Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
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doubt that the defendant, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted any actor in the<br />
commission <strong>of</strong> the murder in the first degree, or with reckless indifference to<br />
human life and as a major participant, aided and abetted the crime. Thus, under<br />
this instruction the jury could find the special circumstance to be true if it found<br />
merely reckless indifference to life, when in fact it was required to find an intent to<br />
kill.<br />
Because the prosecutor expressly acknowledged the fact that he had not<br />
proven who the actual killer was, it is not possible that the jury could have made<br />
the finding that appellant was the actual killer. Therefore, this instruction allowed<br />
the jury to convict on two theories, one <strong>of</strong> which was improper and therefore<br />
violative <strong>of</strong>the principles explained in People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Ca1.4th 1116 and<br />
subsequent cases. (See AOB at pp. 90-93.) There is nothing in the verdict form<br />
which would make it possible to determine which theory the jury relied upon, and<br />
reversal is therefore compelled.<br />
B. The Doctrine OfInvited Error Does Not Bar This Claim<br />
Respondent argues that the doctrine <strong>of</strong> invited error prohibits appellants<br />
from raising this issue. Respondent states, "<strong>Appellant</strong>s never requested that<br />
CALJIC No. 8.80.1 be redacted. It was given at their request. (13RT 3045; 37CT<br />
10778)" (RB at p. 177.) Respondent asserts that because appellants did not raise<br />
the claims based on the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments below,<br />
appellants are prohibited from arguing these constitutional errors at this stage.<br />
(RB at p. 177.)<br />
Neither <strong>of</strong>these contentions have merit.<br />
First, as noted previously (Ante, at pp. 29-31.), in order for the doctrine <strong>of</strong><br />
invited error to apply it must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and<br />
not out <strong>of</strong> ignorance or mistake. The duty to properly instruct the jury belongs to<br />
the court, not to defense counsel, and counsel's mere acquiescence or failure to<br />
object to an incorrect instruction does not trigger the invited error doctrine. (See<br />
54