Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
XVII THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF JUROR NO.9 VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL AND TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IS NOT MANIFESTLY SUPPORTED TO A DEMONSTRABLE REALITY BY THE EVIDENCE A. This court Has Recently Made Clear That In Juror Removal Cases The Record Must Show A Juror's Inability To Perform As A Juror To A Demonstrable Reality In the preceding argument concerning the trial court's removal of Juror No. 10, appellant explained that this court has recently made clear that the record must show the juror's inability to perfonn as a juror to a demonstrable reality. Appellant incorporates that discussion here by reference because the demonstrable reality standard governs appellant's claim regarding the court's removal of Juror No.9. Both Wilson and Barnwell made clear that Cleveland's demonstrable reality standard is the appropriate standard of review in juror removal cases. (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Ca1.4th at p. 821; People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Ca1.4th at pp. 1053-1054.) B. The Record Does Not Establish To A Demonstrable Reality That Juror No. 9 Was Unable To Perform Her Duty As A Juror Appellant has set forth the events leading up to the court's removal ofJuror No.9 from the jury in the opening briefand explained there why it is apparent that at the time of her discharge Juror No. 9 was the lone holdout juror. (AOB 278 282.) Juror No. 9: The trial court made the following record with regard to its removal of [] The court finds good cause to excuse Juror No.9. Just so that record is perfected, the court has considered Penal Code section 1089 146
and Code of Civil Procedure 233, which is formerly Penal Code section 1123, and this court finds that this juror's unable to perform her duty; and given that she had two years ago lost a child at five months because of stress at work, and given the stress that this case has caused upon her throughout this trial - she has suffered one hemorrhage, and now she is having pains again starting Friday - to ask her to continue on to endanger her life and also the life of her unborn child, if that is the ultimate risk, would be - would be a high price to pay for jury duty. And so based upon the court's exercise of its discretion, the court finds good cause that this juror is unable to perform the juror's duty because she's sick. I mean, she's got a stomach ace that's related to that pregnancy, and I'm excusing her. (l8RT 4483:19-28 to 4484:1-8.) The demonstrable reality standard of Cleveland, Barnwell, and Wilson requires that the evidence manifestly support the record ofthe court's reasons to a demonstrable reality. In a hearing with court and counsel, Juror No.9 confirmed she wrote the following note to the court: Your Honor, respectfully, I am asking ifI may be removed from this case. I feel the high amount of stress this case created will be detrimental to the health of my unborn child, as well as toward myself. Because I am considered high risk in this pregnancy, I want to make sure I do everything possible to increase my chances of being able to carry this baby full term. I wish to thank you for your time, effort, and compassion in the rendering of your decision. Sincerely [name omitted]. (18RT 4479.) Juror No. 9 stated she was in the third month of her pregnancy and impliedly acknowledged that the trial recessed for three days in the second month of her pregnancy because she had had a hemorrhage. (l8RT 4478:24-27.) Her medical doctor cleared her for further jury service. (18RT 4479:22-24.) In response to leading questions from the court, Juror No.9 said she had experienced a miscarriage two years earlier, losing her baby at five months, which 147
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and Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure 233, which is formerly Penal Code<br />
section 1123, and this court finds that this juror's unable to perform<br />
her duty; and given that she had two years ago lost a child at five<br />
months because <strong>of</strong> stress at work, and given the stress that this case<br />
has caused upon her throughout this trial - she has suffered one<br />
hemorrhage, and now she is having pains again starting Friday - to<br />
ask her to continue on to endanger her life and also the life <strong>of</strong> her<br />
unborn child, if that is the ultimate risk, would be - would be a high<br />
price to pay for jury duty.<br />
And so based upon the court's exercise <strong>of</strong> its discretion, the court<br />
finds good cause that this juror is unable to perform the juror's duty<br />
because she's sick. I mean, she's got a stomach ace that's related to<br />
that pregnancy, and I'm excusing her.<br />
(l8RT 4483:19-28 to 4484:1-8.)<br />
The demonstrable reality standard <strong>of</strong> Cleveland, Barnwell, and Wilson<br />
requires that the evidence manifestly support the record <strong>of</strong>the court's reasons to a<br />
demonstrable reality.<br />
In a hearing with court and counsel, Juror No.9 confirmed she wrote the<br />
following note to the court:<br />
Your Honor, respectfully, I am asking ifI may be removed from this<br />
case. I feel the high amount <strong>of</strong> stress this case created will be<br />
detrimental to the health <strong>of</strong> my unborn child, as well as toward<br />
myself. Because I am considered high risk in this pregnancy, I want<br />
to make sure I do everything possible to increase my chances <strong>of</strong><br />
being able to carry this baby full term. I wish to thank you for your<br />
time, effort, and compassion in the rendering <strong>of</strong> your decision.<br />
Sincerely [name omitted].<br />
(18RT 4479.)<br />
Juror No. 9 stated she was in the third month <strong>of</strong> her pregnancy and<br />
impliedly acknowledged that the trial recessed for three days in the second month<br />
<strong>of</strong> her pregnancy because she had had a hemorrhage. (l8RT 4478:24-27.) Her<br />
medical doctor cleared her for further jury service. (18RT 4479:22-24.)<br />
In response to leading questions from the court, Juror No.9 said she had<br />
experienced a miscarriage two years earlier, losing her baby at five months, which<br />
147
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