Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
VII THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT TESTIMONY THAT LAWRENCE KELLY OFFERED A WITNESS $100 TO TESTIFY THE WEST SIDE WILMAS "GET ALONG" WITH AFRICAN-AMERICANS. THIS ERROR DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A RELIABLE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS REQUIRED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN A CAPITAL CASE The trial court erred in overruling the defense objection to the testimony of prosecution witness Glenn Phillips to the effect that Lawrence Kelly offered Warren Battle $100 to testify that members of the West Side Wilmas Gang "get along" with African-Americans. A. Appellants Have Not Forfeited This Claim. Respondent claims the constitutional aspects of this issue are forfeited because they were not raised at trial. (RB at p. 197.) Under the principles discussed more fully above (ante, at pp. 21-27), this issue is not waived. Appellate courts have the power of to review an issue in spite of a party's failure to perfectly preserve that issue; there is an exception to the waiver rule regarding issues relating to the deprivation of fundamental, constitutional rights; and there is another exception to the waiver rule that provides that an objection may be excused when the issue involved is a pure question of law. Finally, because, as noted above, whether the waiver rule is to be applied is largely a question of the appellate court's discretion, this court should address the constitutional aspects of this issue. B. Phillips' Testimony Was Not Proper Rebuttal Evidence. The first flaw in respondent's argument is respondent's failure to address the rule discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief (AOB at p. 158), that "[a] party 84
may not cross-examine a witness upon collateral matters for the purpose of eliciting something to be contradicted. [Citations] This is especially so where the matter the party seeks to elicit would be inadmissible were it not for the fortuitous circumstance that the witness lied in response to the party's questions." (People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744.) This is precisely what occurred in this case. Kelly was called by the defense to present testimony as to several facts, including: the fact that appellant personally had no racist tendencies; the fact that all the gang members had access to the rifle used in the murders; and the fact that prosecution witness Joshua Contreras was frequently under the influence of methamphetamine. (See AOB at p. 155.) On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Kelly if he had offered someone money to testify that the West Side Wilmas get along with African-Americans. Kelly denied that he had done so. (lORT 2413.) Thereafter, the prosecution called Glen Phillips to testify that he heard Kelly offer Warren Battle, a African-American employee of Phillips, $100 to testify that ''we'' get along with African-Americans. (13RT 2978-2979.) Obviously, the only reason why the prosecutor originally asked Kelly about this attempt to purchase testimony was to get in the testimony of Phillips after Kelly denied the fact. Equally obvious is the fact that had Kelly not denied this fact, Phillips' testimony on this point would not have been admissible on its own; it became admissible solely because of Kelly's denial. Because Kelly's offer to Phillips was not an issue in this case, it is a classic collateral issue. Therefore, this is exactly within the rule explained in People v. Lavergne. Respondent also dismisses the likelihood of potential confusion caused by this evidence in a conclusory manner. (RB at p. 127.) However, as explained in Appellant's Opening Brief (AOB at pp. 161-162), there actually was demonstrable confusion when the prosecutor misstated the purpose for which this evidence was offered, arguing that it was offered to prove Kelly tried to bribe Warren Battle to testify falsely, when, in fact, the evidence was originally offered not for the truth of 85
- Page 47 and 48: Indeed, in this case the instructio
- Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
- Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
- Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
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- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
- Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 105 and 106: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
- Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
- Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
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- Page 143 and 144: prospective jurors who were found t
- Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
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VII<br />
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE<br />
PROSECUTION TO PRESENT TESTIMONY THAT<br />
LAWRENCE KELLY OFFERED A WITNESS $100<br />
TO TESTIFY THE WEST SIDE WILMAS "GET ALONG"<br />
WITH AFRICAN-AMERICANS. THIS ERROR DEPRIVED<br />
APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A<br />
RELIABLE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS<br />
REQUIRED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT<br />
IN A CAPITAL CASE<br />
The trial court erred in overruling the defense objection to the testimony <strong>of</strong><br />
prosecution witness Glenn Phillips to the effect that Lawrence Kelly <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
Warren Battle $100 to testify that members <strong>of</strong> the West Side Wilmas Gang "get<br />
along" with African-Americans.<br />
A. <strong>Appellant</strong>s Have Not Forfeited This Claim.<br />
Respondent claims the constitutional aspects <strong>of</strong> this issue are forfeited<br />
because they were not raised at trial. (RB at p. 197.) Under the principles<br />
discussed more fully above (ante, at pp. 21-27), this issue is not waived.<br />
Appellate courts have the power <strong>of</strong> to review an issue in spite <strong>of</strong> a party's failure<br />
to perfectly preserve that issue; there is an exception to the waiver rule regarding<br />
issues relating to the deprivation <strong>of</strong> fundamental, constitutional rights; and there is<br />
another exception to the waiver rule that provides that an objection may be<br />
excused when the issue involved is a pure question <strong>of</strong> law. Finally, because, as<br />
noted above, whether the waiver rule is to be applied is largely a question <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appellate court's discretion, this court should address the constitutional aspects <strong>of</strong><br />
this issue.<br />
B. Phillips' Testimony Was Not Proper Rebuttal Evidence.<br />
The first flaw in respondent's argument is respondent's failure to address<br />
the rule discussed in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong> (AOB at p. 158), that "[a] party<br />
84