Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Unless this incident can be traced to racial animosity, it has no relevance. Appellant was allegedly involved in an altercation with an Asian inmate, and there were no racial epitaphs spoken or other evidence of a racial motive as to the incident in issue here. Therefore, it was mere speculation to attribute a racial motive in this particular altercation to appellant. (See AOB at p. 194.) Because Evidence Code section 352 requires a balancing of the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, respondent's failure to address the actual probative value of the evidence dooms his argument. Respondent's conclusion that the evidence was necessary to rebut appellant's defense evidence that he was not hostile to African-Americans is necessarily flawed because half of the equation - the probative nature - was never analyzed. Respondent argues that appellant was not prejudiced by this evidence because he had been charged with killing people in a drive-by shooting, an act more violent than the alleged assault. (RB at p. 129.) However, the fact that the alleged crime was more egregious than the improper character evidence does not negate the fact that a jury may be prejudiced by the evidence in question. The jury's job was to determine whether appellant committed the murders. Presumably, at the time the improper evidence was introduced, the jurors had not made up their minds about the charged offense. The assault evidence created an image of appellant as a violent racist. The inferences drawn by the jurors from such evidence influenced the jurors to conclude that it was more likely that appellant committed the murder than they would have been had the evidence not been introduced. Therefore, the fact that the murder was more serious than the character evidence did not negate the prejudicial impact ofthat evidence. In conclusion, the erroneous introduction of this evidence was prejudicial t appellant, thereby requiring a reversal of the judgment of conviction entered below. 98
XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN ARGUMENT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND COMPELS REVERSAL. The prosecutor committed several forms of misconduct In closing argument, including vouching for the veracity of a prosecution witness and presenting inconsistent factual arguments to the jury, thereby depriving appellant of his due process right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution ofthe United States. A. Appellant Is Not Barred From Presenting This Issue. Appellant contended in the opening brief that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in argument when he vouched for prosecution witness Ernie Vasquez, thereby depriving appellant of the Due Process right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (AOB at pp. 201-205.) Vasquez was a key witness for the prosecution. He claimed to have obtained seriatim jailhouse admissions from both appellant and Nunez. He was present at the scene soon after the fatal shooting. He testified he saw Juan Caballeros at the wheel of a car with other occupants in the vicinity prior to the shooting. The prosecutor used Vasquez's identification of Caballeros as the car's driver and evidence appellant and Nunez were with Caballeros before and after the time ofthe shooting to argue that appellant and Nunez were the other occupants of the car. In making this argument, the prosecutor personally guaranteed that Vasquez's identification was true. Trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's guarantee, which brought about the following exchange with the court: The record shows the following: 99
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
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- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
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- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
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- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
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- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
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- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
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- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
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- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
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- Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
- Page 147 and 148: church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
- Page 149 and 150: (18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
- Page 151 and 152: had in fact reached an impasse at t
- Page 153 and 154: There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
- Page 155 and 156: establishes, for example, that, whe
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- Page 161 and 162: CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Rule 8.63
XI<br />
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN ARGUMENT<br />
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL<br />
RIGHTS AND COMPELS REVERSAL.<br />
The prosecutor committed several forms <strong>of</strong> misconduct In closing<br />
argument, including vouching for the veracity <strong>of</strong> a prosecution witness and<br />
presenting inconsistent factual arguments to the jury, thereby depriving appellant<br />
<strong>of</strong> his due process right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth<br />
Amendments to the Constitution <strong>of</strong>the United <strong>State</strong>s.<br />
A. <strong>Appellant</strong> Is Not Barred From Presenting This Issue.<br />
<strong>Appellant</strong> contended in the opening brief that the prosecutor engaged in<br />
misconduct in argument when he vouched for prosecution witness Ernie Vasquez,<br />
thereby depriving appellant <strong>of</strong> the Due Process right to a fair trial, as guaranteed<br />
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (AOB at pp.<br />
201-205.)<br />
Vasquez was a key witness for the prosecution. He claimed to have<br />
obtained seriatim jailhouse admissions from both appellant and Nunez. He was<br />
present at the scene soon after the fatal shooting. He testified he saw Juan<br />
Caballeros at the wheel <strong>of</strong> a car with other occupants in the vicinity prior to the<br />
shooting.<br />
The prosecutor used Vasquez's identification <strong>of</strong> Caballeros as the car's<br />
driver and evidence appellant and Nunez were with Caballeros before and after the<br />
time <strong>of</strong>the shooting to argue that appellant and Nunez were the other occupants <strong>of</strong><br />
the car. In making this argument, the prosecutor personally guaranteed that<br />
Vasquez's identification was true. Trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's<br />
guarantee, which brought about the following exchange with the court:<br />
The record shows the following:<br />
99
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