Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Presenting Factually Inconsistent Arguments At The GuiltlInnocence And Penalty Phases Respondent denies that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, at the guilt phase, he argued "that both appellants were surely involved in the shooting murder," while at the penalty phase he "point[ed] out to the same jury... that the evidence tended to show what one particular co-defendant was more likely the actual 'shooter' or killer." (RB at p 142.) This is not what happened. It is not true that the prosecutor merely argued at the guilt phase that both defendants were "involved" in the murders, and then later argued that appellant was the likely shooter. Rather, at the guilt/innocence phase that he expressly stated that he did not know and had not proven who fIred the shots. Later, at the penalty phase he argued that appellant was the shooter. (14RT 3214, 3222-3223, 17RT 4293-4295) In fact, at the penalty phase he specifIcally designated the roles of the three people in the car stating that Caballero was the driver, Nunez the lookout, and appellant the shooter, the three roles which the prosecution's gang expert, Julie Rodriguez, explained were typical ofa drive-by shooting. Thus, the prosecutor changed his position from stating at the guilt phase that he did not know and had not proven who fIred the shots to stating at the penalty phase that appellant was the only shooter and Nunez was the lookout. Contrary to respondent's argument, these are completely inconsistent positions. Respondent further argues that "the jury in this case was not required to unanimously agree on which appellant was the "shooter" and which appellant was the "aider" as long as the jury found each appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of liability for being a shooter as defIned by the gun-use statute. (RB at p. 143.) While it is certainly correct that jury was not required to make a fInding at either stage as to who the shooter had been, that does not give the prosecutor 106
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
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- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
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- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
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- Page 156 and 157: XVII THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF J
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D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Presenting Factually<br />
Inconsistent Arguments At The GuiltlInnocence And Penalty Phases<br />
Respondent denies that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, at the<br />
guilt phase, he argued "that both appellants were surely involved in the shooting<br />
murder," while at the penalty phase he "point[ed] out to the same jury... that the<br />
evidence tended to show what one particular co-defendant was more likely the<br />
actual 'shooter' or killer." (RB at p 142.)<br />
This is not what happened. It is not true that the prosecutor merely argued<br />
at the guilt phase that both defendants were "involved" in the murders, and then<br />
later argued that appellant was the likely shooter. Rather, at the guilt/innocence<br />
phase that he expressly stated that he did not know and had not proven who fIred<br />
the shots. Later, at the penalty phase he argued that appellant was the shooter.<br />
(14RT 3214, 3222-3223, 17RT 4293-4295) In fact, at the penalty phase he<br />
specifIcally designated the roles <strong>of</strong> the three people in the car stating that<br />
Caballero was the driver, Nunez the lookout, and appellant the shooter, the three<br />
roles which the prosecution's gang expert, Julie Rodriguez, explained were typical<br />
<strong>of</strong>a drive-by shooting.<br />
Thus, the prosecutor changed his position from stating at the guilt phase<br />
that he did not know and had not proven who fIred the shots to stating at the<br />
penalty phase that appellant was the only shooter and Nunez was the lookout.<br />
Contrary to respondent's argument, these are completely inconsistent positions.<br />
Respondent further argues that "the jury in this case was not required to<br />
unanimously agree on which appellant was the "shooter" and which appellant was<br />
the "aider" as long as the jury found each appellant guilty beyond a reasonable<br />
doubt <strong>of</strong> liability for being a shooter as defIned by the gun-use statute. (RB at p.<br />
143.)<br />
While it is certainly correct that jury was not required to make a fInding at<br />
either stage as to who the shooter had been, that does not give the prosecutor<br />
106