Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
were the occupants of the car driven by Caballeros in the general area of the shooting. Joshua Contreras' statements to law enforcement were thus critical to the prosecution's case, but they too were plagued by trustworthiness issues because Contreras subsequently repudiated them. (See summary of Contreras statements at AOB 10-12, 14.) As a result, when the prosecutor "guaranteed the truth" of Vasquez' identification and spoke of corroboration with factual references to Contreras' statements to law enforcement, the prosecutor was effectively rehabilitating the credibility of both Contreras and Vasquez. Information provided by both ofthese men in statements to law enforcement and in their trial testimonies formed the thrust ofthe prosecution's theory ofthe case. The credibility of each was suspect for the reasons described above. (Ante, at pp. 12-13.) For these reasons, the prosecutor's improper vouching infected the trial with unfairness to a degree that denied appellant a fair trial warranting reversal of the judgment of conviction. (Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, supra, 416 U.S. at p. 642.) Because the trustworthiness of information obtained from Vasquez and Contreras was directly associated with the severe flaws attached to the credibility of each, the prosecutor's vouching may not be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,24.) Appellant further submits that the prosecutor's improper vouching constitutes misconduct under state law because the law is well settled that a prosecutor may not invoke his personal prestige and reputation in vouching for a witness. (People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Ca1.4th at pp. 206-207.) This experienced trial prosecutor would have been aware that he was not permitted to vouch for the credibility of his witnesses. The prosecutor would also have been aware that the credibility of both Contreras and Vasquez was suspect and aware also that information credited to both was essential to his case. In short, they were the weak links in the prosecution's case, and so the prosecutor vouched directly for Vasquez in a way that permitted him to also corroborate information provided by 104
Contreras. Viewed in this context, the vouching appears to be calculated and not happenstance. And, then, of course, the prosecutor repeated the vouching in connection with the van conversation during rebuttal argument. This second instance of vouching demonstrates either that the prosecutor understood that the court overruled trial counsel's objection to the prosecutor's "guarantee," or the prosecutor was confused by its ambiguity, or the prosecutor acted in flagrant disregard ofthe ruling. Bad faith on the part ofthe prosecutor is not a prerequisite for appellate relief. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 822.) A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the State. (People v. Kelley (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 672, 690.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the prosecutor represents "a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." (Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88; People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 806,820.) Here, it seems the prosecutor resorted to reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade the jury that Vasquez and Contreras were credible people and that the information attributed to them was sufficiently substantial to support the convictions. The error was not harmless under the test ofPeople v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) It is precisely because the credibility of both Vasquez and Contreras was so suspect and because their information so instrumental to the prosecution's contention that appellant was an occupant within the car driven by Caballeros that a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached in the absence ofthe vouching. For the reasons stated here and in the opening brief, appellant respectfully submits the judgment ofconviction must be reversed. 105
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
- Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 105 and 106: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
- Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
- Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
- Page 141 and 142: inherent power to review an issue i
- Page 143 and 144: prospective jurors who were found t
- Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
- Page 147 and 148: church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
- Page 149 and 150: (18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
- Page 151 and 152: had in fact reached an impasse at t
- Page 153 and 154: There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
- Page 155 and 156: establishes, for example, that, whe
- Page 157 and 158: and Code of Civil Procedure 233, wh
- Page 159 and 160: a demonstrable reality. The court a
- Page 161 and 162: CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Rule 8.63
Contreras.<br />
Viewed in this context, the vouching appears to be calculated and not<br />
happenstance. And, then, <strong>of</strong> course, the prosecutor repeated the vouching in<br />
connection with the van conversation during rebuttal argument. This second<br />
instance <strong>of</strong> vouching demonstrates either that the prosecutor understood that the<br />
court overruled trial counsel's objection to the prosecutor's "guarantee," or the<br />
prosecutor was confused by its ambiguity, or the prosecutor acted in flagrant<br />
disregard <strong>of</strong>the ruling. Bad faith on the part <strong>of</strong>the prosecutor is not a prerequisite<br />
for appellate relief. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 822.)<br />
A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other<br />
attorneys because <strong>of</strong> the unique function he or she performs in representing the<br />
interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, <strong>of</strong> the <strong>State</strong>. (People v. Kelley<br />
(1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 672, 690.) As the United <strong>State</strong>s Supreme Court has<br />
explained, the prosecutor represents "a sovereignty whose obligation to govern<br />
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,<br />
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice<br />
shall be done." (Berger v. United <strong>State</strong>s (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88; People v.<br />
Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 806,820.)<br />
Here, it seems the prosecutor resorted to reprehensible methods to attempt<br />
to persuade the jury that Vasquez and Contreras were credible people and that the<br />
information attributed to them was sufficiently substantial to support the<br />
convictions. The error was not harmless under the test <strong>of</strong>People v. Watson (1956)<br />
46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) It is precisely because the credibility <strong>of</strong> both Vasquez and<br />
Contreras was so suspect and because their information so instrumental to the<br />
prosecution's contention that appellant was an occupant within the car driven by<br />
Caballeros that a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached in<br />
the absence <strong>of</strong>the vouching.<br />
For the reasons stated here and in the opening brief, appellant respectfully<br />
submits the judgment <strong>of</strong>conviction must be reversed.<br />
105