Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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THE JURY FAILED TO FIND THE DEGREE OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN COUNTS ONE AND TWO, AND BY OPERATION OF PENAL CODE SECTION 1157, BOTH OF THE MURDERS OF WHICH APPELLANTS WERE CONVICTED ARE THEREFORE OF THE SECOND DEGREE, FOR WHICH NEITHERTHE DEATH PENALTY NOR LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE MAY BE IMPOSED VI When a crime is divided into degrees, upon the failure of a jury to find the degree ofthe crime, Penal Code section 1157 mandates that the crime is deemed to be ofthe lesser degree. The failure ofthe jury in this case to designate "the degree" of the crime requires a reversal of the conviction for first degree murder and the consequences which flow from a conviction for that degree ofmurder, namely, the death penalty and/or life in prison with the possibility ofparole. A. This court Should Reconsider The Holding OfPeople v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614 In disputing the argument presented by appellant in his Opening Brief, respondent argues that the instant case is indistinguishable from San Nicolas, a fact which appellant originally recognized in his opening brief. (RB at p. 93, AOB at p. 118.) The problem with the respondent's argument is that appellant presented numerous reasons why this court should reconsider San Nicolas, and respondent has not addressed any ofthose arguments other than to urge this court to rely on a recent precedent which reversed a long history of strict adherence to the letter of section 1157. Briefly, the reasons for overruling San Nicolas included the following: . The jury is empowered to fmd a lesser degree of guilt than the facts or the instructions establish. This stems from the power inherent in the jury of fmding the defendant guilty of a lesser degree ofthe offense than that shown by the uncontradicted evidence, an essential element ofthe right to a 78

jury trial. (People v. Gottman (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 775, 780, see AOB at pp. 120-122.) · Unlike People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Ca1.4th 896, where the only theory of the case was felony murder, which is necessarily fIrst degree murder, and where the jury had no option but to convict for fIrst degree murder or acquit, the jury in this case had the option ofconvicting ofa lesser offense. (See AOB at pp. 127-131.) In extending Mendoza to cover all types of murder, the San Nicolas court overlooked this unique aspect of felony murder. · San Nicolas is inconsistent with the rule that criminal juries render general verdicts, as opposed to special verdicts where the jury fmds the facts and the court determines the conclusion. As explained, this is an inherent aspect of the jury's inherent power to acquit a defendant against the weight of the evidence and "in the teeth of both the law and facts." (See AOB at pp. 134-137.) · The plain language of section 1157 requires the jury to fmd the degree ofthe offense, notjust the facts, a fact which raises numerous issues of statutory construction not addressed by either San Nicolas or respondent. (see AOB at pp. 138-140.) · Numerous other rules ofstatutory interpretation support the position that San Nicolas was incorrectly decided. (See AOB at pp. 141-145.) In summary, in spite of the fact that appellant has demonstrated numerous flaws with the reasoning of San Nicolas, respondent has not addressed any of those contentions. This court should reconsider San Nicolas in light of the arguments presented in Appellant's Opening Brief. B. Other Arguments Presented By Respondent Are Unavailing. Other aspects ofrespondent's arguments are also unavailing. For example, respondent argues that ''when the foreperson signed the verdict form fmding 79

jury trial. (People v. Gottman (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 775, 780, see AOB at<br />

pp. 120-122.)<br />

· Unlike People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Ca1.4th 896, where the only<br />

theory <strong>of</strong> the case was felony murder, which is necessarily fIrst degree<br />

murder, and where the jury had no option but to convict for fIrst degree<br />

murder or acquit, the jury in this case had the option <strong>of</strong>convicting <strong>of</strong>a lesser<br />

<strong>of</strong>fense. (See AOB at pp. 127-131.) In extending Mendoza to cover all<br />

types <strong>of</strong> murder, the San Nicolas court overlooked this unique aspect <strong>of</strong><br />

felony murder.<br />

· San Nicolas is inconsistent with the rule that criminal juries render<br />

general verdicts, as opposed to special verdicts where the jury fmds the facts<br />

and the court determines the conclusion. As explained, this is an inherent<br />

aspect <strong>of</strong> the jury's inherent power to acquit a defendant against the weight<br />

<strong>of</strong> the evidence and "in the teeth <strong>of</strong> both the law and facts." (See AOB at<br />

pp. 134-137.)<br />

· The plain language <strong>of</strong> section 1157 requires the jury to fmd the<br />

degree <strong>of</strong>the <strong>of</strong>fense, notjust the facts, a fact which raises numerous issues<br />

<strong>of</strong> statutory construction not addressed by either San Nicolas or respondent.<br />

(see AOB at pp. 138-140.)<br />

· Numerous other rules <strong>of</strong>statutory interpretation support the position<br />

that San Nicolas was incorrectly decided. (See AOB at pp. 141-145.)<br />

In summary, in spite <strong>of</strong> the fact that appellant has demonstrated numerous<br />

flaws with the reasoning <strong>of</strong> San Nicolas, respondent has not addressed any <strong>of</strong><br />

those contentions. This court should reconsider San Nicolas in light <strong>of</strong> the<br />

arguments presented in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong>.<br />

B. Other Arguments Presented By Respondent Are Unavailing.<br />

Other aspects <strong>of</strong>respondent's arguments are also unavailing. For example,<br />

respondent argues that ''when the foreperson signed the verdict form fmding<br />

79

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