Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Because nothing in the record establishes that the personal weapon use enhancements were actually based on a valid ground, because the prosecution presented its case to the jury on the legally incorrect theory, and because nothing in other properly given instructions corrected the mistake about the law, a reversal of the enhancements is required. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 63-71; People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1125-1126, 1128.) F. The Impact Of The Instructional Errors Was Exacerbated By The Trial Court's Instruction That The Jury Was Required To Use Verdict Forms That Failed To Reflect The Legally Available Options And By The Fact That The Language Set Forth In The Verdicts Conformed To The Legally Incorrect Theory Set Forth In The Court's Instruction Appellant has previously discussed the deficiencies in the language of the verdict form (Ante, at pp. 5-7, AOB at pp. 33-34), and the fact that the verdict form led to an improper finding ofpersonal use of the firearm on the part of both defendants. Respondent acknowledges the verdict forms were "phrased to indicate each appellant personally discharged a firearm" (RB 190), but contends the defects in the verdicts forms were harmless because the prosecutor argued the jury could find the enhancement true on fmding "each appellant was a principal in the commission ofthe murders." (RB 190.) What the prosecutor actually told the jury was a little different than respondent's representation. The prosecutor told the jury: Now, this [proof of the gang enhancement allegation] is also important for another reason. The last allegation. Penal Code section 12022.53 (d). This is the gun allegation. That gun allegation requires that I prove that a defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused someone's death. Obviously, it proximately caused someone's death. Renesha and Edward. You know this was intentional. This wasn't an accident. 72
Then we have the words "personal use." I told you, I don't know how long ago it was now I've been going on, that I did not prove to you which ofthe two defendants personally used a gun. So you're going to say, "I'm going to find that allegation not true, because Mr. Millington [the prosecutor] did not prove who personally shot the gun." But if you look in that instruction, I think it's 17.19, there's a paragraph that is important. It's towards the bottom. What it says is that gang members are vicariously liable. They are all liable for that personal use if that gun has been intentionally discharged and proximately caused death and there is a gang allegation that has been pled and proven. I've told you I pled and proved that, because I proved that Dominic Martinez, Ruben Figueroa - we had Julie Rodriguez. So that gang allegation is proven. Because of that gang allegation, they are both liable for that personal use of the gun. So I don't want that word "personal" to throw you off. When you go back there and it says, "We, the jury, find the allegation that the defendants personally, intentionally used a firearm ..." dab, dab, dab, ''to be true or not true," please circle the true. The reason being is because the law says that they are both liable ifit's a gang allegation proven. (14RT 3222-3223; AOB 57-58.) In short, and contrary to respondent's representation, the prosecutor expressly told the jury that they could find both defendants liable for the "personal" use of the gun because both were proved to be gang members. The prosecutor never informed the jurors that they could find both defendants vicariously liable ifboth were found to be principals. Respondent also argues that because the evidence was "overwhelming," "the wording of the verdict forms was immaterial since the verdicts unmistakably signaled the jury's intention to find both appellants liable for the gun use." (RB at p. 190.) This is a curious argument to make about the weight of the evidence in this case in which the trial prosecutor repeatedly conceded he had failed to prove the identity of the shooter. Respondent's related contention that the incorrect wording of the verdict forms is immaterial because the jury's findings reveal the 73
- Page 37 and 38: not present them to the trial court
- Page 39 and 40: In People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Ca
- Page 41 and 42: Finally, it must be noted that the
- Page 43 and 44: B. The Constitutional Issues Are No
- Page 45 and 46: turn relied on the language from Wi
- Page 47 and 48: Indeed, in this case the instructio
- Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
- Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
- Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
- Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 105 and 106: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
- Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
Because nothing in the record establishes that the personal weapon use<br />
enhancements were actually based on a valid ground, because the prosecution<br />
presented its case to the jury on the legally incorrect theory, and because nothing<br />
in other properly given instructions corrected the mistake about the law, a reversal<br />
<strong>of</strong> the enhancements is required. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 63-71;<br />
People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1125-1126, 1128.)<br />
F. The Impact Of The Instructional Errors Was Exacerbated By The Trial<br />
Court's Instruction That The Jury Was Required To Use Verdict Forms That<br />
Failed To Reflect The Legally Available Options And By The Fact That The<br />
Language Set Forth In The Verdicts Conformed To The Legally Incorrect<br />
Theory Set Forth In The Court's Instruction<br />
<strong>Appellant</strong> has previously discussed the deficiencies in the language <strong>of</strong> the<br />
verdict form (Ante, at pp. 5-7, AOB at pp. 33-34), and the fact that the verdict<br />
form led to an improper finding <strong>of</strong>personal use <strong>of</strong> the firearm on the part <strong>of</strong> both<br />
defendants.<br />
Respondent acknowledges the verdict forms were "phrased to indicate each<br />
appellant personally discharged a firearm" (RB 190), but contends the defects in<br />
the verdicts forms were harmless because the prosecutor argued the jury could find<br />
the enhancement true on fmding "each appellant was a principal in the<br />
commission <strong>of</strong>the murders." (RB 190.)<br />
What the prosecutor actually told the jury was a little different than<br />
respondent's representation. The prosecutor told the jury:<br />
Now, this [pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the gang enhancement allegation] is also<br />
important for another reason. The last allegation. Penal Code<br />
section 12022.53 (d). This is the gun allegation.<br />
That gun allegation requires that I prove that a defendant<br />
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately<br />
caused someone's death. Obviously, it proximately caused<br />
someone's death. Renesha and Edward.<br />
You know this was intentional. This wasn't an accident.<br />
72