Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
It is submitted that these instructions do not take the place ofthe instruction in Cain. Cain involved an instruction that informed the jury that after an alternate was seated it had to begin its deliberations anew and had to set aside all past deliberations. (Id. at pp. 64-65.) Lingering doubt, mercy instructions, and sympathy instructions have nothing to do with these principles, and therefore giving these instructions did not cure any harm by the failure to properly instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew. Finally, respondent relies on what respondent labels as "the overwhelming" nature ofthe guilt phase evidence. There are two problems with this contention. First, assuming arguendo that there was overwhelming evidence at the guilt phase, this does not excuse an error in instructions in the penalty phase. (RB at p. 230.) The penalty phase verdict must rely on evidence and instructions from the penalty phase, not on overwhelming evidence of guilt. The question for the penalty phase jury was, given the fact that the defendants had been proven guilty, what penalty should be imposed? The volume of evidence as to guilt is not relevant to the penalty determination. This follows from the following hypothetical: If six witnesses testified that appellant was in the car from which the bullets were fired, rather than one witness testifying as to that fact, there would be greater evidence of guilt. However, having been seen by six witnesses rather than one does not increase his culpability, the crux ofthe penalty phase determination. This is because the decision to impose the death, unlike the guilt determination, is "inherently moral and normative, not factual." (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 Therefore, it does not depend on the volume ofevidence. 124
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- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
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It is submitted that these instructions do not take the place <strong>of</strong>the instruction<br />
in Cain. Cain involved an instruction that informed the jury that after an alternate<br />
was seated it had to begin its deliberations anew and had to set aside all past<br />
deliberations. (Id. at pp. 64-65.)<br />
Lingering doubt, mercy instructions, and sympathy instructions have<br />
nothing to do with these principles, and therefore giving these instructions did not<br />
cure any harm by the failure to properly instruct the jury to begin deliberations<br />
anew.<br />
Finally, respondent relies on what respondent labels as "the overwhelming"<br />
nature <strong>of</strong>the guilt phase evidence.<br />
There are two problems with this contention. First, assuming arguendo that<br />
there was overwhelming evidence at the guilt phase, this does not excuse an error<br />
in instructions in the penalty phase. (RB at p. 230.) The penalty phase verdict<br />
must rely on evidence and instructions from the penalty phase, not on<br />
overwhelming evidence <strong>of</strong> guilt. The question for the penalty phase jury was,<br />
given the fact that the defendants had been proven guilty, what penalty should be<br />
imposed?<br />
The volume <strong>of</strong> evidence as to guilt is not relevant to the penalty<br />
determination. This follows from the following hypothetical: If six witnesses<br />
testified that appellant was in the car from which the bullets were fired, rather than<br />
one witness testifying as to that fact, there would be greater evidence <strong>of</strong> guilt.<br />
However, having been seen by six witnesses rather than one does not increase his<br />
culpability, the crux <strong>of</strong>the penalty phase determination. This is because the decision<br />
to impose the death, unlike the guilt determination, is "inherently moral and normative,<br />
not factual." (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 Therefore, it does not<br />
depend on the volume <strong>of</strong>evidence.<br />
124