Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

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ultimate conclusion that a juror was failing to follow the oath. In taking the serious step of removing a deliberating juror the court must be mindful of its duty to provide a record that supports its decision by a demonstrable reality. (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Ca1.4th at pp. 1053-1054.) In his opening brief, appellant contended that the trial court's finding that Juror No. 10 had been influenced by her conversations with her mother and her friend was unsupported by the evidence under the substantial evidence test. (AOB aat pp. 272-273.) Appellant now asserts that the trial court's conclusion that Juror No. 10 had been influenced by outside sources is not supported in the record to a demonstrable reality. B. The Record Does Not Establish To A Demonstrable Reality That Juror No. 10 Committed Misconduct Warranting Removal Appellant provided a summary of the factual events leading up to the trial court's removal ofJuror No. 10 in the opening brief. (AOB 264-268.) This court made clear in Barnwell that a reviewing court's task is to scrutinize the trial court's ruling to see that it is manifestly supported by the facts. And, so, appellant supplements the factual summary in the opening brief with a more detailed account ofthe trial court's various restatements ofits ruling below. correction. But, first, aspects of the Attorney General's factual summary require 1. Aspects ofthe Attorney General's Factual Summary Require Correction The Attorney General states that Juror No. 10 appeared to be "seeking extrinsic or expert religious views during her penalty deliberations" because Juror No. 10 called her mother who was "at church." (RB 243 fn. 92; citing to 18RT 4451.) The record does not support respondent's description ofthe situation. The record shows that at a point when she believed the case was done, Juror No. 10 called her mother and learned from her cousin that her mother was at 132

church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.) Juror No. 10 told her mother the purpose of her call was to see how her mother was doing. (l8RT 4451:15-16.) They talked about various things and at the end of the conversation Juror No. 10 responded to her mother's question about how the case was going by saying, "it's done." (l8RT 4451:18-24.) Juror No. 10 then reported the following colloquy with her mother in which she said, "I have some issues and some stuff that I have to work out, and she said, well, just pray; and, you know, which we don't agree on that; but then that's neither here nor there." (l8RT 4451:26-28 to 4452:1; emphasis added.) In direct response to the court's questions, Juror No. 10 also said she did not share her concerns about the issues or her views regarding the death penalty with her mother. (l8RT 4452:2-9.) Thus, this record makes it very clear that Juror No. 10 was not seeking extrinsic or expert religious views in calling her mother, as respondent would have this court believe. The record, therefore, fails to show to a demonstrable reality that the juror was calling her mother for the purpose ofseeking religious views and respondent's factual construct must be rejected. Respondent also asserts that Juror No. 10 exposed the entire jury to extrinsic matters by informing the jurors that her mother and her friend '"sided with her doubts' as to the death penalty." (RB 243.) The record does not establish this to a demonstrable reality. Instead, the record shows that the "sided-with-her-doubts" language had its source not in the responses by Juror No. 10 to the court's questions, but in the written note of the jury foreman, which stated in relevant part, "Jury member No. 10 [] stated that she had confided with her friends and mother and that they sided with her doubts. Possibly replacing her would be appropriate." (l8RT 4443-4444.) The record shows that prior to removing Juror No. 10, the trial court heard in seriatim from the jury foreperson (Juror No.6) and from Juror No. 10. In the portion of the hearing involving the jury foreperson, the court confirmed that the 133

ultimate conclusion that a juror was failing to follow the oath. In taking the<br />

serious step <strong>of</strong> removing a deliberating juror the court must be mindful <strong>of</strong> its duty<br />

to provide a record that supports its decision by a demonstrable reality. (People v.<br />

Barnwell, supra, 41 Ca1.4th at pp. 1053-1054.)<br />

In his opening brief, appellant contended that the trial court's finding that<br />

Juror No. 10 had been influenced by her conversations with her mother and her<br />

friend was unsupported by the evidence under the substantial evidence test. (AOB<br />

aat pp. 272-273.)<br />

<strong>Appellant</strong> now asserts that the trial court's conclusion that Juror No. 10 had<br />

been influenced by outside sources is not supported in the record to a<br />

demonstrable reality.<br />

B. The Record Does Not Establish To A Demonstrable Reality That Juror No.<br />

10 Committed Misconduct Warranting Removal<br />

<strong>Appellant</strong> provided a summary <strong>of</strong> the factual events leading up to the trial<br />

court's removal <strong>of</strong>Juror No. 10 in the opening brief. (AOB 264-268.)<br />

This court made clear in Barnwell that a reviewing court's task is to<br />

scrutinize the trial court's ruling to see that it is manifestly supported by the facts.<br />

And, so, appellant supplements the factual summary in the opening brief with a<br />

more detailed account <strong>of</strong>the trial court's various restatements <strong>of</strong>its ruling below.<br />

correction.<br />

But, first, aspects <strong>of</strong> the Attorney General's factual summary require<br />

1. Aspects <strong>of</strong>the Attorney General's Factual Summary Require Correction<br />

The Attorney General states that Juror No. 10 appeared to be "seeking<br />

extrinsic or expert religious views during her penalty deliberations" because Juror<br />

No. 10 called her mother who was "at church." (RB 243 fn. 92; citing to 18RT<br />

4451.) The record does not support respondent's description <strong>of</strong>the situation.<br />

The record shows that at a point when she believed the case was done,<br />

Juror No. 10 called her mother and learned from her cousin that her mother was at<br />

132

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