Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
In another apparent attempt to justify the finding that both defendants fired the rifle, respondent states, "At any rate, during (sic) or seconds after Robinson was fatally shot from an unknown distance, while seated in the driver's seat ofher parked car, Fuller was fatally shot in her left upper shoulder and right 'back' area." (RB at p. 118.) However, rather than support the conclusion oftwo shooters, these facts actually prove that there was only one shooter. This conclusion follows from the fact that, as respondent concedes, "during or seconds after" Robinson was shot, Fuller was also shot. IfFuller was shot "during" the time Robinson was shot, it necessarily means there was only one shooter. Even ifFuller was shot "seconds after" Robinson, it would still be far more likely that only one person fired the only weapon, rather than one person shooting Robinson and quickly handing the gun to the second shooter who then must take aim and shoot the second victim. In summary, while it is perhaps not "factually impossible" for there to have been two shooters, it is extremely unlikely that more than one person fired all the shots, and even the facts recited by respondent tend to support the conclusion of one shooter. E. The Difference Between Vicarious and Personal Liability. Another flaw that runs through respondent's analysis of this issue is respondent's failure to understand the difference between there being sufficient evidence to find appellant subject to vicarious liability under the enhancement of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e) and sufficient evidence that both appellant and Nunez were the actual shooters. Respondent also fails to understand the different legal and moral culpability that attaches when a vicariously liable defendant is mistakenly found personally liable. Briefly, a finding that there is evidence to support appellant's vicarious liability under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e) only shows that someone fired the rifle, that appellant was a principal, and that appellant violated section 186.22. There may be sufficient evidence ofthese three facts for the jury to render 18
a finding ofliability, but that does not equate to a finding ofpersonal use. Likewise, the actual killer bears more moral opprobrium than one who is only guilty vicariously. As explained in Appellant's Opening Brief, a jury will be more inclined to sentence an actual killer to death, as the jury did in this case. (AOB at pp. 48-52.) Most importantly, in this case Judge Ong relied on the fact that appellant was the actual shooter in imposing the death penalty. (18RT 4596, 18RT 4596-4597.) The jury's imposition of the death penalty and Judge Ong's on-the-record statement establish prejudice from the erroneous finding. Respondent contends that appellants' arguments regarding the Improper wording of the jury form fail if this court determines that the jury received sufficient proofto find that either defendant could have fired the gun, regardless of who actually fired the gun. (RB at p. 110.) Once again, however, respondent fails to understand the nature of appellant's argument. Appellant acknowledges that there was sufficient evidence that "either" defendant fired the gun. For the purpose of imposing the sentence enhancement contained in section 12022.53, subdivision (d), the fact that "either" defendant shot the gun is sufficient. However, a finding that "either" defendant fired the gun is quite different than a finding that both fired the gun. It is the latter finding that creates the problem here because of the increased moral culpability that attaches to appellant if he IS incorrectly perceived to be an actual shooter. Similarly, respondent argues that there is overwhelming evidence to find each defendant liable for the weapon enhancement on the grounds ofthe discharge of the firearm. (RB at pp. 110-111.) However, appellant has never disputed this, and once again respondent has misunderstood the thrust of appellant's argument. Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) allows for the imposition ofthe enhancement on a defendant who personally uses a gun, and subdivision (e)(1) then allows for the enhancement to be imposed on a person even if he did not personally fire the weapon if that person is a principal in the charged crime and that person also violated section 186.22(b)(1), the street gang enhancement. Therefore, as 19
- Page 2 and 3: TABLE OF CONTENTS APPELLANT WILLIAM
- Page 4 and 5: 2. The Pleadings Failed To NotifY A
- Page 6 and 7: VI THE JURy FAILED TO FIND THE DEGR
- Page 8 and 9: C. Standard OfReview And Prejudice
- Page 10 and 11: XIII APPELLANT JOINS IN ALL ISSUES
- Page 12 and 13: Mitchell v. Esparza (2003) 540 U.S.
- Page 14 and 15: People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4t
- Page 16 and 17: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 2
- Page 18 and 19: CALlIC No. 8.31 passim CALJIC No. 8
- Page 20 and 21: ARGUMENTS GUILT PHASE ISSUES I THE
- Page 22 and 23: the facts indicate that only one de
- Page 24 and 25: form finding "personal use" to have
- Page 26 and 27: 57 Cal.AppAth 871, 877; 9 Witkin, C
- Page 28 and 29: the weapon. Without again recountin
- Page 30 and 31: Respondent notes that between the m
- Page 34 and 35: appellant has repeatedly said, the
- Page 37 and 38: not present them to the trial court
- Page 39 and 40: In People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Ca
- Page 41 and 42: Finally, it must be noted that the
- Page 43 and 44: B. The Constitutional Issues Are No
- Page 45 and 46: turn relied on the language from Wi
- Page 47 and 48: Indeed, in this case the instructio
- Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
- Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
- Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
- Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
a finding <strong>of</strong>liability, but that does not equate to a finding <strong>of</strong>personal use.<br />
Likewise, the actual killer bears more moral opprobrium than one who is<br />
only guilty vicariously. As explained in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong>, a jury will be<br />
more inclined to sentence an actual killer to death, as the jury did in this case.<br />
(AOB at pp. 48-52.) Most importantly, in this case Judge Ong relied on the fact<br />
that appellant was the actual shooter in imposing the death penalty. (18RT 4596,<br />
18RT 4596-4597.) The jury's imposition <strong>of</strong> the death penalty and Judge Ong's<br />
on-the-record statement establish prejudice from the erroneous finding.<br />
Respondent contends that appellants' arguments regarding the Improper<br />
wording <strong>of</strong> the jury form fail if this court determines that the jury received<br />
sufficient pro<strong>of</strong>to find that either defendant could have fired the gun, regardless <strong>of</strong><br />
who actually fired the gun. (RB at p. 110.) Once again, however, respondent fails<br />
to understand the nature <strong>of</strong> appellant's argument. <strong>Appellant</strong> acknowledges that<br />
there was sufficient evidence that "either" defendant fired the gun. For the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> imposing the sentence enhancement contained in section 12022.53,<br />
subdivision (d), the fact that "either" defendant shot the gun is sufficient.<br />
However, a finding that "either" defendant fired the gun is quite different than a<br />
finding that both fired the gun. It is the latter finding that creates the problem here<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the increased moral culpability that attaches to appellant if he IS<br />
incorrectly perceived to be an actual shooter.<br />
Similarly, respondent argues that there is overwhelming evidence to find<br />
each defendant liable for the weapon enhancement on the grounds <strong>of</strong>the discharge<br />
<strong>of</strong> the firearm. (RB at pp. 110-111.) However, appellant has never disputed this,<br />
and once again respondent has misunderstood the thrust <strong>of</strong> appellant's argument.<br />
Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) allows for the imposition <strong>of</strong>the enhancement on<br />
a defendant who personally uses a gun, and subdivision (e)(1) then allows for the<br />
enhancement to be imposed on a person even if he did not personally fire the<br />
weapon if that person is a principal in the charged crime and that person also<br />
violated section 186.22(b)(1), the street gang enhancement. Therefore, as<br />
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