Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

ARGUMENTS GUILT PHASE ISSUES I THE FINDING BY THE JURY AND THE TRIAL COURT THAT BOTH APPELLANTS PERSONALLY FIRED THE WEAPON WAS A FACTUAL INCONSISTENCY THAT DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A RELIABLE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS IN A CAPITAL CASE, THEREBY REQUIRING A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT AND DEATH PENALTY VERDICT A. Introductory Statement The finding by the jury and the trial court that both defendants personally fired the weapon was unsupported by and contrary to the evidence presented at trial because the only logical interpretation of the facts presented at trial was that only one person fired the rifle. The fmding that both defendants personally fired the single weapon was caused by a poorly worded verdict form. This finding was made in spite of the fact that the prosecutor admitted he failed to prove who the shooter was. This error was further aggravated when the trial court, in denying the motions for a new trial and modification of the sentence, and in imposing the death penalty, relied in part on the fact that the jury determined that appellant was the shooter. Reversal is required. As will be explained in greater detail below, there are three flaws In respondent's argument regarding this issue: First, respondent mischaracterizes appellant's argument by framing this as an issue of a lack ofunanimity ofa legal theory, when what appellant is arguing is that the jury reached impermissibly conflicting/actual results. Second, respondent fails to understand how this issue arose. Having failed 2
to appreciate the origins of the issue, respondent assumes that the jury correctly found that both defendants fired the weapon, although this was not the People's position at trial, and is a conclusion that can only be reached by stretching the facts ofthe case to reach an unreasonable result. Third, respondent fails to understand the difference between being properly liable for punishment under section 12022.53(d), which may attach vicariously, and the increased moral and legal consequences that may flow from personally using a weapon which causes the death ofanother individual. B. Respondent Mischaracterizes This Issue. Respondent incorrectly characterizes appellant's contentions by framing this issue as purely an issue ofunanimity oflegal theory. Thus, respondent argues that there is no error because a jury does not have to make a unanimous finding as to the theory of liability. (RB at pp. 106-107, citing People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Ca1.4th 96, 160 (Millwee), and People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 249 (Pride).) Millwee and Pride are concerned with whether the jury must unanimously agree on a theory of liability, such as whether a first degree murder is predicated on a theory ofpremeditated murder or felony murder. However, the essence of appellant's claim is not that the jury had to be unanimous in the legal theory upon which it relied. Rather, the essence of this claim is that the verdicts rest on two conflicting factual theories, both of which cannot be true under the facts proven at trial, namely that each of the defendants was the actual shooter. Having misstated the basis ofthis claim, respondent argues that a jury is not required to determine whether liability is based on the whether the defendant is the aider and abettor or the direct perpetrator. (RB at p. 107-108.) What respondent fails to appreciate is the fact that while a jury need not make the determination as to whether either defendant was the actual shooter or the aider and abettor it may not base its verdict on the finding that both defendants are the actual killer, when 3
Page 2 and 3: TABLE OF CONTENTS APPELLANT WILLIAM
Page 4 and 5: 2. The Pleadings Failed To NotifY A
Page 6 and 7: VI THE JURy FAILED TO FIND THE DEGR
Page 8 and 9: C. Standard OfReview And Prejudice
Page 10 and 11: XIII APPELLANT JOINS IN ALL ISSUES
Page 12 and 13: Mitchell v. Esparza (2003) 540 U.S.
Page 14 and 15: People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4t
Page 16 and 17: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 2
Page 18 and 19: CALlIC No. 8.31 passim CALJIC No. 8
Page 22 and 23: the facts indicate that only one de
Page 24 and 25: form finding "personal use" to have
Page 26 and 27: 57 Cal.AppAth 871, 877; 9 Witkin, C
Page 28 and 29: the weapon. Without again recountin
Page 30 and 31: Respondent notes that between the m
Page 32 and 33: In another apparent attempt to just
Page 34 and 35: appellant has repeatedly said, the
Page 37 and 38: not present them to the trial court
Page 39 and 40: In People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Ca
Page 41 and 42: Finally, it must be noted that the
Page 43 and 44: B. The Constitutional Issues Are No
Page 45 and 46: turn relied on the language from Wi
Page 47 and 48: Indeed, in this case the instructio
Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
Page 71 and 72:
have been unreasonable for the jury
Page 73 and 74:
shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
Page 75 and 76:
find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
Page 77 and 78:
THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
Page 79 and 80:
Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
Page 81 and 82:
caused great bodily injury or death
Page 83 and 84:
use enhancement, the statutory lang
Page 85 and 86:
192-193), but fails to explain how
Page 87 and 88:
Then we have the words "personal us
Page 89 and 90:
trial and had therefore forfeited t
Page 91 and 92:
merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
Page 93 and 94:
jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
Page 95 and 96:
Respondent argues that another theo
Page 97 and 98:
needs to rely on the penalty verdic
Page 99 and 100:
may not cross-examine a witness upo
Page 101 and 102:
itself to appellant would be improp
Page 103 and 104:
B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
Page 105 and 106:
egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
Page 107 and 108:
B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
Page 109 and 110:
ut is only being allowed for use ag
Page 111 and 112:
x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
Page 113 and 114:
XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
Page 115 and 116:
"guarantee." Appellant is not proce
Page 117 and 118:
v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
Page 119 and 120:
Contreras. Viewed in this context,
Page 122 and 123:
overwhelmingly showed that only one
Page 124 and 125:
XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
Page 126 and 127:
Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
Page 128 and 129:
The jury in Cruz was given a versio
Page 130 and 131:
PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
Page 132 and 133:
B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
Page 134 and 135:
participation ofall jurors. Contrar
Page 136 and 137:
confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
Page 138:
It is submitted that these instruct
Page 141 and 142:
inherent power to review an issue i
Page 143 and 144:
prospective jurors who were found t
Page 145 and 146:
(Id at p. 821.) This court has char
Page 147 and 148:
church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
Page 149 and 150:
(18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
Page 151 and 152:
had in fact reached an impasse at t
Page 153 and 154:
There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
Page 155 and 156:
establishes, for example, that, whe
Page 157 and 158:
and Code of Civil Procedure 233, wh
Page 159 and 160:
a demonstrable reality. The court a
Page 161 and 162:
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Rule 8.63
show all

Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?