buyer in bad faith since prior to his<br />
purchase he was aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MIAA’s occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
proceeded with <strong>the</strong> purchase in anticipation <strong>of</strong> e<strong>no</strong>rmous pr<strong>of</strong>its from <strong>the</strong> subsequent<br />
sale to <strong>the</strong> MIAA. The point is irrelevant. Regardless <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t Rodriguez<br />
acted in bad faith, all that he will be entitled to is <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property at <strong>the</strong><br />
time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> taking, with legal interest <strong>the</strong>reon from that point until full payment <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> compensation by <strong>the</strong> MIAA. Besides, assuming <strong>the</strong> question is <strong>of</strong> any consequence,<br />
<strong>the</strong> circumstances surrounding Rodriguez’s purchase may <strong>no</strong>t even amount to bad<br />
faith.<br />
For more than twenty (20) years, <strong>the</strong> MIAA occupied <strong>the</strong> subject lot without<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> expropriation proceedings and without <strong>the</strong> MIAA exerting efforts to<br />
ascertain ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lot and negotiating with any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
To our mind, <strong>the</strong>se are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed<br />
and corrected. Hence, <strong>the</strong> award <strong>of</strong> exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is in<br />
order. However, while Rodriguez is entitled to such exemplary damages and attorney’s<br />
fees, <strong>the</strong> award granted by <strong>the</strong> courts below should be equitably reduced. We hold<br />
that Rodriguez is entitled only to P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attorney’s<br />
fees equivalent to one percent (1%) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> amount due.<br />
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III. Co-ownership<br />
A. Right <strong>of</strong> Redemption between co-owners excludes adjoining<br />
owners<br />
Avila vs. Sps. <strong>Bar</strong>abat<br />
G.R. No. 141993, March 17, 2006<br />
Anunciacion Bahena vda. de Nemeño was <strong>the</strong> original owner <strong>of</strong> a lot in Cebu.<br />
Upon her death, ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lot was transferred by operation <strong>of</strong> law to her five<br />
children, petitioners in this case. These heirs built <strong>the</strong>ir respective houses on <strong>the</strong> lot.<br />
In 1964, respondent Benjamin <strong>Bar</strong>abat leased a portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> house owned by<br />
Avila. His co-respondent, Jovita <strong>Bar</strong>abat, moved in with him in 1969 when <strong>the</strong>y got<br />
married. Avila subsequently relocated to Cagayan de Oro City. She came back to<br />
Cebu in July 1979 to sell her house and share in <strong>the</strong> lot to her siblings but <strong>no</strong> one<br />
showed interest in it. She <strong>the</strong>n <strong>of</strong>fered it to respondents who agreed to buy it. Their<br />
agreement was evidenced by a private document. Respondents stopped paying rentals<br />
to Avila and took possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property as owners. They also assumed <strong>the</strong><br />
payment <strong>of</strong> realty taxes on it. They were confronted by petitioner Januario Adlawan<br />
who informed <strong>the</strong>m that <strong>the</strong>y had until March 1982 only to stay in Avila’s place<br />
because he was buying <strong>the</strong> property. Respondents replied that <strong>the</strong> property had<br />
already been sold to <strong>the</strong>m by Avila showing him <strong>the</strong> document. Afterwards <strong>the</strong>y<br />
received a letter from Atty. Joselito Alo informing <strong>the</strong>m that Avila had sold her<br />
house and share to his clients, <strong>the</strong> spouses Januario and Nanette Adlawan. Considering<br />
<strong>the</strong> sale to <strong>the</strong> spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to <strong>the</strong>ir title and peaceful possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property, <strong>the</strong>y demanded that Avila execute a public document evidencing <strong>the</strong><br />
sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property to <strong>the</strong>m but Avila refused. Respondents filed a complaint for<br />
quieting <strong>of</strong> title with <strong>the</strong> RTC. It decided in favor <strong>of</strong> respondents. CA affirmed in<br />
toto.<br />
Issue 1: WON <strong>the</strong> transaction between Avila and Respondents is valid as<br />
an absolute sale?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
For Articles 1602 and 1604 (on equitable mortgage) to apply, two requisites<br />
must concur: (1) <strong>the</strong> parties entered into a contract de<strong>no</strong>minated as a contract <strong>of</strong> sale<br />
and (2) <strong>the</strong>ir intention was to secure an existing debt by way <strong>of</strong> mortgage. Here, both<br />
<strong>the</strong> trial and appellate courts found that Exhibit “A” evidenced a contract <strong>of</strong> sale.<br />
They also agreed that <strong>the</strong> circumstances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case show that Avila intended her<br />
agreement with respondents to be a sale. Both courts were unanimous in finding<br />
that <strong>the</strong> subsequent acts <strong>of</strong> Avila revealed her intention to absolutely convey <strong>the</strong><br />
disputed property. It was only after <strong>the</strong> perfection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract, when her siblings<br />
began protesting <strong>the</strong> sale, that she wanted to change <strong>the</strong> agreement. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,<br />
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contrary to petitioners’ claim, <strong>the</strong> trial court found that it was respondents who<br />
took over <strong>the</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> real property taxes after <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> Exhibit “A.”<br />
Petitioners’ claim <strong>of</strong> gross inadequacy <strong>of</strong> selling price has <strong>no</strong> basis. They failed<br />
to introduce evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> correct price at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> land was sold to respondents<br />
in 1979. How can we <strong>the</strong>refore conclude that <strong>the</strong> price was grossly inadequate? In<br />
<strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> evidence as to <strong>the</strong> fair market value <strong>of</strong> a parcel <strong>of</strong> land at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong><br />
its sale, we can<strong>no</strong>t reasonably conclude that <strong>the</strong> price at which it was sold was<br />
inadequate<br />
Issue 2: WON <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> redemption <strong>of</strong> co-owners excludes that <strong>of</strong><br />
adjoining owners?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
Petitioners’ right to redeem would have existed only had <strong>the</strong>re been coownership<br />
among petitioners-siblings. But <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>no</strong>ne. For this right to be<br />
exercised, co-ownership must exist at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> conveyance is made by a co-owner<br />
and <strong>the</strong> redemption is demanded by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r co-owner or co-owners. However, by<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own admission, petitioners were <strong>no</strong> longer co-owners when <strong>the</strong> property was<br />
sold to respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been extinguished by<br />
partition.<br />
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be<br />
a partition. Here, <strong>the</strong> particular portions pertaining to petitioners had been<br />
ascertained and <strong>the</strong>y in fact already took possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective parts<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing held in common<br />
among those to whom it belongs. By <strong>the</strong>ir own admission, petitioners already<br />
segregated and took possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective shares in <strong>the</strong> lot. Their respective<br />
shares were <strong>the</strong>refore physically determined, clearly identifiable and <strong>no</strong> longer ideal.<br />
Thus, <strong>the</strong> co-ownership had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners’ right to<br />
redeem any part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property from any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir former co-owners was already<br />
extinguished. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership, once a<br />
property is subdivided and distributed among <strong>the</strong> co-owners, <strong>the</strong> community ceases<br />
to exist and <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> more reason to sustain any right <strong>of</strong> legal redemption<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> law (Article 1622 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code) , subject to certain conditions,<br />
owners <strong>of</strong> adjoining urban land have <strong>the</strong> pre-emptive right to a lot before it is sold to<br />
third parties, or <strong>the</strong> redemptive right if it has already been sold. However, this<br />
provision does <strong>no</strong>t apply here. Aside from <strong>the</strong> fact that petitioners never raised it as<br />
an issue, <strong>the</strong> conditions provided for its application were <strong>no</strong>t met. While <strong>the</strong> property<br />
may be considered as urban land, it was <strong>no</strong>t shown or even alleged that its area and<br />
location would render a major portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong> practical use within a reasonable time.<br />
Nei<strong>the</strong>r was <strong>the</strong>re any allegation to <strong>the</strong> effect that <strong>the</strong> disputed property was bought<br />
merely for speculation.<br />
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B. No Co-Ownership in adulterous relationship<br />
Rivera vs. Heirs <strong>of</strong> Villanueva<br />
G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006<br />
Petitioners are allegedly <strong>the</strong> half-bro<strong>the</strong>rs (Eli<strong>no</strong> and Dominador), <strong>the</strong> halfsister-in-law<br />
(Soledad), and <strong>the</strong> children <strong>of</strong> a half-bro<strong>the</strong>r (Te<strong>of</strong>ila and Cecilia) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
deceased Pacita Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales).<br />
Respondents Catali<strong>no</strong>, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva,<br />
and Arnaldo vs. Avenda<strong>no</strong> are allegedly <strong>the</strong> siblings, full and half-blood <strong>of</strong> Romualdo<br />
Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva). They are de<strong>no</strong>minated as <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> Villanueva<br />
and are represented by Melchor. The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva<br />
(hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband Victoria<strong>no</strong> de Luna, are allegedly<br />
<strong>the</strong> daughter and <strong>the</strong> son-in-law, respectively, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late Villanueva.<br />
From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> marriage because <strong>the</strong> latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who<br />
died on April 20, 1963. In <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir cohabitation, <strong>the</strong>y acquired several<br />
properties including <strong>the</strong> properties involved in this case.<br />
Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will. On August 1980, Villanueva<br />
and respondent Angelina executed a deed <strong>of</strong> extrajudicial partition with sale, that<br />
is, an extrajudicial settlement <strong>of</strong> Gonzales’ estate comprising a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed<br />
properties.<br />
Petitioners (Gonzales’ half-bro<strong>the</strong>rs, etc.) filed a case for partition <strong>of</strong> Gonzales’<br />
estate and annulment <strong>of</strong> titles and damages with <strong>the</strong> RTC <strong>of</strong> Nueva Ecija. The RTC<br />
rendered a decision dismissing <strong>the</strong> complaint. The CA affirmed <strong>the</strong> RTC decision.<br />
Issue: WON <strong>the</strong> properties acquired by Gonzales and Villanueva during<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir cohabitation were equally owned by <strong>the</strong>m<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> trial court Gonzales and Villanueva lived toge<strong>the</strong>r without<br />
<strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> marriage and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong>ir property relations were governed by<br />
Article 144 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code:<br />
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live toge<strong>the</strong>r as husband and wife,<br />
but <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>no</strong>t married, or <strong>the</strong>ir marriage is void from <strong>the</strong> beginning,<br />
<strong>the</strong> property acquired by ei<strong>the</strong>r or both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m through <strong>the</strong>ir work or<br />
industry or <strong>the</strong>ir wages and salaries shall be governed by <strong>the</strong> rules on coownership.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> contending parties agreed that <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> Villanueva<br />
and Gonzales was adulterous, at least until <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> Amanda Musngi, Villanueva’s<br />
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legal wife, on April 20, 1963. While Romualdo Villanueva claimed that he and<br />
Pacita C. Gonzales lived as husband and wife and that <strong>the</strong>y were married, it turned<br />
out that he was <strong>no</strong>t legally married to <strong>the</strong> latter, for <strong>the</strong>n, his marriage in <strong>the</strong> year<br />
1927, was still subsisting with one Amanda Musngi.<br />
Because <strong>the</strong> cohabitation <strong>of</strong> Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was<br />
adulterous, <strong>the</strong>ir property relations during those 36 years were <strong>no</strong>t governed by<br />
Article 144 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code which applies only if <strong>the</strong> couple living toge<strong>the</strong>r is <strong>no</strong>t in<br />
any way incapacitated from getting married. According to <strong>the</strong> doctrine laid down by<br />
Juaniza vs. Jose, <strong>no</strong> co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship.<br />
In Agapay vs. Palang, 342 Phil. 302 (1997), we expounded on this doctrine by<br />
declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> partners to prove<br />
his or her actual contribution to <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>of</strong> property in order to be able to lay<br />
claim to any portion <strong>of</strong> it. Presumptions <strong>of</strong> co-ownership and equal contribution do<br />
<strong>no</strong>t apply.<br />
IV. Donation<br />
Moralidad vs. Pernes<br />
G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006<br />
Mercedes Moralidad (Petitioner) owned a parcel <strong>of</strong> land under TCT No. T-<br />
123125 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Registry <strong>of</strong> Deeds <strong>of</strong> Davao City. Petitioner acquired <strong>the</strong> lot property<br />
initially for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> letting her niece, Arlene Pernes, move from Mandug to<br />
Davao City but later she wanted <strong>the</strong> property to be also available to any <strong>of</strong> her kin<br />
wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made this intention in a document<br />
she executed on July 21, 1986. The document reads:<br />
I, MERCEDES VINA MORALIDAD, <strong>of</strong> legal age, single, having been born<br />
on <strong>the</strong> 29 th day <strong>of</strong> January, 1923, <strong>no</strong>w actually residing at 8021 Lindberg<br />
Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest<br />
intention regarding my properties situated at Palm Village Subdivision, Bajada,<br />
Davao City, 9501, … and hereby declare:<br />
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado Pernes may build<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir house <strong>the</strong>rein and stay as long as <strong>the</strong>y like;<br />
2. That anybody <strong>of</strong> my kin who wishes to stay on <strong>the</strong> aforementioned<br />
property should maintain an atmosphere <strong>of</strong> cooperation, live in harmony ad<br />
must avoid bickering with one a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r;<br />
3. That anyone <strong>of</strong> my kin may enjoy <strong>the</strong> privilege to stay <strong>the</strong>rein and may<br />
avail <strong>the</strong> use <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. Provided, however, that <strong>the</strong> same is <strong>no</strong>t inimical to <strong>the</strong><br />
purpose <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>;<br />
4. That anyone <strong>of</strong> my kin who can<strong>no</strong>t conform with <strong>the</strong> wishes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
undersigned may exercise <strong>the</strong> freedom to look for his own;<br />
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5. That any proceeds or income derived from <strong>the</strong> aforementioned<br />
properties shall be allotted to my nearest kin who have less in life in greater<br />
percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better <strong>of</strong> in standing.<br />
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to <strong>the</strong> Philippines to<br />
stay with <strong>the</strong> respondent’s on <strong>the</strong> house <strong>the</strong>y built on <strong>the</strong> subject property. In <strong>the</strong><br />
course <strong>of</strong> time, <strong>the</strong>ir relationship turned sour which eventually ended up with<br />
petitioner filing an unlawful detainer suit against respondent spouses. Petitioner<br />
alleged that she is <strong>the</strong> registered owner <strong>of</strong> he land on which <strong>the</strong> respondents built<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir house; that through her counsel, she sent <strong>the</strong> respondent spouses a letter<br />
demanding <strong>the</strong>m to vacate <strong>the</strong> premises and to pay rentals <strong>the</strong>refore, which <strong>the</strong><br />
respondents failed to heed.<br />
In <strong>the</strong>ir defense, <strong>the</strong> respondents alleged having entered <strong>the</strong> property in<br />
question, building <strong>the</strong>ir house <strong>the</strong>reon and maintaining <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong>ir residence<br />
with petitioner’s full k<strong>no</strong>wledge and express consent. To prove <strong>the</strong>ir point, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
invited attention to her written declaration <strong>of</strong> July 21, 1986.<br />
The MTC ruled in petitioner’s favor. On appeal, <strong>the</strong> RTC reversed <strong>the</strong> order<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MTC, holding that respondents’ possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property in question was<br />
<strong>no</strong>t by mere tolerance but ra<strong>the</strong>r by her express consent. Petitioner appealed <strong>the</strong><br />
decision to <strong>the</strong> CA. The CA dismissed said appeal concluding that <strong>the</strong> ejectment<br />
suit was premature and affirmed <strong>the</strong> RTC decision.<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r a usufruct existed between petitioner and respondents?<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code in <strong>the</strong> following wise:<br />
“Art. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy <strong>the</strong> property <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong><br />
obligation <strong>of</strong> preserving its form and substance, unless <strong>the</strong> title constituting<br />
it or <strong>the</strong> law o<strong>the</strong>rwise provides.”<br />
Usufruct, in essence, is <strong>no</strong>thing else but simply allowing one to enjoy a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r’s<br />
property. It is also defined as <strong>the</strong> right to enjoy <strong>the</strong> property <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r temporarily,<br />
including both <strong>the</strong> jus utendi and <strong>the</strong> jus fruendi, with <strong>the</strong> owner retaining <strong>the</strong> jus<br />
disponendi or <strong>the</strong> power to alienate <strong>the</strong> same.<br />
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, made k<strong>no</strong>wn<br />
her intention to give respondents and her o<strong>the</strong>r kin <strong>the</strong> right to use and to enjoy <strong>the</strong><br />
fruits <strong>of</strong> her property. There can also be <strong>no</strong> quibbling about <strong>the</strong> respondents being<br />
given <strong>the</strong> right “to build <strong>the</strong>ir own house” on <strong>the</strong> property and to stay <strong>the</strong>reat “as long as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y like”. Paragraph #5 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same document earmarks “proceeds or income derived from<br />
<strong>the</strong> aforementioned properties” for <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s “nearest kin who have less in life in greater<br />
percentage to those who are better <strong>of</strong> in standing”. The established facts undoubtedly gave<br />
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respondents <strong>no</strong>t only <strong>the</strong> right to use <strong>the</strong> property but also granted <strong>the</strong>m, among <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner’s o<strong>the</strong>r kin, <strong>the</strong> right to enjoy <strong>the</strong> fruits <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
Issue 2: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> existing usufruct may be deemed to have been<br />
extinguished or terminated?<br />
Ruling: Terminated.<br />
The term or period <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usufruct originally specified provides only one <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> bases for <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> a usufructuary to hold and retain possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> thing<br />
given in usufruct. There are o<strong>the</strong>r modes or instances whereby <strong>the</strong> usufruct shall be<br />
considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, <strong>the</strong> Civil Code enumerates such<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r modes <strong>of</strong> extinguishment:<br />
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:<br />
(1) By <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly<br />
appears;<br />
(2) By expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> period for which it was constituted, or by <strong>the</strong><br />
fulfillment <strong>of</strong> any resolutory condition provided in <strong>the</strong> title<br />
creating <strong>the</strong> usufruct;<br />
(3) By merger <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usufruct and ownership in <strong>the</strong> same person;<br />
(4) By renunciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usufructuary;<br />
(5) By <strong>the</strong> total loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> thing in usufruct;<br />
(6) By <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person constituting <strong>the</strong> usufruct;<br />
(7) By prescription.<br />
The document executed by <strong>the</strong> petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes <strong>the</strong><br />
title creating, and sets for <strong>the</strong> conditions <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> usufruct. Paragraph #3 <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong><br />
states “That anyone <strong>of</strong> my kin may enjoy <strong>the</strong> privilege to stay <strong>the</strong>rein and may avail <strong>the</strong> use<br />
<strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. Provided, however, that <strong>the</strong> same is <strong>no</strong>t inimical to <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>”.<br />
What may be inimical to <strong>the</strong> purpose constituting <strong>the</strong> usufruct may be gleaned from<br />
<strong>the</strong> preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear “that anybody <strong>of</strong><br />
my kin who wishes to stay on <strong>the</strong> aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere <strong>of</strong><br />
cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r.” That <strong>the</strong><br />
maintenance <strong>of</strong> a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin<br />
constitutes an indispensable condition for <strong>the</strong> continuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usufruct is clearly<br />
deduced from <strong>the</strong> succeeding Paragraph # 4 where petitioner stated “That anyone <strong>of</strong><br />
my kin who can<strong>no</strong>t conform with <strong>the</strong> wishes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> undersigned may exercise <strong>the</strong> freedom to look for<br />
this own.” In fine, <strong>the</strong> occurrence <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following: <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> atmosphere<br />
<strong>of</strong> cooperation, <strong>the</strong> bickering or <strong>the</strong> cessation <strong>of</strong> harmonious relationship between/<br />
among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner, extinguishes <strong>the</strong> usufruct.<br />
To reiterate, <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> petitioner and respondents respecting<br />
<strong>the</strong> property in question is one <strong>of</strong> owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondent’s<br />
claim for reimbursement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> improvements <strong>the</strong>y introduced on <strong>the</strong> property during<br />
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<strong>the</strong> effectivity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions<br />
and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo<br />
Parras wrote on <strong>the</strong> matter:<br />
If <strong>the</strong> builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and<br />
580. In case like this, <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract and <strong>the</strong> pertinent provisions <strong>of</strong> law<br />
should govern (3 Manresa 215-216; see also Monti<strong>no</strong>la vs. Bantug, 71 Phil 449).<br />
By express provision <strong>of</strong> law, respondents, as usufructuary, do <strong>no</strong>t have <strong>the</strong><br />
right to reimbursement for <strong>the</strong> improvements <strong>the</strong>y may have introduced on <strong>the</strong><br />
property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code:<br />
ART. 579. The usufructuary may make on <strong>the</strong> property held in<br />
usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he<br />
may deem proper, provided he does <strong>no</strong>t alter its form or substance; but<br />
he shall have <strong>no</strong> right to be indemnified <strong>the</strong>refor. He may, however,<br />
remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage<br />
to <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
ART. 580. The usufructuary may set <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> improvements he may<br />
have made on <strong>the</strong> property against any damage to <strong>the</strong> same.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate<br />
<strong>the</strong> premises without any right <strong>of</strong> reimbursement. If <strong>the</strong> rule on reimbursement or<br />
indemnity were o<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> usufructuary might, as an author pointed out,<br />
improve <strong>the</strong> owner out <strong>of</strong> his property. The respondents may, however, remove or<br />
destroy <strong>the</strong> improvements <strong>the</strong>y may have introduced <strong>the</strong>reon without damaging <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner’s property.<br />
LAND TITLES and DEEDS<br />
A. Indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens Title<br />
Fil. Estate vs. Tro<strong>no</strong><br />
G.R. No. 130871, February 17, 2006<br />
Respondents’ application for registration <strong>of</strong> a parcel <strong>of</strong> land already covered<br />
by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against petitioners’ title <strong>no</strong>t permitted<br />
under <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens<br />
title can<strong>no</strong>t be collaterally attacked; <strong>the</strong> issue on <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> title, i.e., whe<strong>the</strong>r or<br />
<strong>no</strong>t it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted<br />
for <strong>the</strong> purpose. Hence, whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t respondents have <strong>the</strong> right to claim title<br />
over <strong>the</strong> property in question is beyond <strong>the</strong> province <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> instant proceeding. That<br />
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should be threshed out in a proper action. It has been invariably stated that <strong>the</strong> real<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any<br />
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, <strong>the</strong> owner may rest secure,<br />
without <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> waiting in <strong>the</strong> portals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court, or sitting on <strong>the</strong> “mirador<br />
su casa” to avoid <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> losing his land.<br />
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez (244 SCRA 418), we held:<br />
It must be <strong>no</strong>ted that petitioners failed to rebut <strong>the</strong> LRA report and only<br />
alleged that <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Payatas Estate was spurious, without <strong>of</strong>fering<br />
any pro<strong>of</strong> to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having<br />
been issued under <strong>the</strong> Torrens System, enjoys <strong>the</strong> conclusive presumption<br />
<strong>of</strong> validity. As we declared in an earlier case (Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon and<br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Lands, 50 Phil. 791), “<strong>the</strong> very purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens system<br />
would be destroyed if <strong>the</strong> same land may be subsequently brought under<br />
a second action for registration.” The application for registration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioners in this case would, under <strong>the</strong> circumstances, appear to be a<br />
collateral attack <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 8816 which is <strong>no</strong>t allowed under Section 48<br />
<strong>of</strong> P.D. 1529. (underscoring ours)<br />
Corollarily, Section 32 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same law states:<br />
Sec. 32. Review <strong>of</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration; In<strong>no</strong>cent purchaser for value.<br />
— The decree <strong>of</strong> registration shall <strong>no</strong>t be reopened or revised by reason<br />
<strong>of</strong> absence, mi<strong>no</strong>rity, or o<strong>the</strong>r disability <strong>of</strong> any person adversely affected<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby, <strong>no</strong>r by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment,<br />
subject, however, to <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> any person, including <strong>the</strong> government<br />
and <strong>the</strong> branches <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, deprived <strong>of</strong> land or <strong>of</strong> any estate or interest<br />
<strong>the</strong>rein by such adjudication or confirmation <strong>of</strong> title obtained by actual<br />
fraud, to file in <strong>the</strong> proper Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance a petition for reopening<br />
and review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration <strong>no</strong>t later than one year from and<br />
after <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entry <strong>of</strong> such decree <strong>of</strong> registration, but in <strong>no</strong> case<br />
shall such petition be entertained by <strong>the</strong> court where an in<strong>no</strong>cent purchaser<br />
for value has acquired <strong>the</strong> land or an interest <strong>the</strong>rein whose rights may<br />
be prejudiced. Whenever <strong>the</strong> phrase “in<strong>no</strong>cent purchaser for value” or an<br />
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an<br />
in<strong>no</strong>cent lessee, mortgagee, or o<strong>the</strong>r encumbrancer for value.<br />
Upon <strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> said period <strong>of</strong> one year, <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration and<br />
<strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by<br />
such decree <strong>of</strong> registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages<br />
against <strong>the</strong> applicant or any o<strong>the</strong>r person responsible for <strong>the</strong> fraud.<br />
A decree <strong>of</strong> registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive <strong>no</strong>t<br />
only on <strong>the</strong> questions actually contested and determined, but also upon all matters<br />
that might be litigated or decided in <strong>the</strong> land registration proceedings.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
203
B. Good Faith Buyer<br />
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Naval vs. Camalla<br />
G.R. No. 167412, February 22, 2006<br />
While we agree with <strong>the</strong> appellate court that respondents have superior right<br />
over <strong>the</strong> petitioner on <strong>the</strong> subject property, we find Article 1544 inapplicable to <strong>the</strong><br />
case at bar since <strong>the</strong> subject land was unregistered at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first sale. The<br />
registration contemplated under this provision has been held to refer to registration<br />
under <strong>the</strong> Torrens System, which considers <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> registration as <strong>the</strong> operative<br />
act that binds <strong>the</strong> land. 28 Thus, in Carumba vs. Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals, we held that Article<br />
1544 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code has <strong>no</strong> application to land <strong>no</strong>t registered under Torrens<br />
System. The law applicable <strong>the</strong>refore is Act No. <strong>33</strong>44, which provides for <strong>the</strong><br />
registration <strong>of</strong> all instruments on land nei<strong>the</strong>r covered by <strong>the</strong> Spanish Mortgage<br />
Law <strong>no</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Torrens System. Under this law, registration by <strong>the</strong> first buyer is<br />
constructive <strong>no</strong>tice to <strong>the</strong> second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in<br />
good faith.<br />
Applying <strong>the</strong> law, we held in Bautista vs. Fule that <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> an instrument<br />
involving unregistered land in <strong>the</strong> Registry <strong>of</strong> Deeds creates constructive <strong>no</strong>tice and<br />
binds third person who may subsequently deal with <strong>the</strong> same property.<br />
We also held in Bayoca vs. Nogales 31 that:<br />
Verily, <strong>the</strong>re is absence <strong>of</strong> prior registration in good faith by petitioners<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second sale in <strong>the</strong>ir favor. As stated in <strong>the</strong> Santiago case, registration<br />
by <strong>the</strong> first buyer under Act No. <strong>33</strong>44 can have <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> constructive<br />
<strong>no</strong>tice to <strong>the</strong> second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On<br />
account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> undisputed fact <strong>of</strong> registration under Act No. <strong>33</strong>44 by [<strong>the</strong><br />
first buyers], necessarily, <strong>the</strong>re is absent good faith in <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> sale by <strong>the</strong> [second buyers] for which <strong>the</strong>y had been issued certificates<br />
<strong>of</strong> title in <strong>the</strong>ir names. It follows that <strong>the</strong>ir title to <strong>the</strong> land can<strong>no</strong>t be<br />
upheld.<br />
Even if petitioner argues that she purchased and registered <strong>the</strong> subject land in<br />
good faith and without k<strong>no</strong>wledge <strong>of</strong> any adverse claim <strong>the</strong>reto, respondents still<br />
have superior right over <strong>the</strong> disputed property.<br />
We held in Rayos vs. Reyes 32 that:<br />
“[T]he issue <strong>of</strong> good faith or bad faith <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> buyer is relevant only where<br />
<strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale is registered land and <strong>the</strong> purchaser is buying <strong>the</strong><br />
same from <strong>the</strong> registered owner whose title to <strong>the</strong> land is clean . . . in such<br />
case <strong>the</strong> purchaser who relies on <strong>the</strong> clean title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> registered owner is<br />
protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.” Since <strong>the</strong> properties<br />
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in question are unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers<br />
<strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> did so at <strong>the</strong>ir peril. Their claim <strong>of</strong> having bought <strong>the</strong> land in<br />
good faith, i.e., without <strong>no</strong>tice that some o<strong>the</strong>r person has a right to or<br />
interest in <strong>the</strong> property, would <strong>no</strong>t protect <strong>the</strong>m if it turns out, as it<br />
actually did in this case, that <strong>the</strong>ir seller did <strong>no</strong>t own <strong>the</strong> property at <strong>the</strong><br />
time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale.<br />
It is an established principle that <strong>no</strong> one can give what one does <strong>no</strong>t have, nemo<br />
data quod <strong>no</strong>n habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to<br />
sell, and <strong>the</strong> buyer can acquire <strong>no</strong> more than what <strong>the</strong> seller can transfer legally. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> case at bar, since Ildefonso <strong>no</strong> longer owned <strong>the</strong> subject land at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
sale to <strong>the</strong> petitioner, he had <strong>no</strong>thing to sell and <strong>the</strong> latter did <strong>no</strong>t acquire any right<br />
to it.<br />
True, a certificate <strong>of</strong> title, once registered, should <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong>reafter be impugned,<br />
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding<br />
permitted by law. Moreover, Section 32 <strong>of</strong> Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides<br />
that “upon <strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> said period <strong>of</strong> one year, <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration and<br />
<strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title shall become incontrovertible.”<br />
However, it does <strong>no</strong>t deprive an aggrieved party <strong>of</strong> a remedy in law. What<br />
can<strong>no</strong>t be collaterally attacked is <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title and <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> title or ownership<br />
which is represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from a certificate <strong>of</strong><br />
title. The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did <strong>no</strong>t operate<br />
to vest ownership upon her <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject land. Registration <strong>of</strong> a piece <strong>of</strong> land under<br />
<strong>the</strong> Torrens System does <strong>no</strong>t create or vest title, because it is <strong>no</strong>t a mode <strong>of</strong> acquiring<br />
ownership. A certificate <strong>of</strong> title is merely an evidence <strong>of</strong> ownership or title over <strong>the</strong><br />
particular property described <strong>the</strong>rein. It can<strong>no</strong>t be used to protect a usurper from<br />
<strong>the</strong> true owner; <strong>no</strong>r can it be used as a shield for <strong>the</strong> commission <strong>of</strong> fraud; nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
does it permit one to enrich himself at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. Its issuance in favor <strong>of</strong><br />
a particular person does <strong>no</strong>t foreclose <strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong> real property may be<br />
co-owned with persons <strong>no</strong>t named in <strong>the</strong> certificate, or that it may be held in trust<br />
for a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r person by <strong>the</strong> registered owner.<br />
As correctly held by <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals, <strong>no</strong>twithstanding <strong>the</strong> indefeasibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens title, <strong>the</strong> registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey <strong>the</strong><br />
registered property to its true owners. The rationale for <strong>the</strong> rule is that reconveyance<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t set aside or re-subject to review <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands.<br />
In an action for reconveyance, <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration is respected as<br />
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property or its title<br />
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r person’s name, to<br />
its rightful or legal owner, or to <strong>the</strong> one with a better right.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
205
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Bautista vs. Silva<br />
G.R. No. 157434, September 19, 2006<br />
That Transfer Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. B-37189 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Registry <strong>of</strong> Deeds over a<br />
parcel <strong>of</strong> land situated in <strong>Bar</strong>rio <strong>of</strong> Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, containing an<br />
area <strong>of</strong> 216 square meters, was registered in <strong>the</strong> names <strong>of</strong> Spouses Berlina F. Silva<br />
and Pedro M. Silva on August 14, 1980<br />
On March 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact <strong>of</strong> his wife<br />
Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power <strong>of</strong> Attorney purportedly executed on November<br />
1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed <strong>of</strong> Absolute Sale<br />
over <strong>the</strong> said parcel <strong>of</strong> land covered by Transfer Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. B-37189 in<br />
favor <strong>of</strong> defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista<br />
TCT No. 37189 was cancelled and in lieu <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, TCT No. V-2765 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Registry <strong>of</strong> Deeds for <strong>the</strong> Valenzuela Branch was issued in <strong>the</strong> names <strong>of</strong> Spouses<br />
Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 1988.<br />
Berlinda filed in <strong>the</strong> RTC an action for Annulment <strong>of</strong> Deed <strong>of</strong> Absolute Sale<br />
and TCT No. V-2765, Reconveyance and Damages. The RTC rendered a decision<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> Silva. The CA affirmed <strong>the</strong> RTC’s decision.<br />
Issue: Who is a buyer for value in good faith?<br />
Ruling:<br />
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r, without<br />
<strong>no</strong>tice that some o<strong>the</strong>r person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays<br />
full and fair price for <strong>the</strong> same, at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> such purchase, or before he has <strong>no</strong>tice<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> claim or interest <strong>of</strong> some o<strong>the</strong>r persons in <strong>the</strong> property. He buys <strong>the</strong> property<br />
with <strong>the</strong> well-founded belief that <strong>the</strong> person from whom he receives <strong>the</strong> thing had<br />
title to <strong>the</strong> property and capacity to convey it.<br />
To prove good faith, a buyer <strong>of</strong> registered and titled land need only show that<br />
he relied on <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title to <strong>the</strong> property. He need <strong>no</strong>t prove that he made<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r inquiry for he is <strong>no</strong>t obliged to explore beyond <strong>the</strong> four corners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title.<br />
Such degree <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> good faith, however, is sufficient only when <strong>the</strong> following<br />
conditions concur: first, <strong>the</strong> seller is <strong>the</strong> registered owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land; second, <strong>the</strong><br />
latter is in possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>; and third, at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale, <strong>the</strong> buyer was <strong>no</strong>t<br />
aware <strong>of</strong> any claim or interest <strong>of</strong> some o<strong>the</strong>r person in <strong>the</strong> property, or <strong>of</strong> any defect<br />
or restriction in <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seller or in his capacity to convey title to <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
Absent one or two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foregoing conditions, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> law itself puts <strong>the</strong><br />
buyer on <strong>no</strong>tice and obliges <strong>the</strong> latter to exercise a higher degree <strong>of</strong> diligence by<br />
scrutinizing <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title and examining all factual circumstances in order<br />
to determine <strong>the</strong> seller’s title and capacity to transfer any interest in <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
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Under such circumstance, it is <strong>no</strong> longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show<br />
that he relied on <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title; he must <strong>no</strong>w also show that he exercised<br />
reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond <strong>the</strong> title. Failure to exercise such degree<br />
<strong>of</strong> precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.<br />
C. Direct and Collateral Attack on Certificate <strong>of</strong> Tile<br />
Diaz vs. Virata<br />
G.R. No. 162037, August 7, 2006<br />
When is an action a direct attack and when is it collateral? This Court made a<br />
distinction, to wit:<br />
An action is deemed an attack on a title when <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action or<br />
proceeding is to nullify <strong>the</strong> title, and thus challenge <strong>the</strong> judgment pursuant<br />
to which <strong>the</strong> title was decreed. The attack is direct when <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action<br />
to obtain a different relief, an attack on <strong>the</strong> judgment is never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
made as an incident <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
D. Reconveyance<br />
1. Property held in Trust<br />
Cervantes vs. Madarcos<br />
G.R. No. 146050, September 27, 2006<br />
In connection, and in relation to <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> prescription, since <strong>the</strong> land in<br />
question was evidently obtained by private respondent through fraudulent<br />
machinations by means <strong>of</strong> which a free patent and title were issued in his name, he<br />
is deemed to have held it in trust for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> petitioner who was prejudiced by<br />
his actions.<br />
The Civil Code provides:<br />
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, <strong>the</strong><br />
person obtaining it is, by force <strong>of</strong> law, considered a trustee <strong>of</strong> an implied<br />
trust for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person from whom <strong>the</strong> property comes.<br />
The remedy <strong>of</strong> reconveyance, which has its basis on Section 53 <strong>of</strong> Presidential<br />
Decree No. 1529, o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Property Registration Decree, and <strong>the</strong><br />
foregoing article <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code, is available to petitioner as alleged and prayed<br />
for in his pleading.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years<br />
from <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens title over <strong>the</strong> property. Here, private respondent’s<br />
certificate <strong>of</strong> title was issued on April 6, 1977. Petitioner previously initiated a similar<br />
case, Civil Case No. 1505, against respondent on September 8, 1981 which had <strong>the</strong><br />
effect <strong>of</strong> suspending <strong>the</strong> prescriptive period until it was dismissed by <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong><br />
First Instance <strong>of</strong> Palawan on October 21, 1981. The present case was later on filed<br />
on May 18, 1987. Clearly, <strong>the</strong> present action is <strong>no</strong>t barred by prescription.<br />
2. Application <strong>of</strong> Res Judicata<br />
Villari<strong>no</strong> vs. Avila<br />
G.R. No. 131191, September 26, 2006<br />
Spouses Villari<strong>no</strong> filed an action for Annulment <strong>of</strong> Title, Reconveyance,<br />
respondent (AVILAS). The property sought to be reconveyed was a portion <strong>of</strong> Lot<br />
No. 967 situated in San Fernando, Cebu and covered by OCT No. 1035. Said title<br />
was issued to <strong>the</strong> Avilas, as <strong>the</strong> culmination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land registration proceedings.<br />
In said case, <strong>the</strong> Villari<strong>no</strong> spouses opposed <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Avilas for<br />
<strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 967 on <strong>the</strong> ground that a portion <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 967 encroached<br />
upon Lot No. 968 to <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> 2,146 square meters. Lot No. 968 is <strong>the</strong> adjacent<br />
property belonging to <strong>the</strong> Villari<strong>no</strong> spouses per OCT No. 14601 issued in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
names.<br />
The decision in <strong>the</strong> LRC Case had become final and executory. The<br />
corresponding decree <strong>of</strong> registration was issued on January 1989, paving <strong>the</strong> way<br />
for <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> OCT No. 1035 in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Avilas.<br />
The Villari<strong>no</strong> spouses averred that <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 967 was based<br />
on an erroneous survey and technical description. They sought <strong>the</strong> reconveyance <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> disputed area and <strong>the</strong> cancellation <strong>of</strong> OCT No. 1035 to reflect <strong>the</strong> consequent<br />
reduction in area.<br />
The RTC dismissed <strong>the</strong> case. The CA affirmed <strong>the</strong> RTC’s decision.<br />
Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> action instituted by <strong>the</strong> Villari<strong>no</strong> Spouses is barred<br />
by res judicata.<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, <strong>the</strong> following<br />
requisites must concur: (1) <strong>the</strong> former judgment or order must be final; (2) <strong>the</strong><br />
judgment or order must be on <strong>the</strong> merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court<br />
having jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> subject matter and parties; and (4) <strong>the</strong>re must be between<br />
<strong>the</strong> first and second actions, identity <strong>of</strong> parties, <strong>of</strong> subject matter, and <strong>of</strong> causes <strong>of</strong><br />
action.<br />
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When <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> causes <strong>of</strong> action, but only an identity <strong>of</strong> issues,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re exists res judicata in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> conclusiveness <strong>of</strong> judgment. Although it<br />
does <strong>no</strong>t have <strong>the</strong> same effect as res judicata in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> bar by former judgment<br />
which prohibits <strong>the</strong> prosecution <strong>of</strong> a second action upon <strong>the</strong> same claim, demand, or<br />
cause <strong>of</strong> action, <strong>the</strong> rule on conclusiveness <strong>of</strong> judgment bars <strong>the</strong> relitigation <strong>of</strong><br />
particular facts or issues in a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r litigation between <strong>the</strong> same parties on a different<br />
claim or cause <strong>of</strong> action.<br />
All <strong>the</strong> elements <strong>of</strong> res judicata in <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> bar by prior judgment are present<br />
in <strong>the</strong> instant case. The final decision in LRC Case No. N-1175, which has long been<br />
executed, is a bar to <strong>the</strong> civil case filed by petitioners. There is <strong>no</strong> question that said<br />
decision was an adjudication on <strong>the</strong> merits. Petitioners and respondents were <strong>the</strong><br />
same party litigants in LRC Case No. N-1175 and in Civil Case No. CEB-13599.<br />
Petitioners claim that <strong>the</strong> disputed portion is covered by <strong>the</strong>ir title, but that it<br />
was erroneously included in <strong>the</strong> survey and technical description <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 967<br />
subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Avilas’ land registration application. Precisely, that was <strong>the</strong> content<br />
and thrust <strong>of</strong> petitioners’ opposition to <strong>the</strong> Avilas’ land registration application. But<br />
<strong>the</strong> land registration court debunked <strong>the</strong> opposition and upheld <strong>the</strong> application.<br />
Petitioners could have appealed <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land registration court. They did<br />
<strong>no</strong>t. Their failure to do so rendered said decision final and executory. After <strong>the</strong><br />
finality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision, <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration and <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title were<br />
issued as a matter <strong>of</strong> course. The final decision has appropriately engendered <strong>the</strong><br />
application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> res judicata.<br />
E. Reconstitution <strong>of</strong> Title<br />
Subido vs. Republic<br />
G.R. No. 152149, April 25, 2006<br />
As may be <strong>no</strong>ted, Section 13 <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 26 specifically enumerates <strong>the</strong> manner<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>tifying interested parties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition for reconstitution, namely: (a) publication<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Official Gazette; (b) posting on <strong>the</strong> main entrance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincial capitol<br />
building and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> municipal building <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> municipality or city in which <strong>the</strong> land is<br />
situated; and (c) by registered mail or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, to every person named in <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice.<br />
The <strong>no</strong>tification process being mandatory, <strong>no</strong>n-compliance with publication<br />
and posting requirements would be fatal to <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reconstituting<br />
trial court and invalidates <strong>the</strong> whole reconstitution proceedings. So would failure to<br />
<strong>no</strong>tify, in <strong>the</strong> manner specifically prescribed in said Section 13, interested persons <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> initial hearing date.<br />
Contextually, Section 13 particularly requires that <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hearing be<br />
sent to <strong>the</strong> property occupant or o<strong>the</strong>r persons interested, by registered mail or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise. The term “o<strong>the</strong>rwise” could only contemplate a <strong>no</strong>tifying mode o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
than publication, posting, or thru <strong>the</strong> mail. That o<strong>the</strong>r mode could only refer to<br />
service <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice by hand or o<strong>the</strong>r similar mode <strong>of</strong> delivery.<br />
It can<strong>no</strong>t be over-emphasized that R.A. No. 26 specifically provides <strong>the</strong> special<br />
requirements and procedures that must be followed before <strong>the</strong> court can properly<br />
act, assume and acquire jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> petition and grant <strong>the</strong> reconstitution<br />
prayed for. These requirements, as <strong>the</strong> Court has repeatedly declared, are mandatory.<br />
Publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice in <strong>the</strong> Official Gazette and <strong>the</strong> posting <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> in provincial<br />
capitol and city/municipal buildings would <strong>no</strong>t be sufficient. The service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice<br />
<strong>of</strong> hearing to parties affected by <strong>the</strong> petition for reconstitution, <strong>no</strong>tably actual<br />
occupant/s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land, ei<strong>the</strong>r by registered mail or hand delivery must also be made.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case at bar, <strong>the</strong> “posting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice at <strong>the</strong> place where TCT No.<br />
95585 is situated” is <strong>no</strong>t, as urged by petitioner, tantamount to compliance with <strong>the</strong><br />
mandatory requirement that <strong>no</strong>tice by registered mail or o<strong>the</strong>rwise be sent to <strong>the</strong><br />
person named in <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tice.<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> what amounts to a failure to properly <strong>no</strong>tify parties affected by <strong>the</strong><br />
petition for reconstitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> initial hearing <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> appellate<br />
court correctly held that <strong>the</strong> trial court indeed lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance<br />
<strong>of</strong> such petition. And needless to stress, barring <strong>the</strong> application in appropriate cases<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> estoppel principle, a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction to<br />
take cognizance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case is void, ergo, without binding legal effect for any purpose.<br />
Government vs. Wee<br />
G.R. No. 147212, March 24, 2006<br />
Respondent Salvador Wee (Wee) contends that pursuant to an Extra-Judicial<br />
Settlement <strong>of</strong> Estate with Sale, he acquired from <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> Francisco Rivera <strong>the</strong><br />
parcel <strong>of</strong> land subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition<br />
The copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Original Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. 0-10046 was lost and/or<br />
destroyed, as evidenced by <strong>the</strong> certification issued by <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds <strong>of</strong><br />
Zamboanga City<br />
The property was declared by Francisco Rivera for taxation purposes. No coowner’s,<br />
mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title has been<br />
issued. No deed or o<strong>the</strong>r instrument adversely affecting <strong>the</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property<br />
has been presented for registration in <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds <strong>of</strong> Zamboanga City.<br />
Wee filed Cadastral Case No. 96-1 on January 2, 1996, seeking <strong>the</strong> judicial<br />
reconstitution <strong>of</strong> Original Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. 0-10046. The RTC issued its Order<br />
allowing reconstitution <strong>of</strong> Original Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. 0-10046. The CA affirmed<br />
<strong>the</strong> RTC’s decision.<br />
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Issue: WON <strong>the</strong> RTC acquired jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> action for<br />
reconstitution<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
Petitioner reiterates its argument that <strong>the</strong> trial court did <strong>no</strong>t acquire jurisdiction<br />
over <strong>the</strong> case for <strong>no</strong>n-compliance with <strong>the</strong> jurisdictional requirements set in Section<br />
13 <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 26.<br />
Substantial compliance with <strong>the</strong> jurisdictional requirements laid down in<br />
Sections 12 and 13 <strong>of</strong> R.A. No. 26 is <strong>no</strong>t e<strong>no</strong>ugh; <strong>the</strong> trial court’s acquisition <strong>of</strong><br />
jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> reconstitution case is hinged on a strict compliance with <strong>the</strong><br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law.<br />
It must be stressed that <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stringent and mandatory character<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legal requirements <strong>of</strong> publication, posting and mailing are to safeguard against<br />
spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> such action, and to give <strong>the</strong>m e<strong>no</strong>ugh time to intervene in <strong>the</strong><br />
proceeding.<br />
Where <strong>the</strong> authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong><br />
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, <strong>the</strong> same must be strictly complied with, or <strong>the</strong><br />
proceedings will be utterly void. As such, <strong>the</strong> court upon which <strong>the</strong> petition for<br />
reconstitution <strong>of</strong> title is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly <strong>the</strong> petition for<br />
reconstitution <strong>of</strong> title and review <strong>the</strong> record and <strong>the</strong> legal provisions laying down <strong>the</strong><br />
germane jurisdictional requirements.<br />
Loza<strong>no</strong> vs. Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds<br />
G.R. No. 166899, August 10, 2006<br />
The reconstitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title or deed is simply <strong>the</strong> re-issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> copy <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reconstitution <strong>of</strong> title or any document is to have <strong>the</strong> same<br />
reproduced, after observing <strong>the</strong> procedure provided by law, in <strong>the</strong> same form <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were when <strong>the</strong> loss or destruction occurred.<br />
Section 41, second paragraph <strong>of</strong> Act No. 496 reads:<br />
“Immediately upon <strong>the</strong> entry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration <strong>the</strong> clerk shall<br />
send a certified copy <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, under <strong>the</strong> seal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court to <strong>the</strong> register <strong>of</strong><br />
deeds for <strong>the</strong> province, or provinces or city in which <strong>the</strong> land lies, and <strong>the</strong><br />
register <strong>of</strong> deeds shall transcribe <strong>the</strong> decree in a book to be called <strong>the</strong><br />
“Registration Book,” in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall<br />
be devoted exclusively toe ach title. The entry made by <strong>the</strong> register <strong>of</strong><br />
deeds in this book in each case shall be <strong>the</strong> original certificate <strong>of</strong> title, and<br />
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shall be signed by him and sealed with <strong>the</strong> seal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court. All certificates<br />
<strong>of</strong> title shall be numbered consecutively, beginning with number one. The<br />
register <strong>of</strong> deeds in each case make an exact duplicate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original<br />
certificate, including <strong>the</strong> seal, but putting on it <strong>the</strong> words “owner’s<br />
duplicate certificate,” and deliver <strong>the</strong> same to <strong>the</strong> owner or to his attorney<br />
duly authorized. In case <strong>of</strong> a variance between <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate<br />
certificate and <strong>the</strong> original certificate <strong>the</strong> original shall prevail. The certified<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration shall be filed and numbered by <strong>the</strong><br />
register <strong>of</strong> deeds with a reference <strong>no</strong>ted on it to <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong> record <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
original certificate <strong>of</strong> title: Provided, however, That when an application<br />
includes land lying in more than one province or one province and <strong>the</strong><br />
city <strong>of</strong> Manila, <strong>the</strong> court shall cause <strong>the</strong> part lying in each province or in<br />
<strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Manila to be described separately by metes and bounds in <strong>the</strong><br />
decree <strong>of</strong> registration, and <strong>the</strong> clerk shall send to <strong>the</strong> register <strong>of</strong> deeds <strong>of</strong><br />
each province, or <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Manila, as <strong>the</strong> case may be, a copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
decree containing a description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land within that province or city,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> register <strong>of</strong> deeds shall register <strong>the</strong> same and issue an owner’s<br />
duplicate <strong>the</strong>refore, and <strong>the</strong>reafter for all matters pertaining to registration<br />
under this Act <strong>the</strong> portion in each province or city shall be treated as a<br />
separate parcel <strong>of</strong> land.”<br />
Any title issued by <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds, including <strong>the</strong> original copy on file in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds or <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate <strong>of</strong> said title, must bear<br />
<strong>the</strong> signature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds. Hence, <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> title<br />
relied upon by <strong>the</strong> petitioner must be au<strong>the</strong>ntic and <strong>no</strong>t spurious.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 17100 which petitioners<br />
adduced in evidence is <strong>no</strong>t signed by <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds, and does <strong>no</strong>t even contain<br />
<strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title certificate. After <strong>the</strong> words “Certifico de Transferencio De<br />
Titulo No.” is a blank space where <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title is supposed to be typewritten.<br />
The petitioners failed to explain why <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 17100 does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t contain such signature. Thus, <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CA that <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate<br />
presented by <strong>the</strong> petitioners is spurious is correct.<br />
<br />
Calimpong vs. Heirs <strong>of</strong> Gumela<br />
G.R. No. 163751, March 31, 2006<br />
The title <strong>of</strong> ownership on <strong>the</strong> land is vested upon <strong>the</strong> owner upon <strong>the</strong> expiration<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> period to appeal from <strong>the</strong> decision or adjudication by <strong>the</strong> cadastral court,<br />
without such appeal having been perfected. The certificate <strong>of</strong> title would <strong>the</strong>n be<br />
necessary for purposes <strong>of</strong> effecting registration <strong>of</strong> subsequent disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
land where court proceedings would <strong>no</strong> longer be necessary.<br />
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As we have here a decree issued by <strong>the</strong> cadastral court, ordering <strong>the</strong> issuance<br />
to I<strong>no</strong>cencio de los Santos <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title over Lot No. 395 after <strong>the</strong> decision<br />
adjudicating ownership to him <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said property had already become final, and<br />
<strong>the</strong>re being <strong>no</strong> imputation <strong>of</strong> irregularity in <strong>the</strong> said cadastral proceedings, title <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership on <strong>the</strong> said adjudicatee was vested as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> such<br />
judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become from that time,<br />
registered property which could <strong>no</strong>t be acquired by adverse possession.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r a certificate <strong>of</strong> title was issued in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> respondent’s<br />
predecessors-in-interest is immaterial. For, following De la Merced, <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership on respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was vested as <strong>of</strong> 1927. The lot,<br />
for all intents and purposes, had become from said date registered property which<br />
could <strong>no</strong>t be acquired by adverse possession and was, <strong>the</strong>refore, beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Land Management Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DENR (formerly <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong><br />
Lands) to subject it to free patent.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> Act No. 2874 pursuant to which <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> private<br />
respondents’ predecessor in interest was issued, <strong>the</strong> President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines or<br />
his alter ego, <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands, has <strong>no</strong> authority to grant a free patent for land<br />
that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title<br />
so issued is null and void. The nullity arises <strong>no</strong>t, from <strong>the</strong> fraud or deceit, but from<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> land is <strong>no</strong>t under <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands. The<br />
jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands is limited only to public lands and does <strong>no</strong>t<br />
cover lands privately owned.<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislature in adopting <strong>the</strong> former Public Land Act, Act<br />
No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, and lands<br />
held in private ownership are <strong>no</strong>t included <strong>the</strong>rein and are <strong>no</strong>t affected in any manner<br />
whatsoever <strong>the</strong>reby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or <strong>of</strong> private ownership,<br />
constitute <strong>no</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain and can<strong>no</strong>t possibly come within <strong>the</strong> purview<br />
<strong>of</strong> said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as <strong>the</strong> “subject” <strong>of</strong> such freehold or private land is<br />
<strong>no</strong>t embraced in any manner in <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act and <strong>the</strong> same are excluded from<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
<br />
Republic vs. Sps. Sanchez<br />
G.R. No. 146081, July 17, 2006<br />
In sum, RA 26 separates petitions for reconstitution <strong>of</strong> lost or destroyed<br />
certificates <strong>of</strong> title into two main groups with two different requirements and<br />
procedures. Sources enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a) <strong>of</strong> RA 26<br />
are lumped under one group (Group A); and sources enumerated in Sections 2(c),<br />
2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f) are placed toge<strong>the</strong>r under a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r group<br />
(Group B). For Group A, <strong>the</strong> requirements for judicial reconstitution are set forth in<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Section 10 in relation to Section 9 <strong>of</strong> RA 26; while for Group B, <strong>the</strong> requirements<br />
are in Sections 12 and 13 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same law.<br />
There is <strong>no</strong> question that in [petitions for] reconstitution involving Sections<br />
12 and 13 <strong>of</strong> RA 26, <strong>no</strong>tices to adjoining owners and to <strong>the</strong> actual occupants <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
land are mandatory and jurisdictional. But in petitions for reconstitution falling under<br />
Sections 9 and 10 <strong>of</strong> RA 26 where, as in <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> source is <strong>the</strong> owner’s<br />
duplicate copy, <strong>no</strong>tices to adjoining owners and to actual occupants <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land are<br />
<strong>no</strong>t required. When <strong>the</strong> law is clear, <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> courts is simply to apply it,<br />
<strong>no</strong>t to interpret or to speculate on it.<br />
Reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 has for <strong>the</strong>ir purpose <strong>the</strong> restoration<br />
in <strong>the</strong> original form and condition <strong>of</strong> a lost or destroyed instrument attesting <strong>the</strong><br />
title <strong>of</strong> a person to a piece <strong>of</strong> land. Thus, reconstitution must be granted only upon<br />
clear pro<strong>of</strong> that <strong>the</strong> title sought to be restored was indeed issued to <strong>the</strong> petitioner.<br />
Strict observance <strong>of</strong> this rule is vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution<br />
proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificates <strong>of</strong> titles over<br />
parcels <strong>of</strong> land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. The social<br />
and eco<strong>no</strong>mic costs <strong>of</strong> such modus operandi can<strong>no</strong>t be underestimated.<br />
As was observed by <strong>the</strong> SC in Director <strong>of</strong> Lands vs. Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals:<br />
The efficacy and integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens System must be protected and<br />
preserved to ensure <strong>the</strong> stability and security <strong>of</strong> land titles for o<strong>the</strong>rwise<br />
land ownership in <strong>the</strong> country would be rendered erratic and restless and<br />
can certainly be a potent and veritable cause <strong>of</strong> social unrest and agrarian<br />
agitation. . . . . The real purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens System which is to quiet<br />
title to <strong>the</strong> land must be upheld and defended, and once a title is registered,<br />
<strong>the</strong> owner may rest secure, without <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> waiting in <strong>the</strong> portals<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court or sitting in <strong>the</strong> mirador de su casa to avoid <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
losing his land.<br />
<br />
Republic vs. Jacob<br />
G.R. No. 146874, July 20, 2006<br />
Section 48(b) <strong>of</strong> Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.<br />
1942, reads:<br />
Section 48.The following described citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines,<br />
occupying lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain or claiming to own any such lands<br />
or an interest <strong>the</strong>rein, but whose titles have <strong>no</strong>t been perfected or<br />
completed, may apply to <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> province where<br />
<strong>the</strong> land is located for confirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir claims and <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a<br />
certificate <strong>of</strong> title <strong>the</strong>refor, under <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Act, to wit:<br />
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(b) Those who by <strong>the</strong>mselves or through <strong>the</strong>ir predecessors in-interest<br />
<strong>the</strong>rein have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and <strong>no</strong>torious possession<br />
and occupation <strong>of</strong> agricultural lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, under a bona<br />
fide claim <strong>of</strong> acquisition <strong>of</strong> ownership, for at least thirty years immediately<br />
preceding <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> application for confirmation <strong>of</strong> title except<br />
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively<br />
presumed to have performed all <strong>the</strong> conditions essential to a Government<br />
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate <strong>of</strong> title under <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
this chapter.<br />
This provision was fur<strong>the</strong>r amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1903 by<br />
substituting <strong>the</strong> phrase “for at least thirty years” with “since June 12, 1945,” thus:<br />
Sec. 4. The provisions <strong>of</strong> Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII,<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Land Act are hereby amended in <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public<br />
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious<br />
possession, and occupation by <strong>the</strong> applicant himself or through his<br />
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim <strong>of</strong> acquisition <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership, since June 12, 1945<br />
Section 14(1) <strong>of</strong> P.D. No. 1529, o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Property Registration<br />
Decree, likewise provides:<br />
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in <strong>the</strong> proper<br />
Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance [<strong>no</strong>w Regional Trial Court] an application for<br />
registration <strong>of</strong> title to land, whe<strong>the</strong>r personally or through <strong>the</strong>ir duly<br />
authorized representatives:<br />
(1) Those who by <strong>the</strong>mselves or through <strong>the</strong>ir predecessors-in-interest have<br />
been in open, continuous, exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation <strong>of</strong><br />
alienable and disposable lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain under a bona fide claim <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier<br />
Applicants for confirmation <strong>of</strong> imperfect title must, <strong>the</strong>refore, prove <strong>the</strong><br />
following: (a) that <strong>the</strong> land forms part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disposable and alienable agricultural<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain; and (b) that <strong>the</strong>y have been in open, continuous, exclusive,<br />
and <strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same under a bona fide claim <strong>of</strong><br />
ownership ei<strong>the</strong>r since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Regalian doctrine, all lands <strong>no</strong>t o<strong>the</strong>rwise appearing to be clearly<br />
within private ownership are presumed to belong to <strong>the</strong> State. The presumption is<br />
that lands <strong>of</strong> whatever classification belong to <strong>the</strong> State. Unless public land is shown<br />
to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by <strong>the</strong> State,<br />
it remains part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inalienable public domain. Property <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain is<br />
beyond <strong>the</strong> commerce <strong>of</strong> man and <strong>no</strong>t susceptible <strong>of</strong> private appropriation and<br />
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acquisitive prescription. Occupation <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> owner <strong>no</strong> matter how<br />
long can<strong>no</strong>t ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The statute <strong>of</strong><br />
limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does <strong>no</strong>t operate against <strong>the</strong><br />
State unless <strong>the</strong> occupant proves possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same after a<br />
claim <strong>of</strong> ownership for <strong>the</strong> required number <strong>of</strong> years to constitute a grant from <strong>the</strong><br />
State.<br />
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from <strong>the</strong><br />
government, whe<strong>the</strong>r express or implied. It is indispensable that <strong>the</strong>re be a showing<br />
<strong>of</strong> a title from <strong>the</strong> State. The rationale for <strong>the</strong> period “since time immemorial or<br />
since June 12, 1945” lies in <strong>the</strong> presumption that <strong>the</strong> land applied for pertains to <strong>the</strong><br />
State, and that <strong>the</strong> occupants or possessor claim an interest <strong>the</strong>reon only by virtue<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir imperfect title as continuous, open and <strong>no</strong>torious possession.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, when private respondent filed her application with <strong>the</strong><br />
RTC on May 6, 1994, Lot No. 4094 was <strong>no</strong> longer alienable and disposable property<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain, since as <strong>of</strong> August 14, 1970, by virtue <strong>of</strong> Proclamation No.<br />
739, it was segregated from <strong>the</strong> public domain and declared part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reservation<br />
for <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> geo<strong>the</strong>rmal energy. 25 Private respondent filed her application<br />
for confirmation 24 years after <strong>the</strong> said proclamation was issued; thus, <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong><br />
her possession and occupancy after such proclamation can <strong>no</strong> longer be tacked in<br />
favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> claimant.<br />
D. Cadastral Proceedings<br />
Veranga vs. Republic<br />
G.R. No. 149114, July 21, 2006<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Government, titles for all <strong>the</strong> land within a stated area, are adjudicated whe<strong>the</strong>r or<br />
<strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> people living within this district desire to have titles issued. The purpose, as<br />
stated in section one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is to serve <strong>the</strong> public interests,<br />
by requiring that <strong>the</strong> titles to any lands “be settled and adjudicated.”<br />
Admitting that such compulsory registration <strong>of</strong> land and such excessive<br />
interference with private property constitutes due process <strong>of</strong> law and that <strong>the</strong> Acts<br />
providing for <strong>the</strong> same are constitutional, a question <strong>no</strong>t here raised, yet a study <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> law indicates that many precautions are taken to guard against injustice. The<br />
proceedings are initiated by a <strong>no</strong>tice <strong>of</strong> survey. When <strong>the</strong> lands have been surveyed<br />
and plotted, <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands, represented by <strong>the</strong> Attorney General, files a<br />
petition in court praying that <strong>the</strong> titles to <strong>the</strong> lands named be settled and adjudicated.<br />
Notice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petition is <strong>the</strong>n published twice in successive issues <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Official Gazette in both <strong>the</strong> English and Spanish languages. All persons interested<br />
are given <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> assistance by competent <strong>of</strong>ficials and are informed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
rights. A trial is had. “All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by <strong>the</strong> court and<br />
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decrees awarded in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> persons entitled to <strong>the</strong> lands or <strong>the</strong> various parts<br />
<strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, and such decrees, when final, shall be <strong>the</strong> bases <strong>of</strong> original certificates <strong>of</strong><br />
title in favor <strong>of</strong> said persons.” (Act No. 2259, Sec. 11.) Aside from this, <strong>the</strong> commotion<br />
caused by <strong>the</strong> survey and a trial affecting ordinarily many people, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong><br />
presence <strong>of</strong> strangers in <strong>the</strong> community, should serve to put all those affected on<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir guard.<br />
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates<br />
ownership in favor <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> claimants. This constitutes <strong>the</strong> decision — <strong>the</strong><br />
judgment — <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second<br />
action is <strong>the</strong> declaration by <strong>the</strong> court that <strong>the</strong> decree is final and its order for <strong>the</strong><br />
issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificates <strong>of</strong> title by <strong>the</strong> Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Office. Such<br />
order is made if within thirty days from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong> a copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision<br />
<strong>no</strong> appeal is taken from <strong>the</strong> decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less<br />
degree than <strong>the</strong> first.<br />
The third and last action devolves upon <strong>the</strong> General Land Registration Office.<br />
This <strong>of</strong>fice has been instituted “for <strong>the</strong> due effectuation and accomplishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
laws relative to <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> land.” (Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1917, Sec. 174.) An<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial found in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice, k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> chief surveyor, has as one <strong>of</strong> his duties “to<br />
prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases.” (Administrative Code <strong>of</strong> 1917, Sec.<br />
177.) This latter decree contains <strong>the</strong> technical description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land and may <strong>no</strong>t be<br />
issued until a considerable time after <strong>the</strong> promulgation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> judgment. The form<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree used by <strong>the</strong> General Land Registration Office concludes with <strong>the</strong> words:<br />
“Witness, <strong>the</strong> Ho<strong>no</strong>rable (name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> judge), on this <strong>the</strong> (date).” The date that is<br />
used as authority for <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree is <strong>the</strong> date when, after hearing <strong>the</strong><br />
evidence, <strong>the</strong> trial court decreed <strong>the</strong> adjudication and registration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land.<br />
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including <strong>the</strong> rendition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree, is a<br />
judicial act. As <strong>the</strong> law says, <strong>the</strong> judicial decree when final is <strong>the</strong> base <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificate<br />
<strong>of</strong> title. The issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree by <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Office is ministerial act.<br />
The date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> judgment, or more correctly stated, <strong>the</strong> date on which <strong>the</strong> defeated<br />
party receives a copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision, begins <strong>the</strong> running <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> time for <strong>the</strong><br />
interposition <strong>of</strong> a motion for a new trial or for <strong>the</strong> perfection <strong>of</strong> an appeal to <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court. The date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title prepared by <strong>the</strong> Chief Surveyor is unimportant,<br />
for <strong>the</strong> adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be performed is <strong>the</strong> mere<br />
formulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> technical description. If an unk<strong>no</strong>wn individual could wait possibly<br />
years until <strong>the</strong> day before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a technical<br />
description <strong>of</strong> a piece <strong>of</strong> land, <strong>the</strong> defeated party could just as reasonably expect <strong>the</strong><br />
same consideration for his appeal. As a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong> so-called unk<strong>no</strong>wn is a<br />
party just as much as <strong>the</strong> k<strong>no</strong>wn oppositor for <strong>no</strong>tice is to all <strong>the</strong> world, and <strong>the</strong><br />
decree binds all <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
217
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Sps. Rodriguez vs. CA<br />
G.R. No. 142687, July 20, 2006<br />
The Property Registration Decree requires that <strong>the</strong> deed <strong>of</strong> sale with assumption<br />
<strong>of</strong> mortgage be registered with <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds in order to be binding on third<br />
persons. The law provides:<br />
Sec. 51. Conveyance and o<strong>the</strong>r dealings by registered owner. An owner<br />
<strong>of</strong> registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or o<strong>the</strong>rwise deal<br />
with <strong>the</strong> same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms <strong>of</strong><br />
deeds, mortgages, leases or o<strong>the</strong>r voluntary instruments as are sufficient<br />
in law. But <strong>no</strong> deed, mortgage, lease, or o<strong>the</strong>r voluntary instrument, except<br />
a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a<br />
conveyance or bind <strong>the</strong> land, but shall operate only as a contract between<br />
<strong>the</strong> parties and as evidence <strong>of</strong> authority to <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds to make<br />
registration.<br />
The act <strong>of</strong> registration shall be <strong>the</strong> operative act to convey or affect <strong>the</strong> land<br />
ins<strong>of</strong>ar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, <strong>the</strong><br />
registration shall be made in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds for <strong>the</strong> province or<br />
city where <strong>the</strong> land lies.<br />
It is admitted in this case that <strong>the</strong> deed <strong>of</strong> sale with assumption <strong>of</strong> mortgage<br />
was <strong>no</strong>t registered, but instead, respondents <strong>Bar</strong>rameda filed an affidavit <strong>of</strong> adverse<br />
claim with <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds. In <strong>the</strong> case at bar, <strong>the</strong> reason given for <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>nregistration<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deed <strong>of</strong> sale with assumption <strong>of</strong> mortgage was that <strong>the</strong> owner’s<br />
duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title was in <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> HMDF. It was <strong>no</strong>t<br />
shown, however, that ei<strong>the</strong>r respondents <strong>Bar</strong>rameda or respondents Calingo exerted<br />
any effort to retrieve <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate copy from <strong>the</strong> HMDF for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
registering <strong>the</strong> deed <strong>of</strong> sale with assumption <strong>of</strong> mortgage. In fact, <strong>the</strong> parties did <strong>no</strong>t<br />
even seek to obtain <strong>the</strong> consent <strong>of</strong>, much less inform, <strong>the</strong> HMDF <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
property.<br />
Again, we stress that <strong>the</strong> an<strong>no</strong>tation <strong>of</strong> an adverse claim is a measure designed<br />
to protect <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> a person over a piece <strong>of</strong> property where <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong><br />
such interest or right is <strong>no</strong>t o<strong>the</strong>rwise provided for by <strong>the</strong> law on registration <strong>of</strong> real<br />
property.<br />
The deed <strong>of</strong> sale with assumption <strong>of</strong> mortgage executed by respondents Calingo<br />
and <strong>Bar</strong>rameda is a registerable instrument. In order to bind third parties, it must<br />
be registered with <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Register <strong>of</strong> Deeds. It was <strong>no</strong>t shown in this case<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re was justifiable reason why <strong>the</strong> deed could <strong>no</strong>t be registered. Hence, <strong>the</strong><br />
remedy <strong>of</strong> adverse claim can<strong>no</strong>t substitute for registration.<br />
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Caoibes vs. Pantoja-Caoibes<br />
G.R. No. 162873, July 21, 2006<br />
The agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties is analogous to a deed <strong>of</strong> sale in favor <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent, it having transferred ownership for and in consideration <strong>of</strong> her payment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loan in <strong>the</strong> principal amount <strong>of</strong> P19,000 outstanding in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> one<br />
Guillermo C. Javier. The agreement having been made through a public instrument,<br />
<strong>the</strong> execution was equivalent to <strong>the</strong> delivery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property to respondent.<br />
In respondent’s complaint for specific performance, she seeks to enforce <strong>the</strong><br />
agreement for her to be subrogated and/or substituted as applicant in <strong>the</strong> land<br />
registration proceeding over Lot 2.<br />
The agreement is <strong>of</strong> course in consonance with Sec. 22 <strong>of</strong> P.D. 1529 (Property<br />
Registration Decree which became effective on June 11, 1978) reading:<br />
SEC. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. — After <strong>the</strong><br />
filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> application and before <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong><br />
registration, <strong>the</strong> land <strong>the</strong>rein described may still be <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> dealings<br />
in whole or in part, in which case <strong>the</strong> interested party shall present to <strong>the</strong><br />
court <strong>the</strong> pertinent instruments toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> subdivision plan<br />
approved by <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands in case <strong>of</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> portions <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> court, after <strong>no</strong>tice to <strong>the</strong> parties, shall order such land registered<br />
subject to <strong>the</strong> conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments,<br />
or order that <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration be issued in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
person to whom <strong>the</strong> property has been conveyed by said instruments.<br />
The law does <strong>no</strong>t require that <strong>the</strong> application for registration be amended by<br />
substituting <strong>the</strong> “buyer” or <strong>the</strong> “person to whom <strong>the</strong> property has been conveyed”<br />
for <strong>the</strong> applicant. Nei<strong>the</strong>r does it require that <strong>the</strong> “buyer” or <strong>the</strong> “person to whom<br />
<strong>the</strong> property has been conveyed” be a party to <strong>the</strong> case. He may thus be a total<br />
stranger to <strong>the</strong> land registration proceedings. The only requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law are:<br />
(1) that <strong>the</strong> instrument be presented to <strong>the</strong> court by <strong>the</strong> interested party toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with a motion that <strong>the</strong> same be considered in relation with <strong>the</strong> application; and (2)<br />
that prior <strong>no</strong>tice be given to <strong>the</strong> parties to <strong>the</strong> case.<br />
In light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law and jurisprudence, <strong>the</strong> substitution by respondent <strong>of</strong><br />
petitioners as applicant in <strong>the</strong> land registration case over Lot 2 is <strong>no</strong>t even necessary.<br />
All respondent has to do is to comply with <strong>the</strong> requirements under <strong>the</strong> above-quoted<br />
Sec. 22 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Property Registration Decree. Ergo, it was unnecessary for respondent<br />
to file <strong>the</strong> case for specific performance subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present petition against<br />
petitioners to ho<strong>no</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir agreement allowing her to be substituted in <strong>the</strong>ir stead as<br />
applicant in <strong>the</strong> land registration proceeding.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
219
E. Relocation Survey<br />
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Tabaniag vs. Tanque<br />
G.R. No. 144024, July 27, 2006<br />
Plaintiff Margarito Tanque (TANQUE) is <strong>the</strong> son <strong>of</strong> Anastasio Tanque who,<br />
during his lifetime, owned and possessed a parcel <strong>of</strong> land with an area <strong>of</strong> 47,443<br />
square meters situated at Tubungan, Iloilo. Upon <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> his fa<strong>the</strong>r on December<br />
1966, Tanque took over <strong>the</strong> ownership and possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said land and declared<br />
<strong>the</strong> same in his name for taxation purposes. He has, since <strong>the</strong>n, paid <strong>the</strong> real property<br />
taxes on <strong>the</strong> land until <strong>the</strong> present time.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> lands in Tubungan, Iloilo were cadastrally surveyed by <strong>the</strong> Bureau<br />
<strong>of</strong> Lands in 1982, Tanque’s parcel <strong>of</strong> land was surveyed and identified as Cadastral<br />
Lot 2104 with an area <strong>of</strong> 4.74<strong>33</strong> hectares. On February 1986, OCT No. F-31883 was<br />
issued to Tanque based on Free Patent No. 17553 obtained from <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong><br />
Lands.<br />
In 1988, defendant Pedro Tagabi (TAGABI) asserted ownership over a portion<br />
<strong>of</strong> Cadastral Lot 2104 with an area <strong>of</strong> 654 square meters, claiming that <strong>the</strong> same<br />
forms part <strong>of</strong> Cadastral Lot 2097 which is owned by him.<br />
Without <strong>the</strong> k<strong>no</strong>wledge and consent <strong>of</strong> Tanque, Tagabi had <strong>the</strong> said portion<br />
entered into by his co-defendant, Demetrio Tabaniag, who planted <strong>the</strong> same with<br />
palay and corn.<br />
Tanque went to <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands and asked that Cadastral Lot 2104 be<br />
relocated to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r a portion was encroached upon by Tagabi. The<br />
relocation survey was made by Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Ciriaco in <strong>the</strong> presence<br />
<strong>of</strong> both Tanque Tababi and Tabaniag. It was found out that, indeed, a portion with<br />
an area <strong>of</strong> 654 square meters within lot 2104 was encroached upon by <strong>the</strong> defendants.<br />
Tanque filed an action in court to recover possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed portion.<br />
The RTC rendered a decision in favor <strong>of</strong> Tanque. The appeal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> defendants in<br />
<strong>the</strong> CA was dismissed upon motion <strong>of</strong> Tanque.<br />
Issue: WON <strong>the</strong> defendants are bound by <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> courtappointed<br />
commissioner showing that <strong>the</strong> questioned area <strong>of</strong> 654 square<br />
meters is inside Cadastral Lot 2104.<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
The Order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands was issued at <strong>the</strong> instance <strong>of</strong> both parties<br />
and this Order categorically states that <strong>the</strong> relocation survey should be made to<br />
ascertain whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> disputed portion is “within Cadastral Lot 2097 or 2104 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
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Cadastral Survey <strong>of</strong> Tubungan, Iloilo”. Since <strong>the</strong> lots to be relocated are cadastral<br />
lots, it is but logical and proper that <strong>the</strong> relocation survey should be conducted on<br />
<strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> data ga<strong>the</strong>red during <strong>the</strong> cadastral survey.<br />
According to Geodetic Engineer Filome<strong>no</strong> Da<strong>no</strong>, both plaintiff and defendant<br />
Tagabi, were present during <strong>the</strong> relocation survey and both were fully aware <strong>of</strong> and,<br />
in fact, agreed to <strong>the</strong> use by <strong>the</strong> Commissioner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cadastral records and <strong>the</strong><br />
available data pertinent to <strong>the</strong> cadastral survey <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two lots. In fact, both parties<br />
helped <strong>the</strong> Commissioner and pointed to <strong>the</strong> disputed portion using <strong>the</strong> available<br />
cadastral records relative to <strong>the</strong> two cadastral lots.<br />
In any case, it is quite clear from <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Order dated February 5, 1993<br />
appointing <strong>the</strong> Commissioner that <strong>the</strong> parties agreed to abide by <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
relocation survey which results, according to <strong>the</strong> same Order, “shall be made <strong>the</strong><br />
basis <strong>of</strong> resolving <strong>the</strong> dispute between <strong>the</strong>m”. It is <strong>no</strong>w too late in <strong>the</strong> day, so to<br />
speak, for <strong>the</strong> defendants to back out from such commitment that <strong>the</strong>y had made.<br />
Having agreed to abide by <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relocation survey, defendants are<br />
<strong>no</strong>w estopped from questioning <strong>the</strong> same. In Bulacan vs. Torci<strong>no</strong> (134 SCRA 252), <strong>the</strong><br />
Supreme Court held:<br />
“The Torci<strong>no</strong>s try to impugn <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relocation survey. We<br />
agree with <strong>the</strong> appellee that <strong>the</strong> appellants are <strong>no</strong>w estopped on this<br />
issue because <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>mselves prayed in <strong>the</strong> stipulation <strong>of</strong> facts that <strong>the</strong><br />
findings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> geodetic engineer would be <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance. We see <strong>no</strong> error, much less any grave abuse<br />
<strong>of</strong> discretion, in <strong>the</strong> lower court’s findings that <strong>the</strong> house <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torci<strong>no</strong>s<br />
encroached on <strong>the</strong> lot <strong>of</strong> Victoria<strong>no</strong> Bulacan”<br />
Settled is <strong>the</strong> rule that a certificate <strong>of</strong> title can<strong>no</strong>t be subject to collateral<br />
attack and can be altered, modified, or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in<br />
accordance with law. In Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, <strong>the</strong> Court held that an action is<br />
considered as an attack on a title when <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action or proceeding is to<br />
nullify <strong>the</strong> title, and thus challenge <strong>the</strong> judgment pursuant to which <strong>the</strong> title was<br />
decreed. The attack is direct when <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> an action or proceeding is to annul,<br />
or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> attack<br />
is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on<br />
<strong>the</strong> judgment is never<strong>the</strong>less made as an incident <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> attack on respondent’s title is definitely merely collateral<br />
as <strong>the</strong> relief being sought by respondent in his action was recovery <strong>of</strong> ownership and<br />
possession. Petitioners’ attack on <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> respondent’s certificate <strong>of</strong> title was<br />
merely raised as a defense in <strong>the</strong>ir Answer filed with <strong>the</strong> trial court.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
221
Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
F. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Fraud in Land Registration Cases<br />
Cal vs. Zosa<br />
G.R. No. 152518, July 31, 2006<br />
The right <strong>of</strong> a person deprived <strong>of</strong> land or <strong>of</strong> any estate or interest <strong>the</strong>rein by<br />
adjudication or confirmation <strong>of</strong> title obtained by actual or extrinsic fraud is recognized<br />
by law under Section 32 <strong>of</strong> P.D. No. 1529, thus:<br />
Review <strong>of</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration; In<strong>no</strong>cent purchaser for value. — The<br />
decree <strong>of</strong> registration shall <strong>no</strong>t be reopened or revised by reason <strong>of</strong><br />
absence, mi<strong>no</strong>rity, or o<strong>the</strong>r disability <strong>of</strong> any person adversely affected<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby, <strong>no</strong>r by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments,<br />
subject, however, to <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> any person, including <strong>the</strong> government<br />
and <strong>the</strong> branches <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, deprived <strong>of</strong> land or <strong>of</strong> any estate or interest<br />
<strong>the</strong>rein by such adjudication or confirmation <strong>of</strong> title obtained by actual<br />
fraud, to file in <strong>the</strong> proper Court <strong>of</strong> First Instance (<strong>no</strong>w <strong>the</strong> Regional<br />
Trial Court) a petition for reopening and review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong><br />
registration <strong>no</strong>t later than one year from and after <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entry<br />
<strong>of</strong> such decree <strong>of</strong> registration, but in <strong>no</strong> case shall such petition be<br />
entertained by <strong>the</strong> court where an in<strong>no</strong>cent purchaser for value has<br />
acquired <strong>the</strong> land or an interest <strong>the</strong>rein, whose rights may be prejudiced.<br />
Fraud is <strong>of</strong> two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds<br />
from an intentional deception practiced by means <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> misrepresentation or<br />
concealment <strong>of</strong> a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because <strong>of</strong><br />
its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even<br />
though <strong>the</strong> act is <strong>no</strong>t done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury<br />
upon o<strong>the</strong>r persons.<br />
Fraud may also be ei<strong>the</strong>r extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic<br />
where <strong>the</strong> fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in <strong>the</strong> original action, or<br />
where <strong>the</strong> acts constituting <strong>the</strong> fraud were or could have been litigated <strong>the</strong>rein. Fraud<br />
is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting<br />
his entire case to <strong>the</strong> court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining <strong>no</strong>t to <strong>the</strong><br />
judgment itself but to <strong>the</strong> manner in which it is procured, so that <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong>t a fair<br />
submission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to<br />
<strong>the</strong> transaction sued upon.<br />
The “fraud” contemplated by Section 32, P.D. No. 1529 is extrinsic. For fraud<br />
to justify a review <strong>of</strong> a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and <strong>the</strong> facts upon<br />
which it is based have <strong>no</strong>t been controverted or resolved in <strong>the</strong> case where <strong>the</strong><br />
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.<br />
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived <strong>of</strong> his interest in land where <strong>the</strong><br />
fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that <strong>the</strong> lots are <strong>no</strong>t contested when<br />
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in fact, <strong>the</strong>y are; or in willfully misrepresenting that <strong>the</strong>re are <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r claims; or in<br />
deliberately failing to <strong>no</strong>tify <strong>the</strong> party entitled to <strong>no</strong>tice; or in inducing him <strong>no</strong>t to<br />
oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about <strong>the</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lot to <strong>the</strong> true<br />
owner by <strong>the</strong> applicant causing <strong>the</strong> former to withdraw his application. In all <strong>the</strong>se<br />
examples, <strong>the</strong> overriding consideration is that <strong>the</strong> fraudulent scheme <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prevailing<br />
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case.<br />
The fraud, <strong>the</strong>refore, is one that affects and goes into <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court.<br />
Relief on <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> fraud will <strong>no</strong>t be granted where <strong>the</strong> alleged fraud goes<br />
into <strong>the</strong> merits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case, is intrinsic and <strong>no</strong>t collateral, and has been controverted<br />
and decided, like what is very much obtaining in <strong>the</strong> present case.<br />
<br />
Ugale vs. Gorospe<br />
G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006<br />
Federico U. Gorospe (GOROSPE), is <strong>the</strong> registered owner <strong>of</strong> a parcel <strong>of</strong> land<br />
situated in Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan, having bought <strong>the</strong> same from Maria Ugale<br />
and Enrique Uncia<strong>no</strong>, evidenced by two separate Deeds <strong>of</strong> Sale. As a consequence,<br />
Transfer Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. 85450 was issued in his name.<br />
When Gorospe tried to exercise attributes <strong>of</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lot, he was<br />
prevented from doing so by <strong>the</strong> defendants claiming to be <strong>the</strong> installed tenants <strong>of</strong><br />
defendant Juanita A. Vibangco and her bro<strong>the</strong>r, Ni<strong>no</strong>y Altura.<br />
Gorospe filed <strong>the</strong> present case to remove <strong>the</strong> clouds over his title and for <strong>the</strong><br />
recovery <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed land.<br />
The RTC ruled in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> defendants. On appeal, <strong>the</strong> CA reversed <strong>the</strong><br />
decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> RTC and ruled in favor <strong>of</strong> Gorospe.<br />
Issue: WON <strong>the</strong> CA was correct when it applied <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong><br />
indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> title in favor <strong>of</strong> Gorospe<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
In this case, <strong>the</strong> CA correctly held that <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> petitioners in <strong>the</strong>ir Answer<br />
that respondent’s title was acquired through fraud is <strong>no</strong>thing less than a collateral<br />
attack on <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> registration and title which is against <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong><br />
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person whose name<br />
appears <strong>the</strong>rein and <strong>the</strong> rule that any attack on <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> such title should be<br />
threshed out only in an action directly or expressly filed for that purpose.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
This is consistent with <strong>the</strong> precept that <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> a Torrens title can<strong>no</strong>t be<br />
assailed collaterally. Section 48 <strong>of</strong> Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:<br />
Certificate <strong>no</strong>t Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate <strong>of</strong> title shall<br />
<strong>no</strong>t be subject to collateral attack. It can<strong>no</strong>t be altered, modified, or<br />
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.<br />
Indeed, a certificate <strong>of</strong> title, once registered, should <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong>reafter be impugned,<br />
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding<br />
permitted by law. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, reliance on registered titles would be lost.<br />
Here, <strong>the</strong> attack on <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> private respondent’s certificate <strong>of</strong> title was<br />
raised as a defense in petitioners’ Answer filed with <strong>the</strong> trial court. Such defense is<br />
in <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> a collateral attack which is <strong>no</strong>t allowed by law as <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
validity <strong>of</strong> title, i.e. whe<strong>the</strong>r or <strong>no</strong>t it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in<br />
an action expressly instituted for that purpose.<br />
Petitioners argue that respondent can<strong>no</strong>t invoke <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> title since he knew <strong>of</strong> petitioners’ possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property since time<br />
immemorial; that he was <strong>no</strong>t in good faith. While <strong>the</strong>re are rulings stating that a<br />
buyer <strong>of</strong> a real property which is in <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> persons o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> seller<br />
must be wary and should investigate <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> those in possession, o<strong>the</strong>rwise<br />
such buyer can<strong>no</strong>t be regarded as a buyer in good faith, petitioners in this case,<br />
however, failed to show that <strong>the</strong>y have a better right over <strong>the</strong> subject property. As<br />
respondent has presented TCT No. T-85450 in his name, <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> has<br />
shifted to petitioners who must establish by preponderance <strong>of</strong> evidence <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
allegation that <strong>the</strong>y have a better right over <strong>the</strong> subject property. This petitioners<br />
failed to do.<br />
<br />
Republic vs. Sps. Enriquez<br />
G.R. No. 160990, September 11, 2006<br />
Before one can register his title over a parcel <strong>of</strong> land, <strong>the</strong> applicant must show<br />
that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,<br />
continuous, exclusive and <strong>no</strong>torious possession and occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject land<br />
under a bona fide claim <strong>of</strong> ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) <strong>the</strong> land<br />
subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> application is alienable and disposable land <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mandatory requirements in applications <strong>of</strong> original registration <strong>of</strong><br />
land is <strong>the</strong> submission in evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original tracing cloth plan or <strong>the</strong> “sepia<br />
copy” (Diazo Polyester Film), duly approved by <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands. This is to<br />
establish <strong>the</strong> true identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land to ensure that it does <strong>no</strong>t overlap a parcel <strong>of</strong><br />
land or a portion <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> already covered by a previous land registration, and to<br />
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forestall <strong>the</strong> possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration <strong>of</strong> any<br />
adjoining land. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner’s<br />
application for registration.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, in several cases, <strong>the</strong> Court allowed substantial compliance with<br />
this rule.<br />
In Recto vs. Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines (440 SCRA 79) this Court held that blueprint<br />
copies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original tracing cloth plan from <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands and o<strong>the</strong>r evidence<br />
could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece <strong>of</strong> land for registration<br />
purposes, as <strong>the</strong> property was sufficiently identified by: 1) <strong>the</strong> blueprint copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
plan and technical description which were both approved by <strong>the</strong> Land Management<br />
Services <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and 2)<br />
<strong>the</strong> report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Land Management Sector stating that <strong>the</strong> subject property is <strong>no</strong>t a<br />
portion <strong>of</strong>, <strong>no</strong>r identical to any previously approved isolated survey. The applicants<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Recto case also submitted a certified true copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original tracing cloth<br />
plan to <strong>the</strong> CA as well as a certification from <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Authority attesting<br />
that <strong>the</strong> original plan in diazo polyester film was on file.<br />
In Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines vs. Hubilla (451 SCRA 181), <strong>the</strong> Court also deemed<br />
as substantial compliance <strong>the</strong> submission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following in lieu <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original<br />
tracing cloth plan, to wit: 1) a blueprint copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subdivision plan approved by <strong>the</strong><br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Lands; 2) a technical description approved by <strong>the</strong> Land Management<br />
Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DENR; 3) a certification from <strong>the</strong> DENR Community Environment<br />
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) which states that <strong>the</strong> Property has <strong>no</strong>t been<br />
forfeited for <strong>no</strong>n-payment <strong>of</strong> real estate taxes, is entirely within <strong>the</strong> alienable and<br />
disposable zone as <strong>of</strong> December 31, 1925, has <strong>no</strong>t been previously titled and is <strong>no</strong>t<br />
covered by any previous public land application; and 4) a report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Land<br />
Management Bureau stating that <strong>the</strong> Property is <strong>no</strong>t recorded in <strong>the</strong>ir lot and plan<br />
index cards as being subject <strong>of</strong> a previous public land application. The applicants<br />
also filed a motion to admit original tracing cloth plan with <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals<br />
during <strong>the</strong> pendency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appeal and attached <strong>the</strong>reto <strong>the</strong> original plan, which <strong>the</strong><br />
Court <strong>no</strong>ted as <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> blueprint subdivision plan <strong>of</strong>fered as evidence before<br />
<strong>the</strong> trial court.<br />
G. Action for Declaration <strong>of</strong> Nullity <strong>of</strong> TCT<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> vs. Zaldivar<br />
G.R. No. 162593, September 26, 2006<br />
Remegia Y. Felicia<strong>no</strong> (FELICIANO) filed against <strong>the</strong> spouses Aurelio and Luz<br />
Zaldivar a complaint for declaration <strong>of</strong> nullity <strong>of</strong> TCTNo. T-17993 and reconveyance<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property consisting <strong>of</strong> 243 square meters <strong>of</strong> lot situated in Cagayan de Oro<br />
City. The said title is registered in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Aurelio Zaldivar.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> alleges that she was <strong>the</strong> registered owner <strong>of</strong> a parcel <strong>of</strong> land in Cagayan<br />
de Oro City with an area <strong>of</strong> 444 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-8502.<br />
Sometime in 1974, Aurelio, allegedly through fraud, was able to obtain TCT No. T-<br />
17993 covering <strong>the</strong> 243-sq-m portion <strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong>’s lot as described in her TCT No.<br />
T-8502.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> also contends that <strong>the</strong> subject lot was originally leased from her by<br />
Pio Dalman, Aurelio’s fa<strong>the</strong>r-in-law, for P5.00 a month, later increased to P100.00 a<br />
month in 1960. She fur<strong>the</strong>r alleged that she was going to mortgage <strong>the</strong> subject lot to<br />
Ignacio Gil for P100.00, which, however, did <strong>no</strong>t push through because Gil took<br />
back <strong>the</strong> money without returning <strong>the</strong> receipt she had signed as evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
supposed mortgage contract. Thereafter, in 1974, Aurelio filed with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Court<br />
<strong>of</strong> First Instance <strong>of</strong> Misamis Oriental a petition for partial cancellation <strong>of</strong> TCT No.<br />
T-8502. It was allegedly made to appear <strong>the</strong>rein that Aurelio and his spouse Luz<br />
acquired <strong>the</strong> subject lot from Dalman who, in turn, purchased it from Gil. The petition<br />
was granted and TCT No. T-17993 was issued in Aurelio’s name.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> denied that she sold <strong>the</strong> subject lot ei<strong>the</strong>r to Gil or Dalman. She<br />
likewise impugned as falsified <strong>the</strong> joint affidavit <strong>of</strong> confirmation <strong>of</strong> sale that she and<br />
her uncle, Narciso Labuntog, purportedly executed before a <strong>no</strong>tary public, where<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> appears to have confirmed <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property to Gil. She<br />
alleged that she never parted with <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title and that it was never lost.<br />
As pro<strong>of</strong> that <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject lot never transpired, Felicia<strong>no</strong> pointed out that<br />
<strong>the</strong> transaction was <strong>no</strong>t an<strong>no</strong>tated on TCT No. T-8502.<br />
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor <strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong>. On appeal, <strong>the</strong> CA<br />
reversed <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> RTC and ruled in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> CA was correct in ruling that <strong>the</strong> land in dispute<br />
was correctly registered in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Aurelio Zaldivar.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
It should be recalled that respondent Aurelio Zaldivar filed with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n CFI<br />
<strong>of</strong> Misamis Oriental a petition for issuance <strong>of</strong> a new owner’s duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> TCT<br />
No. T-8502, alleging that <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate copy was lost. In <strong>the</strong> Order dated<br />
March 20, 1974, <strong>the</strong> said CFI granted <strong>the</strong> petition and consequently, a new owner’s<br />
duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. T-8502 was issued. However, as <strong>the</strong> trial court correctly<br />
held, <strong>the</strong> CFI which granted Aurelio’s petition for <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a new owner’s<br />
duplicate copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. T-8502 did <strong>no</strong>t acquire jurisdiction to issue such order.<br />
It has been consistently ruled that “when <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate certificate <strong>of</strong> title<br />
has <strong>no</strong>t been lost, but is in fact in <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r person, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
reconstituted certificate is void, because <strong>the</strong> court that rendered <strong>the</strong> decision had <strong>no</strong><br />
jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case <strong>of</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original<br />
certificate.” In such a case, <strong>the</strong> decision authorizing <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a new owner’s<br />
duplicate certificate <strong>of</strong> title may be attacked any time.<br />
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The new owner’s duplicate TCT No. T-8502 issued by <strong>the</strong> CFI in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong><br />
Aurelio is thus void. As Felicia<strong>no</strong> averred during her testimony, <strong>the</strong> owner’s duplicate<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> TCT No. T-8502 was never lost and was in her possession from <strong>the</strong> time it<br />
was issued to her.<br />
The court a quo correctly nullified TCT No. T-17993 in Aurelio’s name,<br />
emanating as it did from <strong>the</strong> new owner’s duplicate TCT No. T-8502, which Aurelio<br />
procured through fraud. Aurelio can<strong>no</strong>t raise <strong>the</strong> defense <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> title<br />
because “<strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> a Torrens title does <strong>no</strong>t apply where<br />
fraud attended <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title. The Torrens title does <strong>no</strong>t furnish a shield<br />
for fraud.” As such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled.<br />
Nei<strong>the</strong>r can <strong>the</strong> respondents spouses Zaldivar rely on <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong><br />
indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> TCT No. 17793 which was issued in favor <strong>of</strong> Aurelio. As it is, <strong>the</strong><br />
subject lot is covered by two different titles: TCT No. T-8502 in Felicia<strong>no</strong>’s name<br />
covering an area <strong>of</strong> 444 sq m including <strong>the</strong>rein <strong>the</strong> subject lot, and TCT No. 17793<br />
in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Aurelio covering <strong>the</strong> subject lot. Aurelio’s title over <strong>the</strong> subject lot<br />
has <strong>no</strong>t become indefeasible, by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that TCT No. T-8502 in <strong>the</strong> name<br />
<strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong> has remained valid.<br />
The claim <strong>of</strong> indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s title under <strong>the</strong> Torrens land<br />
title system would be correct if previous valid title to <strong>the</strong> same parcel <strong>of</strong> land did <strong>no</strong>t<br />
exist. The respondent had a valid title . . . It never parted with it; it never handed or<br />
delivered to anyone its owner’s duplicate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transfer certificate <strong>of</strong> title; it could<br />
<strong>no</strong>t be charged with negligence in <strong>the</strong> keeping <strong>of</strong> its duplicate certificate <strong>of</strong> title or<br />
with any act which could have brought about <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r certificate<br />
upon which a purchaser in good faith and for value could rely. If <strong>the</strong> petitioner’s<br />
contention as to indefeasibility <strong>of</strong> his title should be upheld, <strong>the</strong>n registered owners<br />
without <strong>the</strong> least fault on <strong>the</strong>ir part could be divested <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir title and deprived <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir property. Such disastrous results which would shake and destroy <strong>the</strong> stability<br />
<strong>of</strong> land titles had <strong>no</strong>t been foreseen by those who had endowed with indefeasibility<br />
land titles issued under <strong>the</strong> Torrens system<br />
Issue 2: What are <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> Felicia<strong>no</strong> over <strong>the</strong> house built by <strong>the</strong><br />
Zaldivar spouses over <strong>the</strong> land in dispute?<br />
Ruling:<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Court is <strong>no</strong>t unmindful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that respondents had<br />
built <strong>the</strong>ir house on <strong>the</strong> subject lot and, despite k<strong>no</strong>wledge <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, Felicia<strong>no</strong><br />
did <strong>no</strong>t lift a finger to prevent it. Article 453 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code is applicable<br />
to <strong>the</strong>ir case:<br />
ART. 453. If <strong>the</strong>re was bad faith, <strong>no</strong>t only on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person<br />
who built, planted or sowed on <strong>the</strong> land <strong>of</strong> a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r, but also on <strong>the</strong><br />
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> such land, <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> one and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r shall<br />
be <strong>the</strong> same as though both had acted in good faith.<br />
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It is understood that <strong>the</strong>re is bad faith on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> landowner<br />
whenever <strong>the</strong> act was done with his k<strong>no</strong>wledge and without<br />
opposition on his part.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> circumstances, respondents and Felicia<strong>no</strong> are in mutual bad faith<br />
and, as such, would entitle <strong>the</strong> former to <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> Article 448 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil<br />
Code governing builders in good faith:<br />
ART. 448. The owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land on which anything has been built,<br />
sown or planted in good faith, shall have <strong>the</strong> right to appropriate as<br />
his own <strong>the</strong> works, sowing or planting, after payment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 29 and 548, 30 or to oblige<br />
<strong>the</strong> one who built or planted to pay <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land, and <strong>the</strong><br />
one who sowed, <strong>the</strong> proper rent. However, <strong>the</strong> builder or planter<br />
can<strong>no</strong>t be obliged to buy <strong>the</strong> land if its value is considerably more<br />
than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay<br />
reasonable rent, if <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land does <strong>no</strong>t choose to<br />
appropriate <strong>the</strong> building or trees after <strong>the</strong> proper indemnity. The<br />
parties shall agree upon <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease and in case <strong>of</strong><br />
disagreement, <strong>the</strong> court shall fix <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> is obliged to exercise ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> following options: (1) to appropriate<br />
<strong>the</strong> improvements, including <strong>the</strong> house, built by <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars on <strong>the</strong> subject lot by<br />
paying <strong>the</strong> indemnity required by law, or (2) sell <strong>the</strong> subject lot to <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars.<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong> can<strong>no</strong>t refuse to exercise ei<strong>the</strong>r option and compel respondents to remove<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir house from <strong>the</strong> land. In case Felicia<strong>no</strong> choose to exercise <strong>the</strong> second option,<br />
Zaldivars are <strong>no</strong>t obliged to purchase <strong>the</strong> subject lot if its value is considerably more<br />
than <strong>the</strong> improvements <strong>the</strong>reon and in which case, <strong>the</strong> Zaldivars must pay rent to<br />
Felicia<strong>no</strong>. If <strong>the</strong>y are unable to agree on <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease, <strong>the</strong> court shall fix <strong>the</strong><br />
terms <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.<br />
H. Free Patent<br />
Saad Agro. Industrial vs. Republic<br />
G.R. No. 152570, September 27, 2006<br />
On October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free<br />
Patent for Lot No. 1434, a parcel <strong>of</strong> land with an area <strong>of</strong> 12.8477 hectares located in<br />
<strong>Bar</strong>angay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu. On February 1971, <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Agriculture<br />
and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408, while <strong>the</strong> Registry <strong>of</strong> Deeds<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Province <strong>of</strong> Cebu issued OCT No. 0-6667 over <strong>the</strong> said lot.<br />
The subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. (CORPORATION)<br />
by one <strong>of</strong> Orcullo’s heirs.<br />
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Sometime in 1995, <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, through <strong>the</strong> Solicitor<br />
General, filed a complaint for annulment <strong>of</strong> title and reversion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lot, on <strong>the</strong><br />
ground that <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was<br />
irregular and erroneous, following <strong>the</strong> discovery that <strong>the</strong> lot is allegedly part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
timberland and forest reserve <strong>of</strong> Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after Pedro<br />
Urgello filed a letter-complaint DENR <strong>of</strong> Cebu City, about <strong>the</strong> alleged illegal cutting<br />
<strong>of</strong> mangrove trees and construction <strong>of</strong> dikes within <strong>the</strong> area covered by Urgello’s<br />
Fishpond Lease Agreement.<br />
On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong><br />
Orcullo. However, <strong>the</strong> heirs failed to file <strong>the</strong>ir answer to <strong>the</strong> complaint and were<br />
thus declared in default.<br />
The RTC dismissed <strong>the</strong> complaint. On appeal, <strong>the</strong> CA revered <strong>the</strong> RTC’s<br />
decision.<br />
Issue: WON <strong>the</strong> respondent was able to prove that <strong>the</strong> free patent and<br />
<strong>the</strong> original title were erroneously and irregularly obtained.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy,<br />
involving a question <strong>of</strong> fraud and misrepresentation committed against <strong>the</strong> government<br />
and it is aimed at <strong>the</strong> return <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disputed portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public domain. It seeks to<br />
cancel <strong>the</strong> original certificate <strong>of</strong> registration, and nullify <strong>the</strong> original certificate <strong>of</strong><br />
title, including <strong>the</strong> transfer certificate <strong>of</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> successors-in-interest because<br />
<strong>the</strong> same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, <strong>the</strong> State,<br />
as <strong>the</strong> party alleging <strong>the</strong> fraud and misrepresentation that attended <strong>the</strong> application<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> free patent, bears that burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong>. Fraud and misrepresentation, as<br />
grounds for cancellation <strong>of</strong> patent and annulment <strong>of</strong> title, should never be presumed<br />
but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance <strong>of</strong> evidence<br />
<strong>no</strong>t even being adequate.<br />
It is but judicious to require <strong>the</strong> Government, in an action for reversion, to<br />
show <strong>the</strong> details attending <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> title over <strong>the</strong> alleged inalienable land and<br />
explain why such issuance has deprived <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> claimed property.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> Solicitor General claimed that “Free Patent No. 473408<br />
and Original Certificate <strong>of</strong> Title No. 0-6667 were erroneously and irregularly obtained<br />
as <strong>the</strong> Bureau <strong>of</strong> Lands (<strong>no</strong>w Lands Management Bureau) did <strong>no</strong>t acquire jurisdiction<br />
over <strong>the</strong> land subject <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, <strong>no</strong>r has it <strong>the</strong> power and authority to dispose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
same through [a] free patent grant, hence, said patent and title are null and void ab<br />
initio.” It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that <strong>the</strong> free patent and original<br />
title were truly erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed<br />
to do so.<br />
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Reliance on this provision is highly misplaced. P.D. No. 705 was promulgated<br />
only on 19 May 1975, or four (4) years after <strong>the</strong> free patent and title were awarded<br />
to Orcullo. Thus, it finds <strong>no</strong> application in <strong>the</strong> instant case. Prior forestry laws,<br />
including P.D. No. 389, which was revised by P.D. No. 705, does <strong>no</strong>t contain a similar<br />
provision. Article 4 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code provides that “laws shall have <strong>no</strong> retroactive<br />
effect unless <strong>the</strong> contrary is provided.” The Court does <strong>no</strong>t infer any intention on<br />
<strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>n President Marcos to ordain <strong>the</strong> retroactive application <strong>of</strong> Sec. 13 <strong>of</strong><br />
P.D. No. 705. Thus, even assuming for <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>nce that subject parcel was unclassified<br />
at <strong>the</strong> time Orcullo applied for a free patent <strong>the</strong>reto, <strong>the</strong> fact remains that when <strong>the</strong><br />
free patent and title were issued <strong>the</strong>reon in 1971, respondent in essence segregated<br />
said parcel from <strong>the</strong> mass <strong>of</strong> public domain. Thus, it can <strong>no</strong> longer be considered<br />
unclassified and forming part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public forest as provided in P.D. No. 705.<br />
Private interests have intervened before classification was made pursuant to<br />
P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by herself and through her predecessors-in-interest<br />
cultivated and possessed <strong>the</strong> subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also awarded<br />
to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971. In fact, it appears that <strong>the</strong><br />
issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> free patent and certificate <strong>of</strong> title was regular and in order. Orcullo<br />
complied with <strong>the</strong> requisites for <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>of</strong> free patent provided under<br />
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as certified by <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands<br />
and approved by <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> Agriculture and Natural Resources.<br />
I. Jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Lands<br />
Angeles vs. Republic, G.R. No. 166281, October 27, 2006<br />
The well-entrenched rule is that when property has ceased to be public because<br />
it has been acquired by a private individual by operation <strong>of</strong> law, <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Lands loses jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> said property and <strong>the</strong> State has <strong>no</strong> more title over<br />
<strong>the</strong> property.<br />
In this case, public respondent <strong>no</strong> longer has a cause <strong>of</strong> action for reversion <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> property against <strong>the</strong> heirs <strong>of</strong> Juan Sanga and petitioners.<br />
Miscellaneous Cases<br />
A. Paraphernal vs. Conjugal Property<br />
Spouses Mendoza Go vs. Yamane<br />
G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006<br />
A parcel <strong>of</strong> land in Baguio City was registered in <strong>the</strong> name on Muriel Pucay<br />
Yamane, wife <strong>of</strong> Leonardo Yamane. This land was sold at a public auction as it was<br />
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levied to satisfy <strong>the</strong> lien for attorney’s fees. No redemption was made during <strong>the</strong> 1<br />
year period so a Final Sheriff’s Certificate <strong>of</strong> Sale was issued to spouses Go. A case<br />
was filed with <strong>the</strong> RTC for cancellation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale by Leonardo Yamane on <strong>the</strong><br />
ground that it was conjugal property. RTC dismissed. CA reversed holding that<br />
property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal.<br />
Issue: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> property was paraphernal or conjugal?<br />
Ruling: Conjugal.<br />
The mere registration <strong>of</strong> a property in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> one spouse does <strong>no</strong>t destroy<br />
its conjugal nature. Hence, it can<strong>no</strong>t be contended in <strong>the</strong> present case that, simply<br />
because <strong>the</strong> title and <strong>the</strong> Deed <strong>of</strong> Sale covering <strong>the</strong> parcel <strong>of</strong> land were in <strong>the</strong> name<br />
<strong>of</strong> Muriel alone, it was <strong>the</strong>refore her personal and exclusive property. As stated<br />
earlier, to rebut <strong>the</strong> presumption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conjugal nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property, petitioners<br />
must present clear and convincing evidence.<br />
The <strong>no</strong>n-redemption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property by respondent within <strong>the</strong> period prescribed<br />
by law did <strong>no</strong>t, in any way, indicate <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> his right or title to it. Since<br />
petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that <strong>the</strong> property is paraphernal,<br />
<strong>the</strong> presumption that it is conjugal <strong>the</strong>refore stands.<br />
Charging lien is <strong>no</strong>t chargeable against conjugal property. The expenses<br />
incurred by Muriel for <strong>the</strong> recovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> purchase price <strong>of</strong> her<br />
paraphernal property are her exclusive responsibility. This piece <strong>of</strong> land may <strong>no</strong>t be<br />
used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has <strong>no</strong>t been shown to be<br />
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> charges against <strong>the</strong> conjugal partnership. Moreover, her rights to <strong>the</strong><br />
property are merely inchoate prior to <strong>the</strong> liquidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conjugal partnership.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> New Civil Code, a wife may bind <strong>the</strong> conjugal partnership only when she<br />
purchases things necessary for <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> family, or when she borrows money<br />
for that purpose upon her husband’s failure to deliver <strong>the</strong> needed sum; when<br />
administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conjugal partnership is transferred to <strong>the</strong> wife by <strong>the</strong> courts or<br />
by <strong>the</strong> husband; or when <strong>the</strong> wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to<br />
establish any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se circumstances in <strong>the</strong> present case means that <strong>the</strong> conjugal<br />
asset may <strong>no</strong>t be bound to answer for Muriel’s personal obligation<br />
B. Emancipation Patent<br />
Estribillo vs. DAR<br />
G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006<br />
Inasmuch as <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> positive statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Land Law, regarding<br />
<strong>the</strong> titles granted <strong>the</strong>reunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in<br />
favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> homesteader who come into <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> his homestead after<br />
complying with <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>. Section 38 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Law<br />
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should be interpreted to apply by implication to <strong>the</strong> patent issued by <strong>the</strong> Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Lands, duly approved by <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Natural Resources, under <strong>the</strong> signature <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines, in accordance with law.<br />
After complying with <strong>the</strong> procedure, <strong>the</strong>refore, in Section 105 <strong>of</strong> Presidential<br />
Decree No. 1529, o<strong>the</strong>rwise k<strong>no</strong>wn as <strong>the</strong> Property Registration Decree (where <strong>the</strong><br />
DAR is required to issue <strong>the</strong> corresponding certificate <strong>of</strong> title after granting an EP<br />
to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 <strong>the</strong> TCTs<br />
issued to petitioners pursuant to <strong>the</strong>ir EPs acquire <strong>the</strong> same protection accorded to<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r TCTs. “The certificate <strong>of</strong> title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon<br />
<strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> one year from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> order for <strong>the</strong> issuance<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may <strong>no</strong> longer be <strong>the</strong> subject matter<br />
<strong>of</strong> a cadastral proceeding, <strong>no</strong>r can it be decreed to a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r person.”<br />
As was held by <strong>the</strong> SC through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora vs. Dayanghirang,<br />
Jr., 147 Phil. 301, 304 (1971):<br />
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and <strong>the</strong> character<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title that may be issued by virtue <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, is that<br />
where land is granted by <strong>the</strong> government to a private individual, <strong>the</strong><br />
corresponding patent <strong>the</strong>refor is recorded, and <strong>the</strong> certificate <strong>of</strong> title is<br />
issued to <strong>the</strong> grantee; <strong>the</strong>reafter, <strong>the</strong> land is automatically brought within<br />
<strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Land Registration Act, <strong>the</strong> title issued to <strong>the</strong> grantee<br />
becoming entitled to all <strong>the</strong> safeguards provided in Section 38 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said<br />
Act. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, upon expiration <strong>of</strong> one year from its issuance, <strong>the</strong><br />
certificate <strong>of</strong> title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a<br />
certificate issued in a registration proceeding.<br />
The EPs <strong>the</strong>mselves, like <strong>the</strong> Certificates <strong>of</strong> Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)<br />
in Republic Act No. 6657 (<strong>the</strong> Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law <strong>of</strong> 1988), are<br />
enrolled in <strong>the</strong> Torrens system <strong>of</strong> registration. The Property Registration Decree in<br />
fact devotes Chapter IX 27 on <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are,<br />
in <strong>the</strong>mselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates <strong>of</strong> title issued in registration<br />
proceedings.<br />
C. Double Sale<br />
Delfin vs. Banez<br />
G.R. No. 132281, September 15, 2006<br />
From <strong>the</strong> very opening statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appellate court in <strong>the</strong> decision under<br />
review, it is obvious that said court, along with <strong>the</strong> court below it, resolved <strong>the</strong><br />
controversy on <strong>the</strong> premise that <strong>the</strong>re exists a case <strong>of</strong> double sale. On that premise,<br />
<strong>the</strong> CA and <strong>the</strong> trial court applied to this case <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> Article 1544 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Civil Code, which reads:<br />
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ART. 1544. If <strong>the</strong> same thing should have been sold to different vendees,<br />
<strong>the</strong> ownership shall be transferred to <strong>the</strong> person who may have first taken<br />
possession <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> in good faith, if it should be movable property.<br />
Should it be immovable property, <strong>the</strong> ownership shall belong to <strong>the</strong> person<br />
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in <strong>the</strong> Registry <strong>of</strong> Property.<br />
Should <strong>the</strong>re be <strong>no</strong> inscription, <strong>the</strong> ownership shall pertain to <strong>the</strong> person<br />
who in good faith was first in <strong>the</strong> possession; and, in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>,<br />
to <strong>the</strong> person who presents <strong>the</strong> oldest title, provided <strong>the</strong>re is good faith.<br />
The application <strong>of</strong> Article 1544 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code presupposes <strong>the</strong> existence<br />
<strong>of</strong> two (2) valid and binding contracts <strong>of</strong> sale, which, under legal contemplation, is<br />
made possible by <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Torrens System whereunder registration is<br />
<strong>the</strong> operative act which transfers title or ownership <strong>of</strong> a titled property, such that<br />
before <strong>the</strong> first buyer registers his sale to consolidate ownership and title in his<br />
favor, <strong>the</strong> seller who retains <strong>the</strong> title and ownership in <strong>the</strong> meantime can validly<br />
transfer such title and ownership by way <strong>of</strong> a second sale to a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r buyer, who, in<br />
case he succeeds in registering said second sale before he acquired <strong>no</strong>tice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first<br />
sale, can defeat <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first buyer under Article 1544 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code.<br />
To <strong>the</strong> two (2) courts below, <strong>the</strong> two (2) sales <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lot in question — Lot No. 3-<br />
D-1 — are: (1) <strong>the</strong> sale entered into on May 9, 1979 between Josefina, through her<br />
attorney-in-fact, Atty. Carlos Valdez, Jr., in favor <strong>of</strong> Lagon over <strong>the</strong> 4,094-square<br />
meter portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former Lot No. 3 which portion covered <strong>the</strong> entire area <strong>of</strong> Lot<br />
No. 3-D-1, referred to herein as <strong>the</strong> first sale; and (2) <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 3-D-1<br />
entered into between Josefina and Delfin on June 4, 1987, hereinafter referred to as<br />
<strong>the</strong> second sale. While on <strong>the</strong> surface, <strong>the</strong>re is apparently a situation <strong>of</strong> double sale,<br />
in truth and in law, <strong>the</strong>re is only one: <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 3-D-1 by Josefina to <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner on June 4, 1987. Hence, Article 1544 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code finds <strong>no</strong> application<br />
in this case.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> reality that this Court in Valdez deemed <strong>the</strong> so-called first sale as null<br />
and void by reason <strong>of</strong> Lagon’s breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> express terms and conditions relative<br />
<strong>the</strong>reto before <strong>the</strong> second sale was entered into by and between Josefina and Delfin,<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> Article 1544 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code on double sales do <strong>no</strong>t apply. Josefina<br />
had full and complete ownership over <strong>the</strong> subject lot (Lot No. 3-D-1) at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> second sale, <strong>the</strong> obligation to return to Lagon <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> money originally received<br />
by her from <strong>the</strong> latter <strong>no</strong>twithstanding. This title and ownership <strong>of</strong> Lot No. 3-D-1<br />
was effectively transferred from Josefina to Delfin with <strong>the</strong> issuance <strong>of</strong> a clean new<br />
transfer certificate <strong>of</strong> title in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Delfin upon <strong>the</strong> registration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second<br />
sale.<br />
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D. FORECLOSURE OF A REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE<br />
Guanco vs. Antolo<br />
G.R. No. 150852, July 31, 2006<br />
Under Section 5 <strong>of</strong> Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7939,<br />
<strong>the</strong> provincial sheriff is mandated to post a <strong>no</strong>tice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> real<br />
estate mortgage in at least three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most conspicuous public places <strong>no</strong>t only in<br />
<strong>the</strong> municipality but also in <strong>the</strong> barrio where <strong>the</strong> land mortgaged is situated during<br />
<strong>the</strong> 60-day period immediately preceding <strong>the</strong> public auction:<br />
The foreclosure <strong>of</strong> mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks shall<br />
be exempt from <strong>the</strong> publication in newspapers <strong>no</strong>w required by law where<br />
<strong>the</strong> total amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loan, including interests due and unpaid, does<br />
<strong>no</strong>t exceed three thousand pesos. It shall be sufficient publication in such<br />
cases if <strong>the</strong> <strong>no</strong>tices <strong>of</strong> foreclosure are posted in at least three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most<br />
conspicuous public places in <strong>the</strong> municipality and barrio where <strong>the</strong> land<br />
mortgaged is situated during <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> sixty days immediately<br />
preceding <strong>the</strong> public auction. Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> publication as required herein shall<br />
be accomplished by affidavit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sheriff or <strong>of</strong>ficer conducting <strong>the</strong><br />
foreclosure sale and shall be attached with <strong>the</strong> records <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case: Provided,<br />
That when a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed, <strong>the</strong> homesteader<br />
or free patent holder, as well as <strong>the</strong>ir heirs shall have <strong>the</strong> right to redeem<br />
<strong>the</strong> same within two years from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> foreclosure in case <strong>of</strong> a land<br />
<strong>no</strong>t covered by a Torrens title or two years from <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> registration<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreclosure in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> a land covered by a Torrens title: Provided,<br />
finally, That in case <strong>of</strong> borrowers who are mere tenants <strong>the</strong> produce<br />
corresponding to <strong>the</strong>ir share may be accepted as security.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> present case, <strong>the</strong> provincial sheriff failed to comply with <strong>the</strong> law. It<br />
appears on <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Final Deed <strong>of</strong> Sale executed by Deputy Sheriff Alvior that<br />
<strong>the</strong> petition for extrajudicial foreclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> real estate mortgage purportedly<br />
filed with <strong>the</strong> said <strong>of</strong>fice was dated July 21, 1977. The deputy sheriff set <strong>the</strong> public<br />
auction sale on August 19, 1977, or less than a month after <strong>the</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> said<br />
petition, short <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 60 day-period under Section 5 <strong>of</strong> Rep. Act No. 720, as amended.<br />
E. Lease<br />
Josefa vs. Buenaventura<br />
G.R. No. 163429, March 3, 2006<br />
Lourdes San Buenaventura is <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> a 364-sqm parcel <strong>of</strong> land in Pasig<br />
City. On July 15, 1990, Johnny Josefa entered into a Contract <strong>of</strong> Lease with San<br />
Buenaventura over <strong>the</strong> said parcel <strong>of</strong> land. The parties agreed that <strong>the</strong> period covered<br />
by <strong>the</strong> lease agreement is from August 1, 1990 to July 31, 1995, or a period <strong>of</strong> five<br />
(5) years, renewable upon agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties.<br />
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Upon expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract, San Buenaventura wrote Josefina informing him<br />
that <strong>the</strong> lease would <strong>no</strong> longer be extended but that he may continue with <strong>the</strong> lease<br />
at a rental rate <strong>of</strong> P30,000.00 a month. Josefa was told to vacate <strong>the</strong> property and<br />
pay any arrearages if he opted <strong>no</strong>t to lease <strong>the</strong> property after <strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
lease contract. However, Josefa refused to vacate <strong>the</strong> premises. He continued to<br />
occupy <strong>the</strong> property and paid a monthly rental <strong>of</strong> P15,400.00 which San Buenaventura<br />
received. However, San Buenaventura subsequently made demands for Josefa to<br />
vacate <strong>the</strong> property in a Letter dated June 3, 1998. Josefa still refused to leave <strong>the</strong><br />
premises.<br />
San Buenaventura <strong>the</strong>n filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Josefa<br />
which was however dismissed due to <strong>the</strong> plaintiff’s failure to secure a certification<br />
from <strong>the</strong> lupon ng barangay. The complaint was refiled with <strong>the</strong> MeTC Pasig and<br />
docketed as Civil Case No. 6798.<br />
In his Answer, Josefa averred that San Buenaventura had <strong>no</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> action<br />
because under <strong>the</strong> contract, San Buenaventura was obliged to renew <strong>the</strong> lease. Josefa<br />
pointed out that because <strong>of</strong> this commitment to renew <strong>the</strong> contract, he made<br />
re<strong>no</strong>vations and improvements on <strong>the</strong> land. He also set up attorney’s fees as<br />
counterclaim against San Buenaventura. He prayed that should <strong>the</strong> lease contract<br />
<strong>no</strong>t be renewed, San Buenaventura be ordered to reimburse to him <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
improvements in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong>t less than P3,000,000.00.<br />
The MeTC ruled in favor <strong>of</strong> San Buenaventura, declaring that <strong>the</strong> phrase<br />
“renewable upon agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties” in <strong>the</strong> lease contract implied mutuality,<br />
i.e. both parties’ consent to <strong>the</strong> renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease.<br />
Josefa appealed to <strong>the</strong> RTC. The RTC reversed <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MeTC holding<br />
that <strong>the</strong> inclusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> renewal clause in <strong>the</strong> contract showed <strong>the</strong> intent on <strong>the</strong> part<br />
<strong>of</strong> both parties to extend <strong>the</strong> lease without any condition or requirement <strong>of</strong> mutual<br />
agreement. It declared that <strong>the</strong> phrase was merely a useless addition “for <strong>the</strong><br />
convenience <strong>of</strong> any party who may wish, in bad faith, to back out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> extension <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> lease.” According to <strong>the</strong> RTC, “<strong>the</strong> only time that phrase may come into play is<br />
when both parties mutually decline to extend <strong>the</strong> lease, but when only one party<br />
insists on <strong>the</strong> extension while <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r party refuses, <strong>the</strong> latter party is bound by<br />
<strong>the</strong> term.”<br />
San Buenaventura appealed to <strong>the</strong> CA. The CA reversed and declared that,<br />
after <strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> five-year period in <strong>the</strong> lease contract, <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
property had <strong>the</strong> right <strong>no</strong>t only to terminate <strong>the</strong> lease but to demand a new rental<br />
rate. It held that it was unfair for <strong>the</strong> lessee to refuse to pay <strong>the</strong> demanded increased<br />
rate and still remain in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property. The CA also ruled that Josefa<br />
could <strong>no</strong>t claim to be a builder in good faith since he knew that he was only a lessee,<br />
whose rights relative to <strong>the</strong> improvements he introduced on <strong>the</strong> property are governed<br />
by Article 1678 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Civil Code.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> lease contract between petitioner and respondent<br />
contained a “renewal clause”, and as such, <strong>the</strong>y had agreed to extend <strong>the</strong><br />
period <strong>of</strong> lease after July 31, 1995? NO.<br />
It bears stressing that after <strong>the</strong> subject lease contract expired on July 15, 1995,<br />
petitioner was already unlawfully withholding possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leased premises<br />
from respondent as to entitle <strong>the</strong> latter to file her complaint for ejectment against<br />
petitioner as defendant. Since <strong>the</strong> lease contract was executed for a determinate<br />
time, such contract ceased on <strong>the</strong> day fixed without need <strong>of</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r demand. A<br />
<strong>no</strong>tice to vacate constitutes an express act on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessor that he <strong>no</strong> longer<br />
consents to <strong>the</strong> continued occupation by <strong>the</strong> lessee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property. Hence, respondent,<br />
as plaintiff in <strong>the</strong> trial court, had a cause <strong>of</strong> action for ejectment against petitioner<br />
who was <strong>the</strong> defendant below.<br />
It is true that petitioner and respondent agreed that <strong>the</strong> subject lease contract<br />
was “renewable upon agreement”. The Court <strong>no</strong>tes, however, that <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner’s intransigent refusal to pay <strong>the</strong> P30,000.00 monthly rental proposed by<br />
respondent was <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties to agree on <strong>the</strong> renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract.<br />
The clause “renewable upon <strong>the</strong> agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties” in <strong>the</strong> lease contract is<br />
clear and admits <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r interpretation: <strong>the</strong> contract is renewable only upon<br />
agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties. If <strong>no</strong> such agreement is forged, petitioner has <strong>no</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
option except to vacate <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
Even petitioner himself admits that under <strong>the</strong> subject clause, <strong>the</strong> lease contract<br />
would <strong>no</strong>t be automatically renewed upon its expiration on July 31, 1995. Respondent,<br />
as <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property whose title is recognized in <strong>the</strong> lease contract, was <strong>no</strong>t<br />
obliged to agree to renew <strong>the</strong> lease contract, much less negotiate with petitioner for<br />
such renewal if she opts <strong>no</strong>t to renew <strong>the</strong> agreement. Since <strong>the</strong> renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract<br />
contemplates <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> old contract, it is necessary that <strong>the</strong> new one be executed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> parties. A contract can only be renewed upon <strong>the</strong> mutual agreement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
parties or at <strong>the</strong> will <strong>of</strong> both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. After all, as <strong>the</strong> Court ruled in Bruce vs. Court<br />
<strong>of</strong> Appeals:<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case at bar, it was <strong>no</strong>t specifically indicated who may exercise <strong>the</strong><br />
option to renew, nei<strong>the</strong>r was it stated that <strong>the</strong> option was given for <strong>the</strong><br />
benefit <strong>of</strong> herein petitioner. Thus, pursuant to <strong>the</strong> Fernandez ruling and<br />
Article 1196 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Civil Code, <strong>the</strong> period <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease contract is deemed<br />
to have been set for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> both parties. Renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract<br />
may be had only upon <strong>the</strong>ir mutual agreement or at <strong>the</strong> will <strong>of</strong> both <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>m. Since <strong>the</strong> private respondents were <strong>no</strong>t amenable to a renewal,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y can<strong>no</strong>t be compelled to execute a new contract when <strong>the</strong> old contract<br />
terminated on June 1, 1994. It is <strong>the</strong> owner-lessor’s prerogative to<br />
terminate <strong>the</strong> lease at its expiration. The continuance, effectivity and<br />
fulfillment <strong>of</strong> a contract <strong>of</strong> lease can<strong>no</strong>t be made to depend exclusively<br />
upon <strong>the</strong> free and uncontrolled choice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessee between continuing<br />
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<strong>the</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rentals or <strong>no</strong>t, completely depriving <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> any<br />
say in <strong>the</strong> matter. Mutuality does <strong>no</strong>t obtain in such a contract <strong>of</strong> lease<br />
and <strong>no</strong> equality exists between <strong>the</strong> lessor and <strong>the</strong> lessee since <strong>the</strong> life <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> contract would be dictated solely by <strong>the</strong> lessee.<br />
In Fernandez vs. CA, <strong>the</strong> Court ruled that <strong>the</strong> stipulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
lease contract “to be renewable” at <strong>the</strong> option <strong>of</strong> both parties stresses that <strong>the</strong> faculty<br />
to renew was given <strong>no</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> lessee alone <strong>no</strong>r to <strong>the</strong> lessor by himself but to <strong>the</strong> two<br />
simultaneously; hence, both must agree to renew if a new contract is to come about.<br />
Issue 2: Whe<strong>the</strong>r Josefa could be considered a builder in good faith.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
In this case, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> question that petitioner was initially a lawful possessor<br />
because his entry into <strong>the</strong> property is by virtue <strong>of</strong> a lease contract with respondent.<br />
However, as a mere lessee whose possession after <strong>the</strong> expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract is at<br />
<strong>the</strong> sufferance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property, he can<strong>no</strong>t claim to be a builder in good<br />
faith. Under Article 1678 NCC, petitioner is entitled to one-half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
improvements only if respondent, as <strong>the</strong> owner decides to appropriate <strong>the</strong><br />
improvements. Since respondent refused to appropriate <strong>the</strong> improvements, petitioner<br />
can<strong>no</strong>t compel her to reimburse to him one-half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir value. The sole right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner under Article 1678 is to remove <strong>the</strong> improvements without causing any<br />
more damage upon <strong>the</strong> property leased than is necessary.<br />
Issue 3: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> CA erred in ordering him to pay P30,000.00<br />
monthly rental for <strong>the</strong> renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease contract.<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
The submission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> petitioner has <strong>no</strong> merit. In <strong>the</strong> first place, <strong>the</strong> CA awarded<br />
<strong>the</strong> P30,000.00 monthly rentals <strong>no</strong>t for <strong>the</strong> renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease contract, but as<br />
compensation for petitioner’s continued occupancy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property after <strong>the</strong> lease<br />
expired. However, we agree with petitioner’s contention that <strong>the</strong> increase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
award to P30,000.00 has <strong>no</strong> factual basis considering that <strong>the</strong> appellate court failed<br />
to state its basis for doubling <strong>the</strong> amount adjudged by <strong>the</strong> trial court. It simply<br />
increased <strong>the</strong> award in <strong>the</strong> dispositive portion <strong>of</strong> its decision.<br />
<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
G.Q. GARMENTS, INC. vs. MIRANDA<br />
G.R. No. 161722, July 20, 2006<br />
Angel Miranda is <strong>the</strong> registered owner <strong>of</strong> a 9,646 square meters parcel <strong>of</strong> land<br />
located at Niog, Bacoor, Cavite. In 1984, Angelito Miranda, <strong>the</strong> son <strong>of</strong> Angel Miranda,<br />
established <strong>the</strong> Executive Machineries and Equipment Corporation (EMECO). He<br />
owned 80% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stocks, while his wife Florenda owned 10%. That year, Angel entered<br />
into a verbal contract <strong>of</strong> lease over <strong>the</strong> Property with EMECO, and allowed it to<br />
build a factory <strong>the</strong>reon. The agreement was on a month-to-month basis, at <strong>the</strong> rate<br />
<strong>of</strong> P8,000 per month. EMECO constructed its factory on <strong>the</strong> property. At <strong>the</strong> outset,<br />
EMECO paid <strong>the</strong> monthly rentals. However, after Angelito died on June 21, 1988,<br />
EMECO failed to pay <strong>the</strong> rentals but still continued possessing <strong>the</strong> leased<br />
premises.<br />
On November 19, 1989, <strong>the</strong> factory <strong>of</strong> EMECO was totally razed by fire. In a<br />
letter to EMECO dated June 3, 1991, Angel demanded <strong>the</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> accrued<br />
rentals in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> P280,000.00 as <strong>of</strong> May 1991. EMECO was also informed<br />
that <strong>the</strong> oral contract <strong>of</strong> lease would be terminated effective June 30, 1991. However,<br />
EMECO failed to pay <strong>the</strong> accrued rentals and to vacate <strong>the</strong> property. A<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r<br />
demand letter dated September 27, 1991 was sent to EMECO. It vacated <strong>the</strong> leased<br />
premises, but <strong>the</strong> accrued rentals remained unpaid.<br />
Sometime in November 1991, Florenda arrived at <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> petitioner and<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered to sublease <strong>the</strong> property to Wilson Kho, <strong>the</strong> Officer-in Charge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
corporation. Florenda showed Kho a purported copy <strong>of</strong> a contract <strong>of</strong> lease over <strong>the</strong><br />
said property allegedly executed by Angel in favor <strong>of</strong> EMECO. After visiting and<br />
viewing <strong>the</strong> property, Kho agreed to rent <strong>the</strong> area upon <strong>the</strong> condition that its true<br />
and registered owner would personally sign <strong>the</strong> lease contract in his presence. When<br />
Florenda failed to present Angel for said purpose, Kho turned down her proposal.<br />
Later, Kho was able to locate Angel and <strong>of</strong>fered, in behalf <strong>of</strong> G.Q. Garments,<br />
to lease <strong>the</strong> property. Angel agreed. On December 23, 1991, Angel and <strong>the</strong><br />
corporation, executed a contract <strong>of</strong> lease over <strong>the</strong> subject property. The lease was<br />
for a period <strong>of</strong> 15 years for a monthly rental <strong>of</strong> P30,000.00. As lessee, it was authorized<br />
to introduce improvements, structures, and buildings on <strong>the</strong> property as it<br />
may deem necessary and for <strong>the</strong> purpose for which it was leased. After securing<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessary documents, <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a building and a factory <strong>the</strong>n<br />
commenced.<br />
On January 27, 1992, Florenda, toge<strong>the</strong>r with several armed men who identified<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves as policemen, forcibly evicted petitioner from <strong>the</strong> leased premises. During<br />
<strong>the</strong> encounter, Florenda and her men took some equipment, machinery and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
properties belonging to petitioner, <strong>the</strong>reby causing loss and damage to said<br />
properties.<br />
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In <strong>the</strong> meantime, Angel secured a copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> purported contract <strong>of</strong> lease he<br />
allegedly executed in favor <strong>of</strong> EMECO. On March 12, 1992, he filed a complaint for<br />
declaration <strong>of</strong> nullity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract <strong>of</strong> lease before <strong>the</strong> RTC alleging that his signature<br />
as lessor was a forgery.<br />
Meanwhile, G.Q. Garments sought <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine National Police<br />
(PNP). General Gerardo N. Flores, Deputy Director General and Chief Directorial<br />
Staff, issued a Memorandum to Superintendent Wenceslao A. Sobera<strong>no</strong>, ordering<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter to prevent his men from interfering with <strong>the</strong> pending civil case. Petitioner<br />
subsequently regained possession over <strong>the</strong> leased premises.<br />
Florenda and her group were undaunted. They went back to <strong>the</strong> place and<br />
ousted <strong>the</strong> guards and o<strong>the</strong>r personnel manning <strong>the</strong> corporation’s <strong>of</strong>fice, and even<br />
removed <strong>the</strong>ir equipment, and ransacked anew <strong>the</strong>ir raw materials, electric wire and<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r valuables inside.<br />
On April 20, 1992, petitioner instituted an action for damages and recovery <strong>of</strong><br />
possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property before <strong>the</strong> RTC <strong>of</strong> Cavite City, Branch 17, with Angel,<br />
EMECO and Florenda, as alternative defendants.<br />
On June 25, 1992, Angel and G.Q. Garments, as plaintiffs, filed a separate<br />
complaint for ejectment against Florenda before <strong>the</strong> MTC <strong>of</strong> Bacoor, Cavite. After<br />
due proceedings, <strong>the</strong> court ordered <strong>the</strong> eviction <strong>of</strong> Florenda and all those claiming<br />
<strong>the</strong> property in her behalf. The decision was appealed to <strong>the</strong> RTC. However, for<br />
failure to pay a supersedeas bond, <strong>the</strong> decision was executed and Florenda was evicted<br />
from <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
On November 26, 1993, <strong>the</strong> RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. N-<br />
5573, dismissing <strong>the</strong> complaint against all <strong>the</strong> alternative defendants without<br />
prejudice. It declared that plaintiff was entitled to damages, but it had to dismiss <strong>the</strong><br />
complaint because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pendency <strong>of</strong> Civil Case Nos. 92-699 and 92-1265. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> RTC resolved to deny <strong>the</strong> motion <strong>of</strong> petitioner prompting it to appeal to <strong>the</strong><br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals. Angel Miranda also appealed <strong>the</strong> decision, which was docketed<br />
as CA-G.R. CV No. 45567.<br />
On September 22, 1994, <strong>the</strong> RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 92-<br />
699 in favor <strong>of</strong> Angel and declared <strong>the</strong> contract <strong>of</strong> lease purportedly executed by<br />
him and EMECO void.<br />
On October 29, 2002, <strong>the</strong> CA rendered judgment reversing <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> RTC. It dismissed <strong>the</strong> complaint with prejudice against Angel Miranda and<br />
ordered Florenda Miranda to pay G.Q. Garments, Inc. <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong>: (1) P300,000.00<br />
as and for <strong>no</strong>minal damages; (2) P200,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and (3) To<br />
pay <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> suit.<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
G.Q. Garments filed a motion for <strong>the</strong> reconsideration. It averred that Angel<br />
was liable for damages under Article 1654(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Civil Code, under which, as<br />
lessor, he was obliged “to maintain <strong>the</strong> lessee in <strong>the</strong> peaceful and adequate enjoyment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease for <strong>the</strong> entire duration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract.” It likewise cited De la Cruz vs.<br />
Seminary <strong>of</strong> Manila where it was ruled that in case <strong>of</strong> legal disturbance, <strong>the</strong> lessor is<br />
liable for whatever <strong>the</strong> lessee has lost by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract and that<br />
it is <strong>the</strong> duty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessor to place <strong>the</strong> lessee in legal possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises and<br />
to maintain him in <strong>the</strong> peaceful possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property during <strong>the</strong> lifetime <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
lease. It insisted that <strong>the</strong> lessor who fails in <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> such obligation must<br />
indemnify <strong>the</strong> lessee for <strong>the</strong> damages occasioned <strong>the</strong>reby, <strong>the</strong> true measure <strong>of</strong> damages<br />
being <strong>the</strong> actual loss to <strong>the</strong> lessee arising from <strong>the</strong> breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract on <strong>the</strong> part<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessor. The motion was denied by <strong>the</strong> CA.<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r respondents are liable to petitioner for <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong><br />
P10,000,000.00 by way <strong>of</strong> actual damages?<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
To be entitled to an award <strong>of</strong> actual damages, it is necessary to prove <strong>the</strong><br />
precise amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loss with a reasonable degree <strong>of</strong> certainty, premised upon<br />
competent pro<strong>of</strong> and on <strong>the</strong> best evidence obtainable by <strong>the</strong> injured party to justify<br />
such award. The award <strong>of</strong> actual damages can<strong>no</strong>t be simply based on <strong>the</strong> mere<br />
allegation <strong>of</strong> a witness without any tangible claim, such as receipts or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
documentary pro<strong>of</strong>s to support such claim. Failing to satisfy <strong>the</strong> court that petitioner<br />
certainly suffered actual damages, its claim must <strong>no</strong>w fail.<br />
In this case, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>no</strong> question that, indeed, petitioner sustained damages<br />
because its equipment, machineries, and o<strong>the</strong>r valuables were taken, and its building<br />
was destroyed by respondent Florenda Miranda and her cohorts. Respondent Angel<br />
Miranda did <strong>no</strong>t cause <strong>the</strong> damages sustained by petitioner’s property. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> only evidence adduced by <strong>the</strong> petitioner to prove <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> said property is<br />
<strong>the</strong> testimony <strong>of</strong> Kho. No o<strong>the</strong>r pro<strong>of</strong> was adduced to establish <strong>the</strong> value or price <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> equipment, machineries and valuables taken by respondent Florenda Miranda,<br />
as well as <strong>the</strong> damage to petitioner’s building. The bare claim <strong>of</strong> Kho that <strong>the</strong><br />
petitioner sustained actual damages in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> P10,000,000.00 is utterly<br />
insufficient on which to anchor a judgment for actual damages in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong><br />
P10,000,000.00; it is speculative and merely a surmise.<br />
Issue 2: Whe<strong>the</strong>r Angel Miranda was liable for damages caused to<br />
petitioner’s property.<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
We agree with <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CA that respondent Angel Miranda is <strong>no</strong>t<br />
liable for damages caused to petitioner’s property. Article 1654 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Civil<br />
Code reads:<br />
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Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:<br />
(1) To deliver <strong>the</strong> thing which is <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract<br />
in such a condition as to render it fit for <strong>the</strong> use intended;<br />
(2) To make on <strong>the</strong> same during <strong>the</strong> lease all <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />
repairs in order to keep it suitable for <strong>the</strong> use to which it<br />
has been devoted, unless <strong>the</strong>re is a stipulation to <strong>the</strong> contrary;<br />
(3) To maintain <strong>the</strong> less in <strong>the</strong> peaceful and adequate<br />
enjoyment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease for <strong>the</strong> entire duration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> provision, a lessor is obliged to maintain petitioner’s peaceful and<br />
adequate enjoyment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises for <strong>the</strong> entire duration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lease. In case <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>no</strong>ncompliance with <strong>the</strong>se obligations, <strong>the</strong> lessee may ask for <strong>the</strong> rescission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
lease contract and indemnification for damages or only <strong>the</strong> latter, allowing <strong>the</strong> contract<br />
to remain in force.<br />
The trespass referred to in Article 1654, paragraph 3, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Civil Code,<br />
is legal trespass or perturbacion de mero derecho. The lessor is <strong>no</strong>t liable for <strong>the</strong> mere<br />
fact <strong>of</strong> a trespass or trespass in fact (perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leased property. The lessee shall have a direct action against <strong>the</strong> trespasser<br />
and <strong>no</strong>t against <strong>the</strong> lessor. As explained by <strong>the</strong> Court, if <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> trespass is <strong>no</strong>t<br />
accompanied or preceded by anything which reveals a really juridical intention on<br />
<strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> trespasser, in such wise that <strong>the</strong> lessee can only distinguish <strong>the</strong> material<br />
fact, such a trespass is merely a trespass in fact.<br />
The duty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessor to maintain <strong>the</strong> lessee in <strong>the</strong> peaceful and adequate<br />
enjoyment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leased property for <strong>the</strong> entire duration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contract is merely a<br />
warranty that <strong>the</strong> lessee shall <strong>no</strong>t be disturbed in having legal and <strong>no</strong>t physical<br />
possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
In this case, <strong>the</strong> trespass perpetrated by respondent Florenda Miranda and<br />
her confederates was merely trespass in fact. They forcibly entered <strong>the</strong> property<br />
and caused damage to <strong>the</strong> equipment and building <strong>of</strong> petitioner, because <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
refused to enter into a contract <strong>of</strong> lease with EMECO over <strong>the</strong> property upon<br />
respondent Florenda Miranda’s failure to present respondent Angel Miranda to<br />
sign <strong>the</strong> contract <strong>of</strong> lease. It turned out that respondent Florenda Miranda attempted<br />
to hoodwink petitioner and forged respondent Angel Miranda’s signature on <strong>the</strong><br />
contract <strong>of</strong> lease she showed to petitioner. It appears that respondent Florenda<br />
Miranda tried to coerce <strong>the</strong> petitioner into executing a contract <strong>of</strong> lease with EMECO<br />
over <strong>the</strong> property, only to be rebuffed by <strong>the</strong> petitioner.<br />
Petitioner can<strong>no</strong>t rely on <strong>the</strong> ruling <strong>of</strong> this Court in De la Cruz vs. Seminary <strong>of</strong><br />
Manila, because, in this case, respondent Angel Miranda had <strong>the</strong> legal power to<br />
place petitioner in <strong>the</strong> peaceful possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property upon <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
contract <strong>of</strong> lease between him and petitioner; in fact, actual possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property<br />
was placed in <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> petitioner, enabling it to start <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> its<br />
factory.<br />
<br />
Julia-ay vs. Estate <strong>of</strong> Buenaventura<br />
G.R. No. 149788, May 31, 2006<br />
Starting in 1995, Romeo Julag-ay leased an apartment owned by Felimon<br />
Buenaventura, Sr. On October 15, 1996, Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. died intestate,<br />
survived by his two children, Teresita and Felimon Buenaventura, Jr. Felimon<br />
Buenaventura, Jr. took over <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property. During his<br />
administration, Julag-ay failed to pay rentals covering <strong>the</strong> whole year <strong>of</strong> 1998.<br />
Felimon Buenaventura, Jr. died on December 17, 1998. Teresita assumed <strong>the</strong><br />
administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property. On February 28, 1999, Julag-ay paid Teresita rental<br />
payments for <strong>the</strong> month <strong>of</strong> January and February 1999, but made <strong>no</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
payments.<br />
In April 1999, Teresita referred <strong>the</strong> matter to <strong>the</strong> Lupon Tagapamayapa for<br />
conciliation. During <strong>the</strong> proceedings, Julag-ay ack<strong>no</strong>wledged that he had <strong>no</strong>t paid his<br />
monthly rentals and promised to pay in installments. Despite his promise, he still<br />
failed to pay.<br />
On April 5, 1999, Teresita demanded that Julag-ay vacate <strong>the</strong> leased premises.<br />
Julag-ay refused. She <strong>the</strong>n filed a complaint for ejectment asserting that <strong>the</strong> estate is<br />
<strong>the</strong> lawful owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property and that <strong>the</strong> estate had been deprived <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> property because <strong>of</strong> Julag-ay’s refusal to vacate <strong>the</strong> premises, and that it had<br />
suffered damages because <strong>of</strong> his refusal to pay arrears in rents due.<br />
Julag-ay answered that Teresita had <strong>no</strong> personality to sue since she was <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong><br />
legal representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Estate <strong>of</strong> Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. He also asserted<br />
that <strong>the</strong> said estate had <strong>no</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> action to eject him from <strong>the</strong> property, as it was<br />
owned by <strong>the</strong> Estate <strong>of</strong> Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, which was under <strong>the</strong><br />
administration <strong>of</strong> Resurreccion A. Bihis. He claimed that he did <strong>no</strong>t owe Teresita<br />
any arrears in rent payments as he had already paid rent to Resurreccion A. Bihis.<br />
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Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court Decisions on Property and Land Registration<br />
Issue 1: Whe<strong>the</strong>r Teresita had legal personality to file <strong>the</strong> ejectment<br />
case.<br />
Ruling: Yes.<br />
The evidence is clear that after Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. and his son,<br />
Buenaventura, Jr. died, Teresita was appointed as administratrix <strong>of</strong> his estate. As<br />
administratrix <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> estate, Teresita has <strong>the</strong> unquestionable personality to file an<br />
ejectment suit against Julag-ay. Likewise <strong>the</strong> records show that Julag-ay dealt with<br />
Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. while he was still alive, and, <strong>the</strong>reafter, with his k<strong>no</strong>wn<br />
children, Buenaventura, Jr. and Teresita. He paid <strong>the</strong> rentals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property to<br />
<strong>the</strong>m. Petitioner’s promissory <strong>no</strong>te and his payment <strong>of</strong> two months’ rents to Teresita<br />
are eloquent pro<strong>of</strong>s <strong>of</strong> his recognition <strong>of</strong> Teresita as Felimon Buenaventura, Sr.’s<br />
lawful successor. In this connection, Article 1436 CC provides:<br />
Article 1436. A lessee or bailee is estopped from asserting title to <strong>the</strong><br />
thing leased or received, as against <strong>the</strong> lessor or bailor.<br />
In relation <strong>the</strong>reto, Rule 131, Section 2(b) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rules <strong>of</strong> Court provides:<br />
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions – The following are instances <strong>of</strong> conclusive<br />
presumptions:<br />
x x x<br />
(b) The tenant is <strong>no</strong>t permitted to deny <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> his landlord at <strong>the</strong><br />
time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commencement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relations <strong>of</strong> landlord and tenant between<br />
<strong>the</strong>m.<br />
These provisions bar Julag-ay from contesting <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> his landlord, i.e., <strong>the</strong><br />
Estate or its representative. This Court has consistently held that lessees who have<br />
had undisturbed possession for <strong>the</strong> entire term under <strong>the</strong> lease, like Julag-ay, are<br />
estopped to deny <strong>the</strong>ir landlord’s title, or to assert a better title <strong>no</strong>t only in <strong>the</strong>mselves,<br />
but also in some third person, while <strong>the</strong>y remain in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leased premises<br />
and until <strong>the</strong>y surrender possession to <strong>the</strong> landlord. It is <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong> significance that<br />
Julag-ay is <strong>no</strong>t claiming title to <strong>the</strong> property for himself. Estoppel still applies, as he<br />
enjoyed <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property without interruption from 1995.<br />
VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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Eduardo A. Labitag<br />
Issue 2: Whe<strong>the</strong>r Julag-ay may raise <strong>the</strong> legality <strong>of</strong> Teresita’s adoption<br />
by Felimon Buenaventura, Sr.?<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
It is futile for Julag-ay to raise <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legality <strong>of</strong> Teresita’s adoption<br />
by Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. These proceedings are <strong>no</strong>t <strong>the</strong> proper venue to ventilate<br />
<strong>the</strong> legality <strong>of</strong> her adoption. As a rule, ejectment proceedings are limited to <strong>the</strong><br />
solitary issue <strong>of</strong> legality <strong>of</strong> possession. This issue affects <strong>the</strong> peace <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community<br />
and should be resolved with dispatch. It should <strong>no</strong>t be delayed by peripheral issues<br />
appropriate to be resolved by o<strong>the</strong>r courts.<br />
Issue 3: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> appellate court erred when it relied on <strong>the</strong> affidavit<br />
executed jointly by Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura and Felimon<br />
Buenaventura, Sr. to prove <strong>the</strong>ir co-ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property in question?<br />
Ruling: No.<br />
It is unprocedural to rule on <strong>the</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject property. To reiterate,<br />
<strong>the</strong> only issue in ejectment proceedings is <strong>the</strong> legality <strong>of</strong> Julag-ay’s physical possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises - - - his possession de facto and <strong>no</strong>t his possession de jure. Thus, we<br />
have ruled that it is <strong>of</strong> <strong>no</strong> moment that at <strong>the</strong> time an action for unlawful detainer is<br />
under litigation, <strong>the</strong>re is a<strong>no</strong><strong>the</strong>r action respecting <strong>the</strong> same property and <strong>the</strong> same<br />
parties involving <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> ownership. The rights asserted and <strong>the</strong> reliefs prayed<br />
for are different in <strong>the</strong> two cases. Consequently, it is untenable for Julag-ay to demand<br />
that Teresita should first prove herself to be <strong>the</strong> true and lawful owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property<br />
before she asserts her right to its possession. It is settled that an action for unlawful<br />
detainer may be filed even by one who is <strong>no</strong>t an owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> property in dispute.<br />
<br />
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Survey <strong>of</strong> 2006 Supreme Court Decisions on Property and Land Registration<br />
<strong>Integrated</strong> <strong>Bar</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippines<br />
ABELARDO C. ESTRADA<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Luzon<br />
ERNESTO A. GONZALES, JR.<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Central Luzon<br />
MARCIAL M. MAGSINO<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Greater Manila<br />
BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR.<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Bicolandia<br />
TOMAS N. PRADO<br />
National Secretary<br />
JAIME M. VIBAR<br />
National Executive Director<br />
ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL<br />
National Director for <strong>Bar</strong> Discipline<br />
MARIA TERESITA C. SISON GO<br />
Assistant National Treasurer<br />
ROGELIO V. GARCIA<br />
Deputy Director for <strong>Bar</strong> Discipline<br />
RODOLFO G. URBIZTONDO<br />
Deputy General Counsel & Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff<br />
EDUARDO A. LABITAG<br />
Managing Editor, IBP <strong>Journal</strong><br />
MANUEL P. LEGASPI<br />
Presidential Assistant for Chapter Affairs<br />
BOARD OF GOVERNORS<br />
(2007-2009)<br />
FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA<br />
Chairman<br />
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN<br />
Vice Chairman & Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Luzon<br />
NATIONAL OFFICERS<br />
(July 2007 - June 2009)<br />
FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA<br />
National President<br />
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN<br />
Executive Vice President<br />
EVERGISTO S. ESCALON<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Eastern Visayas<br />
RAYMOND JORGE A. MERCADO<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Western Visayas<br />
RAMON EDISON C. BATACAN<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Eastern Mindanao<br />
CARLOS L. VALDEZ, JR.<br />
Gover<strong>no</strong>r for Western Mindanao<br />
ESTER SISON CRUZ<br />
National Treasurer<br />
ROSARIO T. SETIAS-REYES<br />
National Director for Legal Aid<br />
DOMINIC C.M. SOLIS<br />
Assistant National Secretary<br />
DEAN PACIFICO A. AGABIN<br />
General Counsel<br />
ROAN I. LIBARIOS<br />
Editor-in-Chief, IBP <strong>Journal</strong><br />
JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO<br />
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HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.<br />
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VOLUME <strong>33</strong> NUMBER 2 (SEPTEMBER <strong>2008</strong>)<br />
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