Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the
jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the
verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of
such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning
the mental processes by which it was determined.
Section 1150 is the codification of the traditional rule that allows evidence
as to any matter that could have affected a juror, but forbids evidence as to the
actual impact of such evidence on the minds of the jurors. (e.g. People v. Stokes
(1894) 103 Cal. 193, 196-197.) Thus, the rule is that a court cannot consider
evidence of what the jury actually "felt" or thought or how the jurors understood
the instructions. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 53)
As a result, courts necessarily have to engage in an analysis of how jurors
as people will "normally" act. For example, in People v. Horning (2004) 34
Cal.4th 871 the trial court allowed a criminalist to testify that the forensic evidence
was not conclusive. Rejecting the defendant's contention the evidence should
have been excluded as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, this court explained that
had the evidence been excluded the jury ''would naturally wonder if' any testing
had been done on the bullets. (Id. at pp. 900-901, italics added.) Similarly, in
People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, in describing the possible prejudice from
the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior uncharged bad acts, this court
stressed the danger ''that the jury might have been inclined to punish defendant for
the uncharged offenses..." (Id. at p. 405, italics added.) Likewise in People v.
Harris (1998) 60 Cal.AppAth 727, the court approved of the exclusion of
evidence on the ground that it was "remote, inflammatory and nearly irrelevant
and likely to confuse the jury and distract itfrom the consideration ofthe charged
offenses. (ld. at p. 741, italics added.)
Stating that a jury ''would naturally wonder" about something (Horning),
"might have been inclined" to be influenced (Ewoldt), or was "likely to [be]
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