Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
defective instruction that omitted the elements of the enhancement, that finding must fall. Accordingly, the gang benefit enhancement finding cannot support the personal firearm use enhancement, which consequently must also be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F3d 907, 908-909.) Respondent argues there was no gang benefit instructional error and therefore no corresponding prejudice requiring reversal of the gun use finding. (RB at p. 175.) In Argument III of this brief, appellant has explained why respondent's claim regarding the gang benefit instructional error must fail. Because that is the case, the gun use enhancements are not sufficiently supported by evidence the crimes were committed for a gang purpose and the gun use enhancements must fail. I. The Instructional Errors Were Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Respondent presents two pro forma conclusory arguments regarding prejudice. Specifically, respondent contends that because the evidence was "overwhelming" that appellant was subject to the gun use enhancement regardless of who fired the fatal shots, any error was harmless under the standards of either People v. Watson (1956) 42 Cal.2d 818 or Chapman v. California (1987) 386 U.S. 18. (RB 194-195.) Alternatively, respondent reiterates its responses to appellant's contention and argues that, as to the gun use charge, there was no instructional error; defective verdict forms; improper burden-shifting; improper prosecutorial argument; or violation of a unanimity duty, and as a result no prejudice and consequence related to guilt and penalty phase verdicts. (RB 195.) Appellant respectfully submits that respondent's failure to engage the prejudice discussion set forth in the opening brief is an implied recognition of the 76
merits of appellant's claim. (AOB at pp. 116-117.) Furthermore, contrary to respondent's contention, the evidence was not overwhelming that both defendants were the principals. (RB at p. 195.) As the prosecutor admitted, he had not proven which ofthe defendants fired the fatal shots. Therefore, the evidence may have been overwhelming that one defendant was a principal, but was at best inconclusive as to whether both were principals or one was a principal and the other an aider and abettor. Because the jury did not properly determine facts that were essential for the verdict, a reversal ofthe judgment is required. 77
- Page 39 and 40: In People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Ca
- Page 41 and 42: Finally, it must be noted that the
- Page 43 and 44: B. The Constitutional Issues Are No
- Page 45 and 46: turn relied on the language from Wi
- Page 47 and 48: Indeed, in this case the instructio
- Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
- Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
- Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
- Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
- Page 89: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 105 and 106: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
- Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
- Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
defective instruction that omitted the elements <strong>of</strong> the enhancement, that finding<br />
must fall. Accordingly, the gang benefit enhancement finding cannot support the<br />
personal firearm use enhancement, which consequently must also be reversed<br />
because it is not supported by substantial evidence. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979)<br />
443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690; Taylor v.<br />
Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F3d 907, 908-909.)<br />
Respondent argues there was no gang benefit instructional error and<br />
therefore no corresponding prejudice requiring reversal <strong>of</strong> the gun use finding.<br />
(RB at p. 175.) In Argument III <strong>of</strong> this brief, appellant has explained why<br />
respondent's claim regarding the gang benefit instructional error must fail.<br />
Because that is the case, the gun use enhancements are not sufficiently supported<br />
by evidence the crimes were committed for a gang purpose and the gun use<br />
enhancements must fail.<br />
I. The Instructional Errors Were Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt<br />
Respondent presents two pro forma conclusory arguments regarding<br />
prejudice. Specifically, respondent contends that because the evidence was<br />
"overwhelming" that appellant was subject to the gun use enhancement regardless<br />
<strong>of</strong> who fired the fatal shots, any error was harmless under the standards <strong>of</strong> either<br />
People v. Watson (1956) 42 Cal.2d 818 or Chapman v. <strong>California</strong> (1987) 386 U.S.<br />
18. (RB 194-195.)<br />
Alternatively, respondent reiterates its responses to appellant's contention<br />
and argues that, as to the gun use charge, there was no instructional error;<br />
defective verdict forms; improper burden-shifting; improper prosecutorial<br />
argument; or violation <strong>of</strong> a unanimity duty, and as a result no prejudice and<br />
consequence related to guilt and penalty phase verdicts. (RB 195.)<br />
<strong>Appellant</strong> respectfully submits that respondent's failure to engage the<br />
prejudice discussion set forth in the opening brief is an implied recognition <strong>of</strong> the<br />
76